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Abstract
This thesis promotes a pragmatist and ecological approach to human cognition
and concepts. Namely, that our conceptual system primarily tracks aﬀordances
and other causal properties that have pragmatic relevance to us as embodied
and active agents. The bulk of the work aims to show how various research pro-
grams in cognitive psychology naturally intersect and complement each other
under this theoretical standpoint, which is inﬂuenced by enactivist and em-
bodied approaches to cognitive science as well as linguistic pragmatism. The
term ”ecological” in the title refers to an approach that emphasizes the inter-
action of agents and their environment and ”social ecology” means that this
includes social interaction between agents and that our material environment
is extensively a cultural product, constantly reproduced and altered through
cultural behavior.
The extent of the argument is not supposed to be conﬁned to the theo-
retical psychology and philosophy of science but has somewhat wider motives
pertaining to philosophy of language and knowledge. I do not attempt to reform
extant theories of cognitive processing and representation (unless arguments
against logical computationalism are still considered reformist these days) but
to explain the nature of conceptual understanding. I take it that having a con-
cept is principally not having a particular information structure in one’s brain
but rather a set of interlocking capacities that support intentional action. In
eﬀect, I claim that conceptual understanding should be understood as a cogni-
tive skill and psychological research on concepts should not identify concepts
as static information structures but as capacities which are integral parts of
procedural knowledge that support skillful know-how in situated action.
Conceptual mental representations deal with information but such infor-
mation structures are active constructs that cannot be understood without
pragmatic and ecological perspective on human cognition. I argue for the
claim, earlier proposed for instance by Eleanor Rosch, that contexts or situ-
ations are the proper unit that categorization research needs to concentrate
on. In accordance with Edouard Machery’s well-known claim, I conceive clas-
sical category theories of cognitive science, namely prototype, exemplar, and
knowledge accounts, to tap real cognitive phenomena; however, pace Machery
I aim to show that they do not form distinct conceptual representations but
rather participate in human conceptual capacities as interlocking component
processes.
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The main problem with theories that emphasize situated direct interac-
tion with the environment is to explain abstract and symbolic reasoning. One
theoretically promising way to resolve the issue is to invoke some version of the
dual-process theories of cognition; that is, to explain rule-based, theoretical,
and symbolic reasoning by resorting to a distinct cognitive system, which is
more or less dedicated to those kind of tasks. While dual-process theories seem
to license such a move, they can work only as a partial solution because expert
scientiﬁc reasoning , for example, necessitates implicit skills just like any area of
expertise. Second, commonsense reasoning is partly schematic and utilizes the-
oretical concepts. As an alternative explanation, I oﬀer a hypothesis inﬂuenced
by philosophical linguistic pragmatism which posits that discursive reasoning is
incrementally learned tacit know-how in cultural praxis, which determines how
we understand linguistic concepts. This interactive know-how exploits mostly
the same cognitive mechanisms as situated and pragmatic procedural knowl-
edge. The explanation has immediate implications for the analytic philosophy
of language. When we interpret a text or engage in conceptual analysis, our
conscious conceptual interpretation of the associated contents is a product of
implicit processes intimately tied with procedural knowledge; in short, explicit
know-that is rooted in implicit know-how.
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1 Introduction
Gideon Keren (2013) opens his critique of dual-process theories of cognitive
science ”A Tale of Two Systems: A Scientiﬁc Advance or a Theoretical Stone
Soup?” by reciting a folk tale on how to prepare a delicious soup that requires
nothing but a soup stone. All you need is to add a carefully selected soup stone
to boiling water. But to make it taste right you might also want to add a little
salt and pepper. Naturally, every decent soup calls for some vegetables and
to get an excellent result, you are advised to add a little meat too, and so on.
After you are done, you can take the stone out and wonder what the moral of
the story is.
According to Keren, the recent eﬀorts to understand the workings of hu-
man mind as consisting of two principal cognitive systems—one automatic,
fast, rigid, and subconscious; and the other controlled, slow, ﬂexible, and
conscious—looks pretty much like making a stone soup: You throw a sim-
ple and intriguing theoretical idea in and hope it unlocks many mysteries of
the human mind. However, you need to adjust details before long and reassess
some of the key presumptions. This is how research generally works, of course,
but eventually you have to give up on what were supposed to be the core ideas
of the theory, and in the end, it may be advisable to throw it away altogether.
What you are left with is a somewhat random mixture of elements that may
or may not make an agreeable whole. In any case, it is the other ingredients
that make the outcome palatable.
The story above may be a somewhat accurate description of this work.
It started as a philosophy of science project comparing various dual-process
theories with the relevant data gathered in the literature. My aim was to
ﬁgure out what would be the most theoretically illuminating and empirically
motivated way to conceptualize the two systems, given the numerous diﬀerent
characterizations in circulation. The outcome was something quite diﬀerent:
basically a theory of conceptual understanding and tacit reasoning based on a
sort of cognitive psychological version of pragmatism.
The result built mainly on ideas developed in enactivist and embodied
cognition research, in that cognitive processes and representations are highly
contextualized, pragmatic, action oriented, and shaped by our human prac-
tices, goals, and needs. The notions of situation and action rather than symbol
and referent are the keys to understanding human cognition. Concepts are
principally devices for action rather than building blocks of thoughts. Psycho-
logically, they are structured as feature clusters gathered around causal prop-
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erties. In eﬀect, the human conceptual system primarily tracks aﬀordances and
other causal properties that have pragmatic relevance to us as embodied and
active organisms.
Cognitive theories preceding these embodied trends aimed principally to
explain planning, logical reasoning, and general abstract problem-solving. In
short, they were classic examples of the artiﬁcial intelligence approach. They
fell short of explaining many interesting aspects of natural cognition, such as
perceptually guided action. That was not principally their intent, though,
but crucially they also always had problems in modeling distinctively human
commonsense reasoning. The issue quite likely is attributable to how human
conceptual cognition is organized by how we engage with our environment in
the ways embraced by enactive approaches.
On the other hand, enactive theories emphasize dynamic sensorimotor
loops as the fundamental constituents of intentional action and content. It
is hard to turn this idea into working cognitive science because it is diﬃcult
how you manage to model theoretical and other symbolic reasoning by taking
sensorimotor interaction as a starting point. An obvious and tried solution
is bootstrapping—to try to show how increasingly abstract and ”intellectual”
representations can be built from sensorimotor processes. Another option is
to discard the idea of continuity of concrete action and reﬂective thought and
simply postulate a dedicated cognitive system for symbolic reasoning. However
ad hoc this may sound, dual-process theories apparently license you to do that.
Eventually, I grew dissatisﬁed with both solutions. Instead, I opted to
employ linguistic pragmatism for the task. It is a form of inferentialism where
linguistic and other symbolic expressions ultimately receive their contents from
how they are used in actual social practices. The public and derivatively pri-
vate reasoning is taken to be founded on pragmatic discursive skills, which do
not track intellectual essences but the causal fabric of material social praxis of
giving and asking for reasons. These practices, in turn, may be ultimately con-
strained by non-social factors relevant to their intrinsic rationale. For example,
in science, the discursive acts are not purely linguistic but also involve gath-
ering and analyzing data. Although these practices are fundamentally social
innovations, their speciﬁc applications are still constrained by the underlying
reality of the subject matter of the research.
Taking this route to theoretical and symbolic reasoning tends to blur the
lines between thinking and doing and between the abstract and the practical.
I also do not maintain strict demarcation between enactivism and linguistic
pragmatism. Both theories claim that mental content is produced by how we
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use our conceptual resources in our practical undertakings, or perhaps more
accurately, how concepts participate in the organism–environment interactions.
For my purposes, I consider linguistic pragmatism as an extension of enactivist
ideas to cover discursive interactions, and, for the reasons explained in Chapter
2, I ﬁnd it diﬃcult to understand how linguistic pragmatism can do without
enactivism or other complementary theory of intentional content.
For cognitive science, the proposal eﬀectively means that mainly the same
cognitive faculties execute concrete skills, commonsense judgment, and ab-
stract theoretical reasoning. These faculties, in turn, are tacit cognitive capac-
ities for immediate coping with the environment, which shape our conceptual
system and furnish our explicit thought with meaning. My research problem
then transformed into ﬁnding an empirically sound account of tacit cognition
that can accommodate all this while maintaining reasonable ﬁdelity to key
ideas of enactivism and linguistic pragmatism. To that, end I employ fairly
standard cognitive psychology. No particularly new proposals about mental
representations or processes are introduced but only perhaps a novel way to
put together a stock of empirical research on conceptual cognition. Chapters
4 and 5 are dedicated to the empirical subject matter relevant to the working
hypothesis of this work. However, in what follows, the philosophical theories
of intentional content and empirical theories of cognitive processing are tightly
entangled, and hence their treatments spill from one chapter to another. In
Chapter 3, I discuss some suggestive reasons why concept research in philos-
ophy and psychology should be entangled. There I will also oﬀer a brief and
slightly critical review of classical triad of category theories in cognitive psy-
chology.
Any use theory of meaning holds that use is constitutive of content and,
therefore, content and process cannot be strictly separated. In the naturalistic
version of pragmatist inferentialism that I am selling, this translates to the
claim that you cannot understand conceptual representation without under-
standing the ecological nature of cognitive processing: You need to account for
how, why, and what the cognitive system tracks in its environment to under-
stand what sort of representations it exploits. I hasten to add that I still do not
advocate psychological reductionism about conceptual content. My account is
interactionalist rather than internalist. Our cognitive and biological constitu-
tion with our physical and cultural environments are all genuine determinants
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of meaning, and often it is far more illuminating to look at the environment
rather than the brain.1
Only some basic ideas of dual-process theories remained in the outcome:
the distinction between consciously controlled and intuitive modes of cognitive
processing, with the assumption of the relative impotence of the former. How-
ever, these ideas, especially the distinction, were rediscovered many times in
the past and are not unique to modern dual-process theories. Perhaps Keren
was right, in that if you dig deep enough, the theory seems to lose its initial
allure. Nonetheless, working with it helped me to put lots of previous research
together in the way that would be impossible (for me, that is) without taking
that theoretical framework seriously. Some of the empirical research discussed
in the following chapters has been previously fairly unconnected to dual-process
theories.
I often ﬁnd it often in understanding the point of long arguments if the
structure somewhat follows the narrative structure of the discovery of the main
ideas. Hence, to illuminate the reader as to why I ended up with the questions
and conclusions I did, the introduction ﬁrst portrays how I started and what
went wrong, and then what course the research subsequently took. The discus-
sion of this juncture also provides background information about the expertise
and dual-process research relevant to other chapters. The introduction con-
cludes with a brief description of my ﬁnal research hypothesis whose reasoning
is laid out in the rest of the chapters.
1.1 Getting started
Since antiquity, the notions of intuitive (or habitual) and reﬂective operations
of the mind have been around. During the long history of contemplation of
the human mind and aﬀairs, somewhat similar observations about this duality
have resurfaced. Nonetheless, at least in the Western tradition, deliberative
reason has usually been considered paramount either in quantity or quality.
Automatic acts have been seen as physiological reﬂexes with only a supple-
mentary role in human behavior or representing the animal side of us, which
the reason needs to keep in check. For example, Schopenhauer (1818/1966)
1 See Bruner (1990, Chapter 1) for an illuminating discussion about this point, especially on
how culture is constitutive to meaning, and hence psychology cannot be strictly individualistic
but needs to account for cultural history and other meaning-producing phenomena; at least
to the extent that psychology is a science of meaning-making and meaning-using processes
(pp. 11–15). This point presumes that there is no strict demarcation of cognitive content
and processes; a controversial but defensible claim (e.g. Nisbett et al., 2001).
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thought that human conduct is mostly dictated by non-conscious will, which
was a pessimistic conviction. The will was a bestial thing—a strong blind man
carrying a lame man that can see. The grand rationalist and dualist Descartes
was aware that there are forces in the human body that shape our behavior
and which are neither conscious volitions nor simple reﬂexes (Hatﬁeld, 2007).
However, for Descartes, these impulses were entirely physiological while for
Schopenhauer somewhat obscure metaphysical.2 The birth of the idea of the
psychological unconscious had to wait until the latter half of the 19th century.
The notion of the unconscious mind is most famously associated with
Sigmund Freud. He actually can be considered as a sort of predecessor of
dual-process theories for giving substantial weight to unconscious processing
and characterizing it as associative while describing the conscious mind as
analytic. His notion of the dynamic unconscious is, however, very diﬀerent
from the idea employed in dual-process theories, which can be termed adap-
tive unconscious (Wilson, 2002). For Freud, the unconscious was the place of
repressed emotions and memories that inﬂuenced behavior through neuroses
and other ailments; however, the adaptive unconscious consists of habituated
actions and other implicitly learned associations that automatize by repeti-
tion and subside from conscious awareness. The psychological signiﬁcance of
habitual action was already appreciated by Freud’s contemporaries, perhaps
most famously by William James 1890, a pioneer of empirical psychology and
American pragmatism.
The notion of habituation soon became popular and forged the central
theoretical doctrines of behaviorism (and associationist psychology in general),
which was the dominant form of empirical psychology in North America in the
early 20th century, until the 1950s when its importance waned under the pres-
sure of the emerging computational cognitive science. The new computational
paradigm maintained that the mind was an information-processing system,
executing logical computations over symbolic structures rather than learned
stimulus-response associations. While it was clear that a vast amount of in-
formation processing that occurred in the brain was beyond our awareness,
it was supposed to happen in low-level perceptual analyzers and other sub-
personal supplementary systems that supported the explicit central cognition
and connected it to the world via sensory and motor organs. The central (or
higher) cognition, in turn, was thought to be responsible for personal level
2 See Frankish & Evans (2009) for a historical overview of themes and developments related
to dual-process theories.
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information processing—i.e. conceptually structured thought, like judgment,
reasoning, and decision making (See e.g. Fodor, 1983).
Although not necessarily anti-computationalistic at heart, modern dual-
process theories depart from the above image because many of the automatic
processes are assumed to be learned and not limited to lower cognition. Learn-
ing happens automatically, and the activation of learned associations become
mandatory. The process is adaptive because the resultant capacity acts rapidly
and frees limited cognitive resources—such as attention and working memory—
from routine tasks and makes cognitive performance more eﬀective in familiar
environments. Moreover, automatic processes are considered the default cogni-
tive mechanisms underlying behavior while explicit reasoning is considered far
more ﬂexible, although it is too slow and too limited in capacity to steer much
of our real-time behavior. Automatized capacities do not execute ﬂawlessly
and they often produce predictable errors, especially with unfamiliar tasks.
Methodologically, the research has focused mainly on these defects because
the error proﬁles give information about the workings of the intuitive mind.
Regardless, the theory eﬀectively switches the conceptions about implicit and
explicit mind according to what comes to the primary nature, quality, and
quantity, traditionally associated with these notions.
Dual-process theories emerged slowly from the late 1970s, gathered mo-
mentum in the 1990s, and hit the mainstream after the turn of the millennium;
perhaps this was fueled partly by concurrent, albeit mostly unrelated, theoreti-
cal developments. For the reader acquainted with theoretical cognitive science,
dual-process theories can be approximately described as an amalgamation of
classical computationalism with connectionism. Connectionism is a species
of associationist tradition that resurfaced in a new form in the 1980s with the
invention of powerful learning algorithms for complex neural networks (Rumel-
hart et al., 1986; McClelland et al., 1986). After the emergence of these new
network models, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed heated debates between the
avant-garde connectionists and traditional computationalists. Connectionist
networks were well suited to model pattern recognition, fuzzy categorization,
associative semantic networks, and in general many ill-structured and vague
low-level but important cognitive capacities, which are hard to capture using
logic-based systems. The older computationalist models always had an edge on
associationism in modeling cognitive competencies that ostensibly require sys-
tematic symbolic processing, such as sentence parsing and logical inference; this
is especially true for competencies requiring hierarchical sequential operations
like complex inference and planning. However, soon network models emerged
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that could implement rule-based symbolic processing (Bechtel & Abrahamsen,
2002), and mathematical results established the computational equivalence of
neural nets and symbolic models (Siegelmann & Sontag, 1991, 1995).
To cut the long story short, it became less of an issue what these for-
malisms can accomplish in principle and more of a question what sort of the-
ory and concept formation they promote in cognitive science. If you need
to implement sequential symbolic processing anyway, why bother with neural
networks and not model these capacities by using the theoretical apparatus
of classical computationalism? If you need fast, parallel, and fuzzy learning
systems to model perceptual pattern recognition, for example, why not use
neural networks that are readily tailored for the task? After all, these are
epistemological choices on how to best understand the workings of the mind,
or its components, and you need a proper grain size for your theoretical ap-
paratus to make cognitive processes intelligible. Too ﬁne detail—e.g. looking
at neuronal details when explaining the psychology of logical inference—may
just mask critical higher-level regularities and lead you to fail to see the for-
est for the trees. Theoretical proposals, albeit perhaps not hugely popular,
emerged for hybrid modeling, that is to use mixed systems consisting of both
associative and rule-based computation.3 There has been a somewhat vague
and long-standing demarcation between higher and lower cognitive processes
(e.g. reasoning and perception, respectively) and it seems reasonable, at least
as a ﬁrst approximation, to use diﬀerent tools to model diﬀerent aspects of
cognition and see if you can integrate them into a working uniﬁed theory at
some point.
Meanwhile, on the empirical front, these sorts of hybrid ideas were already
gaining ground. Their similarity to the mentioned theoretical developments
was on the observation that there are qualitatively two kinds of cognitive pro-
cesses: (a) quick and dirty, associative, implicit, and automatic and (b) clean,
analytic, explicit, and controlled. However, these two modes of cognitive pro-
cessing were not assumed to align with the prevailing distinction between lower
and higher cognition. Perhaps some lower-level processes are exclusively asso-
ciative and cognitively impenetrable (e.g. perception) and some higher-level
processes are sequential and consciously controlled (e.g. logical inference and
planning), but the emerging picture was that actually the mind executes the
very same tasks in two diﬀerent ways often at the same time. An inﬂuen-
tial study by Walter Schneider and Richard Shiﬀrin (Schneider & Shiﬀrin,
1977; Shiﬀrin & Schneider, 1977) suggested that there are generic cognitive
3 E.g. Clark (1989); Harnad (1990); Clark & Karmiloﬀ-Smith (1993); Sun (2002).
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processes—namely detection, search, and attention—that have this sort of dual
nature. Around the same time it was also discovered that this might be true
of simple reasoning tasks (Wason & Evans, 1975). Two decades later more en-
compassing studies about the dual-nature of human reasoning were carried out
(e.g. Evans & Over 1996; Sloman 1996; Stanovich 1999), and the idea prolifer-
ated to judgment and decision making (Gilovich et al., 2002; Kahneman, 2011),
learning (Reber, 1993), social and moral psychology (Wilson, 2002; Smith &
Collins, 2009; Greene, 2002), and neuroscience (Goel, 2005, 2007).
Given the various independently discovered but highly similar proposals,
the research was clearly onto something but what exactly? The results came
from various subﬁelds of cognitive psychology, and while they all pointed out
that there were roughly fast and intuitive versus slow and deliberative processes
at play, diﬀerent researchers tended to characterize these processes quite dif-
ferently. The most intriguing hypothesis is quite evident, I suppose: That
the human mind is composed of two major subsystems of higher cognition,
and the dual nature of diﬀerent competencies reﬂect this global arrangement
(Evans & Over, 1996; Stanovich, 1999). Some even went so far to claim that
we eﬀectively have two minds (Evans, 2003).
Since the diﬀerent characterizations of these two systems were rarely con-
tradictory but often orthogonal, this proved to be a great place for some prac-
tical philosophy of science; viz. to take a careful look at the empirical results in
order to (a) check if there really is any common core that supports the strong
two-systems (or two-minds) hypothesis, (b) to regiment the prevailing concep-
tual chaos, and (c) to proceed to ﬁnd out what aspects of the mind can be
brought under the umbrella of dual-process theories under rigorous analysis—
e.g., do emotions have this sort of dual nature, or do they exclusively belong
to the automatic system or outside the scope of the two-systems theory alto-
gether?
My principal aim was plank (b). The enthusiasm for dual-process theories
seemed partly to stem from the prevailing conceptual vagueness. There are
virtually perennial demarcations that seem to characterize the mind and are
important in epistemology and philosophy of language: intuition versus reason,
habitual versus deliberate, practical versus theoretical, linguistic versus imag-
istic, desire versus commitment, tacit versus explicit, and so on. It seemed to
me that the existing elliptic descriptions of the two systems were at least partly
drawn from these kinds of pretheoretical conceptualizations of mental faculties.
If these pretheoretical intuitions could be cashed out empirically, we could then
have a scientiﬁc theory for illuminating the factual nature of these dualisms
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and perhaps show their proper place in the philosophy of mind, knowledge,
and language. Since the systems were often depicted with a rather heuristic
clusters of more or less vague properties, in the literature they were given delib-
eratively austere names ”System 1” and ”System 2” (Stanovich, 1999). Below
is a generic list of characteristics associated with these two systems:4
System 1 System 2
evolutionary old evolutionary recent
shared with animals uniquely human
independent of general intelligence linked to general intelligence
independent of working memory depends on executive function
universal variable across individuals
subpersonal/biased personal/normative
unconscious/preconscious conscious
implicit explicit
intuitive reﬂective
automatic controlled
associative analytic
parallel serial
fast slow
rigid ﬂuid
high capacity/low eﬀort low capacity/high eﬀort
perceptual propositional
holistic pattern detector compositional structure
nonverbal linguistic
heuristic algorithmic
contextual detached
pragmatic logical
modular single system
default process inhibitory
domain speciﬁc general
experience based consequential
4 Adapted from (Wilson, 2002), (Evans, 2008), and Chapters 1,2,5,6, and 13 appearing
in an edited volume (Evans, 2009). I have collected lists of attributes mentioned in these
papers (which, in turn, are integrated from several earlier works) and left out any features
that appear in only one of them; thus the list represents something like a tentative consensus
at least in one branch of the research program.
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The characteristic properties above are clustered somewhat arbitrarily,
and it is not clear which entries should be actually considered as the same.
Does for example ”unconscious”, ”implicit”, ”automatic”, and ”intuitive” mean
the same thing, or are they distinct characteristics? Certainly they are related
but are they related conceptually or empirically? These were the problems I
was set oﬀ to solve.
In my quest to ﬁnd the common core of the two systems, I dismissed the
evolutionary considerations at the outset. It is tempting to think of System
1 as primitive and something that any cognitive creature might need while
thinking that controlled reasoning is sophisticated and a distinctively human
faculty. However, I found hardly found any sound grounds for demarcating
the processes precisely in this way. Indeed, no one knew the nature of these
systems (that was the problem), so how can one say that no other animal has
Type 2 processes? Some non-human mammals and even birds are capable of
something that at least resembles controlled serial cognition (Toates, 2006), and
since no one had a a clear picture of the capacities of System 1, it seemed rather
premature to claim that those are prevalent in the animal kingdom. True,
conditioning and associative learning seem to be shared between humans and
other animals, however if that is the key characteristic of System 1 processing,
then it is perhaps advisable to work with that hypothesis and, for the time
being, abstain from making strong claims about its evolutionary history.
Moreover, the putative Systems 1 and 2 apparently do not to appreciate
the putative distinction of old and new structures in the brain. For example
the so-called belief bias in reasoning is a fast and automatic response, char-
acteristic of system 1 processing,5 which involves the activation of Brodmann
areas 11 and 32 in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Goel, 2007). According
to Jonathan Evans (2008), this shows that not all System 1 processes are an-
cient since prefrontal cortex is heavily developed speciﬁcally in humans. Then
again, at least primate mammals do have these areas (Passingham & Wise,
2012, Chapter 2); yet, it is unclear what the brain development implies about
their functional diﬀerences between the species. But I don’t care really. Mostly
the dual-process theory taps into higher cognitive functions, which are either
5 Belief bias is the tendency to evaluate the validity of arguments on the basis of the
credibility of their conclusion rather than of their logical form (Evans et al., 1983). The
phenomenon is relevant to dual-process theories since the implicit dismissal of the form can be
overridden at will, which happens easily when the conclusion is unconvincing. Cf. ”All plants
need water, and roses need water; therefore roses are plants” and ”All guns are dangerous,
and snakes are dangerous; therefore snakes are guns”.
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clearly lacking or virtually impossible to study in other animals, and hence
these considerations are mostly irrelevant to the empirical evaluation of the
theory.
Inheritance and correlations with cognitive ability may be important clues
for pinpointing the cognitive basis of System 1 and 2 processes. Especially the
latter is signiﬁcant evidence of the theory, since there is a good correlation
between cognitive ability and propensity to Type 2 reasoning, while this cor-
relation is lacking in Type 1 processing (Stanovich & West, 1998; Stanovich,
1999; Stanovich & West, 2000). Nonetheless, since I am interested in cognitive
mechanisms, these characteristics are somewhat oﬀ-topic. Working memory
capacity has been strongly linked to general intelligence (Chooi, 2012), and
for my purposes the link between System 2 and cognitive ability serves only
to corroborate the actually interesting (i.e. cognitive architectural) connection
of system 2 and working memory and other executive functions rather than
constituting independently relevant characteristic for system 1/2 demarcation.
The above list contains other notions which are not strictly architectural; e.g.,
being ”fast” versus ”slow”. Still, in combination with what else we know about
the mind and the brain, these features are indicative of underlying cognitive
processing. For example, an oft-cited argument for connectionism against se-
rial symbolic computationalism is that complex actions that are performed in
a few hundred milliseconds must be executed in heavily parallel processing
without recursion. This follows simply from our knowledge of neuronal ﬁring
latencies (Feldman & Ballard, 1982).
Those considerations out of the way, I sought what most philosophers
would probably do to ﬁnd something to complain about: consciousness. If you
take the notion as the so called phenomenal consciousness—the stuﬀ made from
qualia: the subjective feeling of joy, the experienced redness of red, and so on—
you are bound to create more confusion than solve. But ”consciousness” can
mean many things, and in dual-process theories the relevant notion is access
consciousness. We are (generally) aware of our intuitive responses but not
how and why we reach them. We are denied an access to the process. Often
we are able to explain our intuitive decisions but there are good reasons to
believe that the post hoc rationalizations often misrepresent the process that
generates them (Evans & Wason, 1976; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Haidt, 2001).
Thus, ”consciousness” per se is too ambivalent and potentially confusing; yet
properties associated with access consciousness such as implicit, automatic,
and intuitive seem to hang together as an important cluster for dual-process
theory. ”Intuitive” is also a vague notion which pretty much means ”implicit
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and automatic”. Hence, I ﬁgured that ”intuitive” and ”reﬂective” may perhaps
serve more informatively as tags for the putative two processing types, rather
than as their characteristic features, and focused on this particular distinction.
1.2 Putting things together the wrong way
There is also a branch of consciousness research that is interested in ﬁnding
structural analogs between cognitive processing and descriptions of conscious
experience. For example (Petiot et al., 1999) contains several texts that aim
to show how aspects of cognitive processing can be mapped onto Husserlian
phenomenology. I made a brief detour to acquaint myself with the works of
Husserl, mainly via second-hand sources in analytic phenomenology tradition.
So I read cursorily Husserlial works such as Dagﬁnn Føllesdal (1966), and
especially David Woodruﬀ Smith and Ronald McIntyre (1982). I got fascinated
by the way the two latter authors had described Husserl’s account of object
perception as an act that constitutes the content (or noematic Sinn) to what
is perceived.
This content constitution is not merely an act of classifying objects but an
active process that involves the invocation of an intricate pattern of meanings
that are more or less implicit in the act of perception. Every perception has
content, which is constituted against a ”horizon,” a background of further
possible experiences and properties prescribed by the singular experience. We
see an object as a whole; as having a backside, even though what we sense is
only its visible side. In this sense, the content of perception is transcendent,
for the act of perception transcends or goes beyond the information given. In
cognitive terms, the experience is a system of tacit expectations, delivered by
our background knowledge.
These expectations are not subjectively obvious because, somewhat para-
doxically, they are precisely something we take for granted. They are too ob-
vious to be noticed; they are at work when we go around an object to casually
examine its backside. We do not explicitly infer that there is a backside but
simply take it as given, and that implicit givenness is an inherent constituent
part of the object perception and object oriented action. These expectations
do not give all the speciﬁc details, of course; for example, what is the history
of the object and what actually is there on the backside? This indeterminacy
is the very reason for further examinations. Although the horizon of experi-
ences is partly indeterminate, it is still structured. It predelineates the range
of sensible blanks and ﬁllers, or questions and answers, that the perceived ob-
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ject aﬀords while retaining its identity. These tacit expectations can become
manifest, however, when something violates them and the perceived nature of
the object suddenly changes—e.g., when on closer inspection a tree proves to
be a stage prop. Husserl says that in these moments our experience ”explodes”
(Føllesdal, 1966). We sense a fragmentation of the horizon of tacit expecta-
tions, which then become visible. Ordinarily, however, what we are aware of
are just passing speciﬁc stances or perspectives towards things and events that
constitute the totality of our lifeworld.6
Husserl’s account of intentional content provides useful insight into the
constitution of conceptual understanding—something that seems to be lacking
in the analytically oriented philosophy of mind. The description of how we
bring our background knowledge to an experience hints towards the subjective
genesis of meaning which is necessary for intuitive grasping of our surround-
ings and which comes about via our continuous interaction with the world.
Without any attempts to naturalize phenomenology or follow scholarly inter-
pretations of Husserl, I gathered how this analysis could be reconciled with
dual-systems theories. The idea is that intuitive System 1 automatically ﬁl-
ters and processes information and makes situationally relevant information
available for reﬂective processes. Generally, events activate memories encoded
in previous comparable situations. Much of that information remains implicit
but salient to conscious reﬂection. This gives a sort of fullness to our conscious
experience. The sense of understanding comes about by this pre-reﬂective cog-
nitive processing, which brings all kinds of presuppositions and anticipations
into lived situations. Explicit manipulation of meaningless symbols would lack
this sort of phenomenological richness, simply because there is no automa-
tized ﬁlling of the blanks going on behind the scenes. Hence, someone without
any meaningful background knowledge about dealing with this sort of symbols
would be situated like Searle in his famous Chinese room thought experiment
(Searle, 1980). There are symbols, rules, and calculations but no meanings
anywhere, because meanings, phenomenologically speaking, are the systems of
intuitive expectations, shaped by our previous encounters with the world and
are pre-reﬂectively brought into situated action—mental acts included.
The description of how experience changes when expectations are vio-
lated reminds the default-interventionist account of dual-processing. In this
model, System 1 automatically guides our action as long as everything pro-
ceeds smoothly. However, when our tacit expectations are violated, the system
fails to deliver appropriate responses. Then the intuitive ﬂow is interrupted,
6 See Smith & McIntyre (1982), or McIntyre & Smith (1989) for a concise discussion.
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and the reﬂective cognition kicks in to attain a grasp of the changed situa-
tion. We engage in conscious deliberation and action control until the issue is
resolved, the new situation is comprehended, and the sense of normal ﬂow of
events is restored.7
After these contemplations, my research forked into two branches. As
a sort of spin-oﬀ project, I investigated the possibility that the dual-system
account could be turned into a cognitive theory of conceptual understanding,
which would describe how preconscious processes shape our explicit compre-
hension. If carried out successfully, the project should be interesting because
one fundamental problem in cognitive science has been the modeling of com-
mon sense, which seems to have little to do with explicit calculations but
immensely with intuitive understanding and pre-reﬂective assessment of rele-
vance. Not for long, this side project took the lead and turned into the present
work. Along the way, the central role of dual-process theories faded into the
background but many of the theoretical planks that aroused the philosophical
excitement addressed above—along with the actual empirical results—can be
found in some form herein.
I thought that it would be a good idea to think of Systems 1 and 2 ap-
proximately in terms of connectionist and classical computational systems. In
the above list (and especially in the shorter one on page 27), the majority
of the properties of intuitive and reﬂective processing align with the general
characteristics of connectionist and classical systems, respectively. From the
empirical perspective, I thought that assimilating similarity-based category
representations with System 1 contents and theory-based conceptual structure
with System 2 representations is perhaps workable hypothesis because they
also have properties that to go well with this kind of an arrangement. These
theories are elaborated in Chapter 3.
In the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, we encounter yet another
vaguely similar dualism. So called two-factor conceptual role semantics (see
the next chapter) aims to explain the origins of mental content by two inde-
pendent factors: (a) a causal connection between mental representations and
their putative referents, and (b) inferential dispositions of the cognitive agent
that track conceptually relevant relations between mental representations. The
connection to dual-process theories is remote, but the causal factor ostensibly
7 The alternative is the parallel-competitive model (Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000).
It assumes that both systems are active and compete for control in any given task. This model
has worse empirical and theoretical standing than the interventionist model and hence will
be ignored in what follows; see (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).
14
handles content determination for concrete referents and the inferential factor
for abstract and theoretical content; hence the link to similarity and theory-
based accounts of concepts in cognitive psychology. In the introduction of
The Origins of Concepts (2009, 5) developmental psychologist Susan Carey
endorses ”in broad strokes” some form of two-factor conceptual role semantics
or related dual theory of concepts.8 A somewhat similar dual account of con-
cept representation is also proposed, e.g., in Armstrong et al. (1983); Allen &
Brooks (1991); Smith & Sloman (1994), and importantly in Sloman (1996), a
seminal paper in current dual-systems theory, which also proposes close links
to connectionism and rule-based computationalism.
The two-factor conceptual role semantics is unﬁt for the reasons detailed
later but, brieﬂy, the problems concern its background assumption of a univer-
sal, privileged system of concepts which is independent of the concept using
organism. The theory (like the related proposals derived from the analytical
philosophy of language) dismisses the needs, goals, and capacities of the or-
ganism and pretty much the world around it—or, at least, considers these of
only secondary importance. Whether this is a good metaphysics of concepts
or not, it makes a bad philosophy of mind. Moreover this sort of conception
of concepts is mostly incompatible with both empirical results and the genetic
reading of Husserlian phenomenology. I do ﬁnd it important that a full theory
of human intentionality requires both: an account of content that is engen-
dered by causal interaction with the environment, and an account of the role
of public and private reasoning in content determination. However, for those
ends I promote enactivism and linguistic pragmatism instead of causal and
conceptual role semantics.
I use the term ”enactivism” in a broad sense that accommodates situated
and embodied approaches to cognition. According to Evan Thompson the cen-
tral idea of the embodied approach is that ”Cognition is the exercise of skillful
know-how in situated and embodied action” (Thompson, 2007, 11). Cogni-
tion, intentionality, and meaning arise from continuous interaction between the
world and the agent. The approach is independent of but highly compatible
with both connectionism and similarity-based theories of conceptual represen-
8 Although overt references to that book are sparse here, it should be mentioned that The
Origins of Concepts profoundly inﬂuenced my research. There are similarities at least with to
the proposed mechanisms of concept learning and chance, employment of some form of dual
theory of conceptual content, and the existence of diverse sources of content determination:
at least individual learning, cultural process, and evolution.
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tation, especially the prototype theory.9 It is inﬂuenced by phenomenology
(e.g., by Merleau-Ponty and perhaps Heidegger more than Husserl, although
Husserl inﬂuenced both) and bears clear similarities to pragmatist tradition.
According to Robert Brandom ”a founding idea of pragmatism is that the
most fundamental kind of intentionality (in the sense of directedness towards
objects) is the practical involvement with objects exhibited by a sentient crea-
ture dealing skillfully with its world” (Brandom, 2008, 178)—which is pretty
much the founding idea of enactivism, too.
Instead of symbolic representations and reasoning, enactivism emphasizes
the perception–action-loop and the operations of our sensorimotor system as
the fundamental building blocks of cognition. Cognition is embodied in the
way speciﬁc to the organism and developed to serve its needs and capacities.
This view holds that cognition is not static system but it is shaped by the
speciﬁc experiences that accumulate in the interaction between the organism
and its environment. The strength of this approach is that it allows factoring
in the situatedness, contextuality, speciﬁc contents, and individual learning in
content determination without lapsing into solipsism: Similar constitutions of
body, cognitive make up, and the environment forge similar conceptual sys-
tems. The weakness lies in its playing down of the signiﬁcance of symbolic
thought. The more the contribution of the dynamically coupled sensorimotor
system is stressed, the harder it gets to explain how abstract reasoning is even
possible.
One way out of the impasse is to embrace both enactive and symbolic
cognition in their own right and let research sort them out in the long run.
There is no a priori reason why there needs to be continuity from sensorimotor
to symbolic processes and why cognition needs to be modeled based on a single
principle. Although the issue with embodied/enactive versus symbolic thought
is somewhat orthogonal to the debate between connectionism and classical com-
putationalism, these paradigms are facing similar problems: Connectionism is
especially suited to modeling low-level perceptual and motor processes, while
computationalism is developed to deal with planning, symbolic reasoning, etc.
Taking all the above points into consideration, I opted for the follow-
ing, albeit short-lived, working hypothesis and method: To resolve the debate
between enactive/embodied research and the classical view of reasoning and
concepts, put all embodied, fuzzy, online, pragmatic cognition in System 1; and
9 E.g. (Varela et al., 1991), a seminal work on enactivism, explicitly sides with connection-
ism and includes Eleanor Rosch as one of the authors who was also a pioneer of prototype
theory of concepts, discussed in detail later.
16
abstract, clean, theoretical thinking in System 2. Assess what empirical ﬁnd-
ings (especially in concept research) naturally goes with what system, without
strong pretheoretical commitments about the underlying cognitive architec-
ture. Evaluate the characteristics of cognitive processing and representations
in the resultant hypothesis about the putative systems.
So basically the idea was that faculties of abstract and theoretical thinking,
such as those employed in doing science, go to System 2 and intuitive common
sense reasoning and the like to System 1. In light of the reasoning research
that fueled the two-systems theory, the above hypothesis is quite reasonable.
A key part of the methodology is to ﬁnd tasks that prompt subjects to make
conﬂicting responses (Sloman, 1996). This research shows that often the intu-
itive responses violate normative models, while subjects are capable of reaching
the correct solution when they think the problem through (Evans et al., 1993;
Evans & Over, 1996; Gilovich et al., 2002; Johnson-Laird, 2008). Importantly,
the intuitive responses are not random but predictable across subjects, leading
to speciﬁc stable biases in reasoning. These biases are often interpreted as to
show that intuitive system employs quick and dirty heuristics that work eﬃ-
ciently in everyday pragmatic reasoning but are deﬁcient in formal, abstract
thinking.
1.3 From errors to expertise
But that didn’t go very well. Basically, the problem was that theoretical and
other declarative knowledge is not insulated from practical experience with
concrete things. People can have all kinds lay theories derived from practical
experience, and theoretical knowledge inﬂuences how things are perceived and
conceived: If you think that vitamin C cures ﬂu, a simple experiment, using
yourself as a subject, will most likely conﬁrm this. However, it does not matter
what vitamin you take because the odds are that you will get well anyway.
The background assumption about the vitamin may lead you to anticipate
the expected outcome, to attribute it to the purported remedy, and hence to
encode the spurious causal relation as genuine. In general it is complicated to
tell if knowledge is de dicto or de re, or theoretical or practical. If you avoid
spoiled food because you know it is a health hazard, which type of knowledge
is this—especially if you have never experienced food poisoning? Is learning
chess declarative knowledge about rules and strategies or situated knowledge
about how to manipulate the pieces and concrete board positions to reach your
goals? Is a mathematician’s deriving proofs on paper not a sort of concrete
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practice? At least the cognitive skills involved are most likely developed during
laborious thinking, experimenting, trial, and error, that is derived from a long
track of experiences gained in actual material events.
The dual-process social psychological research is also hard to interpret
by conﬂating explicit processing with theoretical or abstract knowledge. Often
the subjects make certain decisions and then give conﬂicting commonsense jus-
tiﬁcations for them, not displaying conﬂict between theoretical and practical
inference but between implicit decision-making and its explicit post hoc ra-
tionalization, framed with solid, albeit irrelevant, practical reasoning (Wilson,
2002). Similar rationalization, or confabulation of reason, is seen in reasoning
studies discussed in Chapter 5.
What is common in these social psychological studies and reasoning re-
search, aimed at uncovering intuitive biases, is that the subjects often engage
themselves in unfamiliar tasks. However, another strand of implicit reason-
ing and judgment research exists that is somewhat overlooked in dual-process
theories in favor of the heuristics and biases tradition, namely expertise re-
search that emphasizes the proﬁciency of intuitive decision making.10 In this
tradition, human expertise is taken to be a product of long and laborious top-
down learning. First, we follow explicit rules to acquaint ourselves with a new
problem domain. Gradually, we accumulate a large stock of memories about
speciﬁc situations, actions, and outcomes. If randomness is involved, the re-
curring situations equip us with a good grasp of the range and proportional
frequencies of expected events and ways to deal with unintended outcomes.
The situation representations are assumed to be quite concrete, in the sense
that they do not contain summary structural information about the problem
domain but rather speciﬁc information about actual events, associated actions
and their outcomes. A stock of these memories is implicitly activated when an
expert encounters a familiar situation.
This sort of recognition-primed decision-making (Klein, 1998) is nicely cap-
tured by Herbert Simon: ”The situation has provided a cue; This cue has given
the expert access to information stored in memory, and the information pro-
vides the answer. Intuition is nothing more and nothing less than recognition”
(Simon, 1992, 155). Since all this happens eﬀortlessly without conscious inter-
vention, we see a dissociation of implicit decision-making and explicit reporting,
similar to that of untutored biased reasoning. Experts tend to make competent
instead of biased decisions; however, especially in the case of complex tasks,
10 See de Groot (1965); Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986); Simon (1992); Klein (1998); for a concise
dialogue between these two intuitive decision making traditions see Kahneman & Klein (2009).
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they are often quite unable to explain their choices much better than advanced
amateurs. Again, in Dreyfus & Dreyfus’ (1986) words, ”When things are pro-
ceeding normally, experts don’t solve problems and don’t make decisions; they
do what normally works” (30–31) . . . ”They cannot always provide convincing
rational explanations of their intuition, but very frequently they turn out to
be correct” (34).
This sort of intuitive know-how is very similar to the assumed System 1
processing, and it also bears at least superﬁcial similarity to Husserlian theory
of the construction of perceptual content. To obtain pretty much the default-
interventionist theory of dual-systems reasoning, we only need to add that in
case intuitive comprehension fails to deliver useful information in accordance
with our goals, the behavior is interrupted by controlled processing. When
this happens there is no necessarily a ”lift” to more abstract or normative
thinking, but often the subjects lapse to the state of an amateur and are
forced to use whatever cognitive tools and skills they have to think the problem
through (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). It is generally incorrect to assume that,
e.g., the comprehension of a mathematical problem happens by translating it
into a content independent formal representation for explicit mental faculties
to compute. Intuitive comprehensions seems to work in a way that the speciﬁc
problem contents foremost activate associated procedural information.
The following example are from (Ross, 1984) where subjects were tasked
to solve several probability problems:
1. There are six judgeships on the local ballot to be voted for. Each oﬃce
has eight candidates running for it, one of whom is the incumbent. If a
person randomly chose for each oﬃce (with a 1/8 chance of choosing any
of the candidates), what is the probability that she or he would vote for
one or more incumbents?
2. Two 8-sided dice, a green one and a red one, are rolled. Each dice has a
1/8 chance coming up 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8. What is the probability
of getting either a 7 on the green die or a (2 or less) on the red die, or
both?
The subjects were then taught to solve the ﬁrst problem by using the
formula 1 − [(c − 1)/c)]t, where c = number of choices (8), and t = number
of tries (6); they were instructed to solve the second problem by adding the
probabilities of the two events and then subtracting the probability of their
co-occurrence: P (x) + P (y) − P (x) × P (y); i.e. (1/8 + 1/4) − (1/8) × (1/4)
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in this case. Then they were given, e.g., the following problem, which is a
restatement of Problem 1 by borrowing the thematic content from Problem 2:
3. Six 8-sided dice are rolled. Each dice has a 1/8 chance coming up 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8. What is the probability of getting a 8 at least on at
least one of the dies?
For Problem 3, most subjects incorrectly try to apply the solution for
Problem 2.11 What they have learned previously is a procedure to compute
probabilities associated with dice rolls rather than a general method of com-
puting probabilities of n-independent events in t tries—or even a capacity to
recognize the structure of the problem accordingly. More precisely: Of course,
we do learn such capacity because we can appreciate that some procedures lead
to incorrect and some to correct solutions, and that the reason is the underly-
ing problem structure. However, I maintain that the structural understanding
comes principally from associating a correct procedural knowledge to the task
and not from initially forming a formal and decontextualized problem repre-
sentation (see Chapter 5 for details). Finding the correct procedure can be
guided by explicit search, especially for relevant analogies.
Task speciﬁc skills and domain understanding build up from these auto-
matically activated, content-sensitive procedural memories. When the surface
features that guide the memory search are misleading, this can lead to pre-
dictable errors similar to the ones the above. However, if the cues reliably
activate useful and valid expectations, the result is highly eﬃcient, domain
speciﬁc cognitive competence, which does not tax working memory or other
capacity limited cognitive resources. When expertise is cultivated, the focus
gradually shifts from superﬁcial features to more important structural prop-
erties of the domain. Does the latter mean that more abstract representation
of the domain is generated or that the understanding of structural properties
is simply constituted by associating generic procedural knowledge to a wider
variety of superﬁcial situation representations or surface features? Quite likely
both are true; yet, the idea that I’m selling is that the phenomenological click of
comprehension is produced by tacit processes that recruit practical knowledge,
and understanding abstractions is similarly rooted in speciﬁc representations
11 Note that these problems are actually identical in the sense that the solution procedure
for 1 works for all these tasks. However, the solution for task 2 gives wrong probabilities if
there are more than two variables; in other words, P (x1)+ . . .+P (xn)− P (x1)× . . . × P (xn)
is an incorrect solution when n > 2.
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of concrete instances.12 This renders examples, metaphors, and analogies so
useful. Moreover that is why it is not possible just to read a book of calculus
and immediately understand its contents. Instead, you need to labor through
examples and exercises to obtain know-how about the domain. This does not
mean that concepts, in any philosophically interesting way, can be reduced to
sensorimotor contents or to human psychology in general; only that the human
conceptual cognition does not track (at least directly) abstract intellectual or
metaphysical essences but aﬀordances and other functional properties. Fun-
damentally, conceptual understanding is constituted by tacit know-how rather
than explicit know-that.
Given these remarks, we now can review my initial (and now abandoned)
working hypothesis that all embodied, fuzzy, on-line, pragmatic cognition goes
into System 1 and abstract, clean, theoretical thinking to System 2; and the
associated characterizations of intuitive and reﬂective cognition.
To recap, we know that expert competence rests mostly on a tacit cogni-
tive skill-set to negotiate a speciﬁc domain. This know-how builds gradually
through numerous encounters with speciﬁc problems.13 Expert reasoning dis-
plays the eﬀects of context, content, and speciﬁc learning history similar to
pragmatic reasoning. Often expertise is accompanied by rather poor trans-
fer of learning, meaning that acquired cognitive skills do not reliably cultivate
general reasoning capacities; this even holds true for scientiﬁc competence.
Basically, all that resemble standard idea of System 1 processing. If we ac-
cept that intuitive cognition is inherently deﬁcient in abstract reasoning, as
heuristics and biases traditions often suggest, we should expect scientiﬁc and
other theoretical intuitions to be reliably biased. Unfortunately, scientiﬁc cog-
nition has not been studied extensively; however, we know that training in
statistics or formal logic, for example, does not eliminate biases completely
and that experts from scientists to judges are susceptible to common reasoning
errors (Griggs & Ransdell, 1986; Peer & Gamliel, 2013). Although logical and
statistical reasoning errors are less frequent within subjects with mathemati-
cal training, the observed deviation of performance from normative models is
12 Note that ”concreteness” here should be understood as practical familiarity, and not
that you always need to explain abstract concepts and principles by referring to concrete
things—although analogies and metaphors are often used this way. Examples usually serve
to introduce practical familiarity by showing how to apply a schematic mathematical principle
to speciﬁc numbers of symbols.
13 According to oft-cited estimates, acquiring excellence in complex tasks takes about 10,000
hours of practice extended over more than a decade involving a huge amount of repetition
(Ericsson et al., 1993).
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often still substantial (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1983), and an education
level as such is generally a poor predictor of normative performance (Jackson
& Griggs, 1988). Nevertheless, the whole notion of ”expert” implies that the
person outperforms the average.14
Now, scientiﬁc education may equip us with at least three things: 1. For-
mal methods, such as mathematics, that can be applied to several speciﬁc
domains, 2. metacognitive attitude to suppress reliance on intuitive judgment,
and 3. social norms and practices to engage in critical thinking. These items
likely result in more eﬃcient cognitive tools and increased reliance on reﬂec-
tive reasoning. Hence, one might suspect that it is this reﬂective component
that makes people good scientists. Undoubtedly, that plays a crucial role, but
scientiﬁc conceptual domains are complex and sometimes quite vague. This
is especially the case in humanities and social sciences; which does not mean
that these disciplines are less scientiﬁc but that they deal with hard-to-deﬁne
complex phenomena. All this sophisticated knowledge needs to be applied to
actual use, and what we know about human expertise and reasoning in general
suggest that theoretical competence requires considerable implicit learning and
processing. Moreover, the norms and practices associated with critical think-
ing and academic discourse are similarly subtle skills that cannot be wholly
captured by rules of thumb; instead, they need to be exercised to be learned.
The last point applies to other ”intellectual” domains, such as the exten-
sively studied chess, and hence the point is more general. You cannot begin to
play chess from the scratch without explicit rules and metacognitive control;
yet, to play good chess, eﬀective deployment of the intuitive system for the
task is needed. Highly competent players do not explain their moves by ap-
pealing to deductive arguments or computations of the most eﬀective actions;
they, instead, refer to the strategic situation on the board. They certainly do
reﬂect on their play, but they seem to instantly disregard irrelevant and bad
moves and consider viable ones only. (de Groot, 1965, 305–307) Indeed, they
14 There is, however, a caveat in this seemingly obvious point. Experts are susceptible to
believing in spurious causal relationships like anyone else. Sometimes the whole problem
environment is essentially random, which makes it impossible to cultivate any reasonable
skill in predicting long term outcomes. That is why we have professionals from witch doctors
to fund managers whose status as experts is largely socially instituted, while their usefulness
is largely at suspect (see e.g. Kahneman, 2011, part III). Note that randomness per se does
not forbid understanding the domain. In fact any competent fund manager with training in
economics should know why eﬃcient market is impossible to beat consistently. It’s just that
these experts are often recruited for assignments to which their expertise is not actually very
well suited, like making reliable forecasts of investments or of political developments.
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seem to be completely unaware of the detailed rationale of their actions while
still maintaining proﬁcient performance; this is common in human expertise in
general, and with complex tasks such as chess, it is easy to see why it is neces-
sary. The complexity of the mandatory computation of the best move from all
possible options quickly exhausts the performance capacity of the deliberative
mind. The fact that it is possible to employ intuitive cognition to overcome
these limits is more diﬃcult to explain. The candidate explanations seem to
be either that (a) the intuitive system carries out the same rule-based com-
putations than the metacognitive system but only subconsciously and more
eﬃciently, or (b) that the system exploits diﬀerent kinds of information and
processing. For example, intuitive cognition might perform some kind of global
pattern matching to recognize strategically signiﬁcant situations on the board
and exploit complex regularities that associate speciﬁc situations to an eﬃcient
line of actions.15 The latter option is discussed in detail in Section 4.3.
In any case, the psychological research uncovers substantial compe-
tence/performance mismatch: Even if you have passed a course on logic, you
are still as susceptible to elementary reasoning errors as anyone else (Hoch &
Tschirgi, 1985). Having speciﬁc (explicitly acquired) conceptual tools does not
instantly give you skill in putting them to good use. Even if you have learned
abstract reasoning schemata, they are automatically employed only in speciﬁc
contexts. For example, you need to recognize a logic problem as a speciﬁc logic
problem to understand what inference principles to use and how to use then,
which requires practice. Even choosing the right tools for the task does not
mean that you can excel with them. Think of proving a very complex theo-
rem, for instance. Abstract, like other forms of reasoning, requires cultivated
intuitive skills that can be only achieved by substantial practical experience.
Another point to note is that commonsense reasoning is sometimes rather
abstract. For example, the folk is prone to reasoning errors, such as aﬃrming
the precedent or failing to commit modus tollens with logical conditional if A,
then P , but display far fewer deﬁcits with schematic deontic conditionals, e.g.
if the action A is to be taken, then the precondition P must ﬁrst be satisﬁed
(Cheng & Holyoak, 1985). Note that the abstract placeholders A and P need
not be speciﬁed. As long as subjects understand that they are dealing with
inferences concerning conditional permissions, they often display quite ﬂuent
logical competence.
15 Note it is possible to learn complex hierarchical plans by reinforcement learning used
in AI systems. In other words, associations can be learned to map situations to policies of
actions in addition to mapping them only to singular actions. (Russell & Norvig, 2010, 856)
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Thus, my point does not speciﬁcally concern scientiﬁc cognition but that
the assumed System 1/2 processing diﬀerences reﬂect more reliably the dif-
ference between familiar and non-familiar rather than concrete versus abstract
content. In fact, I think that people casually use the term ”abstract” to refer to
notions that are both suﬃciently non-concrete and non-familiar. For example,
the notion of ”permission” does not appear very abstract because we are all
familiar with how permitted actions and their preconditions causally play out
in various speciﬁc contexts. Elementary particles, I presume, are fairly con-
crete; yet, their nature might be rather abstract if not conceived as a kind of
tiny billiard balls colliding with each other or in other familiar terms. There is
also a social dimension to this: My bet is that many scientists agree that they
operate with abstract concepts even if the concepts are completely familiar to
them; however, this perhaps reﬂects the fact that the notions are foreign to
most people, and hence it is appropriate to consider them as abstract in the
common sense of the term. The point is that if we are to ﬁnd the proper place
for abstract and concrete concepts in cognitive theory, the issue is orthogonal
to the ontological status of the referents. It is more useful to pay attention to
the actual practices in which the concepts participate, and it is important to
bear in mind that these practices are not always universally shared. Hence, on-
tological ”abstractedness” is perhaps psychologically and phenomenologically
irrelevant. What is relevant is that many abstract concepts are foreign to the
untutored, and we initially need explicit deﬁnitions and rules to work with
them. Hence the close pre-theoretical association of abstract concepts with
explicit reﬂective thought.
Moreover, the need for controlled explicit thought is hardy linked to the
complexity of conceptual domains. Commonsense reasoning is, in fact, aston-
ishingly complex. One of the signiﬁcant challenges in cognitive science has been
the modeling of common sense. Our behavioral repertoire is very ﬂexible but
still systematic and reasonable in respect of our needs, goals, and situational
demands. Even when facing uncertain and incomplete knowledge, narrow time
frames, and abruptly changing contexts, we are able to parse meaningful wholes
from logically unconnected information and ﬁll in all kinds of missing blanks.
All this is usually accomplished swiftly and seemingly without eﬀort. For ex-
ample, if I leave a note for a friend saying, ”I’m making some bigos tonight.
Could you check what’s in the fridge and drop by the store? Some cash and the
car keys on the kitchen table”, the recipient almost certainly understands how
these logically unconnected statements make a meaningful message. In case
you wonder what ingredients you may need for bigos, you can congratulate
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yourself on conducting a perfectly valid practical inference. Practical reason-
ing is so pervasive and eﬀective in everyday life that it disappears. However,
the deceptive easiness of it hides the convoluted system of tacit presuppositions
and expectations that make it work, and the resultant complexity sabotages
any attempt to model it by explicit and formal propositional reasoning systems,
such as classical logic.16
For the people committed to the classical computational theory of cog-
nition, this might suggest that the human mind is an exceptionally powerful
reasoning engine. Hence, it was surprising for many that the psychological
research during the past half-century or so revealed that our cognition is rife
with biases. Our reasoning and decision-making markedly diverge from for-
mal normative models. We tend to estimate probabilities wildly incorrectly
and neglect the base rate, even when all relevant information is available. We
evaluate credible correlations and outcomes as more probable than they are,
to the point of violating the fundamentals of probability calculus. We tend to
violate the principles of utility theory and make decisions often inconsistently.
We do not respect the Bayesian rules of belief update and tend to disregard the
logical form of arguments and let the content aﬀect our reasoning in logically
irrelevant ways. (Evans & Over, 1996; Gilovich et al., 2002) This discrepancy
illustrates the fact that the intuitive mind does not deploy formal rules for
everyday reasoning, and hence the question is what does it do then? The an-
swer is outlined above. We simply take the notion of skills as the fundamental
building block of not just expert competence but of conceptual cognition in
general.
1.4 The working hypothesis
In this work, the following hypothesis is defended:
A.1. Expert and commonsense reasoning are both grounded in the same cog-
nitive processes.
A.2. Conceptual understanding builds up as an adaptive cognitive skill. Its
cognitive basis is in the intuitive system that gradually learns to exploit
context- and goal-relevant regularities in the environment, especially the
eﬀects of our own actions in speciﬁc situations.
16 See Davis & Marcus (2015) for a brief review of state-of-the-art of commonsense reasoning
in AI.
25
A.3. Often relevant environments are, at least partly, socially constructed. In
the case of theoretical concepts, in particular, the relevant regularities
are in large part inferential and other discursive commitments. Hence,
abstract concept learning is a special case of functional/causal learning
in (broadly) social or cultural contexts.
A.4. Initial competencies depend on concrete examples and their surface fea-
tures or speciﬁc content. Extensive learning of procedural knowledge
results in a gradual shift of focus from surface cues to structural features
of the conceptual domain.
A.5. Through experience, the abstract/practical distinction dissipates both
psychologically and phenomenologically.
A.6. Still, even later competence is aﬀected by the speciﬁc learning history
and content. Hence, the result is not an acquisition of general formal
reasoning capacity but a gradual transformation in domain understand-
ing.
A.7. Therefore, the process produces domain-speciﬁc conceptual competen-
cies by a general adaptive and praxis-oriented learning mechanism. The
resultant domains are products of our needs, goals, capabilities, learning
environments, culture(s), etc.
The fundamental idea is that interacting with the environment forges
our basic conceptual ontology, and the pragmatic knowledge that accumulates
through experience provides us with the know-how that shapes our understand-
ing of how things generally hang together. The latter is the actual conceptual
content. If all goes well, biases level out when the implicit faculties adapt to
the actual statistical and causal structure of the domain of interest. When the
tacit capacities become reliable basis for intentional action, the domain gradu-
ally becomes semantically transparent. The associated intentional contents are
constituted by automatically activated material knowledge that tacitly ﬁlls all
sorts of blanks and produces anticipations of how things unfold without con-
scious reﬂection. This is what I mean by conceptual understanding; Husserlians
probably call it something like ”pregiven construction of meaning”.
But what sort of a thing the intuitive cognition is? As a starting point I
adopt the model from generic dual-process theories, but the list of properties
requires a revision. We need to drop references to biases and other subpersonal
and non-normative attributes. While research on biases is methodologically
important for the study of intuition, normative and conceptually structured
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processing cannot be exclusively attributed to explicit cognition. Moreover,
explicit reasoning can also be biased if there is something wrong with the
underlying intuitions that support reﬂective thought.
Common sense is not a universal system but a local set of dispositions
forged by the surrounding culture(s) and is, hence, variable across individuals,
times, and places (Bruner, 1990). Therefore, there must be individual variabil-
ity, at least, in the content if not in the process of intuitive reasoning. The
pragmatic/abstract division we already abandoned, and item A.3. above im-
ply that language is not a sound demarcation criterion of intuitive/reﬂective
processes. In all, the idea that the intuitive cognition is a universal engine of
quick and dirty heuristics while the explicit system is a cultured, normative,
and linguistic symbolic processor needs to be abandoned.
For now, I skip the discussion about the processing properties of the two
systems appearing in the list on page 9. Properties associated to intuitive
reasoning, in particular, are brieﬂy discussed below and extensively in the sub-
sequent chapters. Basically, the array of features boils down to the following:
B.1. General characteristics of intuitive and reﬂective cognition
Intuitive system Reﬂective system
independent of working memory depends on executive function
high capacity/low eﬀort, fast low capacity/high eﬀort, slow
associative systematic
rigid ﬂexible
parallel serial
implicit explicit
automatic controlled
situated detached
default process inhibitory
In essence, reﬂective processing constitutes an overriding system that is
characterized by ﬂuent control with low-capacity working memory. Intuition
is based on fast, context cued parallel memory search and a slowly adapting
knowledge base. The basic idea parallels the recent trend in artiﬁcial intelli-
gence that trades sophisticated reasoning systems for rich data sets and dumb
but powerful learning algorithms that extract goal-relevant regularities inher-
ent in the data.
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I opened this chapter by reciting the Gideon Keren’s ((Keren, 2013)) con-
cerns about the long term prospects of dual-process theories. In the same
volume, Evans and Stanovich (2013) reply to critics with an overview of the
past research, reaching the same characterization of reﬂective processing as
the above. They propose, however, that non-conscious system is a collection of
autonomous processes of at least three distinct kinds: (a) encapsulated input
modules of the Fodorian type (Fodor, 1983), (b) associative learning system
for extracting world knowledge, and (c) habituated processes that once were
explicitly controlled.
My agenda is to ﬁnd the cognitive basis of conceptual understanding and
sense-making. Therefore, I no longer aim for a ﬁrm stand on how dual-process
theorists should formulate their theoretical apparatus. My focus is on domain
general learning mechanisms that deliver domain speciﬁc conceptual competen-
cies. This framing rules out any low-level hardwired input analyzers, instincts
or other ”Darwinian modules” (Cosmides, 1989), and the like from the following
considerations regardless of their status in the dual-process theory. Although,
if there are any such things they do shape our behavior and therefore our con-
ceptual system. At least I do believe that there are innate, speciﬁc learning
mechanisms that support capacities engendered by general learning. For ex-
ample, I will later explicitly rely on the assumption that we are predisposed to
learn at least about causes, agency, and language in a manner that goes beyond
mere association (see Carey, 2009). However, if we take the stance that skillful
action is the basis of conceptual cognition and hence world knowledge, I fail
to see how the above planks (b) and (c) constitute separate processes. I later
show how they are integrated aspects of concept using and concept producing
basic mechanisms.
What comes to the psychology of concepts, the pragmatic/enactive stance
also means not to focus solely on category representation. I advertise a kind of
inferentialism that is somewhat distinct from how philosophers usually construe
the notion. I claim that content is derived from our capacity to causal induction
and reasoning. Concepts are induction machines—aggregates of causal and
functional knowledge about things and events—rather than symbolic nodes in
a decontextualized analytic network.
From the empirical standpoint the above is hardly more than a statement
of a problem. Hence a tentative model of intuitive processing is proposed along
the following lines:
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B.2. Speciﬁc processing and representational assumptions about implicit cog-
nition:
a) Inductive (Bayesian) search for causally predictive and pragmatically rel-
evant regularities in concrete situations:
- Category representations are (prototype) feature clusters structured by
causal relations between constituent features.
- Basic ontology is formed around aﬀordances and features relevant to
event–event causation.
- Basic situation representations are quasi-perceptual model type struc-
tures.
b) Instance-speciﬁc encoding of event/action/outcome exemplars:
- Context- and goal-dependent causal expectations are generated by as-
sociative (pattern matching) memory retrieval or analogical mapping
from exemplar-based situation representations.
- Without valid expectations, control shifts to exploration or explicit rea-
soning.
c) Basic reasoning mechanisms are forward causal inference, simulation of situated
action, and abstraction by exemplar-based analogical transfer:
- Surface features are the primary retrieval cues.
- Valid analogies bind diﬀerent tasks under shared pragmatic schemata.
Thus, the basic level of representation and processing is considered to be
highly concrete. The problem, then, shared with other enactive or pragma-
tistically oriented theories, is to explain abstract thinking. The key is the
analogical transfer of causal and procedural knowledge. In Sections 3 to 5, I
explain how the capacity for taxonomic and schematic abstraction is based on
bottom-up learning. It does not necessitate constructing more abstract repre-
sentations but focusing on commonalities between speciﬁc instances. In case of
schematic contents, in particular, the commonalities are found in shared prag-
matically relevant causal structures, under which diﬀerent situation variables
are interchangeable in relation to the agent’s goals. The resulting schemata
are projectible to novel situations through similarity or analogy. To under-
stand especially schematic concepts (such as ”permission” or ”medication”), it
is essential for the agent to understand relevant event–event causation which
makes situation a core notion in concept representation.
Theoretical abstract content is construed more along the lines of classical
inferentialism as the use of linguistic and other symbolic tokens in reason-
ing. But again, the hypothesis is that the underlying cognitive capacity tracks
event–event causation in broadly understood discursive practices. Perhaps the
expression ”language games” best conveys the basic idea of these practices.
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To start playing, one often needs explicit instructions about principles, rules,
and conventions of the game. Therefore, reﬂective controlled processing is
needed. No presumption is made that control has much to do with inherently
logical thinking but simply with suppressing inappropriate behavior, following
arbitrary instructions, and decontextualized thinking which is insulated from
existing beliefs. The important capacity of reﬂective cognition is its possibility
to implement an arbitrary algorithm in principle. You take a system of rules
and representational tokens and get going. By using a pen, paper, and other
external props, the system’s inherent limitations can be relaxed—especially
what comes to the working memory. By learning to associate an appropriate
action with a given task by repetition, you can save computation time. Hence,
the idea is that through experience recurring discursive, theoretical, and other
arbitrary ”algorithmic” activity can be partly internalized by intuitive capaci-
ties through top-down learning.
This, of course, is a sort of dual-process theory of cognition. Still, it
is remote from any two minds hypothesis, since the two processing modes are
highly intertwined, and they often carry out diﬀerent aspects of the same tasks.
Another link to the generic dual-process account is that the intuitive mind is
conceived as very concrete- and practice-oriented. Its mode of operation is
largely to serve as a ﬁlter that makes only contextually relevant information
salient for the task at hand and hence limits the scope of all the possible
knowledge and actions that the agent may take into consideration. There also
lies its weakness because for the tasks where one should be open to taking a
new look on things—such as in politics or science—this may lead to serious
tunnel vision especially with highly practiced experts with heavily entrenched
intuitions. Lastly, I do not wish to claim that the implicit heuristics recog-
nized in the literature are nonexistent, but only that they often are results of
interpretative capacities of the intuitive cognition rather than rules of thumb
for shortcutting laborious inferences. That is, what are generally considered
as reasoning biases are sometimes actually semantic problems in task under-
standing, and subjects do not necessarily reason any worse when they display
biased responses but rather commit inappropriate goal setting and information
selection.
In closing, we can restate the hypothesis A.1.—A.7. in epistemological
terms:
C.1. The human conceptual system tracks aﬀordances and other causal prop-
erties that have pragmatic relevance to us as embodied and active organ-
isms.
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C.2. Intentional content is fundamentally procedural competence to exploit
the resulting know-how of what things do and what can be done with
them.
C.3. Expertise in abstract expert domains (e.g. science) can be thought of
as extended common sense, and common sense can be thought of as a
specialized learned skill.
C.4. Cognitive contents of theoretical and formal concepts are constructed by
the agent through social interaction. While grounded in the same capac-
ities, discursive and concrete concept learning often diﬀer qualitatively:
Discursive conceptual domains track explicit and implicit communal con-
ventions; this makes content intersubjective and normative.
C.5. Two people share the same intuitive understanding as far as they share
the same practices, goals, needs, capacities, discursive commitments, en-
vironmental demands, aﬀordances, and culture, or, in brief, the same
practical reality.
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2 What is intentional content?
The concept of concept has multiple meanings in both philosophy and psy-
chology, but I agree with Edouard Machery’s (2009) summary that, roughly,
philosophers think of concepts as constituents of propositions whereas psy-
chologists treat them as mental representations or other capacities that enable
our higher cognitive competences, such as categorizing, learning, inference,
decision-making, and so on. I don’t know what propositions are, but usually
they are considered as something that represent or stand in for states of aﬀairs,
something that can be either true or false and expressed by declarative sen-
tences. If propositions are abstract entities serving as meanings of sentences,
then concepts are abstract entities that correspond roughly to word meanings.
Thinking of concepts as constituents of sentential compound expressions
implies a crucial distinction between logical and non-logical concepts. In the
analytic tradition of philosophy of language, the latter is usually thought of as
consisting of object and category concepts. Objects are individuals that can
be tagged with a label, such as persons, mountains, Eiﬀel tower, your dining
room table, and perhaps individual numbers and other abstract entities. In
what follows, what I mean by an object (or concrete) concept is a category
of things that can be expressed with nouns. Terms referring to this kind of
categories all belong to non-logical concepts as do concepts corresponding to
properties such as red and tall, and relations such as taller than, next to, etc.
Logical concepts consist of negation and the sentence connectives, quantiﬁers,
and related terms that can be used to express relations between propositions
and non-logical concepts. Non-logical concepts roughly refer to the meanings of
nouns, adjectives, and verbs, and sentence-level propositional contents can be
build from these by applying logical concepts that express abstract structural
relations.
To be sure, there are theorists who consider sentence-level propositional
meaning as basic, but I leave that aside for now.17 My intention here is not
to do justice to the full spectrum of philosophical theories of content. The
introductory exposition here is supposed to oﬀer an approximate standard
model to which most traditional analytical philosophers adhere or at least ﬁnd
familiar. Either way, the philosophers who see the propositional meaning as
fundamental often at least think that propositional meaning has structure, and
word meanings can be deﬁned by substitution: What changes in the meaning
17 But see Brandom (2000, Chapter 4) for discussion about how this idea stems from Kant
and Frege and extends to the subsequent philosophy of language.
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or truth conditions of a sentence, when you substitute term x for y in sentence
α, determines the diﬀerence of meaning between terms x and y. The main
diﬀerence, therefore, is that the propositions ﬁrst theorists think that words do
not intrinsically mean anything unless embedded in propositional expressions,
and therefore the meaning constitutive relation between words and sentences
goes the opposite direction. This camp maintains that conceptual meaning
is ultimately determined by the whole language or some relevant subset of it;
for example, that contents of theoretical terms are ﬁxed only in relation to
other terms of the theory. These kinds of holistic accounts are often varieties
of inferential semantics, which will be discussed later.
The so called classical account of concepts—so named because it was the
account of concepts from the time of Aristotle to the early 20th century—
postulates that contents of concepts are determined by their deﬁnitions; that
is, by the necessary and suﬃcient conditions that entity or phenomena needs to
satisfy in order to count as an instance of a particular concept, which generally
holds in holistic theories of meaning because introducing a deﬁnition is a way
to ﬁx the term’s inferential potential. In the classical framework the idea is
often interpreted as implying a hierarchy, or at least two kinds, of concepts:
primitive concepts that can not be analyzed further, and the rest that can be
expressed through biconditionals or other deﬁnitions. For example in classical
physics f = ma; that is, force is deﬁned as mass times acceleration. ”Mass” is
a primitive term, and acceleration is deﬁned as a change in velocity, which, in
turn, is deﬁned by primitive terms ”time” and ”distance”.
In the example above primitive terms are theory related. But what are
primitive concepts, generally? The answer depends on what we are asking.
For example, of you are a concept realist and think that concepts are abstract
entities, then you probably expect some kind of a metaphysical answer. How-
ever, what interests us here are the possible primitives of the human conceptual
system: how the contents of the concepts that we use in thinking and doing
are determined, and what the fundamental building blocks of meaning are,
if any. Logical empiricists, for example, thought that sensory primitives—i.e.
sense data, like a patch of red hue present in the visual ﬁeld—are unanalyz-
able primitives, and every meaningful complex proposition can be analyzed or
translated into logical terms describing sensory experiences or observable prop-
erties. This was quite natural development of the empiricist epistemological
tradition in the modern European philosophy. The logical empiricist project
infamously proved unworkable; yet, the associated theories of conceptual con-
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tent found their way to the naturalistically oriented branch of the philosophy
of mind and cognitive science.18
The basic insight has deep connections with the fundamentals of formal
logic, and it is basically identical to the modern expression of the model the-
ory of predicate calculus.19 Model theory is essentially a formalized version
of classical theory of concepts: A model of a (ﬁrst order) language consists of
a set of objects—called the universe of discourse—and interpretation function
which respectively maps primitive non-logical predicate and relation terms of
the language onto the sets and pairs (or generally n-tuples) of the objects in
the universe. If the language contains proper names, they are mapped onto
individual objects. Logical constants assume standard ﬁxed interpretations,
and sentences are constructed by combining primitive terms with logical oper-
ators. The ﬁxed interpretation of logical terms and the interpretation function
of non-logical expressions guarantee that every well-formed formula has an in-
terpretation: They are either true or false in the model. Regardless of how the
interpretation is initially chosen, you can always introduce new concepts in the
same way that you can construct any compound expressions (i.e. sentences).
As a standard example, assume that we have an interpretation for the terms
”adult”, ”male”, and ”married”. Now, we can introduce the term ”bachelor”
by deﬁnition: x is a bachelor if and only if x is an adult, x is a male and x
is not married; that is, the extension of the concept bachelor equals the set of
adult males that are not in the set of married persons.
All this is probably completely familiar to any analytical philosopher. The
important point is that when at least some of the concepts are interpreted, the
rest can be understood as sentential structures built from these semantic prim-
itives as per the classical theory of concepts. Moreover, the primitive terms,
combined with the logical expressive power of the resultant representational
system, strictly determine what concepts the system can represent. Now, if
we model the human cognition as a sort of logic engine—as per the classical
computational theory of mind—we need only be concerned about ﬁnding a the-
ory of the interpretation function for primitive terms. As far as conceptual
representation is concerned, the logical syntax run by the cognitive system will
take care of the rest. After the semantics is ﬁxed, we can utilize standard
logical computations to carry out deductions and produce and interpret basi-
18 There are many variations of logical empiricism. The account explained here mostly
resembles the one put forward by Rudolf Carnap (1956).
19 The modern formulation was published around the same time as the Carnap’s paper
referred in the last footnote; see Tarski & Vaught (1957).
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cally limitless amount of novel conceptual constructs. The bottom line is that
representation comes ﬁrst, and reasoning and other intentional acts will follow.
Of course you don’t need that interpretation function for any actual com-
putational system to run (like a computer and perhaps the brain), but you
need it to explain how the system’s internal operations and its resultant overt
behavior are intentional; that is, contentful and purposeful. In the logic-based
computational story, you determine a mapping from the internal states of the
cognitive system to the system of (primitive) concepts, and there: You just
explained how the system has internal representations, which have genuine ref-
erential content and therefore bridged the gap between the realms of genuinely
intentional and the mere mechanical.
Well, it’s not really that easy. In what follows, I try to show how almost
every piece of that old story is ﬂawed. Still, it has produced a theory of mental
content that has been well received in the philosophy of mind and has deep
roots in the tradition of analytical philosophy of language. It merits particular
attention, mainly because it serves as a background and contrast to the ac-
count of intentional content advertised in this work. The reader should take a
note of the important distinction between primitive (or fundamental) concepts
and combinatory ones, which can be analyzed into meaningful constituents.
Regardless of the ultimate merit of that distinction, it captures something in-
tuitively appealing in the phenomenology of human understanding: Concepts
seem to play two kinds roles; we have intuitive concepts that we need in order
to understand complex novel expressions and the world around us, and then we
have reﬂective concepts that we can analyze intentionally and understand by
explication. Thus, concepts are both means and ends in the acts of understand-
ing. I think the dynamics of these means and ends has not fully received the
attention in deserves, perhaps because the distinction is trivial if one adheres
to the doctrine of primitive and constructed meaning. Along the way I sketch
an account where intuitive concepts do not have much to do with primitivity
or any kind of conceptual or epistemic foundationalism. The gist of the story is
that intuitive conceptual understanding is largely a learned skill that underlies
our conscious reﬂection, and hence it is a malleable joint product of the agent
and its environment. Reﬂective concepts (in the sense mentioned above) are
something we are trying to learn or to explicate by resorting to our pre-existing
semantic and procedural intuitions.
More speciﬁcally, the theory I that will advance proposes that learned
pragmatic knowledge is encoded in intuitive concepts and that this knowledge
underlies our everyday reasoning capacities. In the intuitive cognition, con-
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cept use and conceptual content conﬂate, and the resulting semantic intuitions
mostly determine our explicit understanding of analytical concepts. The idea
is hostile towards any ﬁxed set of primitive non-logical concepts and universal
conceptual systems. While we may or may not be innately armed with some
kind of formal or structural concepts that,for example, reﬂect the syntactical
categories of our natural language, most approximately word-level concepts are
learned through our activity in our everyday environments. Thus, our concep-
tual system is shaped by our environment and behavior, and potentially any
concept is subject to change and reﬁnement throughout our life if our environ-
ment and/or behavior changes. Moreover, any concept that we use in explicit
reﬂective analysis can be learned intuitively when its use becomes automatized.
I maintain that understanding is based on these automatized ways of utilizing
concepts where the use covers any intentional action ranging from overt be-
havior, including linguistic and social practices, to private thinking. When we
engage in conceptual analysis, we are bound to use whatever intuitive concep-
tual resources we have, and when we use those analyzed target concepts for
further reasoning, the practices of using them gradually form implicit intellec-
tual habits. Thus, conceptual understanding is an acquired cognitive skill set,
and acquiring that understanding tend to change the cognitive tools we engage
with in further reasoning and analysis.
Misunderstanding can be roughly deﬁned as a conceptual capacity that
supports systematically unsuccessful behaviors where an important special case
is non-normative use of a concept in communication and public reasoning.
Thus, I advocate a version of inferentialism or use theory of concepts in which
”use” is conceived in the broadest possible sense of the term. I conceive con-
cepts primarily as instruments of doing rather than of thinking. I also try to
show how concepts in this sense are complex psychological phenomena and
that insulating category structure from category utilization (such as reason-
ing) leads to a distorted understanding of conceptually structured cognitive
processes. The principal claim is that in the typical case of routine reason-
ing, we exploit conceptual competencies to form expectations in given contexts
to initiate an appropriate action. This is not a controlled process whereby
we apply decontextualized formal principles to propositional knowledge but
a skill whereby we apply habitual practical know-how that mostly works in
familiar situations. Conversely, failures in reasoning are often failures of intu-
itive understanding of the functional structure of the task and not failures to
apply inference principles properly. This knits the philosophical and psycho-
logical discussions of concepts, for, in this framework, there is no conceptual
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gap between cognitive skills and understanding of propositional content. I ac-
knowledge the importance of our ability to make explicit controlled inference,
but it has mostly a peripheral theoretical importance to our understanding of
how commonsense reasoning and expert know-how work. I propose that both
of these capacities are mostly executed by our intuitive faculty wherein con-
ceptual understanding, contextual reasoning, and practical know-how are not
strictly separable.
2.1 Intentionality in the old school computationalism
A few of us today would take the Platonic idea of an independently exist-
ing conceptual realm very seriously. As we shall see soon, though, that has
not stopped some philosophers of language behaving like Platonist. In the
philosophy of mind, at least, it is more commonplace to think that concepts
are something that somehow mediate the relation between the mind and the
world. In this picture concepts in a sense have two poles: the other attached
to our intentional mental states and the other to worldly phenomena. Here,
the relevant mental states are the usual belief/desire type propositional atti-
tudes: (agent) a believes that p, desires (that) p, fears (that) p, and so on.
In the inﬂuential computational–functionalist theory, somewhat a synonym to
the cognitivist theory of mind, the idea is that the attitude part of a mental
state—i.e. belief, desire, etc.—can be deﬁned by the state’s causal role in the
agent’s cognitive system. This roughly means that fears, hopes, beliefs, de-
sires, etc. have characteristic eﬀects to our behavior and thinking, and these
causal eﬀects are what makes some states as fears and other as beliefs and so
on. For example if I fear that p, then I desire that not p, which makes me to
act in such a way that p does not happen, if possible. This is an application of
the time-honored practical syllogism, which explicates the conceptual relation
between intentional mental states and intentional action. The placeholder p
here is usually thought to be a propositional mental representation, essentially
a sentence or similar meaning bearing structure that represents some states of
aﬀairs.
The last clause above reveals how functionalism emphasizes the cognitive
nature of intentional processes in the classical sense of ”cognitive”; that is, the
relevant states deal with knowledge or belief. The idea is to model our folk
or belief/desire psychological explanations of human behavior by postulating a
causal mechanism that operates on a language-like representational system. If
we manage to device a model of human psychology where the basic processes
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are purely causal but respect the semantics of propositional representations,
we have a naturalistic reductive theory of intentionality of human thought and
behavior. There are other ways to meet this goal, but the basic idea in com-
putational functionalism is that logic shows how you can deﬁne semantically
constrained syntactical operations over propositions, and computers demon-
strate that you can execute these processes in purely causal system, which
does not care about semantics. The key semantic constraint in logic is the
preservation of truth, i.e. that you can derive only true sentences from true
sentences. The following is perhaps the major reason why cognitivistic theo-
ries are often framed around propositional content: truth perseverance is the
clearest semantic constraint which we know how implement in purely formally
deﬁned systems, and propositions are the simplest elements in logic that have
a truth value. In any case, the core idea of psychological computationalism is
that the world is somehow represented in a computational system which, in
turn, is implemented by our brain. If the representations refer to worldly phe-
nomena, and the mental processes are crafted to respect their representational
character (i.e. meanings) then when our brain is processing these symbols
we are actually making inferences about the world. This aboutness—the in-
tentional character of mental representations—is what builds the mind-world
connection and enables us to function in sensible ways in our environment.
But does our commonsense psychology actually work like this? It seems
that many propositional attitudes are about objects, or classes of objects, but
not about propositions. For example, I may be afraid of snakes with no ref-
erence to any speciﬁc states of aﬀairs that includes snakes. For cognitivists,
this is not a very pressing issue, though, and generally they conceive attitudes
like fears and desires as behavioral dispositions toward objects. While this is
a seemingly innocent detail, it may have far-reaching implications if we pri-
marily focus on behavioral dispositions towards things rather than on logical
operations over propositions when we are formulating our theories of inten-
tional content. Be that as it may, in the next section we will see how ideas
form logical semantics turned into theories of mental content.
2.1.1 Causal theories of mental content
The computational theory of mind in itself does not explain how the contents
of mental representations are determined. Common wisdom concerning formal
systems is that the mere syntax of symbols does not determine their semantics,
and, as far as I can tell, no one has advocated computationalism where content
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derives from syntax without any need for further speciﬁcation. However, it
is not uncommon to think that semantics is somebody else’s problem or that
adverting to intentional content in cognitive science is anyway a non-starter.20
However, if you intend to explain intentionality within the cognitivist frame-
work, then some account of mental content is clearly mandatory. Prevailing
philosophical theories in this regard are causal theories or so called conceptual
role semantics. These frameworks are not necessarily exclusive. On the con-
trary, it is typical to demand that adequate mental semantics requires both
causal and conceptual role factors. I explain these theories separately at ﬁrst
and then discuss them together.
As the name suggests, causal semantics postulate that the content of men-
tal representations is determined by a causal connection between representa-
tions and their putative referents. In brief, the core assumption is that the
occurrences of a speciﬁc phenomenon or object a systematically cause a token
of speciﬁc symbol or symbol structure α to occur in one’s cognitive system.
For example, whenever I see a cat, allegedly some representation α pops up
somewhere in my cognition. If the presence of cats causes this systematically,
then there is a nomological causal link between cats and α, and it is prima
facie reasonable to conclude that α stands for (i.e. represents) cats in my cog-
nitive apparatus. Causal theories hold that the same representational tokens
that occur in perception can be used elsewhere in the cognitive system; thus,
referential mental content can be generally deﬁned by the causal connections
of thought contents and extramental reality.
To be precise, it is not reasonable to assume that it is object a as such
that causes the occurrences of α but a combination of speciﬁc features of a that
allow for its categorization; for example its characteristic looks, sounds, smells,
etc. Thus, pictures of cats, for example, could correctly elicit tokens of α, while
they evidently are not actual cats. What is required for the causal link to do its
job is a suﬃcient set of more or less primitive features associated with cats to
be available for perception. Although causal theories of mental content come
in many guises, the more plausible and popular formulations speciﬁcally postu-
late that there is some primitive (albeit, unfortunately, invariably unspeciﬁed)
set of mental representations that correspond to some simple atomic features
20 For example Jerry Fodor (1980) and Stephen Stich (1983), respectively; though both have
later changed their hearts about these matters; see Fodor (1987) and Stich (1996). Also a
host of theorist reject both the belief/desire psychology as a proper explanandum of cognitive
science and classical computationalism as viable explananda (e.g. Churchland, 1989), but
these views are oﬀ the point right now.
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whose semantics are grounded by a causal connection, as speciﬁed above. In
practice, though, some theorists are quite liberal in what counts as a proper
primitive feature or property. For example, Jerry Fodor, a major proponent
of causal semantics, holds that any property at least potentially counts (see
Fodor 1987, 1990). He uses examples such as the property of being a horse
as a valid causal source. In his theory it is precisely properties, and not ob-
jects, that serve as relevant causal factors. Others are more stringent. For
example Robert Rupert (1999) frames his theory around simple natural-kind
terms, which we supposedly learn in the early years of our development before
we acquire language and a full-blown adult conceptual system. He leaves the
question of whether these representations match lexical items in our natural
language to the developmental psychologists. In any case, in causal accounts
the primitive representations are actually indices in the Peircean sense rather
than conventional symbols since their occurrences are caused by perception not
substantially unlike smoke is caused by a ﬁre.
Not all mental contents are directly grounded by a direct mind–world-
connection, however. More elaborate representations that stand for cats, pres-
idents, and black holes, for example, can be synthesized from atomic con-
stituents in the cognitive system, given that these are not treated as primitives
in the theory.21 The role of the computational theory of mind is to explain how
complex mental representations such as propositional ones can be constructed
from primitive symbols. Formal languages in general—and logics and program-
ming languages in particular—contain recursive rules to compound primitive
symbols from a ﬁnite set to an inﬁnitude of well-formed complex expressions.
These rules enable the interpretation of all well-formed symbol structures that
constitute the formal language, provided the semantics of the atomic symbols
are determined. By the same principles, the causal account of mental content,
combined with the computationalist theory of mind, explains the productiv-
ity and systematicity of thought; that is, our ability to entertain an inﬁnite
amount of diﬀerent thoughts, and our ability to understand the meaningful
21 Note that if we are too liberal in what counts as a proper primitive concept, we quickly
run into problems with distant causal connections: Is a tiger a primitive term, or theoretical
concepts like an electron? Many of us have encountered tigers only through stories, TV, and
other media, and while electrons are all present, our cognitive representations of them come
through scientiﬁc instruments, textbooks, etc. One needs to be very cautious here because if
we restrict primitive concepts to sensory primitives, the theory essentially becomes a form of
logical empiricism. If not, we need to explain how people can have primitive concepts that
are not caused directly. Well, distant causal connections are causal connections, but a good
case can be made that this issue undermines the the whole project, see Kroon (1987).
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but arbitrary recombinations of structured conceptual representations, such
as novel sentences. Productivity means that you can use already interpreted
concepts to build new ones, like x is a unicorn ⇔ x is a horse, and x has
a horn in its forehead, or f = ma. Systematicity means that if you can
think that the cat chased the mouse you can think that the mouse chased the
cat.
Productivity and systematicity are arguably the hallmarks of the human
conceptual system and also serve as evidence that recursive symbol processing
is taking place for it is otherwise tricky to explain these phenomena. In brief,
the meaning of the proposition ”the cat chased the mouse” reduces to the
meanings of ”cat,” ”mouse,” and the past tense of the transitive verb ”x chases
y.” Thus, you can use the hypothetical computational mechanism to generate
and parse any well-deﬁned formula using these expressions. If the formalism
works much like logical languages, the meaning of all symbol structures reduce
to meanings of their constituent elements and, eventually, to the meanings of
primitive concepts that obtain their meaning from the causal connection.22
Not all versions of causal account invest much in the computational the-
ory of mind but instead focus on the key issue, that is the nature of the causal
relation itself. The version I present here mostly resembles the theory that
Jerry Fodor developed during the 1980s and 1990s (Fodor, 1987, 1990). An-
other notable advocate of the causal account is Fred Dretske (1981; 1988) who
relies on the notions of information and function instead of Fodor’s law-like
causal connection. It is not my intention to do justice to the whole spectrum
of these theories but to present a version of causal semantics that I consider
to be as concise, representative, and plausible as possible without going into
speciﬁcs. Unfortunately, all formulations of this theory that I know of suﬀer
from the same three ﬂaws: (a) because of the notorious disjunction problem,
they cannot handle misrepresentation in a non-question begging way, (b) they
22 The idea that mental representations form a language-like system, the language of thought,
has deep Chomskyan roots (in Chomsky, 1957, 1965) and was developed before causal seman-
tics (see Fodor, 1975). Note that in computational functionalism, at least in the Fodorian
version, the computational mechanism plays a dual role: the content of an inner representa-
tion is causally determined, but the fact that it is a representational token in the ﬁrst place
(such as the content of a belief or a desire) is determined by its computationally implemented
functional/causal role in the psychology of the organism that uses it (see Fodor, 1987, Chapter
1). That is content functionalism, which is diﬀerent from the explanatory role computational
mechanism for parsing the meanings of complex expressions. This can cause some confusion
since apparently, at least in the received view of the theory, it was not realized that these two
roles of computational mechanism are separate and thus computational theory is actually
independent of functionalism, see (Piccinini, 2004).
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are applicable only to a very limited set of concepts, and (c) they are empir-
ically inadequate and philosophically dubious since they dismiss the role of
knowledge-based inferences in determining mental content.
The disjunction problem is that, in principle, dog thoughts could system-
atically be caused to someone by foxes in poor lighting, by poking the brain
with electrodes, or by asking ”what was your pet when you were a child?”
Moreover, there are causal factors that necessarily enter between dogs and dog
perceptions, such as neural processes in our sensory organs. Since none of the
mentioned causes of dog thoughts involve actual dogs, they should not count
as a part of the dog concept. Otherwise dog would mean a dog, or a fox in
poor lighting, or neural event x, or . . . ; but, unfortunately, this is what causal
theories seem to imply. Thus, the problem is to separate content- determining
causes from non-content-determining ones. Despite several intriguing attempts
this has proven extremely diﬃcult without smuggling some semantic concepts
into the putative reducing theory, thus rendering the sought reduction of se-
mantics to causality circular and making the content determination dependent
on something other than causal relations.
For example (in 1990) Fodor tries to solve the problem by introducing a
further asymmetric dependency condition: Assume that X → α (read: ”X
causes a tokening of representation α in one’s cognitive system, and this is
a law like regularity.”) The disjunction problem arises when there is also a
nomic connection X or Y → α, where X = Y . The asymmetric dependency
conditions means that if α means or refers to X, then the connection Y → α
must be asymmetrically dependent on the fact that X → α, in the sense that
if you break that connection, then the Y → α goes too but not the other way
around.
The theory is supposed to work like this: Assume that H2O → α holds for
someone. Later, that person runs into a sample of watery substance XY Z that
she cannot tell apart from H2O; thus, we also have that XY Z → α. Assume
also that she uses the word ”water” to denote α.23 Now, two options are
available here, where Fodor’s theory may lead us.: 1◦ As a matter of empirical
fact, the person is unable to make the diﬀerence in any circumstances and does
not care. Then her concept α simply refers to the disjunctive set H2O or XY Z.
Her ”water” concept is arguably diﬀerent from our, even though she uses the
same word as we do. No problem here since there is no misrepresentation, just
23 This is the famous ”Twin-Earth” case devised by Hilary Putnam, which features regularly
in these discussions. The uninitiated may want to consult his (1975) for elaboration of this
thought experiment.
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diﬀerent concepts. In another case 2◦ she maintains that ”water” refers to the
single substance H2O and learns her mistake. In this case XY Z → α is still
in place but (read this quote carefully):
. . . intention to use ”water” only of stuﬀ of the same kind as the
local samples [of H2O] has the eﬀect of making its applications to
XY Z asymmetrically dependent on its applications to H2O ceteris
paribus. Given that people are disposed to treat ”water” as a kind
term (and , of course, given that the local samples are all in fact
H2O) it follows that—all else equal—they would apply it to XY Z
only when they would apply it to H2O; speciﬁcally, they would
apply it to XY Z only when they mistake XY Z for H2O. (Fodor,
1990, 115)
Now, it is one thing to claim that you need causal connections to ﬁx
extensions, but it is quite another thing to claim that it is enough to ﬁx the
meaning of mental content. Here Fodor says that you need intentions to use the
concept as a kind term, and presumably you need to know that H2O is diﬀerent
from XY Z. Right at the next page he refers to ”a settled policy of using ’water’
as a kind term” and presumably we need to know that our policy is that water
refers exclusively to H2O. The message is not that you can ﬁx the contents
of your concepts by their law-like causal co-variation with their referents only.
To settle the basic meanings, Fodor explicitly exploits the notions of inference,
intentions to use concepts in speciﬁc ways, and commitments to linguistic
practices.
Fodor is implicitly invoking a version of a theory of reference called causal
descriptivism. In a nutshell, the theory states that the term α refers to a if and
only if a is causally connected to α and satisﬁes some identifying description
D. E.g., in the above example, D says that water is a substance with speciﬁc
molecular structure etc., and there is a causal link between our use of the term
”water” and the substance that ﬂows in rivers, which happens to be H2O rather
than XY Z. In the cognitivist version, this reads that a causes an occurrence
of representation α in one’s cognitive system and satisﬁes cognitive content D
associated with a, like intentions to use α certain ways that are proper with
respect to a. Arguably, this account resonates better in case of theoretical
terms than the pure causal theory (Psillos, 2012). We then need a theory of
content for descriptive apparatus employed in D. In what follows, we see how
this can be done by introducing a hybrid theory that combines inferentialism
with causal theory. After all, a mere causal relationship seems to be insuﬃcient
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to deﬁne the mental contents, and restrictive principles are needed to track
the conceptually relevant causes. Later we see that this problem seems to
contaminate all kinds of cognitivist theories of content, including the hybrid
account.24
Moreover, the causal co-variation seems unnecessary or even inherently
wrong kind of principle for a large class of concepts. Take abstract concepts
such as democracy or transﬁnite set. Causal semantics seems intuitively reason-
able with concrete object concepts, but no speciﬁc entities instantiate democ-
racies with which you can be in causal connection. Things like the constitu-
tion, decentralization of power, and social equality are essential constituents of
democracies, but it is far from clear how to reduce these kinds of phenomena
to causally eﬃcacious entities with which you can interact. Better yet, many
mathematical concepts do not even have instances. Sure enough, there is a
causal story of how, e.g., I came to grasp the mathematical concepts I know
but attending to math class does not make you to participate in a causal pro-
cess that emanates from prime numbers, transﬁnite sets, logical connectives,
and so on. To acquire these concepts is to learn how to use them.
It is hard to see how a pure causal theory of content might work, apart
from perhaps ﬁxing the content of some very primitive perceptual features; and
if conceptual content reduces to sensory primitives and their logical combina-
tions, we are back at ﬂat-out logical empiricism. Another pressing problem of
Fodorian version of causal semantics is its empirical inadequacy. This theory
aims to explain the productivity of thought and language, and as we saw above,
it does this by resorting to the classical deﬁnitional theory of concepts. In that
respect the causal factor is a bit of a red herring here since it serves only to
get the representational system oﬀ the ground. Therefore the computationalist
causal semantics, at least, seem to stand and fall with the classical theory.
While we do use deﬁnitions in concept formation, this is generally true only of
a very limited class of concepts that are mostly of technical nature. In both
philosophy and psychology25 it became clear during the 20th century that ev-
eryday natural concepts are structured rather diﬀerently. We will have review
these theories in the next chapter; however, it is worth discovering what we
24 But note that the following discussion is not supposed to make an argument against causal
descriptivism in general but only against the discussed cognitivist version. This is because
the cognitivist version here is supposed to be a reductive theory of intentional content while
causal descriptivists in general seem to be interested only in ﬁxing referents of kind terms.
25 See Wittgenstein (1953) and Rosch (1978), respectively, for standard sources.
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achieve by augmenting the causal theory with inferentialism. First, we examine
pure inferential semantics and its problems.
2.1.2 Conceptual role semantics
Causal theories may seem a natural choice for those in the cognitive camp who
stress the reference relation in content determination; however, variations of
conceptual role semantics (CRS) are more obviously computational accounts of
mental content. These theories have their roots in Wittgensteinian ”meaning
is use” conception of language and in the proof-theoretic semantics. The core
idea is to provide the meanings of syntactic tokens by itemizing the relevant
inferences that their putative interpretations would enable. For logical opera-
tors, this strategy is famously simple and eﬀective: Consider a language with
a generation rule ”If α and β are sentences, then α∧β is a sentence.” Then the
following inference rules for connective ∧ deﬁne it as the logical conjunction:
”If α and β, then α∧β” and ”if α∧β, then α (and likewise for β)”. These rules
mirror the semantics of the conjunction. By the tools of axiomatic set theory,
one can deﬁne essentially all the interesting mathematical concepts similarly.
Advocates of CRS reckon that a similar method can also be used to deﬁne
non-logical concepts.26
The core idea is based on the fact that any concept A has several rela-
tions to other concepts B1, B2, . . . , Bn, wherein the relations could be logical,
constitutive, causal, etc. These relations can be stated in terms of inference
rules. For example, if A refers to chairs and B to furniture, then ”if x is A,
then x is B”. If disease D causes symptom S, we can state that ”if x has D,
then x has S”. In the case of constituent relation, we have that ”if x is A,
then x contains B”, and so on. Next, consider that interpretations are given
to concepts B that appear in the consequent of the inference rules. Then by
substituting the occurrences of concept A by uninterpreted syntactic token α
in the conditionals, we may obtain, for example, the following expression: ”if
x is α, then x is a smallish predator mammal and a typical pet, x has four legs
26 Pure versions of CRS without any use of a referential relation or a notion of truth have
perhaps never been very popular, but at least William Rapaport (1995) has advocated that
kind of CRS. Some critics, such as Field (1977), posit that Gilbert Harman (1974) advocates
a version of the theory presented here. Harman (1987) has objected that in his theory the
possession of a concept is, at least in some cases, associated with perceiving a thing and
acting appropriately towards it, and therefore this is a misinterpretation. Because of that
tenet Harman can be loosely grouped together with the two-factor theorists discussed in the
next section. At least it is questionable whether his theory could work unless it implicitly
involves two-factors (see Block, 1986).
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and a tail, x chases mice and says ”meaow”. It seems that α stands for the
cat. Perhaps we can expand the list in the consequent enough to capture all
the essential features of cats or some total description of ”cathood”. Then the
assertion that α=”the cat” can hardly provide any further information. ”The
cat” becomes just a label for the uninterpreted symbol α, whose interpretation
is provided by the description appearing in the consequent of the conditional.
If this is correct, then the meaning of the concept cat, perhaps any concept—
can be encoded as a set of inference rules, and the occurrences of the concept
itself can be then replaced with syntactic token α without any loss of content.
In this manner we usually explain and introduce novel terms, and therefore
CRS looks like typical deﬁnitional view of concepts. However, there are sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences. First, deﬁnitional view holds that concepts can be deﬁned
by biconditionals that contain a list of conceptually necessary and suﬃcient
features of the target concepts, but this usually is not the right interpretation
of inferential relations in CRS. In fact, we typically do not know how to deﬁne
even common concepts such as furniture in a non-controversial way, although
we can use them with high eﬃciency. Well-deﬁned concepts tend to appear
mostly in technical, scientiﬁc, and related specialist contexts, and often we
have problems in understanding precisely those kinds of concepts if we are not
experts in the relevant ﬁeld.
Thus, casual observation shows that well-deﬁnedness often indicates diﬃ-
culties rather than ﬂuency in concept use. Therefore whatever merits concep-
tual analysis may have, the deﬁnitional approach seems to be ill-suited for the
concept of concept in the philosophy of psychology. However, inference rules
in CRS represent a default body of inferences that a competent user of the
concepts is disposed to make in certain circumstances, and those inferential
dispositions typically extend well beyond conceptually necessary and suﬃcient
features. For example, we may tend to infer that breaking one’s legs implies
sick leave, but this is hardly a conceptual fact about bone fractures or legs.
(Though this might be a conceptually constitutive rather than just empirical
fact about sick leaves.) Thus, inferential relations that constitute the concepts
in CRS are typically thought to contain, inter alia, causal knowledge and de-
fault associations with thematically related concepts. Basically, the inferential
rules encode a list of facts about the subject matter, and therefore concepts in
CRS resemble miniature theories rather than deﬁnitions. This is psychologi-
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cally more realistic than the deﬁnitional view27; however, it also constitutes a
problem that will be explained below.
Second, the deﬁnitional view can hardly serve as a reductionist theory of
meaning, since it relies on already understood terms if it is not augmented with
a theory of fundamental meaning, such as the causal theory. The previous cat
concept example hardly looks like a reductionist deﬁnition either, for, although
a syntactic token α replaced the term ”cat”, the consequent in the conditional
contains interpreted terms such as mammal and chases mice. The point in
CRS is that, e.g., the term ”mammal” has to be also ultimately substituted by
a syntactic token, say β, and its semantics provided by a set of inference rules,
such as ”if x is β, then x is an animal”. Again, the concept animal should
be replaced by syntactic token γ, and its semantics be provided by a set of
inference rules, and so on.
By iterating the above method, the result should eventually be an inferen-
tial network, wherein all the concepts are replaced by their respective syntactic
tokens, and the interpretation of any symbol is laid out solely by it’s inferential
relations to other symbols in the web. Thus, the contents of symbols are not
associated with the syntactic tokens as such but with their interrelations, and
the upshot is that no concept has any intrinsic content. Remove a symbol from
the web, and it loses its contents. This may sound counterintuitive but often
if one is prompted to explain the meaning of any particular concept, it seems
that the only option is to give its description in terms of other concepts. This
observation is captured in the classical account of concepts. It is diﬃcult to
say what else the possession of a concept would mean other than the ability
to use it properly in thought and communication, and the advocates of CRS
contend that there really is nothing more to it. Finally, the theory postulates
that the inferential relations between concepts are realized in the cognitive
system as computational rules that the cognitive agent is disposed to execute
in the relevant circumstances, thus completing the reductive theory of mental
content by merging it with the computational theory of mind.
Conceptual role semantics may be rather natural theory with abstract
concepts, but there appears to be concepts whose contents cannot be readily
understood by a description but only by personal acquaintance, such as red
27 A theory paradigm of concepts is a relatively recent innovation in cognitive and devel-
opmental psychology and it lacks a canonical formulation; see e.g. Chapter 4 in Machery
(2009) and Chapter 6 in Murphy (2002) and Carey (2009) for good recent summaries and
discussion. Nevertheless it has become one of the standard textbook accounts and has a good
empirical standing.
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and pain. It is not that one cannot use these concepts eﬀectively without prior
contact with their instances—that is, without ever seeing red or feeling pain—
but the problem is that mere knowledge about the rules of use of these concepts
hardly suﬃces for really knowing what they are about. Hence, it appears that
the blind lack some content of the concept red, which the others do not; even
though the blind may equally well understand and use the concept just like
most of us can understand, e.g., the concepts x-rays and radio waves even
though we cannot sense them. Thus, arguably, there is content that does not
reduce entirely to inferential links, and hence, there seems to be some, even if
very limited, room for primitive unanalyzable meaning after all.
Nvertheless, there are more focal problems with CRS that aﬀect all con-
cepts regardless of their variety. First, the theory is inherently holistic, which
causes all kinds of trouble. The holism comes about by the fact that inference
is a transitive relation: if α aﬀords an inference of β, which in turn aﬀords γ,
then there is an inferential relation from α to γ. For all I know, it is reasonably
plausible that there is a chain of inferences between any two concepts, how-
ever laborious, and thus the content of any concept depends to some degree on
every other by the tenets of the CRS.
Conceptual holism is somewhat odd, but how bad is it? Jerry Fodor and
Ernest Lepore (1991) have pointed out that some may believe that cows are
dangerous, and therefore possess the inference rule ”if x is a cow, then x is
dangerous.” This would render dangerousness as a part of one’s cow concept.
If this is the case, then in general concepts should be highly idiosyncratic, since
we all have diﬀerent experiences and beliefs about many things. The problem is
that the inferential networks between people tend to be dissimilar, and since the
content of any concept reduces to its position in the whole network, it seems
that by the holism of CRS two people cannot, strictly speaking, share any
identical concepts. Even if they superﬁcially agree completely on what cows
are, for example, they might disagree what animals are and thus have diﬀerent
cow concepts. This may still be acceptable but the situation becomes quickly
untenable. Because of the holism, even disagreement about, say, black holes
imply diﬀerent cow concepts. The bottom line is that this makes the inferential
networks, and thus mental contents, incommensurable between people. If the
networks diverge at any point, then you cannot identify any node α with node α′
in the other system, because the sole identity criterion is the nodes’ place in the
network, and diﬀerent networks simply do not have identical places. Moreover,
if you cannot compare the conceptual systems between persons, then on what
basis can you compare any such conceptual network with extramental reality?
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Besides the inferential relations, additional criteria are needed to determine
what the nodes of the network refer to. Hence, CRS in its skeletal form is
clearly incomplete.
Perhaps the remedy is to ﬁnd corresponding inference clusters in diﬀerent
conceptual networks and invent a similarity metric to compare the contents
and the identity conditions of their tokens. Do people not have diﬀerent con-
ceptions almost about anything to a degree? The answer is probably in the
aﬃrmative; however, there are still hard cases. Consider the story of ancient
people who thought that a canopy covers the sky at night and stars are holes
that let the celestial light shine through. Whether this story is true or not,28 it
seems that those people and us, armed with a modern scientiﬁcally informed
world view, have nothing in common concerning the concept of stars—save the
perceptible bright dots in the night sky. Thus, the prospect of ﬁnding simi-
lar local conceptual structures between them and us is highly improbable. In
that case, on what grounds were the putative star thoughts of ancient people
actually about stars? Then again, on what basis our thoughts are? What is
the conceptual structure that sets the standards? This point is worth stressing
since CRS seems to collapse into the core problem of content in computation-
alism: the symbols as such or their formal relations do not determine contents,
which is a necessary fact of formal systems, and the demand stands for some
extraneous act of interpretation. Either, we need causal theory after all or
another non-inferential procedure that we share with ancient stargazers and
other people with diﬀerent conceptual systems to ﬁx shared referents. These
are reasonable demands; however, they are not available for pure versions of
CRS. In my opinion, the only viable naturalistic theory of mental content is a
version of inferentialism, which is framed with references to (human) practices.
But before going into that let’s ﬁrst see how CRS fares in combination with
the causal account.
2.1.3 Two-factor theories
Although some authors consider the causal and inferential semantics as rivals
(e.g. Fodor & Lepore, 1991), a more fruitful attitude is to view them as com-
plementary. The intermixed theory is usually called a two-factor conceptual
role semantics, and the division of labor between causal theory and inferential
account are frequently dubbed as domains of wide (referential or external) and
28 As a side note, this may be the actual conception of stars at least of the ancient Israelites
(see Wright, 2000, 54–56).
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narrow (inferential or internal) content or more metaphorically as long-arm and
short-arm aspects of mental content, respectively. As noted on page 43, this
sort of hybrid theory may be considered a cognitivist version of causal descrip-
tivist theories of reference (see e.g. Psillos, 2012). The version of the theory I
present here is basically that of Ned Block’s (1986). Also Hartry Field (1977)
and Gilbert Harman (1987)29 have introduced relevant and broadly similar
accounts.
Earlier we saw that causal and inferential theories both have types of
concepts which they seem to cover better that the other. As the ﬁrst ap-
proximation, it could be reasonable to let the causal theory handle concrete
terms and CRS the abstract terms that do not have physical referents, such
as freedom and Ackermann function. Then concepts would be divided in two
clusters: the other containing concepts with causally determined content, and
the other handled by the CRS. This move would be too swift, however, since
abstractedness comes in degrees, and it is impossible to draw a deﬁnite line
between the concrete and abstract. Some concepts do not refer to physical
entities as such but can be introduced by ostension of concrete exemplars, e.g.
parity. Moreover, concepts such as wait and perhaps verbs, in general, are in
a sense abstract but something that we can learn through concrete experience.
Concepts such as a doctor have corporeal instances but could not be properly
possessed without having some relevant inferential knowledge. In other words,
you cannot categorize doctors just by perception, and it would be odd to say
that someone has the concept of doctor without knowledge of how one can
become a doctor, what doctors do, and why. It is safe to say that the proper
possession of most of the concrete concepts requires an ability to make relevant
non-trivial inferences about them. Thus, although the putative two-domains
may not overlap completely, at least they intersect to the degree that makes
their categorical separation very dubious.
Therefore dividing concrete and abstract concepts into two separate clus-
ters is not a very good idea, and the focal point in two-factor CRS is that a
mental representation can have two kinds of determinants of meaning: (a) ref-
erents that are picked out by a causal connection and (b) cognitive content that
is determined by a set of relevant inferences. Consider in incommensurability
problem in CRS. If you allow concepts to be at least partly deﬁned by their
referents determined by causal relation, the problem, if not solved, is at least
considerably mitigated. This is because you then have a criterion to ﬁx at least
29 Although it is somewhat contentious whether Harman advocates a one- or a two-factor
theory; see footnote on page 45.
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preliminary referents for a host of syntactic tokens in networks, rendering them
comparable. For example, you can anchor the mental representations caused
by bright dots in a night sky in both ancient and modern astronomers as stars
regardless of how wildly their cognitive contents of the dots may vary. This,
however, does not resolve the problem in the case of abstract concepts. For
example, if two people with very diﬀerent conceptions of democracy are debat-
ing on the matter, then on what grounds are they using the same concept? Is
it enough that they use the same word and that they recognize at least some
common features associated with it? It is not possible to ﬁx referents by a
reference to democratic states, for example, since what the putative extension
actually includes is often precisely the problem.
Regardless, not only does the causal theory alleviate some problems of
CRS, but the theories are mutually supportive both ways since the disjunction
problem of the former can be relieved by CRS to some extent. Consider a
neurosurgeon who activates dog thoughts in one’s mind by stimulating the
brain with microelectrodes. By the causal theory, the electrode assembly is
included as a referent of the concept dog. By the CRS, on the other hand,
the referents of the concept dog are mammals that bark, chase rabbits, have
four legs, and so on, which microelectrode assemblies most deﬁnitely are not.
Therefore, there arguably are non-question begging grounds for claiming the
installed microelectrodes are a spurious causal source of the dog thoughts.
Thus, besides providing means to handle abstract concepts, CRS may also
resolve the problem of misrepresentation—the most pressing problem of causal
theories. Unfortunately, however, the problem is tougher than it looks.
The central problem in the two-factor CRS concerns the relation of the
factors. As explained above, the mental content can be considered a compo-
sition of two constituents: referent, which is determined by the causal theory,
and inferential content, which is determined by the CRS. The principal point
of postulating two distinct determinants of content is to provide means to ﬁx
the extension of concepts when CRS fails to do so and, at the same, time han-
dle the problem of misrepresentation infesting the causal theory, and thus to
produce a prescriptive theory that explains how we can be in error when ap-
plying concepts. This is vital if we are to describe human behavior in terms of
propositional attitudes that rely on conceptual content. If the theory of mental
content renders every use of concepts correct by default, there can not be false
beliefs. In that case, there are hardly any grounds for applying the concept of
belief and other propositional attitudes, and hence no eﬀective use for propo-
sitional attitude ascriptions. The point in two-factor theory is that the factors
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are supposed to determine diﬀerent contents in speciﬁc cases. Otherwise the
other factor would be redundant, or we have to resort to the aforementioned
unattractive two-domain theory.
If the factors should always determine the same content, we would need to
explain how and why they are aligned in this convenient manner, which osten-
sibly is not any less opaque a problem than the one considered here. Moreover,
the factors would not relieve the problem of misrepresentation, since they both
would always fail and prosper in complete correlation. If one of the factors
is primary, we will need a theory to help us understand the circumstances in
which we should apply the secondary one, instead. If neither factor is primary,
we will need an account to help us know the factor on which we should rely
when they determine diﬀerent contents. The problem is that there is no obvi-
ous solution to guide us to know how to do this in two-factor theories, and the
problem with disjunctive categories persists.30
Let us assume that I systematically mistake elms for beeches. I associate
the correct inference rules with elms but beech trees cause the tokening of my
elm representation. Now, how can we decide whether I am really confusing
the referents and not that I have some misconceptions about the disjunctive
category that contains elms and beeches? If this kind of confusion happens in
perception, we may ﬁnd it natural to say that the object is a beech after all
and that disjunctive categories make poor concepts—hence we wish to avoid
preferring the option that I have the concept beech or elm with improper in-
ference rules that pertain only to beeches. This is the basic intuition behind
the theory; however, what we really want is to explain this kind of semantic
intuitions and why we have cross subjectively robust preferred ways in grasp-
ing the reality. The two-factor theory is not helping much. There seem to be
no satisfactory way around this problem but to rely on semantic intuitions on
which would be the appropriate factor in a given situation. Thus, we need
either justiﬁed semantic intuitions or a theory of content in order to apply the
two-factor account properly, which is an untenable situation because the sole
point of the two-factor CRS is to be a theory that explains such intuitions or
alternatively removes the need to resort to them.
30 For a more detailed discussion see e.g.(Perlman, 1997). Note also how at this point a
theorist might be lured to exploit dual-process theory of cognition to resolve these issues:
the alignment and primacy problems may turn out empirical if one associates System 1 with
concrete concepts and the causal factor, and likewise System 2 with abstract concepts and
the inferential factor. That’s what I tried and failed.
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Deep down the problem is that although the causal factor may help us ﬁx
referents for some terms, we still have the problem of determining what counts
as correct use. Without restrictions, every use of concept counts as content
determining, and hence necessarily correct. Moreover, although incorrect use
cannot be content determining, we do not want every possible correct use to
count either. For example, not every empirical fact we happen to believe about
a target concept can count as content determining; this is because some of our
conceptions may turn out to be false without changing our concepts, and if
correct use of a concept requires the tracking of all the facts of its referent,
then we barely grasp correctly any concept at all. In any case, the wholesale
conﬂation of meaning determining factors with contingent facts sounds a bit
too radical move. This becomes very clear in the case of abstract concepts,
which do not have empirical content and can not be deﬁned by using natural or
scientiﬁc kinds, such as socially constructed contents. It seems that two-factor
theorists need a criteria of correct use that is independent of actual use and
empirical facts but what could that be?
Mark Perlman (1997) has concluded that the fundamental problem with
the two-factor framework is that it simply cannot work without invoking syn-
thetic/analytic or some eﬀectively similar essentialist distinction of content.
Otherwise, it is impossible to frame any cognitivistic or related internal con-
ceptual role theory without making meaning completely idiosyncratic and iden-
tical with belief, thus rendering all use error-free by deﬁnition. The way out is
to employ some non-cognitive criteria of what counts as conceptually proper
use, and in CRS it is implicitly assumed to be analyticity.31 Therefore cogni-
tivist concept realism is untenable unless analyticity is built in to our cognitive
system.
How fatal is this problem? Cognitivists in general are probably quite hos-
tile toward Platonic concept realism; no longer does anyone believe in strict
analytic/synthetic distinction, and blatant psychologism or logical empiricism
does not sound that great either. So what to do? This provides an excel-
lent reason to abandon the two-factor account as well as the causal and CRS
theories. This, however, would be a severe blow to the attempt of explaining
mental representation on the basis of cognitivism. Perhaps you do not need to
be an old-school computationalist; however, it may be diﬃcult to see how you
can be naturalist and realist about intentional content without some reductive
account that identiﬁes intentionality with cognitive contents: If the origins of
intentional content are not inside our minds, where could they be residing?
31 See also Fodor & Lepore (1991) for similar remarks on inferentialism.
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At this point, philosophers should probably turn to psychology and try
to ﬁnd out if empirical research can shed some light on the issue, and this
has fortunately somewhat happened. Historically, this chapter has covered the
philosophical discussion of concepts from the early 20th century to the late
1980s and mid-1990s. Since then, there has been an emerging trend to aban-
don the idea that mental processes should be conceptualized after linguistic
and logical models. There are at least three good reasons why this is a good
development:
1. The use theory of concepts is independent of the referential and truth-
conditional theory of meaning, and it can survive without strict content
determination and bivalent true/false assignments of propositions. It
seems that the analytic/synthetic distinction creeps into the theory from
the back door because of the unquestioned and perhaps mostly tacit
demand that correctness of use is a categorical notion. Perhaps we should
think of concept use and conceptual understanding as a learned skill
where, instead of veridical reference, correctness is a graded notion about
the successful deployment of concepts in action, including communication
and reasoning.
2. In that case, we make advance if we know the etiology of that skill and
also what we learn when we acquire that competence since that should
tell us what phenomena our conceptual competencies actually track. The
whole point in conceptual role semantics was supposed to be about our
actual use of concepts and not about whether meaning is analytically or
metaphysically construed. The problem remains to distinguish content
determining use from non-content determining; however, as per item 1◦,
the notion does not need to be necessarily categorical, and the target
of our inquiry should be on the practical reality of the cognitive agent
rather than objective conceptual reality.
3. Moreover, when analytical philosophers probe their intuitions about what
(correct) concept use is, they are actually using that very skill. This
does not necessarily imply vicious circularity; however, it is reasonable
to discover the empirical nature of that activity. The point is that if we
conclude in our analysis that we should replace the idea that concept
use is applying a priori analytical knowledge with the idea that it is an
acquired psychological skill, it becomes more reasonable to investigate its
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nature empirically, similar to any other cognitive capacity. Otherwise, we
are left with nothing but speculative or introspective psychology.
If someone sees an epistemological problem here, all I can say is that this
is a philosophical result after all.32 The result is not that we should completely
abandon philosophy in our quest for intentional content but that we should
abandon strict internalism, logic-based modeling, and cognitive reductionism.
Instead, we should look for phenomena that structure the world as meaningful
to us and leave it to the psychologists to answer the internal questions of
how our concepts are structured and how our cognitive capacities utilize them.
This project is remote from a reductionist cognitivist theory of thinking with
propositional content and that is precisely the point.
The philosophers who began with the theory of content by pondering how
to ﬁx the semantics of propositional thought to explain conceptually structured
behavior (including thinking) got the project completely backwards. You need
intentional content in order to have meaningful thoughts, and, in my opin-
ion, the only way you can have that (empirically but perhaps not conceptu-
ally speaking) is by way of intentional action. This is how we shall proceed.
Before our empirical discussion, we brieﬂy look at two naturalistic but non-
computationalist theories of conceptual content, namely neobehaviorism and
neopragmatism. Both of these accounts diverge from the theories thus far
considered, in that they place the origins of intentional content outside the
cognitive system. The point in these discussions is to lay the conceptual foun-
dations for a pragmatistically oriented version of inferentialism that will be
developed along the way.
2.2 The origins of intentionality reconsidered
In the context of the history of psychology, the term ”neobehaviorism” often
refers to the second generation of behaviorism that reigned mostly in North-
America from the 1930s to the 1960s; it is most prominently associated with the
works of Clark L. Hull, Edward C. Tolman, and B. F. Skinner. Thus, the name
refers to the research tradition that is usually called simply ”behaviorism”—a
32 And any philosopher, who thinks that we need a good analytical understanding of the
phenomena under scrutiny before empirical investigation is even possible, probably believes
in fundamental analytic/synthetic distinction and therefore does not buy the above argument
against cognitivist CRS anyway. I mean to limit this discussion to the philosophy of psychol-
ogy and the mind. Whether the philosophers of language, for example, should take note is
their concern. In the next chapter, though, I give some reasons why they perhaps should.
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convention I will follow. I use the term neobehaviorism to denote a philo-
sophical theory of the semantics of intentional terms that carries no direct
implications to empirical psychology. Indeed, the account is entirely compat-
ible with the methodology of cognitive psychology. My use of the term, like
that of neopragmatism—a.k.a. linguistic pragmatism—is borrowed from John
Haugeland’s (1990) well-known paper ”The Intentionality All-Stars” in which
he compares three main outlines for a philosophical theory of intentionality. I
do not treat these views consistently as separate because I think that neobe-
haviorism and neopragmatism are commensurable and even complementary.
I believe that there is no preferred foundation of conceptual content, if not
that concepts, at root, are capacities for systematic behavior and their contents
depends on who uses the concepts, how, and to what ends. These capacities
are malleable and adaptive, and their contents are determined by our needs,
environments, and capacities as biological, social, and active creatures. Later, I
will explain how this means that there are multiple determinants of intentional
content and that actual conceptual systems are always somewhat idiosyncratic,
although a shared way of life tends to suppress the diversity between agents.
Hence, the more our practical realities coincide, the more easily we understand
each other; this is because the similarities of our practices mark the similarities
in our learned intuitive capacities to grasp how things hang together in our
environments. Thus, at the end of the day I actually will be selling a sort
of enactivism; which is the central philosophical theme of this work. I argue
that by exploiting insight from both neobehaviorism and neopragmatism it is
possible to parse a theory of intentional content that is far more illuminating
than its internalist rivals. Apart from the naming conventions, the following
exposition of neobehaviorism, and especially of linguistic pragmatism, borrows
heavily from the above-cited Haugeland’s (1990) article. Below, I will explain
how I think these accounts are mutually supportive and dependent on each
other’s insights.
2.2.1 Neobehaviorism
As the name suggests, neobehaviorists claim that propositional attitude terms
refer to the behavior of agents instead of their internal mental states. The
diﬀerence from the psychological behaviorism is that this stance does not per-
tain to the empirical methodology or theory formation in psychology but is
simply a thesis about the semantics of our everyday folk psychological par-
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lance. Although this standpoint may take many forms,33 the neobehaviorists
generally agree that it is necessary to consider the internal cognitive processes
of organisms in explaining the etiology of intentional behavior (which marks
the diﬀerence in comparison to the hard-line psychological behaviorism). Ac-
cordingly, this position is compatible with computationalism, but the principal
diﬀerence between neobehaviorism and representational cognitivism is their
diﬀerent accounts of the semantics of intentional terms. The point is not to
deny the importance of internal processes in explaining thought and behavior
but insist that they are irrelevant in our attributions of beliefs, desires, etc., to
cognitive agents.
What neobehaviorists and cognitivists generally agree on is that we can
eﬀectively use the so-called folk or common sense psychology and its propo-
sitional attitude terms to describe, explain, and predict others’ and our own
behavior. The gist is that this strategy works exceptionally well even without
any knowledge of the internal organization or workings of the human cognitive
system. Indeed, we can use the same ascriptions to make sense of the behavior
of widely diﬀerent systems that deﬁnitely have diﬀerent internal organizations.
Daniel Dennett is a prominent proponent of this idea, and his favorite exam-
ple is a chess machine (Dennett, 1971). Consider you are playing chess via a
computer terminal against an opponent who plays decent game. You can make
sense of your opponent’s moves by postulating that the opponent is trying to
win the game and considers dominating the middle of the board as a good
strategy and therefore decides to get the queen out early, and so on. For this
explanative and predictive stance to work, it does not matter whether you are
playing against a competent human being or a competent computer program.
What matters is that the opponent exhibits systematic behavior that is overall
means–ends rational.
Further, even if you knew that the opponent was a machine and knew its
program code and all the details of the physical mechanism that makes it run,
the intentional strategy would still be the most eﬀective way to make sense
and predict the system’s behavior, provided its program is complex enough
33 Philosophical neobehaviorism is not hugely popular, so there are hardly many competing
formulations. Daniel Dennet (e.g. 1987) is by far the most referred author of this view. Other
notable theorists include Robert Stalnaker (1976) and, up to a point, Gilbert Ryle (1949).
Despite its limited popularity, the instrumentalist account of intentionality inherent in this
theory has been adopted by several authors (e.g. Pettit 1996 and Clark & Charlmers 1998).
As a side note, B. F. Skinner had similar views about the status of folk psychological ascrip-
tions (1965, Chapter 17), although he resides in the tradition of psychological behaviorism
and supposedly would have disagreed with philosophical neobehaviorist on many counts.
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to render the machine code explanation too laborious and that its behavior is
suﬃciently systematic and rational to make the intentional explanations eﬀec-
tive. The point of this rather trivial observation is to invalidate the argument,
put forward e.g. by Jerry Fodor (1987), that the success of commonsense psy-
chology in explaining and predicting human behavior gives us at least a prima
facie good reason to assume that propositional attitude ascriptions reﬂect the
factual ontology of our cognitive system. The Fodorian argument states that
we use propositional attitudes as hidden variables in causal explanations of oth-
ers’ behavior, and since those explanations generally work very well, then, in
the spirit of scientiﬁc realism, we have a reason to assume that the intentional
terms correspond to true causal variables in the etiology of human behavior.
However, if it is true that we can apply commonsense psychology successfully
to describe and predict the workings of chess machines, animals, and a wide
variety of other agents, the argument seems to lose its edge.
The upshot is that if folk psychology does not discriminate diﬀerent kinds
of agents, then it does not make diﬀerence between diﬀerent types of theo-
ries of human cognitive processing either. This is because if there are any
stable and real phenomena that commonsense psychological ascriptions pick
out they cannot be the elements of internal structure and processing. Accord-
ing to neobehaviorists, however, you can be intentional realist even though it
turns out that nothing in the cognitive system corresponds to propositional
attitudes because the referents turn out to be real dispositions or patterns in
overt behavior. For example, we can say that ”The cat believes that there is
food in the box” and take that statement as literally true without committing
to the view that there are representations in the cat’s cognitive system that
stands for the concepts of food or box. The corollary is that you do not have
to be able to mentally represent the concept food in order to have wants or
beliefs about it because beliefs and wants are manifest in overt action and not,
at least principally, in thought. This does not mean to deny the existence
of intentional thinking, as some radical old-school behaviorists would have it
but to insist that acting as such is intentional, thinking is a kind of acting,
and concerning to intentionality acting is ontologically more fundamental than
thinking. Moreover when we try to decide whether our intentional descriptions
are adequate or not, we do not inquire into hidden internal causes but try to
ﬁgure out whether the overall behavior of the agent matches our intentional
interpretation of its behavior.
Slight deliberation reveals that the neobehaviorist strategy of intentional
explanation works a bit too well. Why not explain the rock’s rolling down
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the hill by its purported desire to reach the bottom? Perhaps rocks are not
good candidates for things that exhibit intentional behavior, but programmable
washing machines, for example , behave at least in some ways comparable to
chess machines. Should we, therefore, conclude that the washing machine
wants to get the laundry dry and considers spinning it furiously for a few min-
utes contributes toward that end? If that is absurd, why is it all right then
to adopt the intentional explanation stance towards chess machines? Many of
us ﬁnd it hard to dislodge the intuition that while some complex non-mental
systems may have a sort of as-if beliefs and desires, it is humans (and per-
haps some other animals) who really have the right stuﬀ. The neobehaviorists
maintain that these intuitions are unwarranted because intentional explana-
tions actually are instrumental regardless of the fact that they refer to actual
patterns of behavior.34
It is an empirical question of whether an when speciﬁc folk psychological
explanations work; however, when they do, they are concerned with real be-
havioral dispositions. Since there are no as-if behavioral dispositions, there are
no as-if intentional attributions, either. It’s just that in case of rock behavior
you don’t gain anything by postulating rock-beliefs and rock-desires because
simpler and more eﬀective explanatory strategy is just to say that rocks, like
physical objects in general, tend to roll down the gravitation gradient if there
is nothing blocking their way. In the case of chess programs and people or
other entities that exhibit complex behavior, we gain the most eﬀective ex-
planatory and predictive framework by imposing on them intentional states
rather than resorting to laws of physics. It is not a matter-of-fact issue about
which descriptive strategy and terminology to use but a matter of explanatory
and predictive economy.
So, in the realm of intentional explanation everything is permitted because
nothing is, strictly speaking, true? Dennett has stressed that instrumentalism
implies that there are good and bad intentional construals of behavior and the
good ones are genuinely predictive. It is, after all, real patterns that they should
pick out. Moreover, there is a certain logic intrinsic to intentional terms that
the explanations need to respect. For example, you cannot explain someone’s
preference for celery stalks over ice cream by saying that he hates celery and
loves ice cream. However, if you add the fact that he tries to eat healthily, the
preference readily makes sense. On the other hand, if he often consumes large
34 See Dennett (1987, Chapter 2). Note that theory instrumentalism is generally considered
to be incompatible with realism. Dennett defends a sort of mid-ground position, which he
calls ”mild realism” (Dennett, 1991b).
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quantities of bacon, the explanation becomes defective unless it is augmented
with the hypothesis that he believes bacon that is bad for health. Regardless
of whether the latter belief is warranted or not, it again renders the behavior
rational and enables us to derive a further prediction that, all else being equal,
he would prefer bacon over ice cream. There are two points here: (a) there is
a speciﬁc logic intrinsic to terms like ”belief” and ”desire,” and (b) the correct
use of intentional descriptions presupposes that the target systems truly exhibit
patterns of behavior that are systematic and suﬃciently rational under that
logic. According to Dennett (1991b), the target system can satisfy multiple
intentional explanations; however, some of them may imply predictions that
turn out to be systematically false. Hence, Dennettian instrumentalism is a sort
of ”mild realism” about propositional attitudes rather than rampart nihilism.
Fair enough, but how is it that we really seem to utilize internal propo-
sitional representations? I really can entertain a thought that it is raining
and evaluate its implications; however, these mental episodes do not neces-
sarily manifest themselves in my behavior. Moreover, if we want an accurate
intentional description of others’ behavior, is it not usually the most straight-
forward way to just ask them? They may not always tell the truth, of course,
but at least they know the truth. I take that these rather obvious facts render
the internalist accounts of intentionality so compelling. There are two distinct
matters here: The ﬁrst concerns the nature of thoughts and the other is about
the privileged epistemic access to our own intentional states. Thus, the issue
here is that while thinking probably is a kind of doing, you cannot evaluate all
the mental acts on the basis of overt behavior. Therefore, if intentional phe-
nomena are tied to manifest behavior, how can private thoughts be intentional?
Here the story becomes a bit tricky and unavoidably ”just-so”. My preferred
version is roughly what Daniel Dennett (1991a, Chapter 7) speculates about
the development of language.
There are more reﬁned accounts of linguistic development available but
for the sake of parsimony we do not go into details. An interested reader
might appreciate the reference that story bears relevant resemblance to the
theory put forward by Michael Tomasello (2009) and his colleagues (Tomasello
et al., 2005). See also (Fitch, 2010, Section 4) which presents a more broad
outlook of themes discussed below, especially about the diﬀerent varieties of
the possible protolanguage. The developmental aspect of story that follows is
not necessary; it is just illustrative and should be taken with a grain of salt.
The point is to show how the system of communicative expressions can grow
out from shared non-linguistic intentions that an agent wants to communicate
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to another in situations where they both share some common practices, which
make it possible for the recipient to understand what might be the point of the
expression (see also Grice, 1957).
The story assumes that language initially developed from signaling prac-
tices that were tied to the social behavior of communication about things in
the immediate environment. Certain deeds were made to pass warnings, re-
quests, and threats, and to direct joint attention and to coordinate material
exchange. These communicative practices could have comprised sounds or ges-
tures, but they were anyway instruments of social behavior, not unlike what
can be observed in present-day primates. Over time, these practices evolved
into a protolanguage, which enabled communicative acts to be used to refer to
things not immediately present.35 Thus, utterances or gestures were used to
pass and ask for information about things that were absent or not necessarily
even materialized yet. A simple example of this type of practice is when I point
to a direction and signal a particular sound and you respond selectively with
a signal that is used in the presence of food when facing danger. This sort of
behavior could ostensibly engender the representational function of utterances,
which evolved from the primary coordinative function. Before this stage, the
only normative element of language use was how successfully it was applied to
the joint task at hand, but now another factor entered into linguistic practices,
namely truthfulness, which became relevant since the new communicative func-
tion made it possible to misrepresent reality. It was now possible to lie and to
be mistaken. The emergence of this sort of symbolic practices also enabled one
to represent the intermediate consequences of actions before they were taken
and, by induction, alternative chains of actions to reach distant goals. Thus,
while the chains might have been built only from associative links, it became
possible to practice some kind of reasoning and planning jointly by producing
those chains in conversation.
Now, if you can talk with your comrades why not with your self? The
social linguistic practices could have ﬁrst transformed into private talking and
then people just dropped the overt speech when they learned to carry out
the discourse entirely in their minds, perhaps in the same way that we can
mentally simulate overt actions. The neobehavioristic account of propositional
or conceptual mental representation is precisely this. Speaking (or gesturing or
35 This capacity is manifest in the gesturing of at least some great apes (Lyn et al., 2014).
See e.g. (Jackendoﬀ, 1999) and (Arbib, 2005) for arguments for vocal and gestural origins of
protolanguage, respectively.
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whatever) evolved into a system that enabled referring to things not necessarily
present, and thinking is nothing but speaking internalized.
The complete story of the evolution of language is undoubtedly far more
complex and presumably involves concurrent biological evolution. These de-
tails are not much relevant to our discussion, except perhaps the possibility of
the commonly held idea that language came about as a means for expressing
our thoughts. Not surprisingly that has been a more inﬂuential view among
old-school cognitivists like Fodor and Noam Chomsky (Harman, 1975). Com-
putationalists armed with two-factor CRS hold that we speak out our thoughts
whose intentionality originates from within. For neobehaviorists intentionality
is tied originally to behavior. This includes social practices, and when they
extended to the communal use of symbolic language, it became possible men-
talize intentionality. This neobehaviorist stance bears a strong resemblance to
linguistic pragmatism. Before probing that in detail we have one loose end,
still: How neobehaviorism fares with our purported subjective authority and
access to our own intentional states?
The above story answers the question in case of linguistic thoughts but
how it fare with propositional attitudes in general? First oﬀ, it is instructive
to mind the diﬀerence between explicit commitments and dispositions such as
beliefs and desires. Jonathan Cohen (1992) has oﬀered an inﬂuential analysis
of intentional terms in which he claims that beliefs and desires are in a sense are
cast upon us. We cannot choose them, we often do not know where they came
from, and we do not always even know that we have them until we ﬁnd ourselves
in a situation where they manifest themselves. He adds that another breed of
intentional states is accepted commitments, which are explicitly adopted and
aﬀect our behavior as far as we deliberately enforce them. The diﬀerence seems
to be very relevant to the analysis of propositional attitudes within the two-
system framework (Frankish, 2004). The point is a blunt but easily overlooked
fact about the proper use of propositional attitude ascriptions: Often we come
to believe what we accept and sometimes we come to acknowledge our beliefs
and desires; however, the explicit endorsement of our attitudes is not built into
the logic of proper use of intentional vocabulary, and a deliberative control
over them is actually absent as a norm.
To illustrate the diﬀerence, Cohen cites a lawyer who cannot help believ-
ing that her client is guilty and desiring that the client gets punished. Due
to work ethic or whatever, the lawyer may accept the policy of treating the
client as innocent and act accordingly. This is a conﬂict of intentions but not
a violation of practical syllogism: The lawyer desires to win the case and be-
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lieves that to do so, she should treat the client as innocent and hence presents
the client as such. At glance, this kind of self-controlled behavior is problem-
atic for the Dennettian account. In terms of explaining the lawyers behavior,
ostensibly, the most parsimonious intentional explanation would be that the
lawyer believes the client is innocent. However, as per the hypothesis, this
would contradict the facts considering the lawyer’s beliefs. But if we look at
the lawyers behavior in the long run, we may discover that her behavior has
been consistently professional in court cases. If that is the case, we better
assume that the lawyer is simply doing what a good lawyer is expected to do
and resort to the practical inference just explained; we restrict ourselves from
hypothesizing about her beliefs about her client and explain her behavior by
referring to her putative beliefs and desires about proper professional conduct.
Moreover, if we share the same information that made the lawyer believe the
client was guilty, we should expect that she also considers the client not in-
nocent regardless of the lawyer’s actions in the courtroom. This is because if
we compellingly conclude that the client is guilty, then, under the rationality
assumption built into intentional stance, we should expect the lawyer to reach
the same conclusion accordingly.
The problem the neobehaviorists are facing boils down to the status of the
putative actual beliefs and desires of the lawyer. The issue is that even if we
do not have authority over our beliefs and desires, do they still reside inside
us as states of mind that we can access and report or do our reports on our
own propositional attitudes stem from taking an intentional stance towards
ourselves? The latter would mean that when we introspect we actually treat
ourselves as a subject of behavioral theorizing. The idea may appear odd but
at least Wilfrid Sellars (1956) has proposed something along these lines. His
idea was that intentional terminology is fundamentally behavioristic; however,
after the practice of using it to describe others’ behavior was been established,
the next step was to extent it to explain our own behavior to others and to
ourselves.
The point is that while reporting our propositional thoughts (expressed
in internalized language) resembles reporting our propositional attitudes, the
surface similarity is misleading. The latter is actually grounded in taking a
theoretical stance toward our own behavioral inclinations in a vocabulary that
makes sense to others. Interestingly, the facts support this position. The classic
example is Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson’s (1977) experiment. They
arranged a fake consumer survey in a commercial establishment where they
invited passer-bys to evaluate ﬁve pairs of stockings. They found a marked
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preference for pairs positioned on the right-hand side of the table. When
inquired about the reasons for their preferences, the subjects referred to various
properties of the stockings, even though all the pairs were actually identical.
All the subjects denied that the location had any eﬀect on their preferences;
yet, it did for reasons still unknown. Nevertheless, they were not lying or
consciously making up reasons.
The phenomenon is called confabulation which (in this context) means
sincere rationalization of one’s actions. The subjects were conﬁdent that they
were reporting veridical reasons for their behavior, which was actually caused
by non-conscious processes that may elude intentional (in the sense of rational)
explanation altogether—which likely is the case in the stockings experiment.
No normative reason exists for preferring objects on the right-hand side of the
table, although the eﬀect is so evident that there must be a causal reason for it.
Wilson’s Strangers to Ourselves (2002) demonstrates how surprisingly meager
our self-understanding truly is and how often we devise sincere and reason-
able, albeit non-veridical, explanations of our behavior. Although none of this
refutes the reality of so-called internal mental states, not even propositional
ones, our knowledge of the psychology of intentional attributions attests to the
correctness of Sellars idea.
2.2.2 Neopragmatism
Neopragmatists aim to derive conceptual contents not from the individual men-
tal states or patterns of behavior but from the cultural practices that consti-
tute the way of life of linguistics communities. They maintain that conceptual
meaning is produced or determined by using words in a familiar manner. This
can be speciﬁed in many ways and the version that is relevant here is the one
further claims that meaning is normative in essentially social sense. Along this
line of thinking, the original intentionality is often seen as attached to tools,
performances, and other shared objects and practices. The idea is that fun-
damentally norms are not explicit rules or conventions but shared communal
practices of doing things in speciﬁc ways. Norms are established by tracking
what others do and how they do it, conforming to those practices, and pe-
nalizing deviant behavior. This sort of conformism is arguably necessary in
prelinguistic social coordination, since it is hard to do things together if we
have diﬀerent expectations about how to accomplish joint goals and cannot
communicate our intent or negotiate our methods.36
36 See also Tomasello et al. (2005); Tomasello (2009).
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Neopragmatism is a multifaceted postmodern version of classical pragma-
tism that emphasizes linguistic practices in determining intentional content.
The term is often associated with the philosophy of Richard Rorty and has
been inﬂuenced by continental philosophy, especially Martin Heidegger and
Jacques Derrida, and thinkers from the analytical tradition, such as Willard
van Orman Quine, Donald Davidson, Sellars, and Wittgenstein; it has also
been inﬂuenced by early American pragmatism, especially the works of John
Dewey.37 The neopragmatism discussed here inclines toward the analytical
facet, and my exposition is based on the versions formulated by John Hauge-
land (1990) and Robert Brandom (1994; 2000).
Humans tend to form social groups. The potential behavioral variety
of human is higher than other animals; however, as social creatures, we also
have tendency to suppress this variety by imitating others and adopting their
habits. Thus, people tend to adapt to mainstream practices and, moreover,
we persuade others to conform by peer pressure or sometimes force. This
results in a dynamic coupling between the group and its individual members,
which tends to level the initial multitude of behavioral dispositions and forge
a group behavior with relative homogeneity. Group behavior comprises of a
more or less consolidated set of norms that shape society’s culture and way
of life as a whole. Here ”norm” does not mean moral code only but whatever
behavior deemed normal in relevant circumstances. In this reading of ”norm,”
non-normative behavior is deviant by deﬁnition but not necessarily wrong.
Sometimes breaking the norm exhibits criminal, lunatic, or heretic behavior,
but sometimes an innovative act of a reformer or genius. Often, it is mostly
trivial. Why do certain behavioral dispositions end up as the norms of society
while others do not need not concern us here. The reasons are several, including
a mere chance. According to the neopragmatists, it is essential that the norm-
welding process does not initially require explicit thinking or discourse. The
process is solely the result of our innate mode of group behavior, more like
ﬂocking or herding than negotiating.38 In fact, to neopragmatists, there is no
language or concepts to negotiate and reason with befor community’s norms
have consolidated, because they are the source of all meaning.
According to Robert Brandom (1994, Chapters 1 & 2) the foundational
idea of linguistic pragmatism rests on the tenet of Immanuel Kant that all
37 See Haugeland (1990) and introduction in Rorty (1991). Note that it is the later works
of Wittgenstein that are relevant here, especially Wittgenstein (1953).
38 Or, as Haugeland puts is, ”When behavioral dispositions aggregate under the force of
conformism, it isn’t herds that coalesce, but norms.” (Haugeland, 1990, 405).
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conceptual activity necessarily has a normative character. In perception we
take something to be true, and in action we make something to be true. What
makes these events intentional, in contrast to merely causal, is that there are
reasons to take or make something true, and the concept of reason is inherently
normative: things can be done for wrong reasons while they cannot happen
for wrong causes. Often norms are understood as explicit rules that express
how things ought to be done; however, neopragmatists conception of norms
also cover socially enforced regularities that are manifest only in action. They
claim that the latter type of norms (i.e. largely tacit forms of social praxis)
are actually more fundamental and a necessarily precondition for explicit nor-
mative rules.
This necessary pragmatist factor relies on the Wittgenstein’s observation
according to which the act of following an explicit rule also has a normative
dimension: In principle, there are conditions where rules can be applied incor-
rectly, and to explicate these conditions, we need further rules and, to cut the
resulting regression ﬁnite, the chain of norms must be eventually grounded in
practical normativity implicit in doing things in particular ways. The point
is not that there must be practices that cannot be described in language but
that some non- or pre-linguistic standard practices are necessary for the system
of rules to get oﬀ the ground and make explicit norms intelligible (Brandom,
1994, 62).39 Finally, the necessary social dimension sets in because mere reg-
ularity in behavior is not normative enough: for a performative regularity to
be normative in the absence of explicit rules, there must be practices of so-
cial sanctioning that enforce certain actions (Brandom, 1994, 34–35). This
last clause has, again, a Wittgensteinian ﬂavor, because it is reminiscent of
the famous (impossibility of a) private language argument40 in that the idea
of private norms is fundamentally incoherent. If we abandon the idea of tran-
scendental, norms then the only remaining viable naturalistic account is that
incorrect behaviors are eventually those that get sanctioned by our peers.
The story so far may sound identical to neobehaviorism with a caveat, in
that it is not patterns of individual behavior that engenders intentional content
but patterns of communal behavioral regularities. In other words, the critical
diﬀerence is that neopragmatists ground meaning in successful conformism
39 Note that the argument bears a close similarity to the one introduced in the famous
”What the Tortoise Said to Achilles” by Lewis Carroll (1895): While you can always substitute
inference rules for axioms, you can’t introduce all the rules within the system. Some principles
must be grounded as uninterpreted procedures. See Brandom (1994) onwards from page 22
for discussion.
40 See Wittgenstein (1953) from §253 onwards.
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rather than means-ends rationality to fulﬁll the individual’s goals. This ob-
servation is not entirely accurate, however. Neopragmatism takes norms to
be necessary for demarcating the causal realm from intentional because the
latter is constituted by reasons. According to Brandom (2000, 106–110) it is
essential to note that a mere selective responsivity to the environment is not
enough to render behavior intentional; otherwise, we should accept that iron
has the concept of oxygen because it rusts as a response to an exposure. In
the preceding section, we dismissed this problem by treating intentional ascrip-
tions as instrumental; however, neopragmatists maintain that a fundamental
distinction can be made between intentional and non-intentional behavior.
Norms are essential to intentionality because they establish reasons for
acts, claims, and conclusions. In order to do or say X intentionally, one has
to have a reason for doing so, and the norms regulate what are good and
what are bad reasons for X. This implies a kind of inferentialism that links
premises, which work as reasons, to conclusions that are established for rea-
sons. Here, inferences need not have anything to do with formal logic. In
the intentional discourse, they are often codiﬁed as practical inferences where
conclusions are usually actions and where perceptions can be considered a spe-
cial case of premises (Brandom, 1994, 233-234). This is what establishes the
logic of intentional vocabulary discussed in the previous section. To exhibit
true intentionality, we need to be able to play the game of giving and asking
for reasons. This means that we need to understand and be able to explicate
the purported rationale of our actions. This parallels the neobehaviorist ac-
count of internal intentional states explained earlier.41 The diﬀerence is that,
according to neopragmatists, it is this ability to exploit the logic of estab-
lished intentional vocabulary to make sense of the reasons behind actions that
renders behavior conceptually structured. Indeed, neobehaviorists owe us an
explanation where the logic of intentional terms comes from, which enables us
to take intentional stance in the ﬁrst place. According to neopragmatists it
comes from the social fabric of reasons that determines what cultural niches
various contentual tokens, such as ritual objects, customary performances, and
tools, occupy (Haugeland, 1990, 404). However, conforming to social norms as
such cannot exhibit full-blown intentionality since the neopragmatist position
assumes that such conformism is initially operative without conceptually struc-
tured intentionality (i.e. prior to language), which would require the capacity
41 And, in fact, Wilfrid Sellars is perhaps more clearly in the linguistic pragmatism camp
than with the neobehaviorists for he holds similar views.
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to articulate reasons and hence language. So, how does conceptual content
emerge from social praxis then?
John Haugeland (1990) explains the idea of how practical norms relate
to linguistic meaning by an analogy between words and tools. Consider tools
like a saw or a hammer. They clearly are not symbolic representations and,
as objects, they do not refer to anything. However, as tools, they are for
something. Hammers are for driving nails and saws are for cutting wood.
Moreover, there are correct and incorrect or intended and non-intended ways
of using them. Hence, tools have something like proto-semantic properties
that are derived from their intended or correct use, and, as tools, they in a
sense point toward their purpose not unlike words point toward their meanings.
Moreover the practices of nailing and sawing serve as means to other ends, such
as constructing buildings. Thus, there is a close analogy between linguistic
expressions and carpentry tools, for example. Words and sentences are about
something whereas tools and practices are for something. Where the former are
embedded in social practices, which constitute language (understood not as an
abstract system but a practice of social coordination), the latter are embedded
in an interlocking web of paraphernalia and practices, which constitute the art
of carpentry.
The analogy goes one crucial step deeper, still: The major philosophical
problem with the naturalization of intentionality is to explain how intentional
phenomena can satisfy both semantic and causal properties simultaneously.
Tools have this character, since an essential properly of being a tool is to take
part in causal nexus of hunting, constructing, or whatever kind of work, and
tools also retain their normative character of what they are for even in the
absence of their intended practical use. Similarly, linguistic tokens are inter-
twined in causal acts of communication but retain their meanings independent
of occurrences of their use and in the absence of their referents. In both in-
stances this intended purpose or meaning is ontologically dependent on the
underlying culture in which the tools or the words are put to use. Outside
the actual speciﬁc use contexts they carry no interesting causal or semantic
properties.42
Linguistic utterances, though, have a property that tools lack: they are
tokens that stand for other things; that is, they have a symbolic function.
42 For further discussion (outside strictly neobehaviorist tradition) the reader is advised to
consult Enﬁeld (2015) on treating language as both a medium for and a result of causal social
interactions; the parallel to tools is further elaborated in Sections 4 and 5 and in the ﬁrst few
pages of Wittgenstein (1953).
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However, here ”symbolic function” does mean an abstract reference relation
but a context bound causal factor in social exchange. Words symbolize through
their use in actual material social contexts. The point of neopragmatist use
theory of language is not just that in order to make sense to others we need to
follow some rules of language, but also that norm bound communal practices
precede and establish all intentional content. Accordingly, concepts form a
kind of inferential network where their contents are partly determined by how
they relate to each other in reasonable intentional explanations. For example,
explaining why one is cutting down trees by referring to one’s intention to visit
his relatives would presumably make perfect sense without further elaboration
in a society where families are dispersed on several islands and it is a common
practice to build boats. Speciﬁc ways of explicating our intent make sense
while others do not, and our everyday communication requires ﬁguring out a
vast amount of relevant semantic and practical connections rooted in our daily
practices. This essentially knits intentional content and practical reasoning.
Furthermore, this makes linguistic tokens function similar to tokens of
mental representations in conceptual role semantics; that is, their content is
determined by their role in the system of tracking reasons. The key diﬀerence
here is that for neopragmatist, the ontologically fundamental domain of con-
cepts is their use in communicating intent in social praxis rather than their
use in mental processing as the proponents of CRS would have it. Thus, while
both theories are varieties of inferentialism, the original medium is external and
communal to neopragmatists whereas internal and individual to the advocates
of CRS.
I take that these communal regularities play the role of ”settled policies”
that in turn translate into ”intended purposes” that Fodor tried to smuggle
into his theory to make sense of misrepresentation.43 What we have ﬁnally
found here are the grounds for demarcating correct and incorrect applications
of concepts without invoking analytic/synthetic distinction or other notion of
conceptual truth. There is a price to be paid, however. One of the main prob-
lems with internalist accounts was to explain how it is possible that diﬀerent
cognitive agents can have the same propositional attitudes and commensurable
conceptual systems. In the case of CRS, the problem lapsed into determining
the correct inferential network. If you go along with linguistic pragmatism,
these problems disappear because of conceptual relativism built into the the-
ory. The correctness in the use of concepts is dependent solely on how they are
understood under the social conventions that determine what is locally rational.
43 See the quotation on page 43.
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Local rationality here means that while local norms are not necessarily arbi-
trary, their acceptance is fundamentally just a question of how they play out in
social discursive practices. When we learn these practices, we simply learn to
explicate reasons according to principles that are sanctioned by our peers. To
neopragmatists, conceptual domains are constituted by human practices where
particular objects and acts are intentionally bound together by their perceived
normative statuses. This means that conceptual contents and domains are
strictly dependent on the idiosyncrasies of the relevant community.44 What is
taken as obvious or (un)reasonable is likewise locally determined.
If you have postmodernist (or perhaps Quinean) inclinations, you may ﬁnd
this aspect of the theory appealing; however, I think many would ﬁnd it hard
to swallow that meaning and rationality are just a matter of communal inclina-
tions, especially in the ﬁelds of science and formal disciplines. In any case, this
view departs radically from the idea that reasoning is grounded in intellectual
intuition of universal conceptual or metaphysical essences. Here, the concept of
”norm” is philosophically very thin as it is. Ultimately, it is taken to mean just
social expectations; basically what people with certain statuses are expected
and allowed to do in certain situations, which is often far from the notion of
ideal. Moreover, social expectations are supposed to emanate from learning
social regularities, which can often violate explicit normative standards. But
note that this ”often” comes about because we usually notice the normative
character of behavior only when our expectations are violated. Much of our
everyday life is normatively structured but this eludes our awareness because
social norms are mostly implicit and often quite trivial. What needs to be
shown is that non-trivial, non-social, explicit, and often abstract norms, such
as moral ideal, and those that govern formal rationality (both often violated
in everyday behavior) are fundamentally the same ontological species as the
more trivial social expectations. We will get back to this in chapter 5.
But how credible are the principles of neopragmatism? Inferentialism as
such is too commonplace to require a dedicated discussion here; however, the
idea that the relevant inferential relations are local discursive regularities is
certainly far more controversial. I do not intend to delve into the philosophical
merits and problems of this account. I will, however, question the claim that
44 But note that certainly plain practical matters can engender normative statuses and
often practical and other factors are intertwined. The use of clothing and dietary customs
are excellent cases in point. Moreover practical rationality is supposedly constrained by our
biological makeup, and therefore this account does not in principle rule out the possibility of
more or less universal human practices and hence universal norms.
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linguistic pragmatism can be the whole story of human intentionality. It will
play an important role later when we discuss abstract concept learning. Right
now I want to address the conjectural mechanism tracking and enforcing the
relevant social regularities, which bears rather strong empirical commitments
considering human social cognition. Another empirically risky claim is the
comparison of tool and language use. Both planks are somewhat diﬃcult to
assess empirically; however, our scant evidence supports these ideas. Let us
start with remarks on the connection of language and technological praxis.
Premotor cortex F5 in monkeys contains a mirror neuron system for grasp-
ing, which has common activation patterns for executed and observed manual
actions. Area F5 is homologous to human Broca’s area in left cerebral hemi-
sphere, which is generally considered to be a speech area, or, more speciﬁcally,
to execute tasks associated with production and syntactic parsing of language.
Moreover, the monkey area F5 contains canonical neurons that ﬁre when a
monkey sees a graspable object. (Arbib, 2005) Recent evidence shows that
in addition to speaking, Broca’s area is also active in signing and when hu-
mans both execute and observe grasp. It seems to play a crucial role in action
recognition and production, and in interpreting actions of others in term of
goals. (Fadiga & Craighero, 2006; Fadiga et al., 2006) This strongly suggests
that cognitive mechanisms responsible for social understanding and language
use are closely related to manual praxis. Broca’s area seems to be involved
with a more general function than previously thought, which is not solely a
linguistic capacity but a general function to extract action meanings by inter-
preting sequences (e.g. motor or phonemic) in terms of goals (Fadiga et al.,
2006, 87). Naturally, such capacity is essential for dealing with meanings of
actions that have sequential and hierarchical structure—which are hallmarks
of both language and tool use.
There is also evidence that links archaeological records of increasingly
complex tool making to progressively complex neural structures, which overlap
language processing. Apparently, in stone tool making (and in many modern
manual tasks), the division of labor of dominant hand performing small-scale,
rapid processing, and the inferior hand providing stable postural support for
the worked object is mirrored in the development of more general functional lat-
eralization in the brain. Ancient Oldowan stone tool manufacture require less
of this type of hand specialization, while newer Acheulean tools require more
asymmetric specialization of contralateral hand coordination. These tasks re-
cruit neural resources that respectively overlap with neurons involved in the
word- and sentence-level processing in the left hemisphere and discourse level
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processing in the homologous areas in the right. This suggests that there may
be an important evolutionary link between the development of language and
cognitive capacities underlying tool use and manufacture. (Faisal et al., 2010;
Uomini & Meyer, 2013) Broadly comparable conclusions have been drawn by
studying the teaching of Oldowan stone tool-making techniques by mere imi-
tation and teaching with gestural or verbal support. The results indicate that
verbal teaching has signiﬁcant beneﬁt over gestural teaching which is, in turn,
superior to mere imitation. Hence, apparently the reliance on stone tool mak-
ing generated selection for teaching and especially for verbal tutoring, thus
engendering the gradual evolution of language tied to social and technological
praxis. (Morgan et al., 2015)
The idea that tools, gesture, and language share a common evolutionary
history and, therefore, common cognitive resources is not new and far from a
settled matter. Nonetheless, it is becoming clear that the old discoveries of neu-
ral correlates of linguistic processing have actually found neural resources for
more general capacities, which are involved in organizing and interpreting com-
plex intentional action, which transcend mere linguistic tasks and are shared
with technological and social praxis. This, and related recent research,45 are
important to our inquiry because these considerations highlight that regardless
of the conceptual and factual disanalogies between language and tool use, their
psychological connections and similarities as hierarchically and combinatorially
organized causal domains are not superﬁcial. Therefore it is empirically mo-
tivated, and not a mere philosophical speculation, to theorize about actual
language use as ontologically similar to technological and social praxis, thus
empirically supporting the neopragmatist conception of language.
The other open issue was the assumption that we exhibit a speciﬁc type
of social conformism. It is, of course well, known that children are prone to
imitate others and that most people tend, often unconsciously, to prefer in-
dividuals who are similar to themselves (Jones et al., 2004). However, the
neopragmatist claim of conformism is far stronger since it assumes that we
extract norms by tracking what our peers and authorities do and that we also
tend to enforce these practices to others. Moreover, this disposition should be
an instrument for social cohesion and coordinating collective behavior in com-
plex tasks, and therefore it should interact with both perceived group aﬃliation
and instrumental rationality in a social setting. It seems that for a long time
imitation research has somewhat missed the social and normative aspect, and
45 In addition to the above mentioned research the reader will ﬁnd a brief and accessible
summary of relevant discussion in Stout & Chaminade (2012).
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therefore much of these phenomena have remained undisclosed; however, recent
evidence reveals essentially this type of pattern (Over & Carpenter, 2012).
Children often readily learn what is relevant for achieving instrumental
goals; however, they also pick up and replicate irrelevant aspects of others’
actions, leading to over-imitation. There is ostensibly some inconsistency in
this behavior, but at least four variables modulate it: (a) causal opacity of
procedures, (b) instrumental versus ritual (or conventional) context, (c) peer
pressure, and (d) a need to identify (or to ”aﬃrm a shared state”; Over & Car-
penter 2012, 185) with a model. Thus, children faithfully replicate futile details
if they are unsure what aspects of behavior are causally relevant or what the
purported goal is supposed to be; but they may also do this knowingly—even
when alone—if they want to identify with the model. Both the presence of the
model and observing several peers participating in causally irrelevant behavior
facilitate over-imitation. Hence, this sort of learning is often termed ”ritualis-
tic” instead of imitative. This tendency apparently serves many functions, such
as learning causally opaque skills, learning cultural conventions, forging social
cohesion, and aﬃrming one’s position in the relevant group (Over & Carpenter,
2012; Keupp et al., 2015; Legare et al., 2015). The underlying mechanism in-
volved in all these factors seems to be that of tracking what perceived in-group
members do and how they do it.
Of particular importance is the normative character of ritualistic learning
precisely in the sense of normativity employed by neopragmatists. Children
spontaneously enforce learned practices on others and protest against viola-
tions. It seems that they pick up regularities in ways of doing things as socially
normative regardless of their causal relevance. The enforcement of norms is
stronger if the context is considered conventional rather than instrumental and
also if others are deemed to be in- rather than out-group members (Over &
Carpenter 2012, 187; Keupp et al. 2015).
Abstaining from norm enforcement in instrumental contexts may appear
contradictory to neopragmatism; however, this is not the case. If the fundamen-
tal function of conformism is to coordinate social praxis in the absence of ex-
plicit knowledge about how to achieve shared goals, then we should, somewhat
paradoxically, expect that irrelevant regularities are enforced more strongly in
a conventional context where participants are unable to explicate any reason
for conforming to shared standard practices. In conventional or ritual con-
texts, the speciﬁc ways of doing things are the ends themselves. However, in
instrumental contexts, what matters is that things are accomplished and any
means–ends rational way is, in fact, normative if the procedure is laid out
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such that it makes sense to the peers. Showing that the goal can be achieved
in novel ways may be an essential part of making sense of one’s idiosyncratic
actions because it makes salient what parts of action sequences actually are
relevant. In this sense instrumental rationality is multiply realizable in a way
that conventional normativity is not. Therefore norm enforcement may be sup-
pressed. On the other hand, perceived practical rationality is also constrained
by (implicit) social norms underlying our understanding of what means and
ends make sense. This is why in instrumental contexts, we still should expect
people to sometimes protest the perceived violations of means–ends rational-
ity even if their own interests are not directly involved and even if ends are
met. This is because causally opaque procedures may be perceived as failing
to behave in (locally) rational ways, thus constituting a norm violation—given
that the procedure is not carried out by the model; i.e. authority or in-group
majority. That is somewhat curious because it means that people may get irri-
tated by completely eﬀective behavior simply because they have learned to do
things diﬀerently; however, this is precisely the pattern that has been observed
(Kenward, 2012, 203).
Although many variables modulate the ﬁdelity of imitation systematically,
children are often incapable of explicating why irrelevant actions should or
should not be performed. While children from two to three years of age can
often distinguish morally bad from mere violations of conventions, they tend
to encode observed actions as normative without encoding explicit reasons for
this. (Kenward, 2012, 205) This kind of naivety is philosophically signiﬁcant
for the reductive explanation of (socially) normative intentionality because
one only needs to be able to observe what others do and follow suit. One need
not be able to understand why certain acts and choices are made. Rather,
this conformism lays the foundations of social expectations and, hence, norms
and eventually understanding reasons.46 Essentially, it explains normativity
through social normality. Relevant research discussed here is mainly involved
children. It may be reasonable to hypothesize that these eﬀects diminish when
children mature and develop better conceptual tools to rationalize what is nor-
mative and why and gradually drop imitation and other ritualistic behavior;
however, this is not the case. Implicit norm extraction and enforcement actu-
ally increases with age and remains with adults. I quote Ben Kenward (2012,
205):
46 Although the imitative behavior requires goal directed intentionality in (social) action,
see the next section and Tomasello et al. (2005) & Tomasello (2009) on etiology of norms,
collaboration, and language.
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First, in over-imitation studies, there is no clear evidence avail-
able to the children as to why the action is performed. Second, in
one previous study, using a very simple apparatus, the majority of
over-imitating children, when asked why they would perform the
unnecessary action, were unable to give any sort of coherent answer,
although most could explain that a necessary but otherwise equiv-
alent action was causally necessary (Kenward et al., 2011). These
observations demonstrate that children are capable of encoding ob-
served behavior as prescriptively normative without exposure to
clear information as to why it is normative, or even as to within
which domain the normativity of the behavior is determined, and
without having formed an expressible belief about the reasons for
the action’s normativity.
Therefore, I suggest that children may sometimes encode an ob-
served action as normative without engaging in any reasoning jus-
tifying the action’s normativity and without even believing the ac-
tion’s normativity is determined within any speciﬁc domain such
as social convention or instrumental rationality. This suggestion is
in line with evidence from adults, who are capable of holding views
about the normative status of a behavior without being able to give
coherent explanations for why the behavior should be proscribed or
prescribed (Haidt, 2001; Hauser et al., 2007). The cognitive pro-
cesses that produce such views are intuitive and not directly avail-
able to introspection, and norms can be acquired unconsciously as
a result of observing others follow them (Cialdini, 2007; Haidt &
Bjorklund, 2007; Sripada & Stich, 2007).
I believe that this is more than enough to conclude our discussion about the
empirical credibility of the psychological nature of implicit norms as employed
by neopragmatists. What remains to be shown is that practical social norms
in this precise sense are constitutive of conceptual content. As I explained
earlier, I will rather take that as a starting point later when discussing abstract
concept learning and try to show how that idea can be utilized to yield a
fertile theory of intuitive conceptual understanding, pertaining especially to
theoretical concepts understood as a set of learned social practices.
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2.3 The constitutive role of non-linguistic behavior
Whether or not there is a uniform class of psychological phenomena that can be
labeled as ”concepts”, I’m conﬁdent that they are primarily not instruments of
thinking but doing. With concepts, we can make generalizations which allow
us to encounter the world as a multitude of ordered phenomena so we need
not consider every thing and every situation as novel and singular without
connection to other phenomena and past encounters. This, of course, is what
makes goal-directed rational behavior possible in the ﬁrst place. Therefore,
concepts mediate the relation between sensing and acting, and it is natural to
assume that the information that conceptual mental representations carry are
primarily aﬀordances and related functional information. In other words, the
cognitive system does not just represent what is out there but primarily what
things do and especially what can be done to or with them.
This point has been too often overlooked in the traditional philosophy of
mind, and as a result there have been considerable problems in accounts of the
content of mental representation. To put it bluntly, it is no wonder that there
have been critical problems in attempts to determine mental content when
the theories tend to leave half of the content out of consideration—indeed
a very important half since the whole point of ”what is it” part of mental
content is to serve the ”what can I do about it” part. There is no point in
intentional content if it cannot be used to direct behavior. This, however,
does not rule out that some of our concepts may be purely ”intellectual” or
”discursive”. This is trivial since thinking and public reasoning are kinds of
behavior. The non-trivial claim that I will pursue mostly in Chapter 5 is that
the psychological content of even highly abstract concepts is at least partly
constituted by functional knowledge about the actual use of these concepts in
concrete situations, as per the principles of linguistic pragmatism.
A serious issue with linguistic pragmatism, which I take to be fatal for
the orthodox version of the theory, is that it tacitly assumes—but ends up
denying—the existence of non-linguistic intentionality. I ﬁnd it rather evident
that some non-linguistic intentions necessarily underlie the capacity to enforce
and engender prelinguistic practices that institute norms in the ﬁrst place.
Brandom’s philosophy carries an intuitively compelling implication that mere
responsive mechanisms do not count as intentional agents; however, it is far
more harder to swallow that non-human animals and prelinguistic infants do
not count, either. Brandom certainly acknowledges this and also that infants
and animals may be thought of as having something like beliefs that guide
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their action (1994, 153-156). However, concerning non-linguistic creatures, he
thinks that intentional ascriptions are merely derivative (p. 142). He adds
that we make sense of the behavior of such organisms (and perhaps other sys-
tems) by applying propositional attitudes that, strictly speaking, apply only
to linguistic agents. This is because to have propositional content, which ac-
cording to Brandom is the only form of genuine conceptual content, one must
have an ability to participate in the practice of giving and asking for reasons
which, in turn, necessitates language. In his account, this marks the very im-
portant distinction between genuinely sapient and merely sentient creatures.
For Brandom, plain perceptions and actions are not normative if they are not
framed with discursive concepts, and therefore the behavior of organisms that
lack language belongs to the realm of causality rather than of intentionality
(Brandom, 1994, 233-234).
It seems intuitive (to me, at least) that creatures that exhibit selective
responsiveness to their environment with accordance of their needs, pains, per-
ceptions, and expectations have exhibit some form of intentionality even if
they are incapable of doing deliberative judgments and decisions. This seems
particularly true for organisms that ostensibly express primitive non-linguistic
conformism by learning to keep their behavior in order. But, after all, it is phi-
losophy’s task to check these intuitions when they are unfounded. However,
like e.g. Carl Sachs (2014, 69) I ﬁnd that Brandom is selling the right account
of linguistic intentionality, but there is the problematic move from this to a
less credible linguistic account of intentionality. Nothing in Brandom’s the-
ory of linguistic meaning seems to imply that a notion of non-linguistic and
non-propositional intentional content is incoherent. His theory of conceptually
structured observation and action seems to entirely dismiss the relevance of
other cognitive capacities, which makes it possible for organisms to respond
to their environments diﬀerentially, systematically, and means–end-rationally
with regards to their needs and capacities.
Brandom makes it a point that if we accept any sort of intuitive/discursive-
concept distinction—where intuitions carry non-discursive content—we will
face problems with normative restrictions on intuitive concepts and end up ba-
sically in the same muddle than with two-factor CRS: We either need to resort
to supposedly given semantics facts or else we cannot explain what it means
to apply concepts incorrectly. Therefore he rather rejects the need to oﬀer
an account on how intuition guides the use of concepts; he refuses to discuss
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diﬀerential responsiveness in other terms than physiological; and, therefore,
conﬂates intentionality with discursive reason rather than with agency.47
The most pressing issue here is not the intentionality of animals and infants
(or the lack of it) but that if we take even rudimentary formulations of two-
process theories seriously, pure linguistic pragmatism tends to render most of
human behavior not conceptually structured and hence non-intentional, which
is absurd. This is because most of our daily activities and expert tasks are
executed either completely or at least partially as a tacit process that is gener-
ally supposed to be pragmatic, action-oriented, and independent of language.48
More to the point, putative System 1 processes are inaccessible, and hence of-
ten we do not have any explicit understanding on what the supposed rationale
our intuitive judgments manifest. As noted earlier, in some reasoning tasks es-
pecially non-experts often oﬀer irrelevant, nonsensical, and even contradictory
assessment about their presumed decision-making processes (Wason & Evans,
1975; Evans & Wason, 1976; Evans & Over, 1996). Experts obviously apply
conceptual knowledge but are often incapable of articulating clear reasons for
their decisions—or at least better reasons than advanced beginners—especially
with complex problems.49 Thus, even though people are capable of ratio-
nalizing and conceptualizing their behavior (either through confabulation or
reﬂection), this capacity is often irrelevant to the behavior exhibited. Hence,
it is an empirical fact that although concepts and knowledge guide perception
and action, the associated cognitive processes are often not guided by discur-
sive knowledge. In other words, the reasons we give in the practice of giving
and asking for reasons are sometimes diﬀerent from those that actually pro-
duces our behavior, and even if they often do conﬂate, it is still possible that
the cognitive mechanisms driving the two (i.e., implicit production and explicit
comprehension of behavior) generally operate independently.50
Of vital signiﬁcance is the assumption that intuitive System 1 processes
carry out the very same tasks as reﬂective System 2 because, considering the
47 For more elaborate discussion see Sachs (2014, 72–82) and Pendlebury (1998).
48 A proviso should be added outright. Much of what I intend to say later depends on
the claim that some intuitive processes are linguistic. This does not aﬀect the issue at hand,
however. Many of my arguments also depend on the claim that very little intuitive processing
is linguistic. This means that language is not a sound criterion for demarcating System 1
from System 2 processes.
49 This observation dates back to the famous research on chess masters by Adriaan de Groot
(1965). The phenomenon is discussed at length in connection with other tasks and domains,
for example, in Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986) and Klein (1998). See also Kahneman & Klein
(2009).
50 For further details, see the discussion in Section 3.1.
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paragraph above, it would be borderline absurd to count behavior intentional
only if is a product of System 2 deliberative processes. The upshot is that there
has to be a vast intentional middle ground between discursive knowledge and
mere causal diﬀerential responsiveness. But how can we analyze this kind of
intentionality which perhaps eludes analysis into propositional constituents? It
is worth noting how neobehaviorists shift the focus of intentional interpretation
from articulated reasons to behavioral competence and hence substitute central
elements of propositional representations with instrumental ones. This means
to focus on goals instead of referents, success instead of truth, and means and
ends instead of evidence and conclusion (Haugeland, 1990, 398). Brandom
says that non-linguistic systems can only have ”a primitive kind of practical
taking of something as something” (Brandom, 1994, 33–34). However, to me
it is clear that this ”primitive” capacity can go a very long way in what comes
to conceptually structured behavior.
I am not sure why the aforementioned capacity should be normatively de-
termined especially in social sense. A good enough reason for taking particular
action is to fulﬁll one’s goals, even if the agent is incapable of explicating its
rationales. Misapplication of discursive concepts can be thought as a special
case of behavioral failure where the feedback that something went wrong comes
from the social environment rather than the material one. You can’t pass a
course in logic if your behavior violates the norms of valid inference. Shifting
the focus from misrepresentation to pragmatic failure blurs the line between the
causal and intentional (in the Brandomian sense); however, the other option
seems to be denying non-linguistic and non-human ”primitive” intentionality
entirely. I take that that would also mean that non-human organisms do not
have goals or intentions, properly speaking. I guess one philosopher’s ponens
is another’s tollens, basing my argument on this wisdom, I would rather go for
the former option. What ever demerits this choice may have, I am convinced
that they are balanced out by the advantages it oﬀers in understanding how
conceptual cognition works, including discursive reasoning.
Taking discursive misapplication of concepts as a special case of pragmatic
failure also blurs the line between cultural and material: Social praxis is just
a special case of material praxis. Learning discursive practices is based on
tracking actual material causal events in the social domain. This position
is generally endorsed in neopragmatism, and it precisely gives its status as
a naturalistic theory of intentionality. The implication for cognitive theory
is that even if humans have dedicated cognitive capacities to language and
social cognition, more general causal learning should be involved in learning
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and comprehension of discursive practices. This was, after all, the point in the
above comparison between social and technological praxis. Often the core idea
of neopragmatism is considered to be that everything contentful is normative
all the way down; however, I am more interested in the aspect that conceptual
understanding is based on causal induction, all the way up to abstract concepts.
In short, causal cognition is the key to semantic cognition.
Given the discussion above, I propose that concepts or intentional mental
capacities are primarily devices for systematic behavior and only secondary
instruments of thinking and public reasoning. Thus, contents associated with
object and event concepts also contain information about the environment and
object aﬀordances, possibly in the form of motor (or more abstract action)
schemata and causal knowledge. Moreover, representational and pragmatic
aspects of mental contents are frequently inseparable. Perhaps content deter-
mination in non-propositional mental representation must ultimately be ﬁxed
by terms of behavioral control in the perception–action loop because it is the
action control for which mental contents are principally for. However, for my
purposes it is immaterial whether this is strictly necessary. The important
point is that to understand what content mental states carry, we must ﬁnd out
what behavior they bring about and how the world discloses itself to the active
organism. This is basically an obscure (i.e. philosophical) way of saying that
we need empirical research on what the organism tracks in its environment,
and why and how it employs the conceptual resources so produced. If this
is correct, the quest for abstract reference relation is generally inadequate for
forging the foundations of contents of mental representation and intentionality
in general.
Also, is that if propositional attitude ascriptions presuppose phenomeno-
logical or commonsense theoretical understanding of how we grasp the world
(the ”propositional” part) and our psychological needs, capacities, disposi-
tions, and so on (the ”attitude” part), it follows that folk psychological de-
scriptions capture the actual essence of our own intentional contents almost
by deﬁnition—since that is where propositional attitude terms receive their
meaning; however, we can apply these ascriptions only derivatively and instru-
mentally to other lifeforms and systems. As we saw, this is what orthodox
neopragmatists claim. The reason is that our interpretation of these descrip-
tions depends on our conceptual system, and full appreciation of our con-
ceptual system includes, inter alia, the discursive and inferential knowledge
that it contains. And if there is no strict demarcation of discursive and other
pragmatic knowledge, human concepts that are contaminated with discursive
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contents (which is perhaps most of our concepts) cannot be projected on non-
discursive conceptual systems without residue. But given this, it is essential
to note that then these ascriptions apply only partly also to other people, es-
pecially from other cultures. Their pragmatic and discursive knowledge may
be diﬀerent from ours because of their diﬀerent environmental demands and
ensuing experiences. In the case of language users, this parallels the thesis of
the indeterminacy of translation,51 although its impact is somewhat diﬀerent.
This is because most of our conceptual content—as I will show later—is partly
constituted by non-discursive pragmatic knowledge.
Therefore, like any discursive concepts, intentional ascriptions refer to
the kind of intentionality or intentional content that we share with similar
agents with similar worlds (or practical realities or Lebenswelt or whatever).
In other words, our understanding of intentional ascriptions are dependent on
our pre-theoretical understanding, gained through personal experience, of how
we cope with our world. The extent to which we share with other people
or agents the same capacities, needs, goals, demands, social institutions, and
other practical frames that constitute our life-world approximately determines
the extent to which our conceptual contents coincide. Moreover, discursive
reasoning is a practice in its own right, and it may well be a powerful tool in
widening the scope of our conceptual understanding. Mutual reasoning is a
way to integrate conceptual systems (at least to a degree), and hence explicit
discourse relieves us from being a hostage to our culture and autobiography,
even if we cannot wholly share our diﬀerent life experiences. These remarks
about cross-cultural understanding should also pertain to subcultures, expert
communities, etc., in one’s own social environment. The implication is that
intentional content depends on several factors: our biological and cognitive
makeup, our experiences, and our material and social environment.
The reader may ﬁnd that the above paragraph contradicts my earlier state-
ment, that often we do not know the rationale behind our own behavior. Hence,
a point of clariﬁcation is perhaps in order: What I’m claiming here is that the
neobehaviorist story about propositional attitude ascriptions is, by and large,
correct. However, language as such is not semantically transparent and folk
psychological language (or perhaps all language) is too crude an instrument
to accurately describe all the psychological, social, and environmental aspects
behind the etiology of our behavior. Neopragmatism is necessary for elaborat-
ing the origin from which our understanding of the logic of practical reasoning
51 See Quine (1960, Chapter 2). I see this as a rather trivial implication of locality of
rationality, as explained earlier.
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emanates. Our life experience makes that logic semantically transparent be-
cause the propositional attitude terms grow in and out of our practical realities.
Hence, the ”essence” what these expressions capture is not stable, and the same
propositional attitude descriptions may describe diﬀerent contents to diﬀerent
persons. It is important to note that even if the propositional attitude terms
refer to behavior (and derivatively to thoughts, as explained earlier), we need
to make sense of that behavior and that happens by (mostly tacit) recourse
to our own experience as agents in the world. This does not mean that our
folk psychological reports are always correct, even in the case of our own be-
havior, but that the involved concepts obtain their contents from our human
conduct, including how we think and talk about it. We often misinterpret
others’ reasons, and the rationale of even our own behavior may sometimes be
completely obscure to us and require a cognitive scientiﬁc explanation. Again,
our understanding of these latter explanations is grounded in our scientiﬁc
practices. Propositional attitude terms are explicit statements that capture
aspects of our life-world and our orientation toward it but not necessarily the
essential aspects of the cognitive capacities that enable us to think and behave
in meaningful ways. So, if a lion could talk, we could not understand him and
presumably, neither would Aristotle readily understand the Bayesian rational
analysis of intuitive decision-making.
Furthermore this means that there are no strict objective facts about in-
tentional attributions because diﬀerent capacities, demands, and experiences
will end up dissecting the world diﬀerently. However, as a matter of empirical
fact there are gradual similarities between intentional contents and, therefore,
more or less literal and derived ways of attributing them. What is implied is
that there is no one privileged source of meaning and no possibility of general
analysis or identiﬁcation criteria of intentional content, at least in propositional
terms.52 Later, I will explain how this will pertain to abstract and discursive
concepts and that all understanding is based on our ability to use concepts
skillfully, including ”intellectual” understanding. If this is correct, then the
linguistic meaning is a form of (or at least mostly constituted by) pragmatic
knowledge rather than a separate representational realm. This blurs the dis-
tinction of the two, and if one wishes to hold a strict discursive theory of
52 To be more precise, there should be no hegemony of language, logic, non-linguistic prac-
tices, perception, or cognitive faculties in determining conceptual content. They all take part
in constituting content both in subjective and in intersubjective spheres because they all take
part in deﬁning the limits and character of our practices. To what extent each listed factor
is relevant depends on the speciﬁc tasks.
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concepts (i.e., that genuine conceptual content is linguistic knowledge), we risk
claiming that most if not all human intentional behavior is not strictly speaking
conceptual, linguistic behavior and thinking included.
Even after dismantling the possibility of a determinate analysis of propo-
sitional content, the question about content similarities and diﬀerences still
makes sense. However, the relative indeterminacy of content ceases to be a
merely philosophical question and becomes an empirical one. Content deter-
mination may be a diﬃcult task (depending on the case), but basically content
determination problems now lapse into empirical underdetermination of fac-
tual claims, which we cannot entirely avoid in science anyway. My argument
aims to show that (a) non-linguistic content often precedes linguistic content
(I take the latter to be determined by enactive extension of neopragmatist
inferentialism) both ontologically and psychologically, but (b) in some cases
they are independent to a degree, but (c) even when they are, inferential use
of language almost invariably recruits non-linguistic cognitive resources. I aim
to blur the distinction of sentience and sapience as much as I can. Sadly, this
distinction appears to be the last line of defense in the border of causality and
intentionality. I hope the reader is already accustomed to the basic drift that I
do not feel much entitled to defend any dualisms of the enlightenment, be they
intuition vs. reason, mind vs. matter, subject vs. object, or thinking vs. doing.
I do not think that what I am sketching here denies us of the understanding
of these distinctions or of what the clear cases of the agency are. If it robs us
the notion of clear boundaries between mechanisms and agents, so be it.
The above remarks rather deﬁne a problem than answers one. If we get
rid of the aforementioned important frames of modern philosophy that have
shaped our understanding of epistemology, ontology, subjectivity, and mental
concepts what questions can be oﬀered in their place? The problem becomes
to determine exactly the pragmatically relevant variables and relations that
conceptually structured cognitive processes are sensitive to, and what is the
proper language to be used in describing the allegedly non-propositional prag-
matic content. The ﬁrst problem is empirical, and we can get a grip on the
latter if we put the skills and functional knowledge in the foreground of our
analysis and try to explain conceptual understanding as an adaptive skill per-
taining to practical expertise.
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2.3.1 Embodied and enactive alternatives
To recap the discussion thus far, I think neobehaviorism and linguistic prag-
matism both get aspects of propositional attitude ascriptions right. Neobehav-
iorism harbors the correct idea that intentionality is not fundamentally about
reasoning or propositional thinking but about doing. Neopragmatism provides
a fruitful naturalistic account of discursive concepts and ontology of language.
What is particularly important is the idea that linguistic meanings are social
practices and that utterances can be considered analogical to tools in how they
take part in concrete causal processes. Both of these approaches, however, are
ill-suited for describing non-propositional conceptuality in its own terms and
hence do not readily provide any analysis of the nature of intentionality that
is operative when an organism couples with its environment through action.
Fortunately, under the banners enactive, embodied, and embedded cognition,
a body of research is emerging speciﬁcally addresses this aspect of intentional
action. I will not discuss these positions in detail for reasons that are explained
below; however, a review of the core characteristics of these overlapping trends
is useful before we conclude this chapter.
Diﬀerentiating between these three approaches is not straightforward
mainly because they share many common characteristics, and diﬀerent the-
orists hold diﬀerent views and emphases. The ﬁeld is currently taking shape
and lacks a canonical formulation. Often the collective header 4E is used to
refer to these research paradigms. The fourth E comes from ”extended”—the
idea some of our cognitive processes and memory systems are distributed in
the environment (Clark & Charlmers, 1998; Clark, 2008). What can be con-
sidered the unifying theme is that cognition and intentional phenomena are
active processes that are manifest in a dynamic coupling of the organism and
its environment through its bodily action. The point is incisively paraphrased
in the subtitle of Andy Clark’s (1997) book as ”putting brain, body, and world
together again.” The message is that mind is not a representational system at-
tached to the brain, insulated otherwise from the world but through the body
that works as the brain’s input/output interface—like cognitivists often seem
to think.
Often the terms enactive and embodied cognition are used interchangeably
and neither do I mind the subtle diﬀerences they might carry. However, as a
terminological choice, I would rather call my stance enactivist because I put
more theoretical weight to action than to the body. My understanding is that
some form of embodiment is at least implicitly presumed in any enactivist
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stance. Although enactivism is relatively recent development (the term was
introduced in Varela et al. 1991),53 it has important predecessors; for example
biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1926), developmental psychologist Jean Piaget
(1952), perceptual psychologist James J. Gibson (1979), and, in this context,
oft-cited phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1996).54 Merleau-Ponty,
in turn, refers to Edmund Husserl’s notion of ”operative intentionality” in an
introduction to his anti-cognitivist theory of perception:
When I begin to reﬂect, my reﬂection bears upon an unreﬂective
experience; [. . . ] Perception is not a science of the world, it is
not even an act, a deliberate taking up of a position; it is the
background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by
them. The world is not an object such that I have in my possession
the law of its making; it is the natural setting of, and ﬁeld of, all
my thoughts and all my explicit perceptions. (x–xi)
[. . . ] Husserl distinguishes between intentionality of act, which is
that our judgments and of those occasions when we voluntarily take
up a position [...] and operative intentionality (fungierende Inten-
tionalität), or that which produces the natural and antepredicative
unity of the world and our life, being apparent in our desires, our
evaluations and in the landscape we see, more clearly than in ob-
jective knowledge, and furnishing the text which our knowledge
tries to translate into precise language. [...] Through this broad-
ened notion of intentionality, phenomenological ’comprehension’ is
distinguished from traditional ’intellection’ [. . . ] (1996, xviii)
This non-propositional intentionality is precisely what I am after: inten-
tionality that is manifest in action and perception, that precedes our intellec-
tual reﬂective understanding and furnishes our discursive reason with meaning.
The notion and the importance of operative intentionality are again raised by
Shaun Gallagher and Katsunori Miyahara (Miyahara, 2011; Gallagher & Miya-
hara, 2012) in their attempt to fuse neopragmatism with enactivism and to
hence produce a somewhat similar account of human intentionality to what is
developed here.
53 Although psychologist Jerome Bruner already used the term in similar but somewhat
more restricted sense in 1966 in his book Toward a Theory of Instruction (p.10–11) .
54 Other notable inﬂuences/concurrent developments are, for example, autonomous robotics
by Rodney Brooks (1999) and embodied cognitive linguistic of George Lakoﬀ and Mark
Johnson (1999).
85
In 1991, Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch described
enactivism as stemming from the observation that there are many ways the
world can disclose itself to diﬀerent organisms, depending on the structure
they have and the kind of distinctions they can make. They wrote that ”[. . . ]
cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but
is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the
variety of actions that a being in the world performs.” (1991, 9) Thus, the mind
is a plastic and dynamic system, and a cognitive agent’s world is a relational
(in contrast to absolute) entity formed through the autonomous activity of
the agent with its speciﬁc mode of coupling with its environment. The same
conviction is echoed in the later works of these authors. Varela (1999) cites
the works of Lakoﬀ and Johnson and asserts that higher cognitive capacities
”also emerge from recurrent patterns of perceptually guided action” and that
”the world we know is not pregiven; it is, rather, enacted through our history
of structural coupling, and the temporal hinges that articulate enaction are
rooted in the number of alternative microworlds that are activated in every
situation” (Varela, 1999, 17). These ”microworlds” are basically situations
or events with which we cope in our daily lives. Thompson (2007), in turn,
stresses that cognition is the skillful exercise of embodied know-how in situated
action. This is an important idea, which will be echoed throughout the rest of
this work.
The enactivist framework focuses heavily on sensorimotor mechanisms
that are engaged in all perceptually guided activity of the organism. The point
is that cognition-in-action is not best thought of as a linear perceive-compute-
act cycle but as real-time coordination of behavior and changing environmental
variables. In this line of thinking the intrinsic activity of the organisms marks
the diﬀerence between intentional agents and mere responsive mechanisms,
such as vending machines or rusting blocks of iron. The upshot is to insist that
all cognitive processes are truly cognitive insofar as they participate in the
corporeal activity of the organism, including the ones that are often thought
of as information pick up processes, such as perception and categorization.
For these reasons, enactivist and embodied paradigms are closely aligned with
mobile robotics, self-organizing systems, and artiﬁcial life research rather than
artiﬁcial intelligence. This is not meant to be an all-out assault on reﬂec-
tive reasoning but to insist that action itself is meaningful, cognitive processes
that take part in perception and action have intrinsic intentional content, and
that operative intentionality is constitutive also of reﬂective thought and hence
fundamentally conceptual. As Di Paolo et al. (2011, 39) remark:
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Regulation of structural coupling with the environment entails a
direction that this process is aiming toward [. . . ] This establishes a
perspective on the world with its own normativity [. . . ] Exchanges
with the world are thus inherently signiﬁcant for the agent, and
this is the deﬁnitional property of a cognitive system: the creation
and appreciation of meaning or sense-making, in short.
[. . . ] Organisms do not passively receive information from their
environments, which they then translate into internal representa-
tions. Natural cognitive systems are simply not in the business
of accessing their world in order to build accurate pictures of it.
They participate in the generation of meaning through their bod-
ies and action often engaging in transformational and not merely
informational interactions, they enact a world.
The knowledge involved in these interactions serves us to respond to the
environment selectively and anticipate how the world—or our perception of
it—changes as a result of our activity; thus, intentional content tied to enac-
tion is both meaningful and ”goes beyond information given” while it remains
non-propositional and non-representational because it is constituted from the
viewpoint of the organism and intrinsically for the organism. Whether this
kind of content can be considered conceptual or not naturally depends on the
analysis of concepts one adopts, but I hasted to add that the matter is some-
what orthogonal to the intuition/deliberation distinction. There is no reason
why conscious deliberation should necessarily involve symbolic representations
because you can reason with mental images or other sensorimotor representa-
tions, and such thinking may constitute propositional but non-discursive and
enactive reasoning. As Alva Noë has put it, ”we need only to recognize that
the concept of experience and the content of thought [as representing things
as being thus and such] can be the same” (2004, 190). The issue is discussed
in detail in Chapter 4
Neither does enactive intentionality cut across linguistic/non-linguistic de-
marcation, because this sort of mental content does not imply that all percep-
tual concepts should have lexical labels nor deny that some have. Some content
involved in operative intentionality is readily communicable, although it clearly
does not have meaning in referential semantics sense. Rather, this sort of con-
tent is something that comes out as the intuitive interpretation of propositional
attitude ascriptions and which is, as explained earlier, intersubjectively com-
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municable and understandable to the extent the participants share the same
capacities and practical world as deﬁned by enactivists.
Another key tenet that I will exploit comes from Valera with considerable
inﬂuence from Dreyfus brothers (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). It connect enac-
tivism with dual-process theories and highlights the importance of expertise in
intuitive reasoning and casual coping with the world:
My interest in immediate coping does not mean that I deny the
importance of deliberation and analysis. My point is that it is
important to understand the role and relevance of both cognitive
modes. It is at the moments of breakdown, that is, when we are not
experts of our microworld anymore, that we deliberate and analyze,
that we become like beginners seeking to feel at ease with the task
at hand. In this light one can say that computationalist cognitive
science has been mostly concerned with the behavior of beginners
and not with that of experts. (Varela, 1999, 18)
The moral is that if tacit and automatized commonsense reasoning is an
expertise that pertains to our daily activities, then it is this practical know-how
that cognitive science needs to study, instead of deliberative problem-solving
and explicit know-that, if it intends to reveal to us the fundamental nature of
cognition. Moreover, concerning intentionality and mental content, the mean-
ing constitutive relation goes precisely the opposite direction in comparison to
cognitivism or Brandomian linguistic pragmatism: Action does not inherit its
meaning from acts of deliberation by the agent; it is the other way around.
Enactivism comes close to neobehaviorism; however, is also contrasts with it,
in that intentional content is not an interpretation of behavior but instead en-
gendered in it. Ontologically, the only thing that incorporates meaning in the
world is the intentional activity of organisms. Certainly, interpreting behav-
ior is behavior, but the ﬁrst order intentionality is realized in the action itself
and for the agent itself. Therefore, the manifestation of intentionality does
not necessitate a separate act of interpretation. It is diﬃcult to tell whether
enactivism strictly inclines toward the internalist or the externalist side of the
fence since enactivist intentionality is supposed to be found in junction with
inner and outer realms if analyzed according to the traditional philosophy of
mind.
Because of these characteristics, enactivism has always been closer to phe-
nomenological tradition than to logical analysis, even while it promises not to
be a descriptive project about human experience but an empirical framework
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for psychology. This has sparked hopes not only for phenomenologisizing the
cognitive science but also for naturalizing phenomenolgy55 and thus perhaps
narrowing the notorious explanatory gap between the physical reality and the
consciousness.
For the philosophers accustomed to analytical rigor, everything said above
may appear vague and programmatic at this point. The enactivist framework
is somewhat challenging to describe concisely because it is more a collection
of ideas that indicates a problem space rather than a solution. Consequently,
many authors have diﬀerent interpretations of what enactivism and embodied
cognitive science is or should be about. There are reasonable doubts that enac-
tivism is too vague and radical and whether or not it can really provide a new
framework for modeling cognition and not just a new vocabulary for concep-
tualizing mental processes in novel ways—which, of course, is an achievement
in its own right.
Enactivism is closely related to a modeling framework called dynamic sys-
tems theory (van Gelder, 1995; van Gelder & Port, 1995; Beer, 1995; Thompson,
2007). Applying dynamic systems theory in cognitive science is not an entirely
new innovation. It originates in Ross Ashby’s general cybernetic theory of the
behavior of organisms and other systems (1956; 1960), which inﬂuenced the
second generation of neural network models (Rosenblatt, 1958, 1962) and later
found its way back to the foreground of cognitive science through developments
in connectionist theory in the 1990s56. The basic idea of dynamic systems mod-
eling is to identify a set of variables that characterize the system and deﬁne how
their values depend on each other. The state of the system can be deﬁned as a
point in n-dimensional space, deﬁned by value ranges of the n-variables. The
state space of the system can then be represented geometrically as a manifold,
which is essentially an n−1 dimensional surface, formed by the points that rep-
resent possible conﬁgurations of values (i.e. states of the system). The shape of
the manifold and the resultant dynamics is determined by functions that deﬁne
dependencies between the variables and how the state of the system evolves as
a function of time in each point. Thus, the manifold is a vector ﬁeld, and the
system dynamics can be represented as a trajectory through the state space on
the manifold. Essentially, a dynamical system simply is this vector ﬁeld.57 The
55 See e.g. Thompson (2007) and Petiot et al. (1999), but also Zahavi (2004) for critical
remarks about the latter project.
56 See Bechtel & Abrahamsen (2002, Chapters 8 & 9.)
57 For an accessible introduction to basic concepts of dynamical systems see e.g. Abraham
& Shaw (1992) and Norton (1995).
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aim is to represent how a complex system of interdependent variables evolves in
time. Inputs to the system are conceptualized as perturbations to its intrinsic
dynamics, and if the system is self-organizing—like a living organism—then its
internal dynamics can be considered to consist of triggered compensations to
push the system back to acceptable regions in state space. As an explanatory
framework, dynamic systems theory aims to capture the internal and external
forces that shape these trajectories as they unfold in time (Thompson, 2007,
10–13). If the variables are highly connected (as in feedback loops) and the
functions that characterize the system are non-linear, even seemingly simple
systems may exhibit surprisingly complex behavior.
Dynamic systems theory in cognitive science approaches cognition as a
temporal phenomenon, and depicts the internal dynamics of cognitive system
as a self-maintaining causal manifold rather than an instruction set for com-
puting symbolic representations. Dynamic systems formalism is commonly
utilized in connection with (artiﬁcial) neural networks. In case of neural net-
works, the variables are neuronal units, their values are neurons’ activation
states, and the manifold is determined by the strength of connections that
pass signals (i.e. unit activations) between the neurons. It is not always ob-
vious what the relevant variables should be in enactivist dynamic systems;
however, the basic idea is to identify the relevant causal components of the
organism (e.g., brain states, joint angles, direction of gaze, hormonal levels
etc.) and the environment and then model how the cognitive dynamics emerge
as circular and non-linear interactions involving brain, body, and the environ-
ment. Practically that is pretty tall order, but this gives some conceptual tools
to understand what ”dynamic coupling with the environment” might mean in
causal terms and how to analyze it. Work done with simple autonomous robots
has demonstrated the power of embodied dynamics in some decision-making,
route planning, and perceptual discrimination tasks. The complexity of many
motor and perceptual problems can be signiﬁcantly reduced if the corporeal
activity of the agent is taken into account (Brooks, 1999; Beer, 2000; Floreano
et al., 2004; Floreano & Mattiussi, 2008).
A powerful demonstration of utility of embodied dynamics is a simple vi-
sion discrimination robot designed by Floreano et al. (Floreano & Mattiussi,
2008, 474–475). The system uses a camera that can pan, tilt, and zoom and
contains a single-layered neural network for shape recognition. It is a fun-
damental result that single-layered networks can only solve linearly separable
problems (Minsky & Papert, 1988); however, the robot managed to achieve
100% accuracy in a linearly non-separable recognition task. What made this
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possible was factoring in the same model with the system’s cognitive archi-
tecture, the environmental variables, and behavioral capacities and how the
processing unfolds in time. This changes the formal deﬁnition of the problem
and hence the computational requirements. All these variables and not just
the neural network do genuine explanatory work in the robot’s visual recogni-
tion capacity, which remains unaccounted for if we restrict our analysis to its
internal cognitive machinery. In general, the hallmarks of systems designed in
autonomous and active robotics is that they lack central control and often do
not allow a neat functional decomposition. Instead, the behavior they exhibit
is the result of the whole system coupled with its environment.
The bad news is that although dynamic systems theory may be a pow-
erful tool for modeling things such as active perception, insect locomotion,
perception–action loop in tennis playing, and other smooth ”online” behaviors,
it is far less clear if it helps at all in understanding higher cognitive functions
such as causal induction and ”oﬀ-line” reasoning. Undoubtedly, the latter are
causal processes unfolding in time, and it is not an issue whether higher cogni-
tion can be in principle modeled with dynamic systems framework. The theory
can be deﬁned in a way that trivially accounts for any causal system.58 More-
over, it might be true that ”when we examine very simple level intelligence we
ﬁnd that explicit representations and models of the world simply get in the
way. It turns out to be better to use the world as its own model” (Brooks,
1999, 81). However, when we examine reﬂective reasoning, ﬂexible problem-
solving, planning, and other tasks that used to be at the center of cognitive
research, it appears that the notions of conceptual content and representation
are indispensable. To use Andy Clark’s example (1999, 348), consider whether
or not US gun manufacturers should be held liable for having knowingly man-
ufactured more guns than the legal market could possibly account for. It is
thoroughly mysterious how sensorimotor capacities could possibly account for
all the moral and abstract reasoning involved. Still, human cognitive life is
ﬁlled with this sort of ”representational hungry” tasks. Perhaps sensorimotor
simulation has a substantial role in human reasoning; however, it is hard to
understand how to even deﬁne the relevant variables that the sensory processes
58 In Beer (2000), for example, a dynamic system is deﬁned as triplet consisting time series
T , set of system states S and transition function φ(s, t) → (s′, t′), i.e. a mapping that
determines the state s′ of the system at time t′ as a function of its state s at time t. There
is no other restrictions on elements T , S, and φ other than that T should be ordered. This
is clearly as abstract as any deﬁnition of temporal system can get, incorporating for example
neural networks, Turing-machines, or any implementation of cognitive architecture one might
think of.
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track in higher cognition without some more conventional theory of conceptual
representation.
This problem is often surpassed in autonomous robotics by keeping the
variables predeﬁned and low in number, which renders the analysis tractable
even if conducted on a single neuron basis. With humans, however, we do
cognitive psychology precisely because in practice we need to work with more
abstract descriptions of behavior than modeling environment interactions at
a neural level. To that end, we need to know what higher-order properties
exists in the human cognitive system, and it is unclear whether the successes
in modeling simple behavior can provide useful research program in this re-
spect. It might turn out that higher cognition also needs to be modeled on a
whole organism basis (this is what I am claiming in this work anyway); how-
ever, the successes of cognitive psychology are existential proof that functional
decomposition and theory formation at a higher level of abstraction is a vi-
able research strategy and arguably the best we have at the moment. Even
while enactivist framework has shown prospect in explaining some higher cog-
nitive phenomena (e.g. aspects of social cognition) it is for the aforementioned
reasons that radical embodiment and enactivism have received well-earned crit-
icism for excessive radicalism and because of the worries that it might get stuck
into accounting only for marginal, even if important, issues in human cognition
(Clark & Toribio, 1994; Clark, 1999; Di Paolo et al., 2011). In brief, enactivist
program is quite hard to turn into actual working cognitive science. Philosoph-
ically, radical enactivism might lead to a new form of material eliminativism
if it replaces the analysis of how intentional content structures human thought
and behavior with a purely causal framework. This might be a tempting posi-
tion for some but it is not a necessary outcome of either enactivism or dynamic
systems account. To what analysis of the mind enactivism eventually leads to
depends on how these frameworks are employed in the study of cognition.
2.3.2 Chapter summary
As things stand, the whole 4E paradigm is theoretically too heterogeneous to
lend itself to a concise analysis, and it remains to see how radical enactivism
fares empirically, especially with explaining conceptually structured higher cog-
nition. Although I am convinced that symbolic propositional representation is
the wrong unit on which cognitive science can be founded, I am still not en-
tirely ready to give up on the notion of representation altogether. It is perhaps
better to think of representations as a forming a continuum from subjective,
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implicit, and contextual (or situated) sensorimotor expectations to intersub-
jective, explicit, and abstract symbolic concepts (see also Clark & Toribio,
1994). It is somewhat a matter of terminology whether the former can be con-
sidered representations because is not apparent what they actually represent.
However, by deﬁnition, they do contain subjective knowledge for generating
expectations about how concrete situations and the eﬀects of actions unfold.
What I am interested in is to explain how our conceptual understanding builds
up from this form of practical knowledge that is drawn from personal expe-
rience. I advocate a pragmatist inferential theory of understanding which, in
this case, means that understanding is not semantic knowledge about linguis-
tic expressions but practical know-how about how things relate functionally to
each other in speciﬁc concrete circumstances. As explained earlier, I assume
that this ability is founded on tracking causally relevant variables in concrete
environments and a capacity to generate expectations of our actions (including
refraining from acting) based on the values of those variables.
This approach certainly comes close to enactivism, at least in spirit and it
shares the very same problems, especially how to explain abstract conceptual
thinking and related higher cognition. My solution is to integrate enactivism
and linguistic pragmatism to yield a working model on conceptual cognition,
which also includes discursive reasoning. I favor a reformist rather than a
radical stance on enactivism. That is, I assume that dynamic systems theory
or related approaches might be the best way to model sensorimotor skills in
executing appropriate behaviors at appropriate times as external and internal
situation continuously change;59 however, nothing in my account depends on
this. I am interested speciﬁcally in how our conceptual understanding is con-
stituted by the ways we cope with concrete situations and how this aﬀects our
reasoning capacities and understanding of abstract concepts. If those capaci-
ties can be strictly reduced to sensorimotor coupling that’s very exhilarating,
but I make no claims that they can.
My strategy will be to make my case by analyzing rather standard re-
search on cognitive psychology and closely related ﬁelds. At ﬁrst, this might
appear like an odd way to pursue a theory that is principally inﬂuenced by
neopragmatism and enactivism, especially since the latter is supposed to be a
radical departure from standard cognitivist research. However, on closer exam-
ination it becomes clear that the real target of enactivist criticism is internalist
cognitivism and especially computationalist theories that rely on language-like
mental representation. A large body of research on cognitive psychology is
59 As Randall Beer (1995, 174) deﬁned the central task of autonomous agents.
93
quite antagonistic to this sort of cognitivism anyway and reconcilable with
theoretical insights drawn from enactivism; for example, this is how Eleanor
Rosch (1999) sees her classic work on prototype theory of concepts. Moreover,
recent advances in causal inference and concept research support pragmatism
rather than logics oriented accounts of (intuitive) reasoning and conceptual
structure. Keeping the discussion approximately at the level of cognitive pro-
cesses and representation that pertain to commonsense reasoning is interesting
from both philosophical and cognitive scientiﬁc standpoints. This is because
common sense is notoriously diﬃcult to model and the possible novel theoretical
insights are directly relevant to several philosophical discussions considering,
for example, the philosophy of language and epistemology. Moreover, the enac-
tivist/embodied framework should account for the established research at some
point anyway, and I consider it a healthy scientiﬁc conservatism to incorporate
existing knowledge as much as possible into novel theoretical frameworks. I
am more interested in empirical adequacy of the resultant account rather than
in the theoretical orthodoxy subservient to a particular philosophical project.
The following chapters employ theoretical ideas drawn from enactivism
and philosophical pragmatism to re-examine and integrate selected research
programs in cognitive, developmental, and social psychology and, at the same
time, to advance a philosophical theory of concepts by showing how conceptual
understanding derives from accumulating personal experience via pragmatic
action. This contrasts with seeking conceptually suﬃcient and necessary con-
ditions or other decontextualized and explicit basis for semantic knowledge.
The argument aims to solve the problem of how competence for abstract rea-
soning can be explained by pragmatic contextual knowledge. To that end,
the key is the neopragmatist idea that a causal exchange in social interaction
engenders discursive meaning.
As explained above, making that case necessitates an account of non-
linguistic conceptual cognition, which will occupy most of the discussion in the
rest of this work. Tracking and ﬂuently exploiting relevant causal regularities
in real time is far from trivial, and it is vital capacity to both common sense
and expert competence. The epistemologically signiﬁcant idea is that while
abstract reasoning is usually associated with deliberation and expertise, the
skillful use of abstract concepts requires intuitive encoding of a vast amount
of speciﬁc concrete situations where the concepts are applied and that the
process is similar to the accumulation of practical common sense through per-
sonal experience. It is probably wrong to say that intuitive concepts in this
sense are information structures that we use in reasoning. They rather par-
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ticipate in situated action of the agent. These aspects suggest that situations,
context eﬀects, and practical skills should be at the fore of concept and cat-
egory research. These convictions parallel very closely the ideas expressed by
Rosch (1999). The resultant explanation blurs the demarcation of abstract
and concrete, and theoretical and practical reasoning. These and related dis-
tinctions are often considered important in System 1/System 2 classiﬁcation,
and therefore there are implications for dual-systems theory, as explained in
the introduction.
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3 Bringing the philosophy and cognitive psychology of
concepts together
The plan for this chapter is as follows: I begin with an overview of the meth-
ods and aims of the empirical part of this work with the further development
of some points covered in the previous one. This is followed by a review of
the three main strands of concept research in cognitive psychology, namely
prototype, exemplar, and theory accounts. I discuss how all these theories
capture fragments of human conceptual cognition; an integrative account is
subsequently proposed. The basic idea is that category knowledge is repre-
sented as feature clusters that coalesce around causal properties. The role of
exemplars is to encode situation representations that both provide a source of
causal knowledge and mediate the access to category information on a contex-
tual basis. They connect tacit reasoning to category content, and this forms a
crude explanation of how a human intuitive grasp of reality works.
In the ﬁrst paragraph of the previous chapter I referred to Edouard Mach-
ery’s (2009) summary that philosophers and psychologists have diﬀerent aims
and therefore diﬀerent deﬁnitions of concepts: Psychological concept research
is mainly concerned with the nature of information representation that sup-
ports higher cognitive processes while philosophers often think of concepts as
constituents of propositional content and try to determine the general condi-
tions under which one can have propositional attitudes. While I think this is a
broadly correct description of the explicit aims of the respective ﬁelds, I argued
in passing that there are reasons to believe that the philosophical project can
not proceed strictly independently of empirical research (as a matter of fact,
not as a point of logic). In the ﬁrst half of this chapter, I continue with this
theme.
The discussion in 3.2, Category theories in cognitive psychology, begins to
unravel the Machery’s (2009) main argument that although the aforementioned
three concept theories in cognitive psychology are thought of as rivals, they
all tap into equally real, albeit, distinct phenomena. However, they contain
diﬀerent assumptions about information structure, processing, and memory,
to the extent that there are no scientiﬁcally interesting shared features that
characterize all these three capacities. In conclusion, the candidate cognitive
mechanisms of concepts form a disjunctive class and therefore the notion of
”concept” should be abandoned in cognitive psychology since it does not stand
for a speciﬁc natural kind but refers to at least three diﬀerent kinds of processes.
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After the short review of these three theories, I will show how they actually
may describe integrated rather than an independent set of processes. However,
my aim is not to criticize Machery’s work but rather build on it. I will not
touch his arguments, except for some scant remarks in the concluding chapter.
The reason to mention his Thinking Without Concepts in these introductory
remarks is that I have found this work intellectually liberating because it re-
lieves us from pitting against each other in vain the three theories that describe
component processes of conceptual cognition. Therefore I will not devote much
eﬀort to argue that prototype, exemplar, and knowledge accounts describe real
and independent processes. I take consider this eﬀort properly done already. I
will also acknowledge, at least tentatively, that these processes might encode
separate conceptual representations; however, I take that this sort of compart-
mentalization presents limiting cases at best. I am interested in exploring how
these processes interact to engender intentional behavior and thought jointly.
Although the jury is still out, the recent research supports rather strongly the
view that similarity-based categories (i.e. prototypes and exemplars) are not
independent of causal knowledge but that the latter forms a fundamental con-
stitutive part of the similarity structure (Medin, 1989; Hampton, 1998; Ahn et
al., 2000b; Rehder, 2003, 2009; Luhmann et al., 2006).
Machery’s (2009) main conclusion is not contested here. If the integrative
theory that I oﬀer is right, then in cognitive psychology it becomes impossible
to identify concepts with any speciﬁc type of information structure. Instead,
possessing a concept should be seen as a product of interlocking capacities
where use cannot be strictly separated from content. This means that we
should shift focus from static representation to active processing. This was
the main conclusion in the last chapter considering the philosophy of mind,
and if the argument in this chapter goes through, it brings philosophical and
psychological concept research a signiﬁcant step closer together.
My contribution, mosty laid out in Chapters 4 and 5, is twofold:
First, I separate prototypes and exemplars to serve diﬀerent functions
in conceptual cognition. The idea is that while prototypes carry summary
information about categories, exemplar eﬀects reﬂect implicit input and out-
put processing, such as selective access to the prototype memory, retrieval of
contextually relevant information, causal induction, and generation of causal
expectations. In short, exemplar eﬀects arise from processes that support in-
tuitive reasoning.60 I discuss at length the constitutive role of exemplars and
60 I use the term ”reasoning” mostly as a catch-all term for any conceptually structured
cognitive processing. It should not be understood as a explicit rational inference.
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implicit skills in conceptual understanding. The proposal rests on a rather
standard cognitive psychology and does not postulate novel types of mecha-
nism or representation. The proposed etiology of the exemplar eﬀects is not my
idea but stems from Gregory Murphy (2002, 85–88), albeit with slight diﬀer-
ences. Murphy proposed that exemplar eﬀects might result solely from memory
access and that there might be no stored exemplars at all (2002, 88). He was
talking about taxonomic categories; however, I assume that there are stored
exemplars of events, which are used to classify situations, interpret stimulus,
and support causal inference and learning. The exemplars encode contextual
goals and event stimuli, interpreted in terms of those goals and knowledge of
past actions and their outcomes. A pragmatic knowledge base is composed of
these very concrete and speciﬁc event representations. My assumptions about
the exemplar representation format and processing are eﬀectively identical to
Gordon Logan’s (1988) idea of memorized ”processing episodes,” which con-
stitute the basis of implicit skills. I also draw on a body of empirical and
theoretical work that has established a close link with memories of speciﬁc
exemplars, pattern recognition, and intuitive skills (de Groot, 1965; Dreyfus &
Dreyfus, 1986; Dreyfus, 1992; Ross & Kennedy, 1990; Simon, 1992; Palmeri,
1997; Klein, 1998, 2008; Kahneman & Klein, 2009). A prominent feature of
these theories is that they consider expertise as knowledge intensive and not
computation intensive phenomenon. Expertise is achieved by exploiting asso-
ciative memory search, cued by superﬁcial features, to retrieve a match to the
current situation and using analogical inference as a default reasoning mech-
anism. This combined with analogical transfer based schema abstraction is
basically the cognitive theory of pragmatic knowledge that follows.
My second contribution builds on the ﬁrst and accommodates discursive
reasoning into the pragmatic knowledge framework. The idea is based on neo-
pragmatist inferentialism by treating discursive knowledge as a special case of
procedural and causal knowledge. Much of our declarative knowledge is not
about causal facts, of course, but if inferentialism is the correct theory of dis-
cursive meaning, then our conception of discursive content is engendered by
our ability to carry out discursive practices eﬀectively. That ability, I maintain,
rests on tacit causal and procedural knowledge about discursive acts embed-
ded in wider cultural praxis. If this is correct, it has signiﬁcant implications
because then theoretical reasoning is, at least psychologically, a special case
of practical reasoning. This implies that grasping theoretical concepts is not
simply a matter of acquiring explicit know-that (although this might be nec-
essary for learning many conceptual domains) but a learned skill that rests
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on implicit know-how. Moreover, the hypothesis oﬀers an empirical frame-
work for explaining how and why our discursive reason reﬂects our local social
and cultural practices. In consider the theory to be plain pragmatism, but to
the extent that social, contextual, and constructivist character of meaning and
reason are central to continental and postmodernist philosophy, this latter con-
tribution can be thought of as something like postmodern or post-structuralist
cognitive science, making a rather sharp departure from both empiricist and
rationalist traditions in cognitive theory.
3.1 Theoretical and methodological motivations
What comes to the mutual constraints between philosophy and psychology, I
here adopt an approach which is reversed in comparison the one in the previous
chapter. That is, I assess empirical research of concepts through the lens of
philosophical theories of intentional content. Basically this means to investi-
gate the possible cognitive basis of enactive and neopragmatist intentionality
as presented in the last chapter. This is the key methodological principle here,
and before putting it to work we need to examine its rationale because there
are reasonable grounds for skepticism about this kind of an approach. For one,
cognitive psychologists may worry that conﬂating inference and related higher
processes with category representation might needlessly degrade the analytic
precision of concept research. However, the strict demarcation of process and
content does not survive if the theory of concepts proposed here is correct. If
use is constitutive of conceptual content, one should expect that some questions
concerning conceptual representation remain elusive without consideration of
the processes utilizing them. This might be apparent in the case of logical con-
cepts, for example, that are inherently tied to reasoning. The remark, however,
pertains even to concrete concepts and issues, such as conceptual combination
and coherence, construction of ad hoc categories, contextual malleability of
category representations, and representations of contexts and situations them-
selves. Moreover, as human reasoning is content-based, it might be intractable
without references to inferential potential, which is directly encoded in concep-
tual structure, and to how this information is accessed.
After this chapter, I present evidence that category representations are ac-
tive, task-oriented, and context-dependent constructs that encode, inter alia,
procedural and causal information that is selectively activated in category re-
trieval. I further that utilization of pragmatic knowledge is an essential part
of sense-making and intuitive situated reasoning mainly by automatically ﬁl-
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tering relevant information and generating causal expectations. This sort of
tacit inference underlies explicit reasoning and conceptual comprehension and
makes ﬂuent commonsense reasoning possible in the ﬁrst place.61 Since propo-
sitional attitudes essentially are commonsense ascriptions, and commonsense
ascriptions depend on our capacity for practical inference, it is theoretically
motivated not to insulate at least certain aspects of active cognitive processing
from concept research. Recalling Eleanor Rosch’s point, that was iterated at
the end of the previous chapter, I hold that the unit of concept research should
be situations rather than precompiled information structures. Concepts par-
ticipate in the making sense of situations, and it is not clear whether they have
any relevant explanatory function in cognitive science, apart from their active
interpretative role in situated intentional action.
3.1.1 Methodological discussion
The general point I try to make is that if philosophers intend to discover the
conditions under which one can have intentional contents while psychologists
try to discover the nature of our higher cognitive competencies, they are both
actually studying the same phenomenon—given that the conditions in question
happen to be precisely those competencies. This does not mean a wholesale
conﬂation of these research programs, because they obviously have their re-
spective aims and methods but that they should be mutually informative and
constraining. Moreover, the theory advanced here contains strong pragmatist
and constructivist elements that imply that intentional content cannot be re-
duced to psychological mechanisms. We also need to understand the lifeworld
of the organism to understand how it represents its environment. Hence, the
account is not internalist or rationalist. Moreover, we cannot get a grip on
exactly what the organism’s mind tracks in its environment without under-
standing its biological and cognitive constitution. Therefore, the account is
not strictly externalist or empiricist either. I believe the key to concepts, both
in philosophy and psychology, is interaction, which cannot be understood if ei-
ther the environment or the organism’s capacities is granted only a second-class
status.
Certainly there is an important distinction between content and form, evi-
dent in explicit logical inference, especially when formal principles are involved.
61 Something like this view generally shared amongst enactive and neopragmatist theorists;
see also e.g. the introduction in Dreyfus (1992), Johnson-Laird (2008, Chapters 4 & 5), and
the next footnote.
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However, not even formal reasoning is psychologically content free in any clear
sense, at least if it utilizes learned concepts rather than innate mental logic
or other hardwired formal procedures. Although the computationalist theory
that stresses the content/process distinction provided a powerful model for
cognitive science for decades, it has not helped much in understanding human
concepts and commonsense reasoning, and one of the most pervasive results
in the psychology of deduction is that content aﬀects human inference in log-
ically irrelevant ways (Evans et al., 1993, 4–7). In the empirical discussion
of this work I mostly focus on implicit content driven-inference, underlying
commonsense and expert reasoning.
This tacit ability enables us to grasp our lifeworld as self-evident without
explicit comprehension and often even awareness of the active interpretative
processes taking place. It is not very controversial that at the heart of the
cognitive sciences is to discover how this process works, but it is contentious
to what extent and how exactly implicit processes are constitutive of explicit
reasoning. This controversy dates back at least to the 1960s when Hubert
Dreyfus (1965) criticized ongoing AI research for dismissing sophisticated and
highly relevant implicit intelligence as seemingly primitive and marginal. Cur-
rent dual-process theorists generally hold that tacit System 1 processes are the
default mechanisms for executing routinized tasks; however, whether explicit
reasoning is considered as independent or fundamentally dependent on implicit
cognition is a matter of controversy.
Whether or not there is a categorical demarcation of implicit and explicit
reasoning processes, I work under the assumption that there is no such strict
division in higher cognitive capacities. Implicit know-how can become (partly)
explicit, and explicit procedures can be tacitly learned. Regardless, as far as
cognitive skills are concerned, implicit cognition is primary. Because I consider
intentional content to be founded on tacit inferential skills (broadly construed)
it follows that, by and large, implicit cognition is also fundamental in con-
tent determination. However independent explicit processes might be, they
generally need content that is provided by the tacit system.62 A quotation
by psychologist Arthur Reber illustrates my position: ”. . . to ’get the point’
without really being able to verbalize what it is that one has gotten, is to have
62 See Evans (2009) and Johnson-Laird (2008, Chapter 5). On the implicit/explicit distinc-
tion and the primacy of the former see e.g. Reber (1989, 1993) on implicit learning, Sun
(2002); Sun et al. (2005) speciﬁcally on cognitive skills, Evans & Over (1996) on reasoning,
and Karmiloﬀ-Smith (1992) on conceptual development.
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gone through an implicit learning experience and have built up the requisite
representative knowledge base to allow for such judgment” (Reber, 1989, 233).
However, primacy should not be understood as total hegemony. Many
tasks are executed as mixtures of automatized implicit procedures with ex-
plicit conscious control. Arithmetical calculation (Rumelhart et al., 1986, 45)
and reading (Shiﬀrin & Schneider, 1977, 161) are oft-cited examples in litera-
ture. Both are examples of skills that contain learned automatized procedures
that were initially carried out explicitly. For example, most people presumably
learn single-digit addition by serial counting (perhaps with ﬁngers) until the
task is internalized by associating the correct answer to numbers to be added
without explicit counting. This capacity is then further exploited in multi-digit
addition by breaking down the problem into a controlled series of single-digit
computations. This is perhaps one of the clearest examples of complemen-
tary contributions of implicit and explicit cognition where automatized and
controlled processes execute diﬀerent aspects of the task.
Thoroughly learned attention and control demanding tasks tend to form
habituated chunks whose execution does not require explicit cognition. These
chunks come in varying degrees of access and control. Complex tasks with mul-
tiple dimensions generally promote implicit learning, which yield competencies
that are hard to articulate and even carry out by following explicit instructions
(Sun, 2002; Reber, 1989). The habituated chunks can be exploited to orga-
nize complex hierarchical behaviors where control and attention are shifted
to more strategic and general aspects of the task (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987;
Christensen et al., 2016). Now, linguistic concepts just might be these sort
of chunks that support various communicative, interpretative, inferential, and
other complex tasks. If that is the case they can be procedurally opaque and
semantically transparent at the same time, meaning that our phenomenology
of conceptual understanding stems from our ﬂuent intuitive use of these infer-
ential chunks while we might be quite unable to explicate what their proper use
is and how we actually use them. Complex higher-level tasks, which are em-
bedded in wider contexts and require explicit thought, make sense just because
these underlying component processes are already understood, i.e. eﬀectively
applied without reﬂection.
This might look like a promising avenue for a philosophy of concepts to
pursue because it seems to respect broadly construed inferentialism and ex-
plain interesting aspects of the phenomenology of conceptual understanding.
However, on philosophical grounds, a good case can be made that the inquiry
into implicit cognition does not really amount to the research of concepts in
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the sense philosophers use the term. This sentiment often stems from the past
divorce of psychological theories from the classical account of concepts.
3.1.2 Problems ahead: Kripke–Putnam externalism
For example Georges Rey (1983) has argued that there is a substantial dif-
ference between conception and concept. The former pertains to epistemology
and belongs to the domain of psychology, while the latter is a matter of meta-
physics. Concepts, properly construed, are factual descriptions of essences or
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for category membership. Until the 1970s
this was also the received view among psychologists (Murphy, 2002, Chapter
2). But things changed decisively when similarity based theories entered the
scene. The new paradigm held something that Wittgenstein (1953) had already
proposed around two decades earlier, i.e. that most concepts hardly have any
deﬁning features but only more or less vague set of characteristics that gener-
ally are neither suﬃcient nor jointly necessary. Later, it turned out that even
if there were such deﬁning properties, they—as a matter of fact—are often not
used as the basis for categorization (Murphy, 2002, 25–28). Hence, the human
conceptual system does not track analytical truths nor metaphysical essences.
Of course everyone knew already that we are unable to deﬁne many con-
cepts and that there are numerous inherently vague cases; however, this is
hardy a conclusive argument against the deﬁnitional view, especially if one
considers the deﬁning characteristics as metaphysical and not epistemological
properties. But the new psychological theories sought to explain where this
ignorance comes from and, more importantly, held that conceptual competence
without knowledge of deﬁnitions is a built-in property of the human mind. In
this new outlook, the lack of deﬁnitions did not reﬂect ignorance but a normal
functioning of conceptual cognition.
What follows is that if the classical account of concepts is correct, then
psychological research cannot shed light on the true nature of concepts but
only on how we, as the limited creatures we are, can conceive them or rather
their degenerate substitutes. If so, the new empirical paradigm cannot reﬁne
philosophers’ conception of concepts but it only proves that there is an irrevo-
cable departure of psychology from philosophy since empirical theories fail to
meet the essential desiderata of concept theory, which are, according to Rey,
to explain the semantic stability, communicability, tracking of counterfactuals,
metaphysical taxonomy, and certain epistemic functions. Because psychology
only pertains to the last item, using empirical theories to reﬁne the philoso-
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phy of concepts would only amount to a naive conﬂation of metaphysics with
epistemology.63
Underlying the above argument is the widely acclaimed Putnam–Kripke
line of semantic externalism (Kripke, 1971, 1980; Putnam, 1975), which can be
roughly summarized thus: Meaning is the extension of a word. Extensions are
classes that are deﬁned by the necessary properties that their members share
and that makes them the entities they are. So far nothing new, but these
properties, while conceptually necessary, are often not knowable a priori and
in fact they might not be knowable at all. For example, modern science has
shown that gold is an element with 79 protons in its nucleus, and it is this
property that makes gold atoms as instances of gold. This particular essential
property clearly cannot be known a priori. It is an empirical fact discovered by
science. However, if it is a fact, it is a metaphysically necessary condition for
something to be referred correctly as ”gold” once the extension of the term is
ﬁxed. The theory is tailored to respect common intuitions about the semantics
of natural kind terms: If category members share an internal structure, it is
this hidden structure rather than observable surface properties that determine
their identity as category members.64
Importantly, the theory also applies to other kinds of concepts that are
often taken to be representative of the classical deﬁnitional theory, namely for-
mal ones. For example, it is not known whether every even integer greater than
63 There is also an inﬂuential internalist line of argument against similarity-based theories.
The standard objection is this: Similarity based categories do not compose. That is, a
feature set of a typical pet ﬁsh is not a combination of features of typical pet and typical
fish. But concepts do compose in the sense that the meaning of ”pet ﬁsh” is a combination
of the meanings of ”pet” and of ”ﬁsh”, and this property, and respecting boolean functions
in general, is essential in explaining productivity and systematicity of thought. (Fodor &
Pylyshyn, 1988; Fodor & Lepore, 1996). Also, if the problem with the deﬁnitional theory is
that we do not know the putative constituents of concepts (i.e. deﬁnitions), exactly the same
issue plagues the similarity based theories, i.e. we are unable to articulate the features we rely
for similarity computations (Margolis, 1994). I will ignore this particular discussion for the
following reasons. First, on theoretical grounds the relevance of compositional systematicity
as an explananda can be reasonably questioned, especially the role of logical processing as its
necessary explanandum (Matthews, 1997; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2002, Chapter 6.). Second,
even the early prototype researchers (Smith & Osherson, 1984) recognized the problem with
conceptual combination; however, it was taken as an empirical issue worthy of a research
program that has since yielded solid results (Murphy, 2002, Chapter 12). The standard
objection gets it right that prototypes cannot be combined by simple extensional operations
(e.g. set intersection or union) but goes wrong in assuming that extensional logic is the only
viable route to conceptual combination.
64 See Kripke (1980, lecture III) and Putnam (1975, 160).
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2 can be expressed as the sum of two primes or not, and as things stand, it is
unknown if this can be even proven to be either true or false. Still, this sort of
property is an excellent candidate of something that is necessarily true or false
of numbers.65 But never mind, for the point of this theory is that we do not
need to know these things to use concepts such as gold or an integer correctly.
Conceptual necessity is metaphysical necessity to which human intuition has
no privileged access (Putnam, 1975, 151). This means that intensions, concep-
tions, or cognitive contents are fundamentally irrelevant to meaning. What is
relevant is that we track correct referents, not essential properties. According
to this theory, concepts work like proper names: Someone names an instance of
a category and then the use of the term spreads through cultural transmission.
Whether folk’s conceptions of the properties of the referents are correct or not
depend on what properties the referents in fact have, but for semantics it is
immaterial whether we can ever deﬁne or even recognize these properties or
not, hence Putnam’s famous catchphrase ”’meanings’ just ain’t in the head!”
(Putnam, 1975, 144)
Linguistic pragmatists agree that meanings are not in the head, but they
are not metaphysical essences ”out there,” either but immanent social institu-
tions. We are often unable to articulate exact word meanings, not because we
lack access to metaphysical facts but because the underlying social norms that
govern meaning engendering practices are implicit—including the instituted
use of those very words. Note that while this implies semantic constructivism,
it does not entail metaphysical anti-realism. The claim is that intentional con-
tent is engendered in interaction with the environment. For us, the relevant
environment is partly socially constituted; however, the practices of human
communities are also shaped by the physical environment and other material
conditions. If these practices are the foundation of linguistic meaning then even
65 Note that there are some technicalities involved with this example. It is contentious if
knowing non-trivial mathematical facts equals proving them, and second, ”provability,” in
the technical sense intended here, is not an absolute but an axiom-system related notion.
Moreover mathematical antirealists may raise issues whether non-provable properties can be
considered necessary. The reader may want to consult e.g. Clarke-Donae (2013) and Koellner
(2006) about conceptual issues regarding absolute undecidability in mathematics. The papers
discuss the continuum hypothesis instead of Goldbach’s conjecture referred in the paragraph.
Nevertheless, the point is that while after Gödel’s incompleteness results it is commonplace
to informally talk about ”unprovable statements”, it is unclear if, strictly speaking, there are
any. Gödel’s results state that for any ﬁnite and consistent theory T , which is expressive
enough to formulate arithmetics, there is a true proposition p which can not be proven in
T ; however, this does not mean that there is an absolutely undecidable statement p, in the
sense that it can not be proven in any such theory.
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while our (linguistic) concepts are ontologically dependent on our communal
deliberation, cultural practices, and historical traditions, it does not mean that
their putative referents are or that human conceptual system is independent
of physical reality. Scientiﬁc realism holds that this is generally true also of
theoretical concepts which are negotiated by scientists and perhaps other ex-
perts. For example, planets as physical objects certainly exist regardless of
our astronomical practices, even while their respective status as a planet does
not. This is because ”planet” is a socially negotiated concept for human pur-
poses whose extension depends, among other things, on how speciﬁc expert
communities see best to carve the nature at its joints. The ex-planet Pluto is
a case in point. While the pragmatism advertised here is constructivist about
conceptual content, it presupposes materialist metaphysical realism.
To be sure, in the ”meaning of ’meaning,”’ Putnam stresses many of the
same points I try to argue here, namely that social factors and individual ap-
titude in concept use are important. But these factors are secondary to him
on what comes to the determination of conceptual content. The position I am
arguing is certainly more antagonistic to Kripke–Putnam externalism beyond
these remarks, given that their theory is supposed to be a general theory of
meaning. Their theory suﬀers from the same fault as Fodor’s causal semantics.
It presumes a form of intentionality without reductive (i.e. non-intentional)
explanation, speciﬁcally that we have a practice of interpreting natural kind
terms in certain essentialist ways. But perhaps Putnam, Kripke, and their fol-
lowers are just articulating common linguistic intuitions in selected conceptual
domains and trying to extend this to linguistic meaning a bit more generally.
If that extension is not very wide, it does not threaten the method employed
here. Neopragmatism gives us a general reductive account of linguistic mean-
ing, and what we eventually want is a more fundamental theory that also
covers non-linguistic intentionality, as explained in the previous chapter. If
semantic externalists do not dispute the importance of that agenda, and only
consider it to lie outside the scope of their theory, then our explananda sim-
ply do not align, and I fail to see why these projects should be contradictory:
Then Kripke–Putnam externalists are concerned only with particular practices
associated with a speciﬁc fragment of natural language, and not with meaning
or intentionality in general.
Then again, neopragmatism and especially enactivism can be criticized
precisely on the grounds that they are merely framework theories about how
subjective understanding is engendered, and therefore they fall short of the
philosophers’ project because they disregard the essential desiderata of con-
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cepts harbored in analytic philosophy. Well, clearly they do. In the last chap-
ter, we saw that analyticity and universality go right out the window. What is
even worse, I later argue that concepts lack even intrapersonal stability. This
is, of course, an anathema to the adherents of the classical account. On the
face of it, I could probably leave the issue at that because perhaps philosophers
of language, at least in the analytic tradition, simply discuss diﬀerent things
that I have on the agenda. However, what is at stake here is this: By agree-
ing to disagree with the philosophical project, there would be little point in
using philosophical theories of intentional content to constrain interpretations
of empirical research, because they should track entirely diﬀerent phenomena.
Therefore, to counter the argument from Kripke–Putnam externalism by this
sort of evasive maneuver is not really an option for me. Instead, I need to
confront it head on and explain the semantic intuitions behind their theory
within my framework. This will be addressed later (see p. 155).
In the last chapter, I argued that the philosophical study of concepts
cannot be strictly separated from empirical research because, methodologically
speaking, we often conduct a philosophical inquiry by grounding our theories
on our analytical intuitions which, in turn, are nothing but products of our
implicit psychological faculties. In the context of the philosophy of mind, this
tends to lapse concept research into speculative or introspective psychology
because the method employs the exact conceptual capacities that it is probing.
While this does not necessarily imply vicious circularity, it makes a bad division
of scientiﬁc labor, in that philosophers ﬁrst should ﬁgure out what concepts
are and then psychologists should try to ﬁnd out how or to what extent we
can possess such things. For one, empirical ﬁndings change the way we think
and discuss concepts—that is the point of research after all, and this arguably
changes our analytical intuitions. That, I gather, is the philosophical impact
of dispensing with the analytic/synthetic distinction; that is, giving up on a
clear distinction between what we know about things and how we conceptualize
things.
Moreover, analytical intuitions are notoriously unreliable and unstable
across cultures, individuals, and contexts. To understand semantic intuitions,
it would help us to know where these discrepancies come from. Even if intu-
itions were stable, we should ask what gives them epistemic authority, espe-
cially in peculiar and wildly counterfactual thought experiments. If the source
of this (in)stability is individually learned psychological dispositions, empirical
research can be useful if not indispensable tool in understanding methodolog-
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ically important aspects of philosophical inquiry.66 Some instability of intu-
itions should be expected even among experts, if philosophical intuitions stem
from the same psychological mechanisms as any judgment making process.67
Moreover, as James Beebe (2012) remarks, intersubjective stability of intuitions
among experts may be a sign of socialization rather than of mutual enlighten-
ment. However, even if that is the case, it does not mean that shared intuitions
are always incorrect or untrustworthy but that examining their source and fac-
tual character should be on the agenda of philosophers who wish to be careful
with their methodology.
Lastly, if it turns out that our philosophical analyses of concepts are fun-
damentally incompatible with psychological results, the apparent implication
would be that human thinking, reasoning, and linguistic understanding are not
strictly speaking conceptual. If you accept this, you probably should also stop
grounding conceptual facts in analytical intuitions. This conclusion, of course,
presumes that analytical intuitions are products of our conceptual cognition
and that human mind learns or constructs meanings rather than has access
to the realm of objective semantic facts. The previous chapter aimed to show
precisely that: Intentional content is a product of the activity of a cognitive
agent and that the ontological foundations of discursive meaning are in social
and linguistic behavior. The evidential basis of many of the claims was left
more or less open, and in this chapter and the following ones, I present em-
pirical results that back those claims and examine these empirical results from
the standpoint of pragmatist inferentialism.
3.1.3 Section summary
Following the reasoning laid out above, I try to motivate the remarriage of
philosophical and psychological concept research by questioning the rationale
of strictly demarcating concepts from conceptions. The theory required to ac-
count for non-linguistic intentionality is somewhat hard to formulate. There
are attempts to produce generic theories of content that should apply to non-
human agents also. Except for instrumentalist theories such as neobehaviorism,
these generic theories often need to bootstrap intentional content from biolog-
66 See e.g. Knobe & Nichols (2008) for an overview of this point. A body of empirical
research on philosophical intuitions have been done, e.g., on folk conceptions of knowledge,
which shows how social and cultural background, context, the framing of questions, and other
factors aﬀect intuitive responses to thought experiments (Beebe, 2012).
67 See e.g Kahneman (2011) and especially Gendler (2010, Chapter 5 & 6), which address
directly the nature of intuitions and philosophical methodology.
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ical or other teleological functions, the notion of normal conditions, and the
like (e.g. Millikan, 1989a,b). I have found these attempts rather unsatisfactory;
however, I have no intention of criticizing them here. Eventually, some of these
theories may prove to be fruitful, but to me it seems they are doomed to lapse
into underdetermination problems discussed in the previous chapter. In gen-
eral, there seems to be no theoretically privileged unique descriptions of why
some organism does what it does and what it is trying to achieve—i.e. what
are its ends and the rationale of its means. Hence, with non-human agents, it
is often unclear if propositional attitudes can be even properly applied.
Recall from the last chapter that with humans we generally do not have
this problem. We have a sort of epistemologically privileged (even if not in-
fallible) position to understand human intentions and their derivatives, such
as artifact, institutions, and intentional descriptions. This does not mean that
there is anything inherently special about being human. Only that we have a
privileged intuitions about human aﬀairs simply because our conceptual under-
standing is a product of our sense-making activity, and our intentional terms
get their meaning from our own human capacities and practices. Bear in mind
that this does not mean that we always have explicit knowledge of what con-
stitutes the proper use of propositional attitude terms. For example philoso-
phers were content for two millennia that ”knowledge” means justiﬁed true
belief. However, what ”justiﬁed” amounts to is hard to deﬁne and after Get-
tier (1963), we have been less sure whether this is correct analysis to begin
with. The point is only that the foundation of our conceptual understanding
rests on our local practices, and living a human life in human cultures arms
us with experience that makes us intuitively understand human intentionality
even if we sometimes ﬁnd it hard to explicate it analytically. Concerning other
lifeforms, we simply do not enjoy such luxury. Therefore, generally the least
controversial way to understand the behavior of non-human agents is either
to treat them in merely causal terms or treat their intentional ascriptions as
instrumental, because we do not have better intentional vocabulary than com-
monsense propositional attitudes, which receive their intuitive contents from
our own human lifeworlds.
It is worth noting again that our insights into other people’s intentional
realm are also somewhat limited by intercultural and intersubjective diﬀer-
ences; that is why underdetermination problem of content is not strictly lim-
ited to human/non-human diﬀerence. This is also obvious when one considers
conceptual and methodological problems in developmental psychology. Now,
because I do not believe in conceptual universality, it serves my purposes well
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if we can formulate our theory of non-linguistic content as an empirically ade-
quate theory of human intentionality. This helps a lot, because we are licensed
to resort to actual (or hypothetical) mechanisms in human cognition while the
in-principle counterarguments based on content underdetermination should not
be cause for insurmountable concerns. At least, we should be able to tolerate
underdetermination as far as we can tolerate miscommunication, intersubjec-
tive instability of meaning, and indeterminacy of cross-cultural translation.
The enactivist framework relieves us from the burden of devising philo-
sophically deep conditions for operative intentionality. Some kind of goals and
intentional behavior are already presupposed in the notion of an active organ-
ism which is, I believe, philosophically quite non-problematic. An active or-
ganism does not need an external authority to deﬁne its goals and conditions of
success. The situation is somewhat diﬀerent with social behavior where shared
goals and procedures are expected by others, which provide grounds for norms
and hence the conditions for communally shared intentional descriptions. Be-
cause non-linguistic intentionality may be inexplicable and lack intersubjective
normativity, some might prefer to refer to related cognitive content as sub-
or non-conceptual. Although this choice of terminology might respect some
reasonable pretheoretical intuitions, I do not believe that there is a clear dis-
tinction of putative subconceptual and bona ﬁde conceptual content. Linguistic
meaning and norms of commonsense rationality are vague enough to make the
implicit/explicit demarcation somewhat a moot criterion, and I think there
is no sharp boundary of discursive and other practices. Intentional contents,
including linguistic concepts, are primarily devices for action whether they are
explicable by reﬂection or not.
This observation does not require any deeper insight than appreciation of
practical syllogism. If paradigm cases of intentional contents are putative ref-
erents of the terms appearing in practical syllogisms, then generally contents
are somehow related to action because they often appear as conclusions in the
syllogisms. To pragmatists, it is clear that through action norms, discourses,
and eventually referential use of language are engendered. Explicit referential
use of language does not represent the core but a limiting case of concept use.
The etiology of explicit mental representation and the putative subconceptual
content that it carries should be ultimately built into any theory of concepts
and linguistic meaning. Therefore, it is at times justiﬁable to speak of dis-
cursive contents (or discursive concepts); however, it unwise to consider other
mental contents as categorically distinct and non-conceptual. After all, if the
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theory advanced here is correct, even discursive contents are brought about by
mostly implicit practical abilities.
To deter misunderstanding, a note on my use of the word ”discursive” is
in order: Linguistic and other communicative acts are perhaps the standard
way to understand the term ”discursive”; however, my use of the term is more
encompassing. Any activity that connects to the nexus of cultural practices,
especially practices of giving and asking for reasons, can be taken as discursive.
For example, gathering and interpreting evidence for scientiﬁc inquiry, are clear
cases of discursive acts in my terms. The notion of discursive practice does not
presuppose the presence of other people. If you are studying mathematics
alone, you are engaging in discursive activity.
I presume that the notion of successful action is not philosophically prob-
lematic and hence require dedicated analysis. Still, the account of pragmatic
knowledge that I need for my purposed should be able to account for failure
and also misunderstanding. This requires kind of rational analysis of behavior;
however, we need not formulate its details prior to research mainly because
the analysis pertains to the interaction of the organism and its environment,
which requires an ecological understanding of the empirical constraints of the
cognitive system and the structure of its practical environment. Hence, any a
priori analysis should be considered tentative rather than authoritative. While
the remarks in this and the two previous paragraphs primarily concern indi-
vidual non-discursive behavior, the desiderata for pragmatic knowledge does
not strictly cut the linguistic/non-linguistic nor social/individual demarcations
because there are no such strict divisions. Our biology, bodily constitution, in-
dividual dispositions, and communal practices are all genuine determinants of
meaning. The implications of this will be elaborated later. For now, it suﬃces
to remember that linguistic practices are rooted in non-linguistic practices, and
our sense-making process is guided by interaction with both social and non-
social environment. The social environment is constituted by real causal and
material processes and hence nature and culture do not constitute two funda-
mentally diﬀerent realms. In conclusion, we better avoid needlessly wasting
eﬀort in seeking distinct cognitive basis for reﬂective linguistic thinking and
for non-linguistic practical cognition.
3.2 Category theories in cognitive psychology
Concept research in cognitive psychology covers a diverse range of phenomena
such as categorization, induction, cognitive taxonomies, word meaning, com-
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munication, conceptual combination, and cognitive development (e.g. Murphy,
2002). This variety reﬂects the centrality of the notion of concept in almost
all higher cognitive processes. Still, the core of the research is heavily focused
on categorization perhaps mainly because of the idea that we do not have di-
rect access to reality but concepts act like ﬁlters that bridge the mind–world
gap. To interpret, that is to see something as something, is to categorize, and
the fundamental constituents of (propositional) thought are category repre-
sentations. This is the heir to representationalism. Some authors have even
suggested that cognition fundamentally is categorization (e.g. Harnad, 2005).
This insight can be construed as misguided, trivial, or profound; depending
on how categorization, concepts, and even the notions of the mind and world
are conceived. Either way, categorization allows us to treat distinct entities
as equivalent in some sense, enabling inductive generalizations and accessing
knowledge, and ultimately systematic reasoning and behavior. These jobs are
often attributed to concepts and hence, wisely or not, categorization and con-
cepts are often treated as synonymous in cognitive psychology.
During the late 20th century, two major shifts occurred in concept research
(Medin, 1989). The ﬁrst was the abandonment of classical deﬁnitional theory
in the late 1970s in favor of similarity-based prototype and exemplar theories.
Although the two are often pitted together, seen as diﬀering mostly in detail,
they make very diﬀerent assumptions about memory and cognitive processing,
and hence are discussed separately below. The second shift happened about
a decade later and focused on how concepts are organized as theories.68 The
account might look like a step back towards classical ideas in philosophy of lan-
guage, for it can be construed as a species of inferentialism and amenable to
classical view; however, the framework is not committed to symbolic represen-
tations or logical computations and it focuses on causal rather than analytical
knowledge in concept representation.
As things stand, no canonical version of the knowledge account exists.
While there are detailed quantitative models for both prototype and exem-
plar theories, none of them explain all the data. The three theories combined
accommodate known categorization phenomena extensively, even though it is
often unclear which theory fares the best. As diagnosed by Machery (2009), the
68 After Gregory Murphy (2002), I will use the term ”knowledge account” to denote this
account of concepts instead of the more common ”theory–theory”. The terminological choice
is not merely stylistic but reﬂects the conviction that not all causal, taxonomic, and other
ostensibly declarative know-that need to be mentally represented in (quasi)linquistic format;
see also Murphy & Medin (1985), a seminal paper on the subject.
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reason seems to be that these theories are all adequate but limited in scope;
they cover limited aspects of human concept representation and processing,
and hence they are perhaps best viewed as complementary rather than rivals.
Another factor which may limit their applicability is that they are intended
as general accounts of concepts; however, factually, they are speciﬁcally devel-
oped to explain speciﬁcally categorization. There are indications that category
structure is partly determined by concept use (Barsalou, 1987, 1991; Sloman
& Malt, 2003; Markman & Ross, 2003; Christensen et al., 2016), and there-
fore the data we have might reﬂect more faithfully our experimental paradigms
than the intrinsic nature of conceptual cognition. In other words, the limited
empirical adequacy of similarity-based theories, in particular, might emanate
from reliance on an ecologically invalid methodology that overemphasizes cate-
gorization, often with highly artiﬁcial stimulus sets while dismissing the actual
raison d’être of concepts, which is contextual reasoning in real-world situations.
Given this, certain philosophers’ reservations about the adequacy of these the-
ories as proper accounts of concepts might look slightly less reactionary.
Besides these three accounts, there actually is a fourth major, albeit still
emerging, branch of concept theories, often called neo-empiricism69, that takes
concepts to be constructed from of modal components, namely motor schemata
and especially sensory representations instead of symbolic or other amodal con-
stituents. While rather radical (and quite compatible with enactivism), these
developments can be seen as reﬁnements of older accounts rather than com-
pletely new stand-alone theories. Also, there may be an emerging consensus
on the canonical expression of knowledge account, namely causal models with
Bayesian inference (Holyoak & Cheng, 2011). In the next chapter, I will dis-
cuss selected neo-empiricist and Bayesian theories to produce an account of
knowledge representation, which is inﬂuenced by both of them and incorpo-
rates elements from similarity-based theories. The following brief review of the
three major research programs aims for conciseness rather than completeness
with a focus on details relevant to my argument. For more extensive discus-
sion the reader is advised to consult an excellent (albeit slightly outdated)
book length summary by Gregory Murphy (2002) or any standard textbook
on cognitive psychology.
69 Perhaps the best-known references are Barsalou (1999) and Prinz (2002); see Machery
(2007) for a critical review.
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3.2.1 Prototype models
There are several prototype models, but for our purposes it is enough to un-
derstand their general outline. The central postulate is that a category is men-
tally represented by a prototype, which contains summary information about
the category. The prototype can be thought of like a caricature that need not
represent any actual member but rather a combination of characteristic fea-
tures associated with category members. For example, the category bird might
be encoded as a set of features such as has a beak, can ﬂy, is a non-mammal
animal. Often the features are assumed to be somewhat vague and may consist
of shapes, behaviors, aﬀordances, and other qualities that can be more or less
clearly present in its various instances (Rosch et al., 1976). Importantly, the
theory does not postulate that there must be any speciﬁc set of features that
all the members share.
A focal feature of category representation in prototype theory is a graded
structure, which determines the distance of each instance from the prototype.
The more features an instance shares with the prototype, the closer to the pro-
totype it is. The graded structure also pertains to non-members: Chairs are
better examples than butterﬂies as non-members of the bird category (Barsa-
lou, 1987). Categorization is based on the assessment of proximity to the
prototype: If a target falls too far from the prototype along this similarity
gradient, it is judged to be either a poor member or a non-member; if it is
close enough, it is judged to be in the same category as the prototype. Very
similar members to the prototype are generally judged to be more typical of
the class than the more distant ones. Hence, the distance to the prototype is
often conceptualized as subjective typicality of the target as an exemplar of
the category. (Rosch & Mervis, 1975)
While closely related studies were conducted already in the 1960s (e.g.
Posner & Keele, 1968), the prototype theory was reﬁned to its current form
largely by Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues during the 1970s (e.g. Rosch, 1973,
1975, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). In her early studies, Rosch (1975) asked
200 subjects to rate the typicality of 60 items in several categories on a 7-
point scale. For example, in the furniture category chair received an average
score of 1.5 (most typical), telephone scored 6.68 (most untypical), and lamp
2.94 (intermediate). In the early analyses, very high (above 0.9) within sub-
ject correlations were reported (Armstrong et al., 1983; Rosch, 1975); however,
according to Barsalou (1987) this resulted from a ﬂawed methodology, and a
corrected analysis gives more moderate agreement averaging around 0.45. This
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has little signiﬁcance, though, because it does not put into a dispute the exis-
tence of graded typicality structure. The reason that this might matter is that
if there is zero correlation of typicality rankings between subjects, one might
legitimately question if typicality plays any role in categorization, given that
there is some (and often high) intersubjective agreement on category mem-
bership. However, what matters is that these rankings were later shown to
predict several behavioral patterns, such as reaction times, error rates, and
ease of learning in classiﬁcation tasks.
In prior studies, it was already established that subjective typicality rank-
ings correlate with reaction times in classiﬁcation (Rips et al., 1973). However,
Rosch could show that the graded structure of superordinate categories (e.g.,
furniture) also aﬀects in predictable ways how its subordinate instances (e.g.,
chair vs. lamp) are processed in perception. The study suggested that category
representations contain more information about instances rated as good rather
than bad examples of the category, and, therefore, category processing has a
central tendency that makes the category processing more eﬃcient with in-
stances that are more similar to its prototype. Moreover, the study concluded
that the eﬀects were not solely due to perceptual processing. Nevertheless,
because perceptible features play an important role in typicality estimates,
category representations may be somewhat more like images than symbols.
The central tendency is also seen in category learning. People tend to learn
typical instances sooner than atypical ones and learn faster to discriminate cat-
egories with fewer overlapping features (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Therefore, the
central tendency does not only reﬂect the subjective conception of already ac-
quired concepts but also inﬂuences the very category formation. In addition to
learning and recognition, typicality inﬂuences inductive inferences to the ex-
tent that it can result in violations of extensional logic (Tversky & Kahneman,
1983; Osherson et al., 1990; Shaﬁr et al., 1990). For example, American college
students generally ﬁnd robins a more typical bird than ostriches, and they are
more willing to infer that all birds have an ulnar artery than that ostriches
have an ulnar artery, given the premise that robins have one. This means that
typicality is not only a categorization phenomenon but it also aﬀects concept
use. These studies show that categorization and category-based inference is
not based on knowledge of deﬁning features but on a mostly automatic assess-
ment of similarity to an implicit prototype. Categorization principles are often
opaque to the subject, and categories may be idiosyncratic and vague. Often
when subjects are asked to deﬁne a concept, they produce generic descriptions
that are generally, but not always, true of its members. (Hampton, 2006)
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All in all, the impact of typicality on category processing is extensive and
robust; even to the extent that, according to Gregory Murphy, if an experiment
fails to reveal any eﬀects of typicality when comparing category members, it is
a good reason to suspect that there is something wrong with the experiment
(Murphy, 2002, 23). This is quite devastating for the classical view of concepts
in psychology. Arguably, only similarity-based theories can naturally explain
central tendency, sensitivity to family resemblance, and related typicality ef-
fects. The core of the classical view is that conceptual content is determined
by a deﬁning set of features, and that by instantiating those features, all mem-
bers are equivalent as category instances. However, if characteristic features
really are constitutive of conceptual contents, it turns out that meaning (or
intension) is continuous rather than discrete and not all category members are
equivalent.
The following two examples show how this works.
1◦ The body mass index is deﬁned by weightkg/height2m and classiﬁes
people as normal weight if the value of the index is in the range of 18.5–25.
Thus, the category is deﬁned by two features with continuous values. The
index is not supposed to be a psychological model and does not contain a
singular prototype. Instead, it deﬁnes the concept with a numerical range. It
clearly has a graded structure, however, and the prototype could be deﬁned
as an (idealized) person with an average height and ideal weight deﬁned by
the index. The distance of actual persons from the prototype increases as the
function of both height and weight, but as long as the combination of values
stays in the predeﬁned range, the person gets classiﬁed as normal weight. This
is an example of a category that is deﬁned by a two-dimensional continuous
feature space with a strict category boundary. The classiﬁcation is based on a
graded structure along these two dimensions.
2◦ DSM-5 deﬁnes the generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) as excessive anx-
iety that is associated with three or more from the list of a total of six symp-
toms, f1 =restlessness, f2 =fatigue, f3 =diﬃculty concentrating, etc. (Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, 2013, 222). None of the symptoms are necessary
for diagnosis, while any three of them is suﬃcient. Therefore, two persons can
be classiﬁed into having GAD while satisfying no common features besides the
underlying anxiety. Hence, there is no underlying ”essence” of the disorder
but a cluster of related symptoms. The prototype of GAD can be deﬁned as
the presence of all the six symptoms, and we get the distance measure by sub-
tracting the number of symptoms from the total of six in the prototype. A
person gets classiﬁed as having GAD if there are at least three of the symp-
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toms present, and anyone with fewer symptoms is too far from the prototype
to satisfy the classiﬁcation.
These two examples are not based on psychological models but artiﬁcial
deﬁnitions for medical classiﬁcation purposes. Hence, we have to stipulate the
prototype for both. This is as it should be, however, because the prototype is
not supposed to be an intrinsic property of a category but its implicit men-
tal representation. Yet, the category deﬁnitions in these examples arguably
track important properties of our conception of normal weight and pathologi-
cal anxiety. Of particular signiﬁcance here is the graded similarity underlying
classiﬁcation.
The category structure in example 2◦ is called family resemblance after
Ludwig Wittgenstein, who remarked that ordinary concepts are often struc-
tured this way. The general idea is that the extension of these kinds of concepts
can be formed by chains of the close resemblances between instances (Wittgen-
stein, 1953, §66 onwards). The name comes from the idea that in a big family
we can supposedly ﬁnd a closely resembling member y for any member x, and
again a third member z that resembles y but not that much x. Eventually,
we may ﬁnd two individuals who share no common features at all but who are
adjoined by a chain of resembling relatives. Along the way, some features are
adjusted, some added, and some removed.
If the prototype is deﬁned as a collection of all the features that are im-
portant in determining category membership, it may diﬀer from statistically
typical category member. It may actually present a rather strange case. For
example, Wittgenstein used the concept of game as an example of a family re-
semblance. Bridge is like solitaire to the extent that both are played with cards;
bridge is like football because both games are played in opposing teams, and
so on. But what sort of a game would have all the characteristic features of all
possible games? The theory does not claim that prototypes always need to be
formed in precisely this way, however. It allows an abstraction hierarchy where
a concept is split into several subdomains with each having their own proto-
type. The higher-order prototype may not have all or any attributes common
to its subordinate categories (Rosch et al., 1976). In other words, games (like
many other categories) form subordinate conceptual clusters where instances
resemble each other more than any other instance from a diﬀerent cluster (e.g.,
ball games, card games, board games, etc.); and the superordinate game pro-
totype does not necessarily need to contain attributes such as ”played with
cards,” and so on. In any case, the crucial point is that the prototype does
not generally represent an average or the subjectively most familiar member
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of a category but an aggregate of features that are characteristic of the whole
category. The more abstract you go in the taxonomic hierarchy, the less you
will ﬁnd commonly shared features. (Mervis et al., 1976; Barsalou, 1985).
In prototype theory, the family resemblance structure is taken to be a gen-
erally inherent property of categories.70 To understand the formal properties of
prototype representations, it often helps to think of category instances as vec-
tors; i.e. basically as lists of numbers. Binary values can be used to represent
the absence and presence of features. Take the deﬁnition of GAD for example.
We can present list of the six symptoms as a vector of features [f1, f2, f3, . . . , f6]
where f1 =restlessness, f2 =fatigue, f3 =diﬃculty concentrating, etc. For ex-
ample, someone with the three mentioned symptoms and no others would be
described with the vector [1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0]; 0 marks the absence and 1 the pres-
ence of a feature. The prototype is a vector with all the symptoms present (i.e.,
[1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]). Instances [0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1] and [1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0] are also in the cate-
gory while [0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1] is not because it has only two symptoms present and,
therefore, lies too far from the prototype. The feature space is six-dimensional
and discrete. It is straightforward to compute the distance measure: subtract
any vector from the prototype and take the sum of the remaining values. If the
sum is at most at the threshold (which is 3 in this case), the instance repre-
sented by the vector counts as a category member. This construction explains
the psychological propensity to recognize family resemblance structures not
as an ability to construct plausible similarity chains from member to member
but as a comparison of targets to the underlying prototype (Rosch & Mervis,
1975). This makes categorization an essentially associative pattern recognition
and enables inductive inference without explicit deduction: If the values (i.e.,
presence or absence) of some features are unknown, their default values can be
retrieved directly from the prototype.
Now, one might question if a strict threshold is psychologically or con-
ceptually sound. Consider the examples 1◦ and 2◦ above. Do we take normal
weight or pathological anxiety to have strict boundaries? Also, what justiﬁes
placing it exactly at three symptoms in GAD, for example? Technically, this is
not necessary. Think of the decision boundary as a binary function c that maps
instance x to a category member; i.e., c(x) = 1, if the distance to prototype is
less than a predetermined threshold θ. If x is too far from the prototype, then
70 To avoid confusion, note that the family resemblance structure is supposed to be an
intrinsic property of categories while the prototype is not. The prototype is an internal mental
representation of the former which, together with a similarity sensitive pattern matching
mechanism, enables us to recognize the external graded or family resemblance structure.
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x is a non-member (i.e., c(x) = 0). For psychological modeling, we may c to
be linear instead of binary, for example. Then there is no strict decision rule,
e.g., for anxiety but a six-point scale where the score of 6 deﬁnitely indicates
the presence and 0 the absence of GAD and in total there are 64 combinations
of features that represent cases with varying degrees of category membership.
We might also want to allow the features themselves to take graded values (like
real values in the normal weight example), say, from the normalized range [0, 1]
(from deﬁnitely not present to deﬁnitely present) and add the values to get the
instance’s distance from the prototype in a real-valued 6-dimensional feature
space. The characteristic function may take forms other than linear or binary.
The only restriction is that its value always decreases as a function of distance
to the prototype.71
We can generalize these remarks further. It seems reasonable to assume
that some features are more important than others. We can implement this
by associating each feature with a coeﬃcient called weight. Take a category
that has three characteristic features f1, f2 and f3, and assign a weight wi
to each. Thus, we get a vector [(w1 × f1), (w2 × f2), (w3 × f3)]. We allow
weights to have negative values, meaning that the presence of a feature is a
contraindication for category membership. Now, let θ be a threshold value
determining a decision boundary: If (w1 × f1)+ (w2 × f2)+ (w3 × f3) ≥ θ then
[f1, f2, f3] is a category member. That is, a target counts as a member if the
sum of the weighted features exceeds the set threshold, which determines the
critical distance from the prototype. This is perhaps the best-known prototype
model, called the independent cue model (Medin & Schaﬀer, 1978; Hampton,
1993). The name comes from a classiﬁcation scheme, which is sensitive only
to the presence of features. It detects if there are enough categorization cues
present and disregards their possible structure (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Tversky,
1977).72 For example, the bird classiﬁcation might be sensitive to the presence
of wings and the ability to ﬂy but not to the causal relation of wings and ﬂying.
This kind of mechanism is a paradigm example of what associative processing
means in modern cognitive science.
The readers familiar with artiﬁcial neural networks should readily notice
that the independent cue model is formally equivalent to the simple perceptron
(see Rosenblatt, 1958, 1962). More generally, the related systems are called lin-
ear classiﬁers because they classify instances based on the linear combination
71 See Osherson & Smith (1981) for a similar but more detailed formal deﬁnition.
72 But see Hampton (1995) and Smith & Minda (2000) for arguments that this simplest
feature addition models do not ﬁt well to all categorization data.
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(i.e., basically an addition) of features. Simple linear classiﬁers have severe lim-
itations; however, they are used extensively for pattern recognition and other
tasks in machine learning because, in practice, they are fast to execute, of-
ten easy to train, fairly eﬀective in classifying data in rich dimensional feature
space, and can learn to recognize features and categories that defy clear deﬁ-
nitions. All these properties are also commonly attributed to human intuitive
judgment.
While linear classiﬁers treat features independently, the prototype theory
does not claim that property correlations are unimportant. Quite the contrary,
the prototype theory assumes that the environment is highly structured in the
way that certain properties combine frequently (e.g., wings and ﬂying) while
others do not (e.g., ﬁns and walking), and this empirical fact makes linear clas-
siﬁers highly eﬀective despite their inherent theoretical limitations. The human
categorization system picks out these stable environmental combinations and
makes the basic category cuts to maximize the cue validity of features. Cue
validity of feature f is its diagnostic value in respect of a given category c. It
is deﬁned as the conditional probability of x belonging to a category c, given
it has a feature f ; i.e. P (c(x)|f(x)). If P (c(x)|f1(x)) > P (c(x)|f2(x)), then
feature f1 is more diagnostic for category c and hence bears more weight. For
example, feathers is highly diagnostic for birds because all birds have them and
especially because other animals do not. Flying is somewhat less cue valid. The
features that the category prototypes consist of are those with high cue validity.
As a result, typical items share many properties with other category members
and fewer properties with non-members.
Note that cue validity measure is contextual because it depends on the
assumed contrast classes (Tversky, 1977), meaning that cue validity is not an
intrinsic property of a category or a feature but depends on how features are
distributed in the environment. The category partitions supposedly reﬂect the
environmental correlations of properties, and classes that do not have salient
central clusters make poor categories. (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch, 1978)
Again, means that instance typicality is not a function of instance familiarity or
statistical typicality. Instead, psychological typicality tracks central tendencies
of property clusters present in the environment as perceived by the organism.
Behind these technicalities hides an important point. If we think of proto-
type mechanisms as linear classiﬁers, the actual prototype or category bound-
ary does not need to be represented in the system. The system is only sen-
sitive to an array of features, and their combination does not represent the
features. The summation generally wipes out all the information about the
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input. Hence, the system can perform classiﬁcation in the absence of any sort
of representational capacity traditionally understood.
While the allure of the prototype theory rests mostly on its ability to
handle inherently vague concepts, linear classiﬁers can also accommodate many
concepts with clear deﬁnitions. For example, GAD has a family resemblance
structure but it can be captured by a logical rule. The complete deﬁnition,
according to DSM-5, can be spelled as ”A: A presence of an excessive anxiety
that is diﬃcult to control, with B: at least three of the aforementioned six
symptoms (call these features b1, . . . , b6), and C: the disturbance is not better
explained by substance abuse or by other mental or physical disorder.” To see
how an independent cue model can capture this deﬁnition, we deﬁne a feature
vector: [A, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, C], associate each feature with respective weights
[7, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,−4], and set the threshold θ = 10. Now, if the presence of a
feature is represented by 1 and the absence by 0, we can easily verify that the
model exactly computes the deﬁnition of GAD (here C stands for the presence
of substance abuse or alternative disorder). An instance cannot exceed a score
of 10 if feature A is absent (a necessary condition) or if less than three of the
features b1, . . . , b6 are present. These constitute a jointly suﬃcient condition
for classiﬁcation, given that C has the value 0. With value 1, the coeﬃcient
−4 of C prevents the total score from reaching the threshold.
Regardless, many classiﬁcation problems need recursive rules or other
methods that can transcend the inherent limitations of linear classiﬁers (see
Minsky & Papert, 1988), and hence these systems do not work as a straight-
forward generalization of deﬁnitional account. For example the DSM-5 (p.
160) criterion of major depression consists of a linearly nonseparable set of
symptoms. In fact, linear classiﬁers cannot compute as simple operation as
the exclusive disjunction; i.e. either x or y, but not both x and y. Formally,
the problem can be surpassed by chaining linear classiﬁers to form what are
essentially multi-layered neural networks; however, these models are too un-
constrained. The resultant models can approximate any computable function
(Hornik, 1991; Siegelmann & Sontag, 1995) and hence as such they hardly con-
stitute a very informative theory of concept structure. Nevertheless, mental
representation of linearly nonseparable categories may not require linguisti-
cally structured and rule-based representations; however, they do necessitate
systems that can do more than mere feature additions (e.g. Marcus, 1998).
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3.2.2 Exemplar theories
Prototype comparison is not the only way to implement similarity-based cate-
gorization. Perhaps the most obvious way is to introduce a set of examples and
use them as a standard for category judgments. Category theories that take
this approach are called exemplar theories. The general idea is that whenever
we classify an object, we tacitly memorize it as an exemplar of that category.
Category representation is based on stored exemplars instead of abstraction of
generic information, such as deﬁnitions or prototypes. Categorization is done
by comparing novel stimuli to exemplars in each category. In the context of
exemplar theories, we can retain the essentials of the above discussion about
similarity-based categories, and exemplar and prototype theories make mostly
similar behavioral predictions. Hence, they are often discussed together as
an alternative frameworks to account for the same categorization phenomena.
Still, they make substantially diﬀerent claims about the underlying cognitive
psychology, and their predictions diﬀer in some critical points.
As with the prototype account, the exemplar framework has several de-
tailed models. They all share the core idea that category representation consists
of a set of concrete exemplars that are grouped under the same label. As in
the prototype theory, instances are associated with a set of n features, and any
stimuli can be thought of as occupying a point in n-dimensional feature space.
However, instead of having a central prototype, category representations con-
sist of a set of points with none having any special status. A novel stimulus
is mapped onto this feature space and the categorization process compares it
to stored exemplars in its neighborhood. There are many ways to do this. For
example, the stimulus can be classiﬁed based on the nearest neighbor, accom-
modated to the category with most matching exemplars (inside a predeﬁned
distance), and so on.
Perhaps the most famous exemplar model is the so-called context model
(Medin & Schaﬀer, 1978) and its generalization (Nosofsky, 1986). Below, I
will mostly limit the discussion to the original context model. Whatever ac-
count one chooses to employ, it is important to appreciate how radical this
approach is. Prototype theory attacks the assumptions of necessary and suﬃ-
cient conditions, the equivalence of category members, and bivalent extensional
logic underlying conceptual structure. However, the prototype theory does not
question the idea that category representations are summary descriptions of
their extensions. Exemplar theory goes further and dismisses this assumption.
It claims that all the information of a category is encoded in the representa-
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tion of its speciﬁc instances. It should be clear that exemplar representations
generally diﬀer from prototypes. Prototypes are lists of independent features,
but, in exemplars, features are always correlated because they are correlated
in actual objects. Therefore, in contrast to independent cue models, these sys-
tems are often called interactive cue models because they are sensitive to the
co-occurrence of features.
On the theoretical side, one might wonder what good exemplar-based cat-
egory encoding could do in principle for the whole point of categorization is
to abstract away from individual instances. But consider concept learning: If
you do not have any previous understanding of a category, pretty much all
you can do to categorize novel stimuli is to rely on reminding them them of
prior examples. After seeing a few instances, you are in a better position to
evaluate what the common characteristics of the category are based on their
shared features (Posner & Keele, 1968; Medin & Schaﬀer, 1978; Ross et al.,
1990). If an understanding of the important properties of a category is lacking,
it is reasonable to store the instances in rich detail because features that may
prove important later can then be readily retrieved. This strategy reduces the
risk of making premature, biased commitments on the nature of the category
(Brooks, 1978).
Moreover, exemplar-based systems readily lend themselves to analogical
reasoning. If a novel entity x is grouped with familiar exemplar y, then knowl-
edge about y can be used to reason about x. This sort of interchangeability of
instances is the hallmark of conceptual thought. With instance-based reasoning
the problem then comes to select the relevant information about y to support
category based inference, because exemplars are encoded without highlighting
what information is relevant to the category. This might appear as shortcom-
ing because selecting the appropriate information for further inference is one
of the key problems that categorization is supposed to solve, but assessment
of relevance is a problem for any reasoning or category theory anyway, and it
is at least not evident if the contextually correct categorization of an entity
is diﬀerent problem from choosing the relevant information about it for the
task at hand. In short, much can be done with instance-based category rep-
resentation, at least in principle. Hardly anyone deny that people remember
and recognize previously encountered things; nonetheless, the question is, are
there any reasons to support the idea that category judgments are based on
exemplars? A considerable body of data suggests that there are.
Oft-cited exemplar research comes from Lee Brooks, Norman Allen, and
collaborators. In one study they investigated medical residents and experienced
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practitioners and showed that their ability to visually classify skin diseases were
aﬀected by the examples of lesions that they had seen previously. Considering
that medical diagnostics is a learned expert skill, it should appear evident that
it is aﬀected by learning; however, the study revealed several phenomena that
are signiﬁcant to the psychology of categorization. The eﬀects of similarity
were compulsory and lasting. Even though subjects had diagnostic rules avail-
able, they still classiﬁed on the basis of similarity to previous exemplars, which
led to misclassiﬁcation with clinically signiﬁcant error rate. Moreover, the clas-
siﬁcation was sensitive to the correlation instead of mere addition of features,
contradicting the independent cue model. Indeed, dermatological diagnostic
rules are often based on a summation of evidence, constituting a family re-
semblance structure like with GAD. (Brooks et al., 1991) Similar results were
discovered earlier in a related study that used artiﬁcial categories based on
simple additive classiﬁcation rule and clearly identiﬁable features (Allen &
Brooks, 1991). Hence, the misclassiﬁcations imply a categorization strategy
that is diﬀerent from both explicit rule following and prototype matching, and
the eﬀect was not merely due to the complexity of the stimuli or vagueness
of the features. In dermatologist study, the eﬀect was not limited to novices
but was also apparent with experienced practitioners. It was still present two
weeks after the introduction of the learning stimuli, demonstrating that the
exemplar eﬀect is relatively durable. Also, an earlier study found imperfect
but relatively impressive retention of dot pattern stimuli after 10 weeks of de-
lay (Homa & Vorsburgh, 1976), and according to Thomas Palmeri (1997, 324),
the eﬀect lasts for years for highly similar stimuli.
An interesting feature of the dermatology study was that the target cate-
gories were natural skin diseases and not artiﬁcial stimulus sets. One problem
with the comparison between prototype and exemplar models is that while they
make substantially diﬀerent assumptions about category structure, their pre-
dictions are often empirically almost identical in ecologically valid situations.
Rosch and Mervis’ (1975) ﬁndings show that typical members of natural cat-
egories generally share more common features than atypical ones. Therefore,
most exemplars tend to cluster around category prototypes. This is because
if the characteristic features of common kinds are highly correlated, it simply
means that most instances of these categories exhibit many of the prototype
features. Therefore, the point in the feature space occupied by the prototype is
close to many exemplars while there are fewer exemplars close to the category
boundary. The exemplar theory explains the typicality eﬀects as reﬂecting the
amount of exemplars in targets’ proximity. With categories that have high
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family resemblance scores the density of exemplars is basically a function of
distance to the prototype. Hence, exemplar and prototype theories imply ef-
fectively identical predictions. This is why critical tests of the theory generally
employ artiﬁcial, hard-to-learn categories with low family resemblance scores.
(Murphy, 2002, 95–96) The methodology may compromise the ecological va-
lidity of the research, but the categorization data we have considering artiﬁcial
categories, provide good support for exemplar models.
The tables below depict the so-called 5–4 category structure which was
used extensively in the studies that led to the wide acceptance of the exemplar
theory. It was introduced in a seminal paper by Medin and Schaﬀer in 1978
and it was employed at least in 30 experiments in the following two decades
(Smith & Minda, 2000).
Category A Category B
stimuli dimensions
f1 f2 f3 f4
a1 1 1 1 0
a2 1 0 1 0
a3 1 0 1 1
a4 1 1 0 1
a5 0 1 1 1
stimuli dimensions
f1 f2 f3 f4
b1 1 1 0 0
b2 0 1 1 0
b3 0 0 0 1
b4 0 0 0 0
What you see here are two abstractly depicted stimulus sets from cate-
gories A and B. ”Dimensions” refers to four binary features in each individual
stimulus a1, . . . , a5 and b1, . . . , b4. In various studies, the categories have been
given diﬀerent speciﬁc contents, such as colored geometrical shapes, Brunswik
faces (Medin & Schaﬀer, 1978), or yearbook photos (Medin et al., 1983). Thus,
the binary values stand for the absence or presence of perceptible features in
each study, such as colors or facial features. The four binary features makes 16
diﬀerent instances in total. In the learning phase, the participants are exposed
to these 5 + 4 stimuli, and the remaining 7 are used in a subsequent transfer
test that probes how the subjects project the category knowledge to novel in-
stances. Note that category A is derived from prototype [1, 1, 1, 1] and B from
prototype [0, 0, 0, 0]. These categories are quite ill-structured and thus hard to
learn, as predicted by the prototype theory. Even if you knew the underlying
prototypes you could not infer that [1, 0, 1, 0] is in A and [0, 1, 1, 0] is in B
because they are equally far from both prototypes. Initially, subjects just have
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to guess and go through several runs of learning trials to memorize the correct
classiﬁcation for each item and extract weights for each feature dimension to
guide categorization for new stimuli in the transfer task. See (Smith & Minda,
2000) for an extensive critical review of these studies. I will skip the critical
part for now and discuss three phenomena that Smith and Minda considers to
be the key evidence for exemplar models cited in the literature.
The ﬁrst notable eﬀect is the preference for old items during the transfer
test. Prototype models assume that information about speciﬁc stimuli is not
stored. Therefore, subjects should show no better categorization of training
exemplars in comparison to transfer items; however, this is not the case. The
further the target is from a prototype or the less there is a diﬀerence in the
number of similar exemplars in competitive categories, the less sure the sub-
jects are about to which category the target belongs to. Since they cannot use
a simple classiﬁcation rule to decide this, they sometimes assign vague training
exemplars to the wrong category in forced choice situations. Therefore, the
graded structure in each theory implies predictable errors in category judg-
ments. Broadly speaking, both theories make qualitatively identical predic-
tions about the error proﬁles in the transfer task. However, a detailed analysis
will reveal that the predictions diﬀer quantitatively. The prototype theory
predicts that in the transfer task, the error rates for the old items are simi-
lar to novel items—i.e., a linear function of their distance from the prototype.
However, the exemplar model predicts substantially better classiﬁcation for the
old items encountered in the training set. In in comparison to the prototype
theory, this is especially true for items far from the category center because
targets are matched against stored exemplars in category memory instead of
the central prototype; and this is what we actually see in human categorization
studies. Unlike the prototype models, the exemplar theory readily explains this
processing advantage for old items.
Note that the processing advantage does not make classiﬁcation perfect
for the old items. The exemplar theory explains the emergence of a graded
structure partly by a gradual forgetting of the details of stored exemplars.
This means that there generally is uncertainty in category judgments and,
therefore, the possibility of misclassiﬁcation, even with familiar stimuli. If the
memorization was perfect, subjects should simply use the already familiar ex-
emplar to decide the category. However, if the memory trace is degraded, a
familiar exemplar serves just as one more highly similar instance in exemplar
memory. Without postulating this sort of forgetting, exemplar theory should
predict perfect categorization for familiar stimuli, which is an empirically in-
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valid prediction. Forgetting also contributes to the explanation of prototype
eﬀects in exemplar theory: In many natural categories, there are lots of ex-
emplars clustered around the prototype. If their speciﬁcs are lost, then highly
similar exemplars begin to look pretty much the same, engendering a cluster
that works eﬀectively like a prototype and causes pronounced central tendency
in category processing. (Murphy, 2002, 54–56) In this sense forgetting can be
actually adaptive. It may reduce overﬁtting in category learning and thus pro-
mote focusing on relevant dimensions. This sort of forgetting may appear as
somewhat an ad hoc postulate, but, of course, we often do forget the details
of past encounters, hence, it is at least prima facie plausible and supported by
empirical evidence (see Homa & Vorsburgh, 1976).
The second important eﬀect is more subtle but theoretically very sugges-
tive. Consider items a1 = [1, 1, 1, 0] and a2 = [1, 0, 1, 0]. Clearly, item a1 is
closer to prototype A = [1, 1, 1, 1], and hence the prototype theory predicts
that a1 is learned more easily and categorized with fewer errors than a2. How-
ever, it turns out that whether this is the case depends on other items in the
learning task. Although the 5–4 stimulus sets depicted above may appear quite
random, they are carefully selected. Notice that a2 = [1, 0, 1, 0] is close to two
other exemplars in category A: a1 = [1, 1, 1, 0] and a3 = [1, 0, 1, 1] but it diﬀers
at least by two features from any exemplar in B. Item a1 is highly similar to
only one exemplar in A, namely a2, but equally similar (i.e., diﬀering in only
one feature) from two exemplars in set B: b1 = [1, 1, 0, 0] and b2 = [0, 1, 1, 0].
Hence, with this particular set of learning items, the exemplar theory predicts
a processing advantage of a2 over a1. This prediction was veriﬁed in (Medin &
Schaﬀer, 1978) and in several subsequent studies, and has been taken as highly
important evidence for exemplar theory against prototype models. However,
it should be noted that a meta-analysis (Smith & Minda, 2000) revealed that
the eﬀect is not robust. The eﬀect appears in several studies but seems to
disappear in the more encompassing analysis. Then again, the meta-analysis
revealed no sign of a1 advantage over a2, either. The exemplar theory at least
has theoretical resources to explain a2 to a1 advantage when we see it and why
it should be sometimes absent. Still, even if the analyzed data sets were chosen
in a way that at least ostensibly favored exemplar theory, no predicted eﬀect
was reliably found. Naturally, the mentioned theoretical resources are pretty
void if the true explanation happens to be simple statistics.
Third, independent cue models predict that linearly separable categories
are easier to learn than linearly non-separable ones. This is because linear
separability simply means that the extension can be partitioned by a weighted
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additive combination of independent feature component information about in-
stances. The prediction, however, was found not to be always true of human
category judgments (Medin & Schaﬀer, 1978; Medin & Schwanenﬂugel, 1981).
Unfortunately there are, again, some caveats with this ﬁnding. These studies
were conducted with two categories that have very weak structure and were
hard to learn. Learning was very diﬃcult despite the fact that the training ex-
emplars were sparse and their dimensionality was small. A subsequent study
used four categories with either three or nine learning items and with either
linearly separable or non-separable structure (Blair & Homa, 2001). The study
looked into the performance of individual subjects and found that they were, in
fact, often operating under linear separability constraint. When the complexity
of the task was increased, subjects found it easier in the linearly separable con-
dition. With the larger category using nine learning items, the proportion of
subjects displaying classiﬁcation strategy based on linear separation increased
dramatically from 9% to 81%. Other results also illustrate that large, high
dimensional, and well structured categories promote prototype rather than ex-
emplar learning (Smith et al., 1997; Smith & Minda, 1998, 2000).
For the reader not too fond of the methodological niceties of cognitive
psychology, the take-home message is this: Even if prototype and exemplar
theories make very diﬀerent assumptions concerning processing and represen-
tation, they are diﬃcult to compare empirically. The diﬀerences are subtle,
and the critical results are often not very robust. It is clear that the exem-
plar eﬀects are real and signiﬁcant. Still, their theoretical signiﬁcance is not
completely clear, and explaining human categorization data seems to require
prototype theory also. Now, if we are about to resolve the debate between
prototype and exemplar models we, should probably seek evidence from other
phenomena besides mere category learning. Converging evidence from closely
related areas could conceivably tip the scale in either direction. However, we
may wish to preserve both frameworks because their straightforward combina-
tion seems to explain artiﬁcial category task performance quite accurately.73 In
that case, we need to ﬁnd their proper place in conceptual cognition and spe-
cially to explain what the exemplar eﬀects actually mean, given that summary
information about categories is already contained in prototypes.
One should note that the exemplar eﬀects are most pronounced with ar-
tiﬁcial categories that have undiﬀerentiated and diﬃcult-to-learn structures.
These categories are not artiﬁcial in the sense that they consisting of artifacts
but in the sense that they have no apparent content. They are not used for
73 For more detailed discussion see Machery (2009), and Smith & Minda (1998, 2000).
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anything, save for their role as reaction probes in forced choice tasks. The
categories employed in these experiments are very unnatural in all respects,
which has clear impact on their cognitive processing. Often we get the point
of common natural categories pretty swiftly, but with artiﬁcial categories it
may take tens of runs through sparse learning items to obtain about a half of
the subjects to classify correctly (Murphy, 2002, 103ﬀ.). Compared to natural
concepts, these are special sort of learning episodes altogether because there is
absolutely no point to get with artiﬁcial categories. I explained earlier why I
think it is a misguided worry that psychologists working with similarity-based
categories are not actually studying concepts; however, this methodological
aspect of exemplar research should raise some red ﬂags. The categories in
these studies are hardly concepts since they do not have any content or sense.
The best evidence we have for exemplar theory is thus derived from unnatural
hard-to-learn categories where the list of their extensions is pretty much their
simplest description.
Usually we categorize to reach some other goal. That is the whole point
of having concepts in the ﬁrst place. Making a correct category judgment can
be an end itself (e.g., in some games, exams, and psychology experiments),
but categorization as such is only one particular and austere way to interact
with category members. Category knowledge and other associated cognitive
content are shown to be determined by interactions with category instances
which, in turn, aﬀect further categorization—as we will see in the next section
and the following chapters. Generally, category identity is learned as a by-
product of the ways concepts participate in these interactions and category
learning is not the actual goal of the actions unlike in laboratory learning tasks
(Markman & Ross, 2003). The upshot is that artiﬁcial categorization studies
largely dismiss the actual point of conceptual cognition and the methodology
produces settings where category use happens in very unnatural tasks with
unnatural category structures. Hence, the data from the experiments may
mostly mirror the experimental design rather than the cognitive psychology of
conceptual representation.
In conclusion, the exemplar eﬀects are there and they do aﬀect catego-
rization; however, this does not mean that they necessarily have a lot to do
with how categories are represented in general. If you look at these studies, it
appears very much like as if the subjects are gradually learning very speciﬁc,
exemplar-based skills for responding appropriately to ill-structured stimulus
environments. In fact, mainstream cognitive psychologist think that skills are
learned precisely this way, that is by accumulating a vast, implicit knowledge
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base about the speciﬁc instances of the domain. This is basically what training
is supposed to do.74 However, if the amalgamation of pragmatist inferential-
ism with enactivism is the correct theory of human conceptual understanding,
then skills are fundamental in making sense of the world. That is, if exemplar
eﬀects reﬂect skill learning and concept use is a kind of a cognitive skill, then
exemplars do have a profound place in conceptual understanding. However, to
appreciate their signiﬁcance to conceptual cognition, we need to consider them
in a wider context than pure categorization with meaningless stimuli.
3.2.3 The knowledge account
The second major shift in concept research began in the late 1980s. As re-
marked earlier, this third paradigm lacks a canonical formulation to date, but
its core claim is that concepts are organized as theories. As such, this may
sound like a step back toward traditional ideas prevalent in analytic philos-
ophy. For example, conceptual role semantics is one way to explain what it
means for concepts to be structured this way. We do not need discuss this in-
depth again, but recall that the problems with CRS were related to identifying
intentional content under the assumptions that conceptual representation is
veridical and referential in the sense of being universal and respecting biva-
lent extensional logic. The psychologists’ claim here is substantially weaker,
in that knowledge account only claims that conceptual contents carry inher-
ent inferential potential, which often dictates performance in category learning
and use. No claim is made that conceptual content in full can be reduced to
this aspect of category representation. It is pretty clear that raw similarity
matters; however, it is equally clear that sometimes the similarity constraint
is violated.
A casual observation seems to conﬁrm this. We count whales as mammals,
although they ostensibly are more similar to ﬁsh. This as such is not very dam-
aging to similarity-based theories. It is possible to adjust features so that some
of them bear more weight than the others, rendering some of them even nec-
essary for category membership.75 Hence, beyond surface appearances, there
might be more important properties that make whales actually more similar
to mammals than to ﬁsh. However, his solution risks being vacuous or psy-
chologically unrealistic. If similarity means simply a predicate comparison, we
could assign the property mammal to whales and postulate that this property
74 See e.g. Smith & Minda (2000); Johansen & Palmeri (2002) and Murphy (2002, 103–114)
on this interpretation of the exemplar eﬀects in relation to skill learning.
75 For example, we saw this with the linear classiﬁer deﬁnition of GAD on page 121.
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is necessary and suﬃcient for something to count as a mammal. However, this
is pretty uninformative, and similarity-based accounts should explain how we
decide something to be a mammal on the basis of an array of other properties.
Then, we may associate whale prototype with properties that are empirically
important for being a mammal, such as live birth and lactation. But, realis-
tically, does the folk really categorize whales as mammals because they know
that whales lactate, etc., or simply because they have been told that whales
are mammals? (In which case, psychologically, lactation is more likely taken to
be an implication rather than a conceptually constitutive property of the belief
that whales are mammals.) I personally ﬁnd the latter option more plausible,
and in any case, a good deal of psychological literature indicates that such
pieces of explicit knowledge often does dominate category judgments.
One of the most famous experiments demonstrating the dissociation of
knowledge and similarity in categorization was Lance Rips’ (1989) experiment
where he asked subjects to estimate the size of the largest U.S. quarter and the
smallest pizza they have ever seen. Then he read his participants a description
of a circular object that was halfway in size between these estimates. Thus, if
a subject told that the largest quarter she had ever seen was 1 in. in diameter
and the smallest pizza was 5 in., the description was ”a circular object 3-in.
in diameter.” Then he asked them to categorize the mystery object as either
a quarter or a pizza; or alternatively, he asked them to estimate either the
similarity of the object to a pizza or its typicality as a pizza. The study included
36 similar problems where one category was always ﬁxed and the other variable
in size. The results demonstrated a dissociation of categorization, typicality,
and similarity judgments. For example, about 2/3 classiﬁed the item as a pizza,
while the same number of participants considered the item to be more similar
to a quarter. The typicality estimates were about 50/50. This result does
not mean that similarity is unimportant; however, it shows that categorization
is not solely a matter of similarity, because it can be outstripped by world
knowledge.
Obviously, we can keep track of exceptions like we can keep track of, say,
one’s belongings. Perhaps exceptions, such as that whales are actually mam-
mals, work psychologically similarly to any trivial conventional knowledge—
i.e., as culturally transmitted explicit factoids. In Rips’ study this seems to
be the case. Subjects reported that even though the mystery object was more
similar to ﬁxed size category, it still could not be its member, reﬂecting the
conventional understanding that coins do not come in arbitrary sizes. In some
category judgments similarity still dominates, and this discrepancy may stem
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from the arrangement where automatic similarity matching is the default mech-
anism but reﬂective processing may intervene and override its output. There is
evidence for this kind of dual-processing in categorization. For example, a sub-
sequent study did not ﬁnd the reported dissociation when the subjects were not
required to think out loud or justify their decisions (Smith & Sloman, 1994).
The eﬀect was absent even though the participants were working under the
instructions which were designed to encourage rule-based inference. Moreover,
the subjects classiﬁed the object as a coin when it was described as 3 in. in
size and silver colored, thus apparently switching (or lapsing) from necessary-
feature-based analytic processing to similarity- or characteristic-based catego-
rization. This suggests that the assumed similarity-based default mechanism
might be quite hard to suppress.
This looks like pretty much what generic dual-process theories claim about
cognitive architecture: an associative default mechanism, which is sensitive to
concrete perceptible features, augmented with analytic rule based reasoning.
However, the real story is not as simple as prototypes by default + rules for
exceptions. The subjects were clearly doing something else than simple simi-
larity matching, but their responses also diﬀered from deductive inference with
explicit deﬁnitions. Instead, the participants often seemed to engage in abduc-
tive material inference. The following subject report displays this lucidly. The
target object was 4.75 high and it was either a stop sign or a cereal box: ”It
would probably be one huge cereal box, because no one would see the stop sign
if it were that small [...] while I wouldn’t expect to see a cereal box that big,
it wouldn’t make sense to have such a small sign.” (Rips, 1989, 37)
In one of the seminal papers on knowledge account, Gregory Murphy and
Douglas Medin (1985) used a vivid example of abductive categorization: Jump-
ing into a swimming pool in a party while dressed might be strongly associated
with with intoxication. The event is probably quite rare and hence not very
similar to drunken behavior in general; however, the association can be drawn
from a plausible abductive inference. Additional information such as there is
someone drowning in the pool quite likely changes the conclusion from drunk-
enness to heroism. In that case, the information about the person in question
remains the same, but the classiﬁcation from a drunk to a hero changes be-
cause added contextual factors inﬂuence the inference to the best explanation
of the behavior. One might protest that this is not an example of taxonomic
but event classiﬁcation or perhaps property induction. Hence, we probably
should expect the underlying cognitive processes to diﬀer from taxonomic ob-
ject categorization tasks. However, the point of taxonomic classiﬁcation is
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often property induction, and (in agreement with the objection) the example
highlights that categorization going beyond taxonomic classiﬁcation of things
is not be reducible to considerations about similarity alone but we need to
resort to causal and contextual inference.
The above example shows that world knowledge or lay theories are im-
portant for classifying events or behavior but it does not clearly demonstrate
that they are essential for taxonomic classiﬁcation of things. However, there
are conceptual domains that are both taxonomic and theoretically constituted.
Folk biology is an extensively studied example. Preschool children seem quite
susceptible to classify species on the basis of surface features but this tendency
changes around the age of 6 or 7.76 When children mature, they acquire many
interrelated beliefs about biological kinds that guide their category judgments,
for example, that biological things reproduce transmitting many of their impor-
tant properties to their oﬀspring, that biological kinds have a complex internal
structure, and that biological kinds grow and undergo irreversible changes but
it is the less mutable internal structure that determines the organism’s kind.
Based on these principles, children (like adults) judge kind category of living
things as remaining the same even though they undergo superﬁcial changes
through surgery, exposure to ﬁctional toxic substances, or mutation, which
make them look like another kind of animal. (Rips, 1989; Keil, 1994) What is
going on is much more sophisticated than the application of a simple rule. It
does not matter whether the inferences are deductive, abductive, or inductive;
what matters is that these categorization judgments apparently deploy a sys-
tem of rules, principles, or something similar that have causal or explanatory
relevance in determining the target’s kind (Murphy & Medin, 1985).
These sorts of knowledge eﬀects were decisive in shifting theoretical focus
from similarity to knowledge in the psychology of categorization. If similarity
refers to the tabulation of observable raw properties, it is too weak a notion
to explain all the relevant categorization data. On the other hand, similarity
can accommodate functional or other non-obvious properties; however, if it is
extended to cover inferential relations in complex knowledge structures, the
notion becomes too unconstrained and vacuous to be informative. That would
in any case necessitate fundamental changes in the core of the theory to the
extent that it would be rather misleading to use the term ”similarity” anymore.
Still, these results do not entirely invalidate similarity-based theories. The
76 But see Gelman & Wellman (1991); apparently something changes around that age;
however, even 3- to 4-years olds can appreciate that surface features are often less relevant
for species identity than hidden internals.
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emerging picture rather looks like that we have a fundamental tendency to
categorize things on the basis of similarity but that gives way to more or less
explicit and/or analytic knowledge-based categorization. On the face of it, this
makes good sense. Superﬁcial appearances can be misleading but you need to
start with something in order to get causal learning going—something to lock
causal knowledge onto—and generalizations formed by raw similarity is a good
candidate for that something. But the clear-cut two-process story that treats
similarity and causal knowledge as distinct layers is misleading. Actually if
it were correct, the knowledge account would be somewhat superﬂuous as a
theory of categories. Knowledge would be just a sort of an add-on to already
established ontology (apart from perhaps purely formal concepts if there are
any).77 To avoid making this simpliﬁcation, it is relevant to understand the
impact of knowledge that people bring to category-learning situations.
Earlier already Rosch (1978) noticed that the analysis of objects into at-
tributes is often a cognitively sophisticated activity that transcends the mere
extraction of features from the environment. For example, the functional at-
tribute ”you eat on it” requires knowledge about humans, their activities, and
the real world to be understood. Later research with made-up artifact cate-
gories conﬁrmed that subjects’ knowledge about object functions aﬀects the
perception of object properties. For example, one study (Lin & Murphy, 1997)
used a rod with a loop and two other gadgets attached to it as a learning
stimulus. Half of the subjects were told that the instrument was for catching
animals with the loop, and the other half was told that the instrument was
for fertilizing the ground. For the latter group, the loop was explained to be
for hanging the tool for storage. For the test stimuli either the loop or one
of the other features was missing, and the participants were asked to judge
whether the novel object was in the same category as the original tool. For the
ﬁrst group, the presence of the loop was critical for judging that it was, while
for the latter group it was irrelevant. This, of course, is not very surprising,
but the ﬁnding shows that the object’s function and its parts are not coded as
separate features. The subjects deployed their knowledge of the causal relation
of an object part and its use to make category judgments. This happened even
in speeded test conditions that were designed to suppress explicit reasoning,
implying that knowledge aﬀects categorization early in the processing, making
functionally relevant features more salient in perception.
Knowledge also inﬂuences similarity judgments of category attributes. In
Douglas Medin and Edward Shoben’s (1988) study, subjects rated white and
77 Recall our earlier discussion about similar points in the context of two-factor CRS.
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gray to be more similar than gray and black in the context of hair but reverse
judgment was found in the context of clouds. Presumably, this was because
of the subjects’ previously established inductive generalizations that associate
gray and white hair with aging and gray and black clouds with bad weather.
This eﬀect might be better construed as pertaining to similarity of feature val-
ues rather than the features themselves. That, anyway, would be an equally
interesting interpretation, demonstrating essentially the same point: similarity
metric is aﬀected by causal properties associated with the category. Later,
Evan Heit and Joshua Rubinstein (1994) tested directly whether similarity-
based reasoning is guided by feature- rather than category-level similarity. The
underlying assumption was that if category A has property P , then B is con-
sidered to have that property also to the extent that A and B are perceived
to share other features. They found that no single formal measure of category
similarity existed to support such inferences but the subjective understanding
of the nature of property P itself determines which other features of A and
B are deemed as important. For example, the participants were more prone
to make anatomical inferences from bears to whales but behavioral inferences
from tunas to whales (Rehder, 2009).
Lawrence Barsalou’s research on ad hoc and goal derived categories is
another important demonstrations of these points (Barsalou, 1983, 1985). He
deﬁned the category ideal as a feature that category members should have to
ideally serve their purpose as category members. For example an ideal food to
eat on a diet (a goal-derived category) has zero calories, and the fewer calories
an instance has, the better it serves the goal associated with the category.
His main ﬁnding was that ideals determine a graded structure that drives
categorization independently of family resemblance. In a related study, he
showed that people are readily able to form a coherent, graded category out of
ostensibly disjoint objects. For example, on how could things like children, a
blanket, a dog, and stereos form a good category? They are all good candidates
for things to take out in case of a ﬁre. That is also a readily projectible concept:
a wallet is a better exemplar of the category than a cheap and bulky kitchen
table. The lesson is that the correlational structure of category features does
not always determine the goodness-of-example measure. At least for goal-
derived categories, it is determined how sensibly the combination of features
satisﬁes the category goal. In sensible, practical contexts, ill-structured and
disjoint clusters may well make good and coherent categories.
The discussion above illustrates that the psychological contents of our ob-
ject concepts is not determined by a tabulation of features alone but also how
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they are embedded in larger knowledge structures that include human goals
and practices. These results do not deny that feature-based similarity is impor-
tant; in fact, most studies clearly conﬁrm that it is. However, it is also crucial
that often the features themselves are encoded in a way that highlights their
interactions. For example, it is not only relevant to our bird concept that birds
ﬂy and have wings but also that it is the wings that make them ﬂy (see Ahn et
al., 2000b). Therefore, causal knowledge and similarity-based processing hang
together quite tightly. In category learning, it does not matter whether cate-
gories are phrased in terms of meaningless or meaningful features if they do not
form a coherent whole. What matters is that these features are meaningfully
related in a way that makes sense to the cognitive agent. For example, formally
identical categories phrased in terms of meaningless formal symbols +, {, >, $, [
are as hard to learn as the same category structure with meaningful features
that lack conceptual coherence: lives alone, made in Africa, ﬁsh kept there as a
pet, has barbed tail, thick heavy walls. However, if the features form a sensible
whole, for example made in Africa, lightly insulated, green, drives in jungles,
has wheels, the category is substantially easier to learn (Murphy & Allopenna,
1994).78 In the next, chapter we will see that a comparable phenomenon is
observed in a conditional reasoning task; that is, subjects are not sensitive to
formal versus thematic content in rules but whether they can interpret the
rules as expressing a familiar or meaningful relation between variables.
Knowledge eﬀects are prevalent throughout the psychology of concepts
ranging from categorization to concept learning, conceptual combination, in-
duction, and word learning. Formal properties (such as linear separability)
of category structures might be important in initial learning of a foreign do-
main,for example, but background knowledge seems to have a signiﬁcant im-
pact in every aspect of conceptual cognition whenever it is available. Theo-
retically, this is expected. One main impetus to research in knowledge eﬀects
was the question of category coherence (Murphy & Medin, 1985), i.e., what
makes some collection of objects or features intuitively sensible wholes and
others less so. Similarity as such is logically too unconstrained a notion to be
very useful here. The Eiﬀel Tower and pet ﬁsh are similar in many respects.
For example, they both are smaller than the moon. For a functional organism,
78 See also Wattenmaker et al. (1986). The study shows that whether it is easier to learn
linearly separable on non-separable natural categories does not depend on formal category
structure as such but on category content. Some properties combine more sensibly in additive
and some in interactive fashion having implications on the ease of category learning regardless
of the linear separability.
136
something more is required to limit the logical space of possible partitions of
the world. Importantly, as Barsalou’s work shows, this something is not fully
object centered. We impose our own goals on our environment, and once we
get some causal learning going it comes to aﬀect our conceptual understanding
profoundly. Artiﬁcial category research misses these critical points because the
experiments are intentionally designed to suppress the eﬀects of background
knowledge. The question of how the agent determines the relevant features
does not rise because the stimuli is often manufactured in the way that makes
the critical features (e.g., colors and geometrical shapes) highly salient.79 The
insuﬃciency of the methodology in similarity centered tradition, particularly
in exemplar research, lies in its frequent dismissal of the role of content, and
human intentional content can not be understood purely by formal means, in
isolation of human interests and practices.
In summary, we should expect similarity eﬀects to dominate in artiﬁcial
categorization tasks unless the stimuli is contextualized in a way that makes
intuitive sense to participants, which means the subjects can connect the de-
scription of the stimuli with their already established knowledge structures.
Knowledge eﬀects should be prevalent in tasks employing natural categories.
The word ”natural” here should be understood in a subjective or relative sense
of ”familiar.” The distinction between ”natural” and ”artiﬁcial” in this con-
text has little to do with the distinction between natural kinds and artifacts.
What appears ”natural” is determined by the task and subjects’ background
knowledge. For example very young children who lack biological knowledge
rely on similarity-based categorization, even though there clearly is nothing
unnatural about biology. Likewise, in a sense, there is hardly anything more
natural than elementary particles; however, at least to the untutored, their
nature is rather alien making perhaps properties such as ”spin” to appear psy-
chologically and phenomenologically similar to arbitrary features in artiﬁcial
categorization tasks. The more acquainted, on the other hand, might develop a
sense of familiarity with the concepts of fundamental physics, which makes its
odd properties appear utterly natural in light of other strange features, such
as the appearance of the interference pattern in double slit experiments as a
natural consequence of the wave–particle duality.
If the hypothesis developed here is correct, the above remarks should con-
cern knowledge use extensively. The exemplar eﬀects in artiﬁcial categorization
tasks are supposed to reﬂect a limiting case of knowledge eﬀects: They emanate
79 Even though early researchers did mention the theoretical importance of context in at-
tribute perception, e.g. Tversky (1977), Rosch (1978), and Medin & Schaﬀer (1978).
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from selective activation of contextually relevant pragmatic knowledge in case
no rules, or summary or causal information about the category is available.
Then the only (pragmatic) knowledge that is associated with the test stimuli
is its proper categorization response in the context of the experiment. Hence,
categorization in these tasks reﬂects a rather superﬁcial skill for selecting the
correct categorization response for a test stimulus that is utterly meaningless
outside that very task. This can be seen as one of the simplest purely formal
goal-directed behaviors, where the sense of the stimulus is solely constituted by
its role in more or less trivial stimulus–response tasks. If this is true of think-
ing in general, albeit with more complex means-ends patterns and inferential
structures, we should also ﬁnd exemplar eﬀects in reasoning, especially when
reasoning employs concepts that do not form prototypes and are relatively iso-
lated from other conceptual domains (e.g., abstract discursive concepts where
cross-domain background knowledge bears little impact on reasoning.) Thus
expert reasoning, especially with theoretical and formal hard-to-learn concepts,
should be an excellent place to ﬁnd these eﬀects. This is because the psycholog-
ical contents of these concepts should mostly consist of knowledge about their
discursive use, and the exemplars should contain information mostly about
their previous applications in public and private reasoning. Because exemplars
consist of very speciﬁc information, this should result in a limited ability to
apply conceptual resources outside familiar tasks and situations. Indeed, if
exemplars work as the intuitive gateways to contextually relevant information,
the result should be even the dismissal of existing relevant knowledge in unfa-
miliar contexts. That is discussed further in Chapter 5 in connection with the
analogical transfer.
Unfortunately there is little consensus on how the relevant causal knowl-
edge is represented and how concepts are accordingly organized. The basic
idea is that grasping a concept is an ability to explain its instantiation by
resorting to some of its causal properties; hence the often used name ”theory–
theory.” However, the notion of ”theory” seems to be rather loose here if not
entirely misleading. Traditionally, theories are taken to be explicit linguis-
tic constructs that allow prediction and explanation. But knowledge account
is not committed to conﬂating concepts with language. Instead, the idea is
more general: that concepts are represented by properties that cluster around
causal attributes. Some classiﬁcation strategies are explicit, conventional, and
culturally transmitted (e.g., in the pizza/coin case and quite likely in the folk
classiﬁcation of whales as mammals), but often conceptual thinking is implicit
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and idiosyncratic, making the role of public discourse less relevant. (Murphy
& Medin, 1985)
The primacy of language and explicit theorizing are also questionable in
light of developmental psychological evidence. Even prelinguistic infants are
able to pair a toy dog with a toy bird instead of a toy airplane, which looks much
more like the bird, displaying categorization capacity that transcends mere
observable surface similarity (Mandler, 2004, Chapter 8). Moreover, the eﬀect
of knowledge about the causal structure of a category to typicality ratings is
evident in 750 msec time frame, implying that explicit thinking is not necessary
to bring about these eﬀects but the impact of knowledge can be produced
by fast intuitive processing (Luhmann et al., 2006). It should be clear that
similarity- and knowledge-based processing do not form cognitive competencies
that align neatly with the implicit/explicit or intuitive/reﬂective distinctions
as they are generally conceived in the dual-process theories.
Therefore, we perhaps should conceive the knowledge eﬀects as arising
from general sense-making capacities. Explicit theoretical or rule-based rea-
soning is one but perhaps a rather marginal way of making sense of the world.
Some sort of mental models or other less representationalistic ways of under-
standing how things hang together should suﬃce to bring about these eﬀects,
at least in principle. However, in principle, nothing reviewed thus far emphat-
ically rules out the possibility of some kind of innate language of thought for
representing causal and taxonomic knowledge. For now, I leave the discussion
at that. The next two chapter will introduce the main empirical hypothesis and
theoretical contribution of this work. It revolves around a pragmatistically ori-
ented intuitive knowledge account that puts some enactivist and neopragmatist
ideas to work. The next chapter focuses mostly on non-linguistic competen-
cies, and Chapter 5 concentrates on explicit, formal, and theoretical discursive
reasoning and its roots in implicit cognition.
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4 Concrete, situated, and pragmatic intuition
The core idea of the hypothesis elaborated below is that while causal knowl-
edge and aﬀordances concern things, they are also about situations. Pragmatic
knowledge, i.e. the procedural and causal knowledge about things and situa-
tions, stems from the summary encoding of experiences of particular situations
that the agent has encountered and yields a capacity to generate immediate
expectations on how events unfold and how the actions of the agent aﬀect the
outcomes. Here the notion of situation is construed subjectively from the point
of view of the agent. Situations are roughly deﬁned by the goals of the agent
with a material context composed of variables that are causally relevant to it to
reach those goals—generally surrounding things and their properties, including
actors and their dispositions.
It is a remarkable and ill-understood property of both common sense and
expert reasoning that we are capable of focusing selectively on the relevant
variables in complex task environments while automatically disregarding the
irrelevant. We all have a massive amount of more or less trivial knowledge
about the world, and hence the problem ensues that which from all these facts
we need to take into consideration when we perform an action or make an in-
ference. Somehow we manage to exploit that vast knowledge base very ﬂuently,
and this vital aspect of human cognition is part of pragmatic know-how—both
in the common non-technical sense and the speciﬁc sense expounded here.
Commonsense has proven to be very diﬃcult to model, especially with gen-
eral logic-based algorithms, and the problem to date lacks an eﬀective general
solution (e.g, Davis & Marcus, 2015).
Relevance assessment happens immediately when interpreting a passage
or an event. Consider these sentences: ”I stuck a pin in a carrot; when I
pulled the pin out, it had a hole.” and ”I stuck a letter in a spindle; when I
pulled the letter out, it had a hole.” Now, to what does ”it” refer to in each
sentence? The answer is immediately obvious; however, it is not determined
by syntax. To resolve the referent, you need some basic causal knowledge
about how pins, carrots, letters, and spindles may interact, and what it means
to stick things in each sentence. Of particular importance here is that once
you have attained this knowledge you do not use it explicitly to infer the
referent. The meaning is completely transparent, and the alternative reading
most likely does not even cross your mind. Recall from the introduction the
example of a note to a friend saying ”I’m making some bigos tonight. Could
you check what’s in the fridge and drop by the store? Some cash and the
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car keys are on the kitchen table.” One immediately grasps how making a
speciﬁc dish, inspecting the fridge, visiting a grocery store, cash, and the car
keys relate to each other and understands what needs to be done to fulﬁll the
request. This is quite a feat considering the extent of cross-domain knowledge
that might, in principle, be relevant and, therefore, how much information is
outright dismissed from consideration. We are so good at connecting the dots
that most people presumably do not even realize that all the sentences in the
above example are logically unrelated. We just automatically see a meaningful
whole.
The issue was noticed very early on in artiﬁcial intelligence (McCarthy &
Hayes, 1969; Minsky, 1974), and it has also drawn considerable attention from
philosophers. This, of course, is no wonder because of its importance to human
reasoning and knowledge representation.80 The problem of relevance is likely
not resolved here; however, developing new ways of thinking about knowledge
employment and representation is a necessary step toward that goal. I have
come to take it for granted that relevance is not a formal but essentially a
pragmatic matter. Intuitive common sense results from a continuous sense-
making process we participate throughout our lives. This means engaging in
all kinds of activity, ranging from play and random exploration to planning
and problem solving which endows us with steadily accumulating experience
on how things in our environment work and what can be done with them.
Through our activity, we create the ontology of our lifeworlds, and making
sense is ﬁnding out what makes a meaningful diﬀerence to what. This is how
we begin to understand the situations and the nature of things we encounter.
Note that the construction of an ontology here does not refer to how we
change our environment through our labor. Of course, we do that too, both
individually and on a massive scale as a cultural species. We are niche con-
structors. However, we also adapt to existing environments, and this ”ontology
of the lifeworld” is a subjective partitioning of the environment into meaningful
phenomena, which happens gradually through this adaptation as a product of
goal attainment. It is an active and constructive process, but I mostly mean
this in the psychological sense.
In what follows, I will use overtly representationalist language in describing
human conceptual cognition. Still, I maintain that the fundamental meaning
engendering cognitive phenomena involve action-relevant selective sensitivity
to the environment. Whether or not the sensory contents, associated actions,
and anticipated outcomes are represented somehow internally (clearly they
80 For often cited sources discussing the issue see e.g. Dennett (1984); Dreyfus (1965, 1992).
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are at least associated with systematic occurrences of neural or other internal
states), none of these components need to correspond to anything that has
meanings in the representationalistic sense. Rather, they constitute systems of
capacities that are meanings in phenomenological sense (see McIntryre 1986).
Nonetheless, these capacities are employed in explicit thought, and hence I
ﬁnd it diﬃcult to drop the representationalistic vocabulary altogether. This
is because thoughts presumably take some internal states as objects that, in
turn, receive their contents from these meanings. Since I assume these mean-
ings are mostly tacit, they are not direct objects of thought; that is, unlike
classical (computational) representationalists and semantic externalists, I take
that the meanings are not mind independent referents but our intuitions about
these putative referents. Hence, the constitution of meaning can be unacces-
sible to consciousness and it sometimes manifests itself only by observing our
own activity. I think that the psychology of conceptual analysis should be
conceived mostly as mental simulation of concept use situations rather than as
introspective access to mental representation. This idea is discussed further in
the following sections.
These anti-representationalistic remarks may eventually boil down just to
semantics. I am not sure whether I am rejecting or reforming the notion of
representation here. Nonetheless, the bottom line is that the basics building
blocks of mental content are not symbols that get their meanings from their
representational character (like classical computationalist envisioned) but in-
stead it is these underlying tacit systems of meanings that should ultimately
explain the symbolic and representational character of thought.
Here are the main features of the proposed intuitive concept producing
and consuming system:
a) Inductive (Bayesian) search for causally predictive and pragmatically rel-
evant regularities in concrete situations:
- Category representations are (prototype) feature clusters structured by
causal relations between constituent features.
- Basic ontology is formed around aﬀordances and features relevant to
event–event causation.
- Basic situation representations are quasi-perceptual model type struc-
tures.
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b) Instance-speciﬁc encoding of event/action/outcome exemplars:
- Context- and goal-dependent causal expectations are generated by as-
sociative (pattern matching) memory retrieval or analogical mapping
from exemplar-based situation representations.
- Without valid expectations, control shifts to exploration or explicit rea-
soning.
c) Basic reasoning mechanisms are forward causal inference, simulation of situated
action, and abstraction by exemplar-based analogical transfer:
- Surface features are the primary retrieval cues.
- Valid analogies bind diﬀerent tasks under shared pragmatic schemata.
First, we the item a). The basic idea follows the common tenet in psy-
chology that knowledge representation incorporates an ontology of entities and
causal relations that hold among them.81 I explain how basic object and event
categories may be composed of speciﬁc sensory and causal information without
a separate symbolic core. I explain the rough outlines of recent application of
causal graph models of knowledge representation in cognitive psychology. The
bulk of the work happens when addressing of items b) and c) where we see how
schematic abstractions can be built bottom-up from concrete event representa-
tions via procedural and causal knowledge. This last plank is discussed in the
next chapter in addition to how this pragmatic knowledge framework can be
applied to yield a skill-based inferential theory of top-down learned discursive
and theoretical conceptual understanding.
4.1 Object representation
I have characterized the intuitive system as a learning device that tracks af-
fordances and other causal properties that have pragmatic relevance to us.
Binding that knowledge to something requires that the system partitions the
environment into categories or, at the very least, be sensitive to certain fea-
tures and their correlations. I assume that intuitive cognition encodes object
and event categories and associated structural information, such as how object
features relate to their causal properties. The information encoded is rather
concrete and action and outcome centered. Although nothing very crucial
hangs on this, I assume the basic category representations take the form of
prototypes. The reason to make this assumption is empirical. Clearly, some
similarity-based mechanism is needed to explain human categorization, and
81 See e.g. Griﬃths & Tenenbaum (2009, 670). I presume that this is approximately the
standard view also in (analytical) philosophy, although philosophers, in general, may have
some reservations as conceiving the fundamental relations as being necessarily causal.
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it seems that prototype account generally fares more naturally with the data
than exemplar models (Murphy, 2016). The latter has a distinct advantage in
artiﬁcial learning tasks only, and we saw above that it is questionable if those
studies tell much about the mental representation of natural categories. Apart
from that, prototype research also connects to relevant research concerning the
basic representational level and hierarchical structure of taxonomic categories.
4.1.1 Prototypes and basic level categories
It appears a universal tendency for us to group things to categories which form
taxonomic hierarchies. For example, a bulldog is likely to be conceived alterna-
tively as bulldog, dog, or animal instead of belonging to non-nested alternative
classes such as bulldog, drooling animal, or something to rescue in case of a ﬁre.
I hope the reader at this point ﬁnds it obvious how prototypes can implement
taxonomic hierarchies: A subordinate category has all the features of its su-
perordinate class with some added details. Then subordinates consist of richer
and more speciﬁc feature sets, and the inheritance of important properties
from higher levels of taxonomic hierarchy is guaranteed. This works like a ba-
sic set-theoretical taxonomy. We do not need to discuss this in detail here but
exemplar models have fared poorly with these sorts of hierarchical structures.
(Murphy, 2002, Chapter 7) However, by assuming prototype representation for
concrete categories we, in theory, get taxonomic abstraction pretty much for
free.
Unfortunately, in the human conceptual system, nothing seems to be that
straightforward in reality. For example, people are likely to accept that car
seats are chairs and that chairs are furniture, but still think that car seats
are not furniture (Hampton, 1982). Steven Sloman (1998) found that related
violations of extensional logic in taxonomic inference are surprisingly common.
This implies that a tree-like hierarchy, based on set inclusion, is very likely not
an inherent constraint in the human conceptual system. This does not pose
a problem for the prototype view, however. Both studies found that typical-
ity eﬀects may explain the data. Car seats are perhaps seen too untypical as
furniture while they share some (rather obvious) critical features with chairs.
People perhaps make these category judgments by direct comparison of these
features rather than by locating the target category in an existing taxonomic
system. This means that we do not necessarily have a precompiled conceptual
hierarchy stored in our long term memory but suﬃciently abstract superordi-
nate concepts may be usually computed on the ﬂy as needed, and taxonomic
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inference may be feature-based rather than category-based. This is likely (if not
necessary by deﬁnition) with ad hoc categories reviewed earlier. See (Murphy,
2002, 204–210) why this is probably true of object categories in general.
The psychological details of the implementation of taxonomic hierarchies
are not highly relevant for now, but certain related ﬁndings are. According
to several authors, most notably the pioneers of the prototype theory (Rosch
et al., 1976; Rosch, 1978), a level in conceptual hierarchy, particularly with
object concepts, is the most basic in human cognition. This basic level can be
observed in people’s preferences for naming things at a certain level of detail.
For example, a bulldog is much more likely to be called ”a dog” than ”a bulldog”
or ”an animal.” Words at this intermediate level are also learned ﬁrst, and basic
level categories enjoy other processing advantages, similar to categories with
high family resemblance scores. When asked to list features associated with
categories in diﬀerent levels of hierarchy, the basic level stands out as the most
informative. Subordinate listings usually contain a few additional adjectives
while superordinate level descriptions are sparse and contain mostly schematic
(i.e., non-speciﬁc) functional features, such as keeps you warm and you wear it
in the case of clothes.
If the pragmatist theory that I am trying to advance is correct, then the
most critical features in basic level representations should be rather concrete,
action centered, and causally relevant. Basic level (as per domain) should also
be malleable across individuals and cultures, and this indeed seems to be the
case. According to Rosch et al. (1976, 382), in taxonomies of common concrete
nouns in English:
[B]asic objects are the most inclusive categories whose members:
(a) possess signiﬁcant number of attributes in common, (b) have
motor programs which are similar to one another, (c) have similar
shapes, and (d) can be identiﬁed from averaged shapes of members
of the class.
Perceptual cues certainly are important for object classiﬁcation, but here
and in (Rosch, 1978) the authors claim that primary object concepts concern
things we can interact with, and that the categories are partly determined
by their aﬀordances, associated movements, or ”motor programs”. These are
closely involved with perception but not strictly perceptible properties of ob-
jects.82 This might look like a chieﬂy sensorimotor theory of concepts, but
82 Although if perception activates contextually meaningful action knowledge associated
with the percept, then it can be argued that aﬀordances actually are perceptible properties, at
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the status of attributes in plank (a) is left open and may include higher level
schematic attributes. Moreover (d) concerns identiﬁcation, not representation,
and hence the characterization leaves room for more abstract information to
be incorporated into category representation.
According to developmental psychologist Jean Mandler (2004), the ba-
sic building blocks of concepts are structural and functional properties. She
calls these structural features such as path, support, containment, and rela-
tions such as up/down and above/below image-schematic since they are not
symbolic or linguistic but not strictly perceptual either. Already during the
ﬁrst year, infants also possess conceptual structures about intentional agency
and mechanics of inanimate objects, for example (Carey, 2009). Whatever the
representational format, the proposed mental contents in this line of theorizing
do not consider intellectual essences nor strictly perceptual or motor proper-
ties but functioning and structure of things in the environment. According to
Mandler (2004, 86–87):
[T]he meaning of objects for human beings ultimately depends on
what they do or what is done to them, as Katherine Nelson pointed
out many years ago (Nelson, 1974). If the world stood still, there
would not be no conceptual mind—it is events that demand inter-
pretation: What is happening? What is going on? Although it
is possible that it is solely the attraction to motion that sets up
perceptual meaning analysis in terms of paths and their character-
istics, it seems more likely that what infants attend to and analyze
for meaning is one of those indirect innate factors, determined per-
haps by the need of our species. [. . . ] What things do is the core of
their meaning, and for some time in infancy it is the only meaning
that is available.
least in the phenomenological sense. This particular sense means that in perception features
are always interpreted, and hence it is somewhat moot to separate the subjective import
from objective observables, even if this diﬀerence can be meaningfully made between the
physical signal the organism’s sensory organs pick up and the resulting cognitive processing. I
understand that this is approximately the original idea of aﬀordances in perceptual psychology
introduced by James J. Gibson (1979, Chapter 8). In artiﬁcial learning tasks, it has been
demonstrated that it is possible to associate even arbitrary movements to perception so that
executing learned movements consistent with the percept facilitate object recognition. This
suggests that action information is, in eﬀect, incorporated into object representation (Ross
et al., 2007).
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Cognitive capabilities enrich and proliferate when growing up; however,
the core capabilities of an infant’s mind remain active for life (Carey, 2009). If
all this is correct, our object concepts deal in large part with functional infor-
mation. The more appropriate term would actually be pragmatic information
because what is represented is functional information with a point of view,
and categories contain information about object aﬀordances and how they be-
have as a result of our actions. So basically here is the basis for my claim
that basic object representation is rooted to observable aﬀordances and causal
properties.83
Despite strong empirical support, the whole notion of basic levels has been
challenged. Mandler has complained that there is considerable variability in
basic levels across cultures, individuals, and conceptual domains, casts doubt
on empirical adequacy of the concept (Murphy, 2002, 234). Second, she and
her colleagues have found that the early conceptual system of prelinguistic in-
fants is quite undiﬀerentiated, and the concepts are less speciﬁc compared to
how Rosch et al. characterize the basic level. For example, in their studies,
14-month-olds diﬀerentiated between birds and mammals but not between dif-
ferent kinds of mammals, apparently treating land animal as something like a
basic category rather than, say, dog (Mandler, 2004). This is not a domain-
speciﬁc eﬀect. Infants generally tend to group things on a leve which corre-
sponds to superordinate rather than basic in adult category hierarchy.
This criticism would be well-founded if the basic level should be universally
ﬁxed with the environmental correlation of features as the only determinant.
This was suggested by Rosch (1975); however, later Rosch et al. (1976) consid-
ered that basic level is an interactive notion where the other determinant is the
agent with its needs and capacities. They found out, for example, that their
subjects’ basic level of biological taxonomy was higher than what has been
reported in ethnobiological literature. Their explanation for this discrepancy
83 As far as I can tell, unfortunately, little or no comparative research done with disabled
persons who are blind or severely paralyzed, for example. I take that all the talk about
visual features and movements are generalizable to other perceptual modalities and ways
to interact with the environment. Hence, one should not assume that it is precisely visual
features that play such a crucial role in basic level determination—even if they might be
particularly important for most people with unimpaired vision. The general point, I gather,
is that our capacities which allow interaction with the environment play a constitutive part
in determining basic intentional content. With diﬀerent people with diﬀerent abilities the
speciﬁc contents are likely variable to a degree, and this might or might not aﬀect the resultant
subjective ontology. However, these factor are anyway malleable across individuals (regardless
of any disabilities) as a result of our individual life experiences (see the following paragraphs).
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was that the ethnobiological studies were carried out with people living in ru-
ral, non-industrial societies, while their subjects were Western urban dwellers.
For example, for folk in non-industrial societies the genus level of trees (e.g.,
pine, elm) is basic while in urban industrial societies the more general life form
(tree) is basic. This stems from diﬀerent individual experiences and diﬀerent
practical and social needs in diﬀerent cultures. At an individual level, this
discrepancy translates into a diﬀerence in expertise with a particular domain
of interest, which also should be manifest in subcultural levels. In fact, the
referred ethnobiological work mentions that for American bird watchers the
genus level seems to be psychologically unique (in contrast to the general pop-
ulation) for displaying signs of basic level processing in perception (Berlin et
al., 1973, 238).
In addition to biological categories, Rosch et al. (1976) also used vehicles
as stimuli. One of their subjects happened to be a former airplane mechanic.
An interview was conducted that conﬁrmed that the subject had a diﬀerent
canonical view of airplanes than typical subjects (undersides and engines in-
stead of top and side view). His motor programs and list of attributes as-
sociated with airplanes was diﬀerent and taxonomy aﬀected: His conceptual
diﬀerentiation of aircrafts was not unlimited but his basic level airplane cate-
gory was more accurate than the norm. (Rosch et al., 1976, 430) The eﬀect of
expertise on taxonomy was experimentally conﬁrmed later (Tanaka & Taylor,
1991) with the main result that experts tend to exemplify basic level process-
ing in their area of expertise on the level of taxonomic hierarchy that would
correspond to subordinate for novices, eﬀectively blurring the line between
these levels and implying that experts categorize selected domains or smaller
idiosyncratic niches in more detail. The eﬀect is not marely due to the volume
of exposure the experts have with particular things but also due to how they
actively pay attention to certain features and their values. Simple instructions
make subjects pay attention to speciﬁc features which trains them to be more
sensitive to speciﬁc value ranges (e.g., speciﬁc brightness or size), thus enabling
them to make more ﬁne-grained classiﬁcation compared to untutored subjects
exposed to the same learning material (Goldstone, 1994). Expertise also aﬀects
category structure, in that it tends to shift goodness-of-example measure from
the central tendency to goal derived ideals in the sense deﬁned by Barsalou
(see page 135) (Lynch et al., 2000).
In summary, the prelinguistic infants studied by Mandler and her col-
leagues may be in the process of learning cognitive capacities to cope with
their environment. Their undiﬀerentiated concepts, in comparison to adults,
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might be akin to the undiﬀerentiated biological taxa of urban residents in com-
parison to people of agrarian societies—or more to the point, that of the basic
level of novices in comparison to experts. The basic level found by Rosch et
al. is perhaps not the starting point for individual ontology but the generic
end-point (shared as a norm in one culture because of widely shared practices),
where we stop our conceptual dissection of the environment at the ﬁneness of
grain that happens to satisfy our practical needs. After all, the basic level is
not the most accurate level of classiﬁcation of which we are capable. The basic
level is instead a compromise between detail and generality that maximizes
the cognitive economy of category representation following our needs (Rosch
et al., 1976, 384). More inclusive concepts are not accurate enough, and more
accurate concepts compromise the economy with irrelevant detail. Only ex-
perts ﬁnd practical needs to adapt to a more reﬁned taxonomy. With infants,
there presumably are developmental factors involved also; however, it is a rea-
sonable possibility that not all factors observed in conceptual development be
age-related but at least partly reﬂect general trajectory of concept learning.
The fact that the basic level is malleable across individuals, cultures, and
conceptual domains is vital to my claim that not only discursive but also con-
crete concepts are acquired constructively, i.e., they are forged locally and inter-
actively. Part of the content determination stems from our sensory and motor
apparatus and other bodily and cognitive capacities. Contents are also partly
determined by the structure of our environment and partly by the practices and
the way of life in which we are engaged. All these factors interact, making con-
tent determination complex, idiosyncratic, and local but constrained in ways
that are, at points, widely shared among humans. I hope these considerations
convince the reader that chances for informative a priori analysis of fundamen-
tal conceptual content, which disregards the variety of human condition, are
slim at best.
4.1.2 Causal cores with surface miscellanea?
Concerns can be raised that not all subjectively important attributes of per-
fectly coherent categories are causally relevant. When one thinks of cats or
stars or works of Monet, for example, she probably thinks primarily of sen-
sory features and not what these things do and how they work. The tension
between the relative importance of causal and sensory attributes may suggest
that categories perhaps are encoded by two independent sorts of information:
(a) causal cores, which form the actual conceptual content, and (b) surface
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miscellanea, which serve only to identify the category (e.g. Osherson & Smith,
1981; Armstrong et al., 1983). Almost certainly there is some truth to this idea.
If such strict demarcation can be made, it could serve as a last line of defense
for the classical theory of concepts, retaining the possibility of some more or
less hidden metaphysical or intellectual essences. Agreed, at least some cate-
gories have clear identity conditions and therefore essential properties, at least
in some sense. But the prime examples belong to domains that are epistemo-
logically constituted by theoretical, conventional, and other explicit discursive
knowledge. When discussing the knowledge account, we already saw that with
natural object categories causal knowledge and similarity cues are often closely
linked.
From an early age, we clearly causal over non-causal features when in-
formation about the causal structure of a category is available (Ahn et al.,
2000a,b), but these priorities are not clear cut. Adults use diﬀerent knowledge
in comparison to kindergartners in assessing what causal connections are plausi-
ble and consequently stress diﬀerent features and make diﬀerent category-based
inferences (Keil, 1992). In laboratory experiments, subjects tend to rank cause
features as more important than eﬀect features for category identity: If sub-
jects know that a category features are structured in the way that X causes Y
and Y causes Z, then they usually rank X as the most important feature and Z
as the least important for determining the category membership.84 This causal
status eﬀect means that, all else being equal (e.g., cue validity and perceptual
salience), cause features are weighted more than eﬀect features in similarity
computations.
Thus, in brief, surface and causal properties do not constitute mutually
independent sets. Instead, there is a continuum ranging from a more to a less
peripheral properties, and this continuum at least partly depends on general
world knowledge rather than solely on a category-speciﬁc semantic knowledge.
That is, category representation is for understanding how things hang together
in general and not for intellectual apprehension of intrinsic essences. Causal
attributes do not work like classical deﬁning conditions, but their status is
gradual and malleable both in determining and identifying a category. Indeed,
not even the causal status eﬀect is robust. More important than the status
84 For example, if animals called ”roobans” tend to eat fruits, have sticky feet, and build
nests on trees, then subjects rank the ﬁrst feature as the most important and the last as the
least important if they are told that fruit eating makes roobans’ feet sticky, and consequently
they are able to climb trees to build nests there. (Ahn et al., 2000a)
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of particular features is the coherence of their combinations under the known
causal structure of the category.
The notion of coherence here means roughly this: Assume a category is
(partly) characterized by a feature vector [x, y, z], and that there are strong
causal links x → y and y → z. Given this information, people tend to rate
exemplar [0, 0, 0] as a more likely member of this category than [0, 1, 0]. The
reason is presumably that the presence of y in the absence of x means that y is
produced by a cause not intrinsic to the category and hence its presence is then
not a very relevant indicator of membership. On the other hand, because y → z
is strong, the absence of z in [0, 1, 0] is evidence that the exemplar is a non-
member because it violates a causal expectation associated with the category
members ([0, 1, 0] instead of the expected [0, 1, 1]). Instance [0, 0, 0] does not
exemplify any important properties, and therefore it is probably a non-member;
however, it does not violate any causal laws of the category, either. Hence, it
is more coherent and therefore a more likely category member than [0, 1, 0].
Apart from structure, this inference depends on the assumed parameters of the
category: If y is prevalent regardless of x, and y → z is weak, the coherence
eﬀect in found to diminish, like it should. (Rehder & Kim, 2010) In conclusion,
representation of natural categories should be construed as causal models and
not just as unstructured weighted feature lists.
Perhaps apart from explicitly deﬁned concepts, the supposed cores simply
have no clear utility in explaining human categorization performance (Rips et
al., 2012; Murphy, 2002, 24–28). Almost everything we currently know about
human conceptual cognition rather points out that, by default, the informa-
tion deemed relevant in categorization and category-based inference depends
on personal knowledge and speciﬁc tasks we are posed or questions we ask.
So the works of Monet as the works of Monet are, naturally enough, intrinsi-
cally dependent on the fact that they are produced by Monet. What makes
them fabulous and unique is perhaps a matter of their intrinsic combination
of perceptual features that, again, are causally related to the fact that they
are painted by Monet. What makes them instances of art (superordinate cate-
gory) is perhaps dependent on some unspeciﬁc functional or causal properties,
for example, that they are eﬀects of artist intentions, causes of aesthetic ap-
prehension, the role they occupy in history and praxis of the social institution
called ”art”, or some combination of these. Then, what kinds of things cats are
depends on whether we are asking a philosophical, biological, or more casual
question which, in turn, may suggest diﬀerent answers depending on whether
cats are considered as pets or utility animals, why are we posing this question
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in the ﬁrst place, and so on. There is no unambiguous conceptual core that
would provide the correct answer in every conceivable context.
The point is not to claim that the distinction between accidental and
conceptually constitutive attributes is entirely useless, but that seeking them
without specifying a context that is, and taking these limiting notions as the
fundamentals of category representation is misguided. The second point is that
properties that may look like superﬁcial may (a) be complex products of causal
factors, or (b) aﬀord various human practices. For example, speciﬁc pieces of
art are perhaps not best conceived by their raw perceptual attributes but rather
via the expressive patterns they exemplify, which are unique products of certain
artists and embedded in wider cultural practices. The ability to recognize and
appreciate these patters, as the ability to recognize cats, dogs, and their general
characteristics, may be a requirement for us to be competent members of our
society. It depends on our cultural norms and practices (including personal
status and subcultural niches) which things we need to be able to recognize
and cope with. In this way, perceptual properties may be important aﬀordances
that enable us to take part in these practices.
This brings us to the second leg of the answer to the worry that some cat-
egories may essentially consist of superﬁcial attributes. The less apparent but
better substantiated answer is related to the plank (a) in the previous para-
graph: Even if causally vacuous attributes are prominently featured in mental
representations of objects, it is not necessarily a problem for the idea that
concrete concepts are formed around causal attributes because observable fea-
tures might be coded as eﬀects of an underlying causal structure, which is also
responsible for behavioral and other non-obvious properties. Indeed, people
often assume that there is an underlying causal factor responsible for making
things the way they are, which is treated as a placeholder for unobservable and
unknown causes and eﬀects; for example, that there is a causal factor that all
cats, and only cats, share which makes them cats (that perhaps would be the
cat DNA). This tendency is called psychological essentialism.
A sign of essentialism is that even one year old children prefer category-
based inferences over surface similarity if they have a reason to believe that
apparent similarity is not diagnostic of category membership. For example,
they infer that beetles share properties with bugs that look like leaves, but
not that beetles share properties with leaves. Hence, even as infants, we pre-
fer to treat things as alike on the basis of presumed unobservable similarities
over evident observable similarities. The second indication of essentialism is
that we tend to assume that if we change the observable features of organ-
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isms (and some artifacts), leaving their internal structure intact, the organism
retains its original category identity because of the critical unobservable struc-
ture. (Gelman, 2004) Since the diagnostic features that point to the assumed
essences are malleable, and the domains where essentialist reasoning is mani-
fest changes with age and experience, this tendency might be partly learned.
However, because of the prevalence, cross-cultural stability, and the early onset
of essentialist thinking, it seems more likely that these diﬀerences reﬂect how
acquired domain-speciﬁc knowledge modulates our innate tendency to essen-
tialist reasoning (Ahn et al., 2000a, B41).
Principal domains of essentialist thinking are (assumed) natural kinds,
such as chemical elements, organisms, and diseases (Ahn et al., 2013). How-
ever, it depends on the speciﬁc categories and tasks if and how essentialism is
manifests (Gelman, 2003, Chapter 6). Moreover, if subjects have other plausi-
ble and relevant causal knowledge available, it often overrides both category-
and similarity-based inferences (Medin et al., 2003). For example, people are
more prone to infer that sharks are more susceptible than deer to a disease
that trouts have, because sharks are more like trouts; however, many tend to
think that bears are more susceptible to the disease than sharks because bears
eat trouts, and hence the disease might be transmitted to bears more easily.
Also, people readily understand that some observable properties are caused by
hidden variables, while some are not, and the resultant inferences depend on
the subjective plausibility of the causal connections. For example, greenness is
more probably considered an accidental feature of a car than of a pine needle.
Research conducted into artifact categorization shows that whether artifacts
are considered to have essential features or not depends on the task as well as
the assumed nature of the essence, for example the intended function or the
intended kind membership by the creator (Sloman & Malt, 2003). Children
weight more surface similarity instead of assumed essences in artifact than in
biological domain, reﬂecting the reasonable idea that artifact identity is deter-
mined by its function, which can often be inferred from its appearance (Gelman
& Markman, 1986). Sometimes, it is precisely the observable surface features
that are deemed essential (e.g. in case of a pizza slicer).
In summary, the research on psychological essentialism underscores the
recurring theme in contemporary concept research: there is no single unitary
process for categorization, and diﬀerent conceptual domains and diﬀerent goals
the categorization serves uses diﬀerent information (Gelman, 2004). Basically,
essentialism boils down to a default assumption that there is an intrinsic, yet
often unknown, reason why the things are the way they are and which warrants
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taxonomic inductive inferences. However, this default stance can be dismissed
in the face of any other known relevant information.
Essentialism shows that category representation with all its surface mis-
cellanea is causal to the core: Observable features are often tacitly encoded
as diagnostic eﬀects of an assumed hidden structure. It is instructive to note
that this interpretation of psychological essentialism supports the idea that
the conceptual system is tracking epistemologically indeterminate causal struc-
tures. Causal mechanisms and relations are not directly observable but need
to be inferred, and it is generally reasonable to assume that observable fea-
ture correlations in categories are not accidental but an eﬀect of an underlying
structure, which makes the members the way they are. In the causal learning
literature, it is a common observation that people spontaneously assume hidden
causes and track their eﬀects (e.g. Cheng, 1997; Gopnik et al., 2004; Griﬃths &
Tenenbaum, 2009; Kushnir et al., 2010). Hence, a natural consequence is that
we treat the causal constitution of kinds potentially open and indeterminate
like any causal structures. As Douglas Medin remarked, essentialism may be
bad metaphysics but sound practical epistemology: Similarity guides learners
toward causal structures and works as a constraint on the search of causal
knowledge (Medin, 1989). In the absence of better knowledge, it is a sound
practice to discern the environment as clusters by appearances and take the
dissimilarities as a sign of potential relevant functional diﬀerences. However,
appearances are often misleading, and hence it is also reasonable to treat the
observable structure not as an aggregate of causal loci but a sign of one and
restructure the category representation around better causal knowledge when
it is available.
Psychological essentialism is not competitive to similarity- and knowledge-
based views but rather an additional component that works as a unifying bridge
between them. This reading of psychological essentialism is highlighted, e.g.,
by Medin (1989), Gelman (1994), Rehder (2007), and Rehder & Kim (2010).85
It also shows that however concrete our intuitive thinking might be, simple
empirical associationism is out of the question. Mental representations of con-
85 Note that Rehder (2007) aims to show that essentialism combined with the causal model
approach to categories can salvage the distinction between accidental and essential properties
in mental representation; so we apparently have quite a diﬀerent drift here. However, I think
we are just emphasizing diﬀerent messages. As a psychologist, Rehder tells that the tradi-
tional distinction in philosophy can be partly reconstructed by modern cognitive psychology,
and I agree (see below in the main text). As a philosopher, I try to tell that this distinction is
not (psychologically) neither fundamental nor all present, and if I am not mistaken, Rehder
would agree.
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crete entities are not just aggregates of distinct obvious features, but we expect
the world to be structured as a causal nexus where categories are construed
as nodes even when the sources of causal power are not observable. In other
words, we do not track mere regular patterns of sensory features but also infer
causal regularities and make tacit assumptions that transcend mere observa-
tion. Categories are not represented as a static collection of knowledge but as
open structures that also serve a placeholder function for potentially unknown
properties (Gelman, 2004). This, of course, is mandatory if category content
is learned and potentially always revisable.
Psychological essentialism is also my ﬁnal answer (promised on pg. 107)
to the claim that Kripke–Putnam concept externalism implies the dissociation
of psychology and philosophy of concepts. Regardless of whether we can (or
should) replace philosophical analyses of concepts with psychology or not, psy-
chological essentialism helps us understand the nature and the etiology of some
of our analytical intuitions without implying metaphysical or analytical essen-
tialism. As I see it, Kripke and Putnam are exercising introspective psychology
or explicating the commonsense phenomenology of kind concepts, which em-
anates from our psychological disposition to essentialist thinking. There is
absolutely nothing wrong with that, and I take that psychological essential-
ism corroborates some of their key insights. What I oppose is the claim that
their account makes empirical and philosophical concept research incompati-
ble. If we are to understand how concept essentialism works, we perhaps better
concentrate on empirical research rather than a priori metaphysics. However,
”empirical research” here is not conﬁned to cognitive psychology.
Chemical elements are prime examples of natural kinds, but do diﬀerent
isotopes have the same or diﬀerent essences? If common people think that
ibuprofen cures headaches, does their ibuprofen concept refer to the ibuprofen
molecule per se or speciﬁcally to its biologically active S-enantiomer? What
if the people in question happen to be medicinal chemists? (The question is,
do medical chemists and common folk track diﬀerent but equally real kinds,
or does the folk fail to track anything or perhaps a disjunctive kind, instead?)
Is the essence of water a substance that conducts electricity or H2O, which is,
in fact, an insulator? Is the essence of a disease its underlying cause or the
symptoms it causes? (Think, does ”ﬂu” refer to a virus or a condition?) Do
superordinate categories such as ”pet” have intrinsic essences?
I think these are not perfectly good questions to ask. The right questions
are how these concepts are deployed in intentional action (including thinking)
and what determines their use. These are not metaphysical but practical,
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psychological, contextual, and cultural issues. I ﬁnd it evident that it is not
strictly an empirical question if, for example, isotopes of iron or spin-isomers of
water are the same kind or not. If these sort of questions are supposed to make
sense at all, they need to be asked in speciﬁc times in speciﬁc contexts that
delineate what diﬀerence it makes, which, in turn, means that these are not
purely metaphysical or a priori questions, either (i.e., independent of contexts
and human interest). And indeed, the philosophers who discuss these matters
generally introduce concrete examples and scenarios to prompt our intuitions
about them, and these intuitions, I maintain, are products of the interplay of
human practices and cognition.
The assumption that our analytical intuitions track extensions determined
by stable essences is problematic also because we are disposed to track essences
when there are none. Biological species are a good example. They are often
taken to be representative examples of natural classes, determined by hidden
essences, namely genes. However, we know that there is no strict demarcation if
two organisms are diﬀerent species (especially along the phylogenetic lineage).
Common (mis)conceptions about the nature of race, gender, and various social
groups are also good examples of where genetic essentialism goes wrong (Dar-
Nimrod & Heine, 2011). With artifacts, people tend to be inconsistent and
unsure whether they are dealing with things with essences or not (Sloman &
Malt, 2003). Now, apparently ”gold” means the physical stuﬀ, whatever it
is, and the modern science tells us that it is an element with atomic number
79, as Kripke proclaims. But this observation only tells us something about
our scientiﬁc epistemic practices, and if it really contributes to anything, it
only underlines that the assumed essences are multifaceted and ﬂuid entities—
products of our cultural practices and psychological dispositions, aﬀected by
context, and also by critical thinking and theoretical knowledge. In any case,
concepts are psychologically complex and essentialist thinking is only one piece
of the larger puzzle.
Lastly, one reasonable interpretation of essentialism is that it eventually
vindicates symbolism in mental presentation. Clearly, the deﬁning feature of
essentialist thought is a sort of referential character: Since assumed essences are
often unknown, they cannot be deﬁned by speciﬁc contents but by something
like a formal character of category representations to involve a placeholder that
points to some unspeciﬁed thing. I have been deliberately avoiding any refer-
ence to linguistic thought, but it is particularly interesting how language relates
to essentialist thinking. Category labels are processed in a diﬀerent manner
than other category properties, not as features but a reference to the category
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as a whole (Markman & Ross, 2003). Children tend to group things based on
thematic associations (e.g. pairing poodle and dog food); however but label-
ing things by nouns promotes taxonomic classiﬁcation, instead (pairing poodle
and German shepherd) (Markman & Hutchinson, 1984). Labeling entities with
generic names or describing them with noun phrases invites children to regard
things as belonging to a kind category and also to essentialize them accordingly.
Hence, words (or more speciﬁcally nouns) in natural language have a symbolic
character. They are not merely associated with already established category
knowledge but also point to a potentially unknown category essence and foster
certain ontological assumptions. If one thinks of language and mental represen-
tation as somehow isomorphic (a core assumption in the Language of Thought
tradition associated to classical computationalism, e.g., Fodor 1975), then one
perhaps cannot avoid the conclusion that conceptual mental representation
also has this symbolic character. However, as we have seen, category represen-
tation and essentialism do not require linguistic representation.86 This does
not mean that all concepts can (or always are) represented independent of lan-
guage, but that any category knowledge, such as an object function or a set
of its observable features, can serve as cues that point to the assumed essence.
The relation of this knowledge to its associated category is not symbolic (in
the sense of arbitrary and referential) but constitutive of category knowledge
and identity.
As far as I can tell, essences are not always mentally represented (e.g.,
with amodal symbols). Essentialism is a processing characteristic or an atti-
tude associated to a category rather than a distinct representational feature.
Essentialize something apparently requires taking it as a kind, which means
that essentialist tendencies are not fundamental to intentionality but neces-
sitate speciﬁc conceptually structured processing.87 It is still important and
86 See Gelman (2003, Chapter 8) for an overview of the relation between language and
essentialist thinking, especially in children.
87 Remember my criticism of Fodor on page 43, that a ”settled policy of using [e.g.] ’water’
as a kind term” requires intentional thought and, hence, cannot be part of reductive basis
of intentionality. In somewhat similar fashion, essentialism requires that the agent considers
something as a kind and, hence, essentialism is a product and not a foundation of concep-
tually structured thought. Recall from our earlier discussion that although young children
essentialize, they often treat observable properties as more critical for category membership
compared to older children (p. 133). Therefore, while the domain-general capacity to essen-
tialize may be innate, it is likely that domain-speciﬁc dispositions to do so are learned. The
point is that essentialism is not a universal constraint on thought, which is relaxed when the
child learns that it is sometimes inappropriate, but more likely essentialization happens after
learning some causal principles about a domain.
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interesting that apparently a mere word token is representation enough to be
taken as a sort of mental sign of an essentialized category (and perhaps word
use as a piece of knowledge about the category). More speciﬁcally, (a) words as
such may work as mental symbols, and an additional symbolic representation
for the associated linguistic concept may not be required, and (b) words are
associated with non-linguistic category representations in non-trivial ways.
The analogy between essentialist thinking and the referential character of
language might not be accidental. This is quite speculative, but perhaps the
cognitive capacities that enable observable attributes to ”point to” essences also
enable nouns to point to unknown absent objects; that is, both are founded on
a capacity that enables us to anticipate that there is something real beyond
manifest signs. If that is the case, and if the mental representation of categories
as causal models explains essentialism (as Rehder (2007) claims), then one may
suspect that causal learning likely has something to do with referential aspect
of natural language. This is relevant to neopragmatist language theories but
this speciﬁc aspect should not be overstated. Quite likely the coordination of
joint attention and other communicative pragmatics is also part of the explana-
tion of the referential capacity of language and thought, especially for present
objects.88 Generally, neopragmatists are more interested in causal regularities
that are not inherent in things but brought about by agents.
Before moving on, I should clarify that the ”non-trivial ways” in which
language is associated with non-linguistic knowledge means that labels are not
cognitively processed as category features or simple name tags.89 As discussed
above, language might constitute a partly independent representational de-
vice and linguistic knowledge may be encoded somewhat separately from non-
linguistic category knowledge. For example, explicit linguistically mediated
theoretical knowledge is perhaps (at least partly) dissociable from knowledge
encoded in implicit prototypes. Note that this does not mean that feature-
based representation is independent of knowledge in a sense meant in knowl-
edge account. Above, I argued that it is not. Instead, the claim here is that
there might be diﬀerent kinds of knowledge—linguistic and non-linguistic, or de
dicto and de re—which are somewhat separate in the sense that discursive use
of language is not simply an overt expression of covert mental representations.
88 In short, the picture should look like this: Count nouns promote both (a) taxonomic
classiﬁcation, which probably has an important communicative function for underwriting the
intent communicated is about an object, and (b) essentialization, which likely is brought
about by causal representation of objects and may have the communicative function that the
reference is not sensory data but a thing with generic, inductive supporting identity.
89 This was proposed by Anderson (1991b) and refuted by Markman & Ross (2003).
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For example, the fact that whales are mammals may not be part of the whale
prototype while it may be part of whale knowledge. This would explain why
people seem to construe ”fruit” diﬀerently in biological and culinary contexts
(the former being discursive de dicto type and the latter pragmatic de re). I
am not arguing that this necessarily implies two concepts, linguistic and non-
linguistic. Clearly, biological and culinary notions of fruit are closely related
and largely co-referential. Instead, I have in mind that diﬀerent contexts such
as biology class and cooking activate diﬀerent knowledge about fruits. Does
this mean that the human conceptual system is inconsistent? Not necessarily.
Later, I will explain that superordinate categories (e.g., fruit) are not always
stable precompiled information structures but constructed (or interpreted) on
a contextual basis as needed. Even basic object concepts have diﬀerent struc-
tures and functions and the kinds of information that we learn and employ
vary according to context. There is an interplay between perception, language,
and knowledge, which mutually aﬀect task performance, and it is needless to
pit these determinants against each other.90 Before that, we will have a brief
overview of how (language independent) causal knowledge is represented and
acquired.
4.2 Causal knowledge representation with Bayesian networks
We are now moving into a less charted territory, but in the last decade or
so it has become increasingly popular to model causal inference and learning
by Bayesian causal networks.91 Although Bayesian methods have a long his-
tory in machine learning, it was not until the 1990s when Bayesian statistics
emerged as a normative model of reasoning in cognitive psychology. Jonathan
Evans (1991, 493) has summarized the Piagetian argument for logic-based ap-
proach in psychology as follows: ”[P]eople are intelligent, intelligence requires
accurate reasoning, logic describes how correct deductions are made, so people
must reason by logic.” This is abductive inference where a conclusion is partly
derived from the normative status of deductive logic.
90 Cf. e.g. Jones & Smith (1993) and Gelman & Medin (1993) for discussion about these
points speciﬁcally within the framework of psychological essentialism.
91 The major contributions were the development of Bayesian networks for probabilistic
knowledge representation and reasoning (Pearl, 1985, 2000), a sort of Kantian a priori frame-
work for causal induction (Cheng, 1997), and their amalgamation for psychological modeling
(Gopnik et al., 2004; Griﬃths & Tenenbaum, 2005, 2009; Lu et al., 2008b). See Lagnado et
al. (2007) and Holyoak & Cheng (2011) for review and Sloman (2005) for an accessible book
length introduction.
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On reﬂection, it is unsurprising that the logical model soon faced mounting
counterevidence. Classical logic is bivalent and monotonic, roughly meaning
that it is suited for decontextualized inference when information is certain,
static, and consistent. With mathematics these assumptions are perfectly ﬁne
but most deﬁnitely they do not characterize everyday reasoning in real environ-
ments. Bayesian probabilistic inference, in turn, is precisely the theory about
how you should update your beliefs in the face of new, uncertain, changing, and
conﬂicting information. So the new argument goes that people are intelligent,
intelligence requires reasoning under uncertainty, Bayesian probability calculus
describes how to reason rationally in the absence of complete information, so
in order to understand human reasoning and rationality, psychologists must
interpret behavioral data in a Bayesian framework.
Note that the conclusion this time was is that people must reason by
Bayesian, methods but that if psychologists use formal theories of inference
to interpret their data and observed error patterns as evidence for cognitive
theories (they often do), then they need to understand the goals and capacities
of the organism and the demands of the environment to which it has adapted,
to understand what counts as a lapse of rationality and what may actually be
an adaptive response in ecologically valid tasks (to minimize uncertainty, for
example). The adequate normative model is probably not logic, and the issue
cannot be settled a priori on the formal basis alone but in concert with hy-
potheses concerning the goals, practical challenges posed by the environment,
and representation and processing capacities of the agent. This methodology
is an actual realization of the critical points that I have been arguing along
the way. Since this approach focuses explicitly on intentional characterization
of the agent—or rational analysis as it is called—it directly connects to our
previous discussion in Section 3.1.3 and elsewhere where I argued that inten-
tional interpretation of cognitive agents (i.e., interpreting their means and ends
and, by implication, their putative mental contents) has an inherent empirical
aspect.
In the classical computationalist tradition, it was already well acknowl-
edged that because of computational constraints people cannot be expected
to perform perfectly logically (Simon, 1955); however, most of the focus was
on mathematical analysis of algorithmic complexity. Nevertheless, because the
deviations from classical logic and the impact of logically irrelevant content in
human thinking are apparent and systematic even in trivial tasks, it is unlikely
that these ﬁndings can be attributed to computational constraints or random
performance errors, such as lapses of attention (Stanovich, 1999). Instead,
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the rational analysis paradigm focuses on how to interpret the systematic de-
viations from formal rationality in the laboratory as reﬂections of adaptive
reasoning strategies in agents’ normal environment. As such, it does not make
strong commitments concerning cognitive representation and processing.92
4.2.1 Overview of the basic concepts
The standard χ2 statistical inference is indirect. Generally, we are interested to
know if there is a causal relationship between events or variables C and E. For,
example hypothesis H might be that a gene (C) causes a speciﬁc syndrome (E).
In order to ﬁnd this out, we collect evidence D about the correlation of E and
C and then compute the probability of those data under a foil hypothesis H0,
which is generally that C and E are not dependent, i.e., that the incidences
of E are distributed evenly in samples having C and not having C. This
computation is an elementary statistical test, which tells us how likely the
observed correlation in the data is given the foil hypothesis. If the probability
is low, this gives us grounds for rejecting the null hypothesis. So what the
standard statics gives you is P (D|H0), which is the probability of the data
given the foil hypothesis. However, what you probably want is P (H|D), which
is the probability of your hypothesis given the data. But that is something you
can not get because of the usual considerations of the problems of induction,
empirical underdetermination of theories, etc. Statistical tests tell you what
data are not likely (given some boundary conditions) and not what hypothesis
is likely. As a point of logic then, the test does not directly upvote your actual
hypothesis but you need some independent considerations why the hypothesis
is a good idea and a likely alternative in case the null hypothesis is suspect.
Fortunately, if you can give some prior estimate of the likelihood of H you
can calculate how you should change that estimate after the data. This is what
Bayes’ theorem gives you:
P (H|D) = P (D|H) × P (H)
P (D)
92 See Anderson (1991a) about the fundamentals, Oaksford & Chater (2007) for further
developments, and Jones & Love (2011) for an overview of the relevant research and especially
for critical remarks on how mitigating the relevance of cognitive mechanism risks producing
vacuous theories that end up taking any behavior as rational by default. This discussion is
philosophically interesting if one notices how it parallels the standard philosophical critique
of purely empirical inferentialism, i.e., if meaning is simply factual use, then all use is correct
by deﬁnition.
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The problem, of course, is that you generally cannot tell the objective a priori
probability of the hypothesis P (H); however, the point of the formula is that if
you have some subjective estimate, the formula will tell how you should change
the degree of your faith in it a posteriori.
Here is a standard example of how this works: Say, you are concerned if you
have a genetic disposition to a certain disease. Your hypothesis H is that you
have it. You take a test, which is established to give a false positive one time
in a thousand, and the result comes out positive. This is your data D, which
may now look alarming. Previous research has found that in your reference
group the prevalence of the gene is only 1/10000, so this is the prior likelihood
of H. For simplicity, let us disregard any false negatives and assume that the
probability of the positive test result is 1 if you have the gene, meaning that
P (D|H) = 1. Then by Bayes’ formula the a posteriori probability P (H|D)
becomes simply P (H)/P (D) = 0.00001/0.001 = 0.1. So you start with the
prior probability 1/10000, and after the data end up with posterior probability
1/10. Because of the positive test result your subjective assessment of your risk
should have been changed but you cannot estimate from the test alone how
much to change that estimate. The test as such seems reliable; however, the
possibility of false alarm is still much more higher than the a priori likelihood
that you have the gene because the of low base rate of its occurrence. If you
continue your investigations, the P (H|D) = 0.1 that you got is then the new
prior you adjust after the evidence.
Thus, in Bayesian framework the key notions are conditional probabilities
given data and prior probabilities of hypotheses. The notion of probability is
construed as a subjective degree of belief (rather than objective frequency of
an event, for example), and inference is direct and proceeds by computing how
to change those degrees after observations. The above example also shows how
posterior probabilities can be heavily aﬀected just by a single event. In that
example, all the relevant empirical facts and quantities were already in place,
reducing our task to simple calculations. Things are slightly more complex
without such information, as we shall see soon. As everyone remembers, David
Hume assured us that causality in itself is not observable. Generally, we need
to use prior knowledge to assess the plausibility of a candidate for the observed
covariations and events (Lagnado et al., 2007; Griﬃths & Tenenbaum, 2009).
One might think that bringing prior knowledge to causal judgments is irrational
or at least unscientiﬁc and means to contaminate evidence with one’s biases
and prejudices. While the concern is valid, generally that is far from the truth.
When variables grow in number, the number of possible causal relations grow
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factorially. Because of this combinatorial explosion, it is impossible to keep
causal induction tractable if you refuse any tentative judgment on what are
plausible and what unlikely causal links.
Imagine walking into a dark room. You see two switches on the wall
next to the doorway. You ﬂip one, and nothing happens. You try the next
one and lights go on. You immediately grasp how the switches and lights
connect causally. No statistical test, of course, would grant you the conclusion.
Simple mechanisms such as light switches tend to work near deterministically;
however, most causal relations in both science and everyday life are stochastic.
Without previous knowledge that associates switches to strong expectations
about lighting, these two events (ﬁrst switch, no light; second switch, light on)
would never imply statistical signiﬁcance and causation. Moreover, there is
no logical reason to assume that the switches are relevant; some lights react
to sound, some to movement, and in principle possibilities are limitless. Yet,
even infants seem to infer causality from a handful of observations and this is
the norm with adults (Gopnik et al., 2004; Sobel & Kirkham, 2007). Temporal
order and interventions are powerful cues to causality (Lagnado et al., 2007);
however, they are not always available. Recall the time-worn example that
in a hot summer we ﬁnd a correlation between ice cream consumption and
drowning incidents. By intervening on each of the variables (e.g., banning ice
cream sales), it should become evident that the correlation is spurious. The
point of the example, though, is that even if such an intervention were possible,
it would not be necessary. People know that ice cream consumption does not
cause drowning and hence readily infer that the correlation must be due to how
the weather aﬀects people’s behavior. As clichéd as the example is, note that
it is rarely mentioned that, regardless of the correlation, drowning does not
cause ice cream consumption. We tend to dismiss such a possibility without
even noticing.93 Of course, we get things often wrong, but the point is that
we are disposed to ﬁnd causation in our environment, and speciﬁc knowledge
helps a lot in narrowing down where to expect causal links, enabling us to draw
conclusions from very sparse data (Griﬃths & Tenenbaum, 2009). That is the
93 And note that in the example ice cream sales and drowning rates are measured according
to the population level. If you happen to live in a culture where ice cream is widely eaten in
funerals and almost never otherwise, the idea that drownings actually cause increases in ice
cream sales would probably not appear odd at all but rather obvious. It is just not the dead
people eating the ice cream. The morale is that intuitions of both obvious and obviously
wrong hypotheses are generally learned rather than given a priori.
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upside of having a conceptual system with concepts as aggregates of causal
knowledge.
Unfortunately, speciﬁc background knowledge is not always available, and
the fundamental epistemic problem is to ﬁnd a causal structure in observed
data to start with. Fortunately, however, some causal structures can be inferred
from raw data by relying on generic assumptions. To use Judea Pearl’s (2000,
43) example, imagine someone is tossing two coins, and a bell rings whenever
either coin comes up tails. The outcomes of coin tosses (call them B and C)
are mutually independent and the operation of the bell (E) is correlated with
both. These variables constitute the following causal structure: B → E ← C.
The entry b) below is an example of the data that the system produces. Bit
strings B and C represent sequence of simultaneous coin tosses in each column
(1 = tails, 0 = heads) and E whether the bell rings 1 or not 0.
a) deterministic system
B C E odds
[0, 0, 0] 0.25
[0, 0, 1] 0
[0, 1, 0] 0
[0, 1, 1] 0.25
[1, 0, 0] 0
[1, 0, 1] 0.25
[1, 1, 0] 0
[1, 1, 1] 0.25
b) B : 011011101000000111001
C : 101000101110001111101
E : 111011101110001111101
Given enough of observations but no knowledge about the causal struc-
ture of the system, standard statistical analysis shows the independence of B
and C and their respective correlations with E. Statistics only discover cor-
relations, not causation; however, the causal structure of the system can be
recovered from the data. This necessitates a reasonable, albeit potentially fal-
lible, assumption that the data is produced by a stable and a minimal, unique
mechanism (i.e. no unnecessary hidden variables; see Pearl, 2000, Chapter 2);
in essence, a combination of Occam’s razor with the supposition that the world
has a stable causal structure that is responsible for most recurring events.
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c) stochastic system
B C E odds
[0, 0, 0] 0.2469
[0, 0, 1] 0.0031
[0, 1, 0] 0.0250
[0, 1, 1] 0.2250
[1, 0, 0] 0.0250
[1, 0, 1] 0.2250
[1, 1, 0] 0.0003
[1, 1, 1] 0.2497
d) P (x = 1) = P (x = 0) = 0.5
P (y = 1) = P (y = 0) = 0.5
P (z = 1|x = 0, y = 0) = 0.1
P (z = 1|x = 1) = 0.9
P (z = 1|y = 1) = 0.9
Standard statistical models can be completely deﬁned by a full joint distri-
bution, which speciﬁes the probabilities of all atomic events (i.e. combinations
of the values that the variables can take). For convenience, I will restrict the
discussion to binary variables. In the above table, a) depicts the joint prob-
ability distribution for the coin–bell-system. It is basically a truth table of
logical inclusive-OR with equal probabilities for all the events. However, both
in science and in everyday life, interesting causal relations are rarely determin-
istic. Entry c) represents the same system when events B and C make the
bell ring with 90% of certainty, and the bell rings for some unspeciﬁed reason
10% of the time. The system constitutes a noisy-OR gate, which is simply a
probabilistic version of the logical OR. As you perhaps notice, these tables are
often diﬃcult to read. A more critical problem, however, is that they grow
exponentially: Any added variable doubles the number of rows.
Fortunately, the model can be stated by declaring the base rates and
conditional probabilities between events as in entry d). These systems of de-
pendencies are even more intuitive to represent with graph notation, depicting
variables as nodes joined by directed edges. Below are two elementary causal
graphs. In Graph 0, variable C is completely independent of the others. Graph
1 depicts the (noisy-)OR.
Graph 0 Graph 1
B C
E
B C
E
But why elementary graphs,
if they are not the simplest struc-
tures that depict a link (or lack
thereof) between single cause and
an eﬀect? Graph 0 represents
the null hypothesis that C is in-
eﬀectual and E is brought about
solely by background causes. In
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Graph 1, cause C inﬂuences E in addition to the background causes B, which
are responsible for the base rate of the eﬀect. Note that C can be preven-
tive, decreasing the probability of E. In that case, Graph 1 does not con-
stitute noisy-OR but noisy-AND-NOT function, meaning that eﬀect comes
about when background causes B are present, AND preventive cause C is
NOT present. Just as noisy generative causes do not work deterministically,
preventive C generally decreases the occurrence of E and absolutely prevents
it only at the limit. Elementary causal judgment is often taken to be a selec-
tion between these two graphs. Constant (and undeﬁned) background causes
B are assumed to be there independently of the candidate cause C, and B are
observed only indirectly by the occurrences of E in the absence of C.
It is possible to omit the background nodes from explicitly appearing in
the graphs and implicitly factor them in the models by setting a corresponding
base rate for E. Then the elementary graphs depicting causal link reduce
simply to two linked nodes, which can be used to build more complex networks
such as the one below.94 As in the rest of the text, I will use dashed lines here
to represent preventive causes.
antibiotic
bacterial infection couch
viral infection headache
aspirinpeptic ulcers
The advantage of graphical models is that they make all the links and
independences explicit while keeping the model complexity in check. They also
enable qualitative causal judgments without quantitative parametrization: It
is not necessary to accurately deﬁne the strength of the links or to specify how
multiple causes interact to use the bare structural model to infer the inﬂuence of
interventions and assess the independence of variables. This is psychologically
relevant because generally people are taken to implicitly follow the qualitative
version of these models rather than (explicitly) use or even understand the
94 Adapted with modiﬁcations from Holyoak & Cheng (2011, 138).
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exact mathematical analysis (e.g. Cheng, 1997). Parametrization establishes
the exact connection between the graph and the data by specifying how the
model exactly generates the data. This gives a fully deﬁned causal net.
A common parametrization in psychological modeling is to use the noisy-
OR and noisy-AND-NOT functions to represent generative and preventive
causes, respectively. As will be explained below, this basically means to assume
that causes operate independently. This speciﬁc parametrization is obviously
inadequate to model continuous variables that combine linearly, for example;
however, it is strongly motivated by psychological research on causal induction
from binary contingency data. If the evidence or task so dictates, people are
readily able to adopt other functions to integrate causes.95 In any case, us-
ing noisy logical functions helps express intractably complex full distributions
eﬀectively (Russell & Norvig, 2010, 520). After the network is set, typical in-
ference proceeds as setting (or observing) speciﬁc values for certain nodes and
querying the resultant probability distributions in others. That means comput-
ing posterior probabilities for query nodes after evidence, which is to carry out
basic Bayesian inference. Formally, the inference in the networks is equivalent
to the probabilistic extension of propositional logic (Russell & Norvig, 2010,
Chapter 14). This is quite evident if the models are chains of generalized OR
and AND-NOT functions. From a processing perspective, Bayes nets read-
ily translate to parallel computing systems, aking to neural networks, which
pass signal from node to node (Pearl, 1985). Indeed, nets with noisy logical
functions are highly reminiscent of the McCulloch–Pitts neural network model
(McCulloch & Pitts, 1943).
In the previous section I brought up the idea—after Rehder (2003; 2007)
and Kim (Rehder & Kim, 2010)—that concepts should be conceived as causal
models. The meaning of the proposal is that concepts are structured like the
causal networks described here (parametrized or not). At the limit, all nodes
are unconnected, categorization is solely similarity-based, and category knowl-
edge associative. However, representations of coherent and informative natural
categories tend to have causal links between features, which makes category
judgments knowledge-based and category knowledge structured. If a category
is essentialized, the essence can be represented as a hidden/unobserved back-
ground cause node. Just like in general causal induction, category learning
should be aﬀected by available background knowledge, enabling inference of
95 See e.g. Novick & Chend (2004); Beckers et al. (2005) and Lu et al. (2008a) for Bayesian
model of the latter results; indeed, even rats are capable of learning the conjunction and
exclusive disjunction of causes (Fast & Blaisdell, 2011).
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unobserved properties in unfamiliar categories and rapid acquisition from few
or even one example.96 Categorization judgment, then, can be seen as both
an inferential and associative process: you observe features of a candidate
member and (tacitly) use the model to compute how likely your causal model
of the category produces that assignment of features. In case interfeature
causal knowledge is not available, causal models are unconnected graphs—i.e.,
basically unstructured prototype representations. Then the classiﬁer simply
matches the observed features against the assumed default values of the cate-
gory which is the limiting case of the same general mechanism. Causal status
and coherence eﬀects (discussed on page 151) can be derived from this general
account under diﬀerent model parameters (Rehder & Kim, 2010).
4.2.2 Parameter and structure learning
As a ﬁrst approximation one might assume that probabilistic causal relations
can be stated simply as P (e+|c+)—i.e., probability of E occurring when C
occurs—and the larger the value is the more there is evidence of causal link
C → E.97 This, however, conﬂates causal structure learning to parameter
estimation which means determining causal strength under the assumption
that the link is there. Clearly, this is conceptually diﬀerent from estimating
the probability that the link exists in the ﬁrst place. As we shall see shortly,
these assessments are also psychologically distinct. Moreover, P (e+|c+) is the
correct estimation of strength only if C is the only cause of E. To see this,
assume that we would like to know if chemical injection to laboratory rats
(C) causes the expression of a particular gene (E). One hundred rats in the
test group are injected and 40/100 express the gene while none does in the
uninjected control group. In a second experiment, diﬀerent chemicals and
genes are studied, and the results come up as 53/100 and 46/100, respectively.
Clearly, in the second experiment, P (e+|c+) is higher than in the ﬁrst (0.53
vs. 0.40) but people judge the ﬁrst experiment to provide stronger evidence
for causality. The gist is that causality is not just about the association of
cause and eﬀect but also what would happen in the absence of the cause. So
what we want is something like the diﬀerence P (e+|c+) − P (e+|c−), which is
0.4 in the ﬁrst experiment and 0.07 in the second. This measure is called the
96 This ability has been long recognized in humans, and recently Bayesian methods have
been used to implement it in visual classiﬁcation (e.g. Lake et al., 2015).
97 I use the standard notation where variables are denoted with upper-case letters C, E,
etc., and their binary values with lower-case with superscript: c+ marks the presence of the
(candidate) cause, e− the absence of the eﬀect, etc.
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ΔP . However, people also judge the result 7/100 (test) vs. 0/100 (control)
to give better support for causation than the second experiment (53/46/100),
although the ΔP is exactly the same 0.07. (Tenenbaum & Griﬃths, 2001)
Patricia Cheng (1997) proposed a correction with the ΔP model by in-
sisting that causal power estimates should be sensitive to occurrences of E
in the absence of any other cause than C, giving ΔP/[1 − P (e+|c−)] as the
correct estimate. Cheng’s model is a combination of the Humean idea that
causal judgments are sensitive to observed covariation of cause and eﬀect, and
the Kantian view that people bring prior assumptions about causality into
learning situations. Speciﬁcally, these assumptions are as follows:
1. Any event E is always caused and hence in the absence of C it is brought
about by some (unknown/unobserved) background causes B.
2. Causes (C, B, etc.) inﬂuence E independently (unless there is a reason
to suppose otherwise).
3. The causative powers of C and B (expressed as weights wc and wb) are
independent of the frequency of their occurrences, meaning that rarely
occurring events may be strongly causative and frequent causes weak.
Given these assumptions, the combined eﬀect of B and C on E constitutes
the noisy-OR: P (e+|b, c;wb, wc) = wbb+wcc−wbwcbc. Then ΔP/[1−P (e+|c−)]
gives the maximum likelihood point estimate of the causal power of candidate
cause C, that is, value wc that would maximize the likelihood of the contingency
data used to compute that estimate. If C is preventive, the interaction of B and
C takes the form of noisy-AND-NOT: P (e+|b, c;wb, wc) = wbb − wbwcbc. This
is the theoretical explanation of why elementary causal induction conforms to
noisy logical parametrization.
While Cheng’s causal power model and χ2 statistics predict some learning
data quite well, they both fail to explain causal judgments when the ΔP stays
constant at 0 while both P (e+|c+) and P (e+|c−) decrease equally. Think of
test result 8/8/8, that is, 8/8 positives when the candidate cause is present and
8/8 positives when the candidate is not present. The eﬀect is at the ceiling,
so a statistical test can not diﬀerentiate the experiments and hence provide
any grounds for rejecting the null hypothesis of no causation. The ΔP gives
0 diﬀerence, and causal power is actually not deﬁned but we can take it take
it to be 0 (for it is always 0 when ΔP = 0 and 1 − P (e+|c−) > 0). Hence,
all these models give 0 evidence for causality. The same goes for results 4/4/8
and 0/0/8. Human subjects, however, are quite unsure on 8/8/8 and presume
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moderate support for causality. This decreases on 4/4/8 and goes pretty much
to zero on 0/0/8.
Joshua Tenenbaum and Thomas Griﬃths conjectured that this pattern of
judgments could be explained by separating structure learning from parameter
estimation. After representing the contingency data, the question ”What is the
probability that C causes E?” can be interpreted as either querying P (E|C) or
P (E → C|D), and it is the latter question that the subjects are answering in
the above experiments (Tenenbaum & Griﬃths, 2001; Griﬃths & Tenenbaum,
2005). Recall the two elementary graphs, Graph 1 representing a connection
C → E and Graph 0 missing that link. If we are not interested in the strength
of the link but only if it exists, and moreover we assume that the possible
background causes of E are the same in both models, the hypothesis space
is strictly bivalent: either Graph 0 or Graph 1. Given data D about the
correlation of E and C, we can compute the so-called Bayes factor from the
ratio:
P (Graph 1|D)
P (Graph 0|D) =
P (D|Graph 1)
P (D|Graph 0) ×
P (Graph 1)
P (Graph 0)
Assuming uniform priors, i.e. P (Graph 0) = P (Graph 1), the factor is
simply P (D|Graph 1)/P (D|Graph0). It is often expressed in the common
logarithm form, which gives a direct comparative measure of how strongly the
data support the hypothesis. For example, if the log10 value is 5, then Graph
1 is ﬁve times more probable, given the data; the log10 value −3 means that
Graph 0 is three times more probable, and on 0, there is no support for either
side. Hence the factor is a Bayesian measure for model selection. Tenenbaum
and Griﬃths used the log factor to deﬁne causal support, a measure that is
proportional to the subjective strength of belief in the existence of the causal
connection. The actual posterior probabilities can be computed from the factor
after the priors are set.
Generally, χ2 statistics is used likewise to discover causal structures rather
than strength. However, it fails to model psychological causal induction be-
cause it is more conservative than human judgment. Causal support model
predicts, inter alia, the learning data mentioned above. The explanation is
that on 8/8/8, the eﬀect is already at the ceiling, so no inﬂuence of C can
be seen from the data but there can be no evidence against causation either.
Therefore, if you presume equal prior probabilities for and against the existence
of the causal link, you should stay at that after the data. On 4/4/8, there are
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chances for the inﬂuence of C to show up. We don’t see it, but because of he
high base rate and small sample size, this does not mean that it is not there.
On 0/0/8, we can be more conﬁdent that the eﬀect is either weak or lacking.
Therefore, here the Bayesian search for causal structure works diﬀerently from
χ2 statistics. Unlike χ2, it is also applicable with scant and qualitatively re-
stricted data, for example, when information about c− events is completely
missing. (Griﬃths & Tenenbaum, 2005)
What comes to learning causal strength, one problem in Cheng’s theory is
its insensitivity to sample size. It does not make a diﬀerence whether the data
are 2/0/4 or 25/0/50. Both suggest the same 0.5 estimate for causal power, but
clearly you should be more conﬁdent of your estimate in the latter case. Things
are diﬀerent with χ2 statistics which is sensitive to both sample and eﬀect size.
Statistical signiﬁcance test conﬂates them into a single measure ﬁnding weak
eﬀects from large samples and large eﬀects from small samples. An interesting
aspect of causal support model is that it can combine the representation of
both strength and associated uncertainty by using statistical distributions that
integrate over all possible estimates of wc. Below are depicted two illustrative
distribution curves. The peak of the curve gives the best estimate of strength,
and if noisy logical parametrization is used, the peak corresponds to Cheng’s
causal power. Hence, ”. . . this results in a relationship between causal support
and causal power. Speaking loosely, causal support is the Bayesian hypothesis
test for which causal power is an eﬀect size measure: it evaluates whether causal
power is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero” (Griﬃths & Tenenbaum, 2005, 350).
Posterior probability distributions of w1 ranging from 0 to 1. On the left two data
sets results to the same power estimate 0.5. The solid line represents a larger sample
size leading to more certainty and support. On the right, we have two distributions
with the solid curve showing more certainty but smaller strength. Causal support is
a point estimate that is basically determined by how much distributions place their
mass away from zero, and hence it is not directly proportional to the peak height:
In no cause condition, a high curve peaks at 0 and implies no causal support.
The last learning model that I discuss builds on these conceptual foun-
dations. Causal support theory with noisy logical parametrization is basically
a Bayesian extension of Cheng’s causal power with uniform priors over causal
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structures. Lu et al. (2008b) introduced the so-called SS power model which,
utilizes largely the same conceptual framework but assumes that human causal
induction has a marked tendency to expect dependencies to be strong and, by
implication, sparse (hence the ”SS”). The theory leans towards Cheng’s pro-
posal than to causal support model because it places more emphasis on eﬀect
strength than sample size, and especially because priors are deﬁned over causal
strength estimates rather than graph structures. The model utilizes directly
the strength distributions depicted above, and computes the likelihood of data
under the assumption that C and B inﬂuence E strongly. This means that pos-
terior probability distributions are by default elevated near the extreme values
(0 and 1), and a causal hypothesis is considered likely only if the weight distri-
bution is spread mostly near 1. This does not make it impossible to learn weak
dependencies, but they require more data than in the causal support model
with uniform priors. The SS model seems to have an empirical edge over the
support model (Lu et al., 2008b; Holyoak & Cheng, 2011; Powell et al., 2013),
although the diﬀerences are mostly subtle. At this point, I will save the reader
from the empirical details, and conclude this section with a discussion why SS
priors are an excellent to have to guide commonsense causal learning.
Recall the earlier remarks on how strong expectations lead to fast learning.
The obvious implication of the SS model is that by assuming strong default
priors, learning is similarly rapid in generic situations where no background
knowledge is available. Hence, people are expected to jump to conclusions by
witnessing small samples of conﬁrming evidence. That is an obvious source
of errors, but people should also drop their false beliefs quickly if induced ex-
pectations are not subsequently met reliably. In pathological environments,
this might lead to the rapid adoption of false beliefs; however, the more ob-
vious problem with SS priors is that they tend to dismiss genuine but weak
causes. Therefore, causal induction with strong and sparse priors looks almost
like an antithesis of scientiﬁc investigation, which stresses reliability and often
seeks non-obvious causal links. Looking back to the beginning of this section,
where the Bayesian framework was advertised as a rational model of causal
reasoning, suspicions may arise that hence the SS model veers oﬀ from that
tradition. But quite the contrary is the case. The causal induction theories
discussed here are designed to model our innate everyday capacity to form
causal beliefs from observing or producing events, without the help of explic-
itly learned mathematical tools. The practical demands in controlled scientiﬁc
studies and everyday causal reasoning are often quite diﬀerent, and we use
statistical methods precisely because weak dependencies are diﬃcult, if not
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impossible, to spot casually without the aid of careful experimentation and
analysis.
Recall that reasoning in Bayesian nets contains propositional logic as a
special case. This means that, in general, computations are intractable because,
for example, resolving whether a given assignment of three variables is possible
in an arbitrary network is computationally NP-hard. That is, the time for the
required computations grows at least exponentially with the size of the network
in the worst case. This is what makes the modeling of commonsense reasoning
intractably hard with logic. Any two variables or events may be indirectly
connected in complex ways and verifying these links can be a daunting task
in large networks, and the networks can get large pretty swiftly. Writing a
complete truth table or a full joint distribution requires 2n entries, given n
variables. Thus, specifying a model with 30 variables takes 230 numbers, which
a bit more than a billion. In a fully connected network, the number of links is
the same. Luckily, these worst-case scenarios haunt us only if the models are
unrestricted. If we require that every variable most depend on some constant
number of c other variables, that exponential growth becomes linear: n2c. For
example, if c = 5 we only need to specify at most 960 dependency relations, a
millionfold decrease in complexity (Russell & Norvig, 2010, Chapter 14).
These kind of restrictions are conceptually problematic with logical rela-
tions because they are abstract to the point that basically every thing is related
to every other in some way. Causal relations, in turn, are factual dependencies
between speciﬁc variables and hence naturally restricted in occurrence. They
are also local in the sense that every eﬀect is strictly dependent only on its
immediate causes. Moreover, logical relations lack any intrinsic way to spec-
ify relevance. With causal relations, the eﬀect size (i.e. causal strength) can
be taken to be an approximate measure of signiﬁcance. Some ceteris paribus
reservations are needed here, however. You may want to avoid severe but im-
probable outcomes, which makes weak causes sometimes relevant. Also, base
rates and control matter. Strongly causative but uncontrolled and extremely
unlikely events (such as being killed by an asteroid impact) are generally ir-
relevant to everyday decision-making. So are generally also vital but highly
prevalent causes (such as the presence of oxygen as a necessary cause of a ﬁre).
In general, it is reasonable to focus only on the most predictive causes if you
are interested in controlling or predicting a speciﬁc eﬀect. Now, it might be
that the world actually is an extremely complex nexus of small but genuine
causal events, and hence the causal maps that emphasize strong and sparse
causes yield a distorting representation of reality. This is undoubtedly true,
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if we consider the physical microstructure of the world; however, think only
of a casual walk through a crowded street and imagine all the macroscopic
events that are happening all around. In principle, almost an endless variety
of unobserved and remote events may interfere with our everyday plans. Still,
everyday world continues to be highly structured and predictable, and all the
underlying chaos mostly results in only minor events of no practical signiﬁcance
to our daily life.
Given these considerations, causal induction with SS priors should start
to appear as a rather rational choice for tracking pragmatically relevant de-
pendencies in an open and complex world. These priors reduce the number of
causal relations by pruning all except the most signiﬁcant dependencies making
the subjective representation of the world streamlined and more manageable.
Regardless of your sentiments toward the information-processing theory of the
mind, complexity issues should always be something to concern about. Be-
cause of our inherent cognitive limits, increasingly accurate representation of
reality should at some point turn to hindrance rather than an advantage.
Classical computationalist approaches have mostly resorted to some sort
of satisﬁcing strategies to manage complexity, such as heuristic algorithms that
give suboptimal but good enough answer to complex problems (e.g. Newell &
Simon, 1976). The causal learning model that is prejudiced to favor strong and
sparse causes mitigates the problem right at the representational level by pre-
ferring a causal topology with the smallest set of weights that are suﬃciently
strong to predict relevant eﬀects. Adding a link to a graph increases its accu-
racy; however, it is always a trade-oﬀ with growing complexity. A single link
does no harm but if you are about to model a domain with numerous weak
causes, you probably want to consider whether saturating the graph with these
is a sound general policy if there are also more predictive and pragmatically
relevant cues available. This would mean that our causal maps of the world are
geared toward subjective and pragmatic rather than objective veridical repre-
sentation, and it is the nature of probabilistic modeling that makes this possible
without expressly distorting the reality. Discarding a causal hypothesis does
not necessarily mean to accept a belief that the candidate cause is completely
ineﬀectual but to downgrade its status to a part of the constant background
noise. All the background causes are implicitly factored in the model as the
base rates of the eﬀects and the probability distributions of explicit links.
Indeed, the SS priors are deﬁned over causal strengths, which does not di-
rectly advocate sparse structures. The principle strictly advocates only struc-
tural representations where causal strengths tend to be close to 0 or 1. The
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eﬀect of priors is maximal early in the learning, and the accumulating data can
swamp their impact in the long run. Hence, the SS priors do not preclude the
possibility of learning the actual strengths eventually. Neither is learning with
default SS priors contradictory to Griﬃths and Tenenbaum’s (2009) theory of
how speciﬁc priors guide learning after some causal knowledge has been estab-
lished. SS model only makes unique predictions about how learning proceeds
initially in the absence of knowledge when the sample size is small, and learners
have no obvious reason for having any other speciﬁc priors about weights. (Lu
et al., 2008b, 961) In time, more nuanced and accurate networks, employing
more variables and more ﬁne-tuned weight estimates, may be extracted when
more experience is acquired in a speciﬁc domain. Although if this is the case,
then the information about those causal events that are not incorporated into
the causal belief system need to be retained in some way.
Most of the research reviewed above use static summary tables to intro-
duce contingency data about C and E to subjects, but dynamic or sequential
models of causal learning have also been developed. Usually they adjust the
distribution parameters after singular observations and then discard the data
(Holyoak & Cheng, 2011). It is somewhat hard to see how such models could re-
tain the information about events attributed to unspeciﬁed background causes
and learn about hidden variables.98 An obvious way to implement sequential
learning while retaining information about speciﬁc events is simply to keep a
running tally of the contingency data, and to update the posterior probabilities
over structures and strengths as you go. This involves counting the number
of actual events and not only proportional frequencies of C and E, since the
record of the sample size is needed. This technique was employed by Lu et al.
(2008b) as a preliminary investigation with no particularly striking results. At
least, the model should also account for gradual forgetting and keep track of
the order of the events because there are asymmetries in learning due to order
of observed events.99
98 Diﬀerent methods used for this purpose are mainly variations of non-Bayesian Expectation
Maximization and related constraint based algorithms; see (Pearl, 2000; Luhmann & Ahn,
2007) and (Russell & Norvig, 2010, Ch. 12).
99 For example, if cues A and B are paired with eﬀect E, and subsequently subjects
witness only A to produce E, they lower their rating about the causal strength of B and
elevate A. If subjects ﬁrst lean causal rule A → E and then they witness AB → E, the
previous knowledge about A blocks the learning about the possible inﬂuence of B. These
blocking eﬀects are interesting phenomena in their own right, demonstrating that human
causal learning is not (at least straightforwardly) associative: In both learning situations,
B is only positively correlated with E but people still disregard it in the forward condition
(ﬁrst A → E, then AB → E), and even make negative causal judgments about its relation
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Assuming that keeping track of the order of events implies memory for
separate traces, that would require exemplar or comparable encoding, but
more investigation in this area is needed. Logically speaking, you could just
keep track of posterior distributions of all the possible causal relations in case
some weak link eventually shows up. However, that would be tantamount to
tracking the fully connected network. In order to contain the combinatorial
explosion, then, you would need domain-knowledge to inform what dependen-
cies are meaningful to track (Tenenbaum et al., 2007; Penn & Povinelli, 2007;
Holyoak & Cheng, 2011). However, you need the SS priors the most when
you do not have such information. In the next chapter, I will show how that
sort of knowledge may be engendered by exploiting analogical reasoning over
exemplar-based event representations.
4.2.3 Section summary
Bayesian modeling of causal learning is a highly developing ﬁeld with a host of
open issues, alternative accounts, and not much consensus on details beyond
the basics covered here. This is mostly true of causal cognition in general
which, currently lacks a canonical presentation in introductory textbooks of
cognitive psychology.100 Therefore, more in-depth comparison of the various
models of causal learning, reasoning, and representation would not be relevant
for the purposes of this work, which is not supposed to be an exhaustive survey
of the state-of-the-art. Anything beyond what has been said thus far is mostly
theoretical speculation, but let’s sum up what we have learned.
I have argued that category representations are feature clusters structured
by causal knowledge—basically graphical models where, at the limit, there
are no (known) connections between constituent features. Generally, though,
representations of natural categories tend to contain causal links. This enables
us to get a hold on the notion of category coherence, i.e., why some collections
of features make sensible wholes. To grasp something is to understand how
its properties hang together. Moreover, often the relevant causal properties
are not strictly intrinsic to the entity, and critical part of category knowledge
is to track how things participate in events. For example, pain medication
to E when it is absent in the backwards case (ﬁrst AB → E then A → E). This is quite
incompatible with the core idea of associationism, which is that mental processes are sensitive
only to co-occurrence of events; see (Beckers et al., 2005; Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Holyoak &
Cheng, 2011).
100 See the introduction in Waldmann (2017), perhaps the ﬁrst entry level handbook of the
subject, published just recently.
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cures headaches, and this is a conceptually constitutive relational property
that links pain killers to events. I have argued that, in general, categories
are agent related, that is many important properties are determined by our
goals and capacities, even to the point where speciﬁc motor programs may be
encoded as a part of category representation. Theories discussed in this section
are not speciﬁcally designed to address these matters but causal knowledge and
learning in general. My aim in this section was to give some idea what the
Bayesian inductive search for causally predictive regularities means, and to
show that existing models provide viable, albeit imperfect, theories of human
causal induction.
Epistemologically, it is signiﬁcant that the causal structure of the world
can be extracted from covariation of events, but that process is (naturally) fal-
lible and requires generic presuppositions about the structure of reality. This
is somewhat Kantian in spirit, in that the theory does not ﬁt neatly into em-
piricist/associative tradition or the rational/inferentialist tradition in cognitive
science but includes aspects of both. Often we can not directly observe these
causes at work but they are there as part of the noise of unspeciﬁed weak
background causes or unknown speciﬁc variables, which may strongly aﬀect
the observed events. Initial learning, in particular, is often guided by temporal
order and more signiﬁcantly by observing and producing interventions. Inter-
action is particularly important for producing variety and control over the data,
and for discovering independencies and hidden variables (Steyvers et al., 2003;
Lagnado et al., 2007). Hence, elementary causal knowledge is often produced
by active participation in concrete situations, and therefore it is practically
warranted that much of it focuses on pragmatically relevant events and regu-
larities. After some generic knowledge of event types is gathered by these gen-
eral processes, an increasingly eﬃcient grasp of (domain-)speciﬁc novel events
is attained. Domain general learning mechanisms are apparently guided by a
default policy to extract only a crude but suﬃciently predictive causal map of
reality, shaping our causal understanding of the world as primarily pragmat-
ically oriented instead of toward veridical objective representation—although
these two are not necessarily in any way contradictory. The next step then is
to explain how increasingly abstract domain knowledge is produced from these
concrete and speciﬁc representations.
In outlining the main empirical hypothesis of this work, I postulated that
situations are mentally represented as quasi-perceptual model type structures,
but I have not thus far said much about that. The reader may also begin
to wonder what was all that fuss about skills and conceptual understanding,
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because so far we have seen mostly standard cognitive psychology of knowl-
edge and category representation. In the next chapter, I will explain how these
aspects of cognition are related. Cognitive skills and understanding are both
about how all this knowledge actually gets used. It is important to understand
that the Bayesian framework is no silver bullet to the complexity issues posed
by commonsense and expert reasoning. Learning and inference with complex
causal networks can be computationally very hard, and Bayesian methods are
often considered to pose unrealistic processing demands on human cognition
(Gopnik et al., 2004; Knill & Pouget, 2004; Lagnado et al., 2007, e.g.). Com-
puting the integrals of posterior probabilities is one thing, but the more press-
ing issue is that when we move beyond elementary causal induction to wide
domains where the number of variables grows, the complexity of the result-
ing hypothesis spaces may undergo combinatorial explosion. That is, we are
no longer comparing two graphs but posterior probabilities of all the possi-
ble graphs, and suddenly that can be computationally infeasible. This is also
not what people seem to do behaviorally. When subjects can produce data
by interventions, they seem ﬁrst to arrive at a preferred hypothesis through
initial observations and then produce data to optimally investigate that partic-
ular hypothesis rather than the whole hypothesis space (Steyvers et al., 2003).
Sparse causal models and the guide of established knowledge conceivably helps
to manage complexity, but commonsense knowledge is still very intricate. The
problem gets worse when we need to deal also with abstract level of regulari-
ties that are not directly associated with basic-level categories and elementary
causal knowledge.
Note that everyone in the Bayesian modeling business believes that causal
induction happens as an implicit process. Very few adults have any knowledge
of Bayesian methods, and probably no one can do all the necessary computa-
tions explicitly in their minds. Implicit cognition is generally taken to have
a high capacity parallel architecture, and it is also a realistic possibility that
probability density functions can be computed quite straightforwardly by using
population encoding over groups of neurons (Knill & Pouget, 2004). Moreover,
causal networks quite easily translate into parallel signal passing processing
models where each node computes only sparse local information (i.e. joint
distribution contingent only on immediate causes in Bayesian networks). This
means that, conceivably, the brain may be optimized all the way down to
”hardware” level for computing probabilistic networks. However, that capac-
ity necessarily has limits, and it is a sound practice not to attribute intractably
complex computations to any cognitive faculty. When the potential hypothesis
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spaces grow, and we are dealing with ﬂexible use of causal knowledge of more
general level of abstraction than elementary causal relations, the issue still boils
pretty much down to selecting relevant information to focus on—just like with
logic based approaches. Bayesian inference is not a theory of cognitive pro-
cessing and hence it does not readily specify how such information access and
ﬁltering might be implemented. Moreover, Bayesian nets are inherently not
expressive enough to represent higher-order domain knowledge for narrowing
down hypothesis spaces (like schematic principles contained in particular (folk)
theories), since they are limited to state only speciﬁc relations between speciﬁc
variables while sometimes you may need to express more general principles
concerning event or variable types (Tenenbaum et al., 2007).
The reader should recall the discussion in the opening of this section, in
that the Bayesian framework aims to provide a normative analysis of reasoning
and behavior in a complex and uncertain world. The approach is not commit-
ted to any speciﬁc cognitive mechanisms that would produce this behavior
but only to use Bayesian models of rational inference to conceptualize it. Re-
gardless of whether that is an accurate description of the ﬁeld, the paradigm
is consistent with alternative suggestions about how causal learning and in-
ference actually executed, perhaps by approximating unconstrained Bayesian
inference. Note also that the research discussed here is mostly conﬁned to
elementary causal induction for quick and dirty causal maps of the world. It
is possible that this elementary induction is implemented by exact Bayesian
inference in the brain while slowly developing, more ﬁne-grained, and complex
capacities employ diﬀerent methods.
In the next sections, I will propose something along these lines. The last
technical issue we left open before this section summary was how the cognitive
system retains rich contingency information about weak dependencies that are
attributed to the constant background. I suggested that one way to do this
is to retain exemplar representations about events. This is by no means the
only viable solution, but there is independent evidence that exemplars play a
signiﬁcant role in conceptual cognition, and specifying their status in causal
knowledge may help integrate various research programs such as causal induc-
tion, skill learning, categorization, concept learning, and analogical reasoning.
The last item will explain how abstract knowledge is rooted in concrete event
representations. This proposal, which is far more programmatic than the dis-
cussion so far, is pursued in the rest of this work. By now, we have seen how
prototypes and causal knowledge are integrated, and what follows will outline
a role of exemplars and speciﬁc situations in conceptual cognition.
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4.3 Event representation, situations, and cognitive skills
Up to this point we have basically covered how human cognition represents
information about concrete categories. Next, we need an account of event
or situation representations and explain how more abstract schematic knowl-
edge is attained. The latter is the primary goal of the next chapter. Here we
start with the former but, roughly, the idea developed in the next chapter is
that schematic understanding is an incremental product of acquired procedural
knowledge. As explained earlier, procedural knowledge is simply a collection of
long term-memories encoded as situation-action-outcome exemplars that are
activated by a shallow associative memory search, cued by external factors
and endogenous goals in speciﬁc situations. Hence, schematic knowledge is
ultimately anchored to concrete knowledge, but more abstract schematic un-
derstanding can be produced by automatic activation of speciﬁc memories,
which are mentally linked via procedural information. These recurring pro-
cedural patterns can become acknowledged, explicitly represented, lexicalized,
and eventually form their own conceptual representation. Nevertheless, the
intelligibility of the associated schematic concepts depends on the knowledge
of the speciﬁc events constituting those patterns in the subject’s memory and
experience.
Although the idea is not tied to prototype theory, it is inﬂuenced by the
research on basic levels of category representation discussed in the earlier sec-
tions. On the whole, the argument exploits insights from a wide variety of cog-
nitive psychology, for example the early exemplar theory of categories (Medin
& Schaﬀer, 1978; Brooks, 1978), instance theory of automation (Logan, 1988;
Palmeri, 1997), theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird, 2008), neo-empiricist
theories of concepts (Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou et al., 2003), research on re-
mindings in problem-solving (Ross, 1984; Ross & Kennedy, 1990; Brooks et
al., 1991), recognition theory of cognitive skills (Simon, 1992; Klein, 1998,
2008), implicit learning research (Reber, 1993; Sun et al., 2005), research on
analogical reasoning (Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Novick, 1988; Holyoak et al., 1994;
Gentner et al., 2003), and, to a degree, the representational redescription model
of developmental psychology (Karmiloﬀ-Smith, 1992). The core assumptions
about fundamental cognitive processes and control are essentially identical to
the ones employed in recent research on prefrontal cortex function in learning
and decision-making (e.g. Collins & Koechlin, 2012; Collins & Frank, 2013;
Domenech & Koechlin, 2015).
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4.3.1 Event representation and simulation
I assume that events can be represented as causal models, akin to graphs in-
troduced in the previous section, which are composed of any variables that are
relevant to the agent in terms of goal achievement. Often these variables are
objects and actors, and most superﬁcially, events can be characterized simply
by itemizing present things and their properties. However, usually events are
speciﬁed by what is happening rather than by the entities present. We can
transform such lists to causal models by specifying how the items and their
properties interact. This is implicit in such descriptions anyway, as far as en-
tity types are characterized by causal attributes. In any case, events can be
abstractly represented as causal models, which can take category causal mod-
els as variables. This deﬁnition is supposed to be as general as possible. As
a limiting case, categories can be represented by simple unstructured feature
vectors, and vectors can consist only of a single variable. Formally, this char-
acterization allows event representations to have anything from a single-valued
variables to complex structures as constituents. Generally, we tend to factor
our environment in causally relevant elements, and since we are born to track
what is happening, the salient causal properties tend to be informative for
event–event causation. Full event descriptions then point to other subsequent
events, which are the possible outcomes of how things unfold. I refer to these
causal models with event–event structure as situations.
While this representation scheme may apply to an objective depiction of
reality, ”situation” often refers to subjective conditions. To translate the char-
acterization into an empirically adequate notion of mental models—i.e., sub-
jective representations of states of aﬀairs, we need some qualiﬁcations. First,
situations in this sense are partly determined by the environment and partly
by the agent. While external physical conditions obviously are constitutive of
events in general, situations are properly construed from a point of view. In
other words, basic building blocks of situations are not objects as such but ele-
ments of the agent’s conceptual system. Hence, the same stimulus environment
can aﬀord diﬀerent models for diﬀerent agents. Thus, in principle, representa-
tions of external conditions can even be incommensurable between agents. In
practice, however, similar lifeforms tend to perceive many aﬀordances similarly
and shared cultural practices tend to produce congruent conceptual systems.
In any case, diﬀerent variables and event–event contingencies may be diﬀer-
ently salient and relevant to diﬀerent actors, and hence external conditions
bear one-to-many relations to mental models. Second, we enter situations
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with our transient needs and inclinations. Diﬀerent goals make us focus on
diﬀerent aﬀordances and expected outcomes, aﬀecting the interpretation of ex-
ternal factors and even how we categorize objects. Hence, the same agent may
produce diﬀerent models of the same stimulus environment, depending on its
current mindset. Lastly, both of these planks go similarly with all of our back-
ground knowledge that we bring into situations; in other words, what we know
by our previous experiences modulates our anticipations and what we perceive
as salient and relevant. In brief, how we represent external factors as situations
is not straightforwardly determined by the physical or stimulus environment
alone.
The above planks are familiar from our earlier discussion about concrete
category representation. The point that I am after this time is somewhat
diﬀerent: It is wise to abstain from the ﬁrm a priori commitments to the
ontology of situations. It is enough to think of situations as concrete events
that are constituted by speciﬁc variables whatever they might be. Think, for
example, planning a night out on Friday. Clearly, not all the relevant variables
can be naturally construed as objects, actors, or their properties: the weather,
your bank account balance, the length of your evening meeting, and so on.
Bayes net formalism does not inherently diﬀerentiate between propositional,
event, object, or property variables. Causal learning literature rarely speciﬁes
the general type of the variables in the mental representation of events and
objects, and I think it is advisable to follow suit here.
It is theoretically motivated to choose such a policy of minimal commit-
ment. Many categories are, to various degrees, characterized by how they
participate in event causation, and earlier we discussed the inseparability of
category identity from events (e.g., pp. 95–100). Thinking of event represen-
tations as causal models similar to category representations (i.e., as graphs
with ontologically neutral variables) provides a natural means for such inter-
mixed representations. It especially negates the need to postulate new rep-
resentational devices for event representations. Second-order (event) models
simply exploit the representational capacities of the ﬁrst-order (category) mod-
els. Seeing things this way also enables us to import theoretical elements from
category to situation processing. Similar to sparse causal maps and basic level
category cuts that are produced by agents in accordance with their capacities
and needs, situation representations are likely comparable coarse constructions
where the elements and the level of grain are set by the agent on the pragmatic
and contextual basis. Moreover, event categories may be processed similarly to
category models: In case no causal information is available, they are character-
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ized by correlations or family resemblance structure of characteristic elements.
When causal information is available, it primarily guides event classiﬁcation
and events can be grouped with other events that share the common causal
structure. If values of relevant variables are unknown, their default or expected
values can be retrieved from the generic model or computed from the causal
model based on other known values. Notions such as event category coherence
can be derived from this scheme in an obvious way.
Nonetheless, there are apparent diﬀerences in object and event knowledge.
Often one does not have the means to manipulate the causal factors that pro-
duce intrinsic property correlations in concrete categories. This is particularly
true of non-artifact kinds. Hence, the category structure often needs to be
inferred from passive observation in addition to background knowledge about
mechanisms. On the other hand, we often intervene in event–event causation,
and many important things in our environment are causally inert unless we
work as causative agents. As discussed in the previous section, these interac-
tions are especially important for discovering novel dependencies and hidden
causal variables. Assuming that events are precisely individuated by such
information contextualized—i.e. events are also characterized by intentional
action with more or less speciﬁc goals—then event and object representations
are mutually dependent, at least to a degree. It is still reasonable to assume
that there is at least a quantitative diﬀerence in the types of knowledge that is
coded in object and event representation. The former probably consists much of
object-centered correlational information about property instantiations, while
the latter is more characterized by agent-centered pragmatic knowledge about
event–event contingencies. The relevant contingencies in novel situations may
be obscure to novices and their experience with the variability of possible
variables and values (e.g., the type of entities and their properties) limited.
Therefore, we should expect novices to conceptualize situations on based on
superﬁcial features whereas experts to focus more on the functionally relevant
deep structural features, which indeed is the case (Novick, 1988; Campitelli &
Gobet, 2010).
Unfortunately, only limited research has been conducted to address the
level of abstraction at which event variables are conceived, but the data we
have indicate that people associate events labels with superordinate level cat-
egories (Rosch, 1978; Rifkin, 1985). For example, in one preliminary study,
Rosch (1978) asked the subjects to describe the events of a particular day,
and the participants consistently mentioned general activities such as getting
dressed (with an implicit reference to superordinate categories—in this case
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clothes) instead of more accurate activities such as putting on trousers (a basic
level category). More encompassing events such as ”all the morning chores”
did not appear to have memory representation separate from these more spe-
ciﬁc procedures. Thus, it seems that events are primarily conceptualized on
the level of schematic behaviors and other causal events, which can be bro-
ken down into more basic actions (e.g., putting on pants, putting on shirt,. . . )
which do not further decompose naturally into more basic linguistic elements
but idiosyncratic motor programs or something alike, which can perhaps be
demonstrated but not easily described.
By insisting that event representations are quasi-perceptual, I mean that
their default variables generally are basic level categories instantiated by spe-
ciﬁc entities. The basic level, remember, is supposed to consist of most inclusive
categories that share common aﬀordances, sensory properties, and motor pro-
grams. Apart from perhaps schematic aﬀordances, superordinate categories
tend to lack these attributes altogether. Think of clothing, for example. Dif-
ferent kinds of clothes (e.g., trousers and gloves) rarely share similar shapes or
other common visual identiﬁers, and the same applies to speciﬁc aﬀordances
or actions associated with them. A central feature of clothing is that you put
it on, but this property is multiply realizable: you put gloves diﬀerently from
how you put trousers on. From a goal-derived perspective, you generally use
trousers (at least partly) for diﬀerent purposes than gloves. Hence, functional
properties associated with superordinate categories are quite non-speciﬁc and
abstract. The reason for this becomes clear below, to for my argument it is rel-
atively important that functional and other not strictly perceptual knowledge
hangs together with perceptual and motor representations. That basically is
what I mean by that the fundamental level of learning and conceptual com-
prehension tracks concrete entities and events. ”Quasi” here reminds us that
not all information associated with concrete things are perceptual (e.g., causal
ones) and neither situations need to be represented in full detail. This is evi-
dent in explicit thought for we tend to think and remember the general gist of
events while dismissing many surface details. However, perhaps a bit surpris-
ingly this seems to be true even in situ. When we perform tasks, we do not
necessarily extract a detailed representation of the environment prior to acting
but often, in the words of Rodney Brooks (1999, 81), use the world as its own
model, and shift our focus back and forth to retrieve information online on a
need-to-know basis to optimize working memory load and information retrieval
time during execution (Clark, 2008, 11–13,118–122).
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Now, my case may begin to sound slightly confusing. If the ultimate pur-
pose of conceptual cognition is to track event–event contingencies to support
intentional action which is, in turn, conceptualized at a schematic level, then
why am I claiming that core event representations are quasi-perceptual mod-
els with basic level objects as default variables? In other words, if the basic
building blocks of conceptual thought are structural and functional properties
(as Mandler claims) and if superordinate categories are elliptic descriptions of
functional attributes (as Rosch claims), then why I am using ﬁndings of the
basic level categories to make my case? Would it not be more appropriate for
me to expect the superordinate concepts to be fundamentally relevant and con-
sider perceptual features and other such properties as mostly irrelevant residual
knowledge? I gather that something like this is a common attitude amongst
philosophers, especially the ones with essentialist inclinations. Indeed, I have
apparently somewhat backed down from the concreteness or ”quasi-perceptual”
claim by insisting that we should make strong ontological commitments to the
fundamental elements in situation representation.
It is easy to ﬁnd counterexamples to the claim that pragmatically rele-
vant situational variables are speciﬁc and concrete because as adults we have
thoroughly learned how generic situations in our everyday environment work.
Therefore, we have a fairly good grasp of these recurring patterns, which are
not always characterized by speciﬁc contents but rather by functional features.
For example, everyone understands the sentence ”in order to get a permit for
P , you need to fulﬁll an obligation O,” even though P and O are nonspeciﬁc
variables. In the next chapter, I will explain how these kinds of schemata are
learned by clustering situation exemplars that constitute procedural knowl-
edge. The role of speciﬁc exemplars becomes more obvious once we track the
development of cognitive skills but the main point is similar to the one ex-
plained above: The comprehension of unfamiliar situations tends to depend on
speciﬁc surface content while accumulating expertise provides a gradual under-
standing of a more structural kind. People tend to conceptualize their actions
with a generic purpose in mind, but the level of abstraction depends on task
diﬃculty. Novel tasks demand attention to speciﬁc actions; however, eventu-
ally such minute routines become processed unconsciously and chunked to more
complex behavioral units while focus and control shift to a more generic ”gist”
level of understanding. If execution faces diﬃculties, comprehension relapses
to more concrete details. (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; Christensen et al., 2016)
Thus, while event types are individuated by nonspeciﬁc functional knowledge,
this conceptual capacity is grounded on processing episodes dealing with spe-
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ciﬁc event tokens. Since the basic level is the default level of individuating
things, with which we directly interact, one should expect that the default
elements of these processing episodes are conceptualized accordingly.
The key claim here is more or less the core tenet of situated reasoning.
However, I do not claim that every reasoning episode must happen in a context
where the relevant set of variables are physically present in the current local
environment. What I claim is that the human ability to reason on the higher
level of abstraction does not result from logical knowledge about abstract task
structures but from procedural knowledge that is initially tied to perceptually
guided action. That capacity utilizes representational tokens that make possi-
ble for the agent to imagine speciﬁc situations and behaviors. Superordinate
schematic expressions are understood by translating them into comprehensi-
ble concrete world knowledge, i.e. events involving speciﬁc acts with basic
categories (Rosch, 1978). Children tend to learn novel basic level categories
sooner than functionally determined superordinate categories (Rosch et al.,
1976), and object concepts are learned before verbs that refer to structures
and change (Gentner & Boroditsky, 1999); suggesting that schematic knowl-
edge is extracted from concrete knowledge.101
I presume that causal properties and schematic structural attributes such
as above/below or containment are not even comprehensible without reference
to concrete objects or situations. If infants (or adults) extract structural and
functional properties from the environment, they necessarily need to do this in
speciﬁc contexts where the relations are implemented by concrete entities.102
I personally ﬁnd these relational notions semantically transparent yet impossi-
ble to imagine or describe without some speciﬁc concrete content—and so did
the subjects of Rosch et al. (1976, 409). Well, inexplicability may be what
being basic really means but, then, they can be explicated by examples refer-
ring to concrete situations. The importance of functional properties for mental
101 Note that this does not mean that causal and other functional knowledge is learned later
but that functional knowledge can be more easily dissociated from speciﬁc instances after
learning. Infant basic levels may correspond to adult superordinate levels in scope but not
necessarily in content. Therefore, the claim that purely functionally determined superordinate
categories are learned later does not contradict the claim that basic levels for infants might
correspond to superordinate classes in adult ontology. Infant conceptual taxonomy may be
just more undiﬀerentiated and their functional attributes more robust. But from infants’
point of view, their basic level may be similarly speciﬁc and concrete and not determined
solely by abstract function.
102 Mandler’s theory does not contradict this obvious point. The central part of her account
is that basic contents are derived from sensory experience (Mandler, 2004).
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representation is not in question but that they by themselves could engender
intelligible content. An ability to track such functional attributes is a precon-
dition rather than suﬃcient condition for making sense of the world. Here,
I am iterating the point from page 142 that sensory-derived contents, associ-
ated actions, etc., do not need to correspond to anything that have conceptual
meanings; instead, they are constituents in the systems that are meanings.
The general point is that categories are aggregates of functional knowledge,
but that knowledge needs to be anchored to concrete things. Merely procedu-
ral narratives are very diﬃcult to comprehend. Here is an example (Bransford
& Johnson, 1973, 400):
The procedure is actually quite simple. First you arrange things
into diﬀerent groups. Of course, one pile might be suﬃcient de-
pending on how much there is to do. If you have to go somewhere
else due to lack of facilities that is the next step, otherwise you are
pretty well set. It is important not to overdo things. That is, it is
better to do too few things at once than too many. In the short run
this may not seem important but complications can easily arise. A
mistake can be expensive as well. At ﬁrst the whole will seem com-
plicated. Soon, however, it will become just another facet of life.
It is diﬃcult to foresee any end to the necessity for this task in the
immediate future, but then one never can tell. After the procedure
is completed one arranges the materials into diﬀerent groups again.
Then they can be put into their appropriate places. Eventually
they will be used once more and the whole cycle will then have to
be repeated. However, that is part of life.
People tend to ﬁnd it hard to grasp what is going on here unless one
thinks of washing clothes, for example. After that, the initial confusion is
perhaps diﬃcult to evoke again. This results from our automatic ability to
translate the narrative into comprehensible world knowledge—i.e. sensible
practical acts with concrete things—and a sort of ”click of comprehension”
is produced (Rosch, 1978, 20). In summary, whatever is the role of sensory
and motor contents in conceptual content, certain speciﬁcity and concreteness
are prerequisites for understanding events.
The other line of argument for quasi-perceptual processing in thinking
comes from neo-empiricist theories of concepts and related model and simu-
lation accounts of reasoning. These theories further claim that it is not only
concreteness of content that matters but also how the content is represented
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in thought often in the same way as in actual perception. For example, when
people read a passage about a nail pounded either into a wall or the ﬂoor, sub-
sequent processing about the nail is faster in the implied rather than unimplied
orientation (Barsalou et al., 2003, 86). The idea that thinking and reasoning
involves some kind of analogical model construction and manipulation is not
new. It has roots in the 19th-century science and pragmatist philosophy.103
The ﬁrst clear articulation of mental models in the modern sense can be found
in Kenneth Craik’s The Nature of Explanation:
If the organism carries a ’small-scale model’ of external reality and
of its own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out
various alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react to
the future situations before they arise, utilise the knowledge of past
events in dealing with the present and future, and in every way to
react in a much fuller, safer, and more competent manner to the
emergencies which faces it. (Craik, 1943, 61)
According to Philip Johnson-Laird (2008, 428), perhaps the most promi-
nent advocate of the theory, a mental model ”[. . . ] represents what is true in
one possibility, and so far as possible has an iconic structure. Mental models
are the end result of perception and of understanding a description.” The iconic
or image-like character of thought, ”as far as possible,” is repeated throughout
Johnson-Laird’s work. Unfortunately, he does not make much use of this idea
nor of the internal structure of mental models; instead, he focuses on reasoning
over sets of alternative models—usually represented by symbolic propositional
variables. This not intended as a criticism of his work; however, although
Johnson-Laird appears to share the spirit of knowledge representation advo-
cated here, he is more interested in explicit logical inference than implicit
situated reasoning.
To be sure, Craik’s ideas about human cognition are closer to the standard
logical cognitivism than the quotation above suggests. However, the quoted
lines capture the essence of the mental models approach and the closely related
notion that thinking is a sort of trying out—i.e. simulating—one’s own action
in imagined situations. This idea also has long roots in empirical psychology,
e.g., in the works of behaviorist Edward C. Tolman (1932, Ch. XIII).
Recently, the notion of simulation has surfaced in connection with causal
models and analogical reasoning (e.g., Hagmayer & Waldmann, 2000; Rehder
103 See Johnson-Laird (2004) for a historical overview.
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& Kim, 2010; Holyoak et al., 2010), but unfortunately it is rarely ﬂeshed out
in more detail beyond elliptical references to setting up and running a causal
model in one’s mind. The idea is, I presume, easy to understand as a forward
inference in Bayes nets. However, that is not very restrictive characterization,
since these networks can be used to implement, inter alia, logical inference.
Indeed, since models are not supposed to bear isomorphic but one-to-many
relation to their targets, language-like representation can be thought of as
special cases of models and any (rule based) predictive inference as a sort
of simulation (see e.g. Hegarty, 2004).104 As mentioned above, we do not
model the environment accurately even in situ, because selective attention
to important features isolates selected information from the complete stimulus
environment in perception and action (Barsalou, 1999, 358). Hence, it does not
follow that rich and detailed representations are employed when we faithfully
re-enact the mental representations invoked in the past events, and probably
even less so when we imagine future ones based on our previous experience.
Therefore, the notion of simulation as such is not very informative and
it needs to be made more precise to be theoretically useful. A common ref-
erence in this connection is Barsalou’s theory of perceptual symbol systems
and grounded cognition (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Barsalou et al., 2003). The
general idea is that category representations are ”simulators” which, when ac-
tivated, partly recreate the original sensory and motor experiences associated
with the concepts. These simulators ground human conceptual cognition and
support categorization and category-based inference. They can be combina-
torially integrated to produce complex simulators (e.g., models). I will leave
aside Barsalou’s account of abstract thought; nonetheless, we share roughly
the similar idea that schematic representations are understood by binding con-
crete (simulator) tokens to abstract type variables in schematic expressions
(see Barsalou, 1999). In his words:
Simulation is the reenactment of perceptual, motor, and introspec-
tive states acquired during experience with the world, body, and
mind. As an experience occurs (e.g., easing into a chair), the
brain captures states across the modalities and integrates them
with a multimodal representation stored in memory (e.g., how a
104 My reasoning is that generally (computer) simulations express aspects of the target phe-
nomena in terms of diﬀerential equations, for example (which are symbolic expressions), and
then use those equations to infer how the target system behaves under some speciﬁc condi-
tions. Recall that also in the model theory of predicate logic, models are expressions in set
theoretical language.
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chair looks and feels, the action of sitting, introspections of comfort
and relaxation). Later, when knowledge is needed to represent a
category (e.g., chair), multimodal representations captured during
experiences with its instances are reactivated to simulate how the
brain represented perception, action, and introspection associated
with it.
[...] From this [situated action] perspective, the cognitive system
evolved to support action in speciﬁc situations, including social in-
teraction. These accounts stress interactions between perception,
action, the body, the environment, and other agents, typically dur-
ing goal achievement. (Barsalou, 2008, 618–619)
We have discussed at length the constitutive role of perception, aﬀor-
dances, and action in category representation as well as the role of speciﬁc
content in causal reasoning and event comprehension. However, the need for
modal speciﬁc sensory or motor contents in conceptually structured thought
is not strictly implied by these considerations. The pioneering studies about
visual rotation (Shepard & Metzler, 1971) and scanning (Kosslyn, 1973) of men-
tal images instigated a lengthy and well-known debate about quasi-perceptual
thinking. We do not need to concern ourselves with that particular discussion
or any issues considering introspection (or lack thereof) of mental imagery. Re-
member that here the notion of mental image does not exclusively refer to visual
but sensorimotor representations and processes in general, and these images
do not need to be conscious any more than any other cognitive phenomena.
While unconscious imagery may sound like a contradiction of terms to
some, the sensorimotor system is a complex thing, and most of its processing
happens outside the reach of conscious access. More to the point, if routinized
details of perceptually guided action are processed unconsciously during ex-
ecution, while conscious attention is focused mostly to the action gist (e.g.
Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), it should be natural to expect that the same holds
for the simulation of the event. Hence, mental simulation can be rather im-
poverished and more detailed elements may be brought to conscious attention
only when necessary—just like in actual lived situations, where we can focus
on selected details when needed.
The issue here is not conscious imagery but whether sensorimotor faculties
have a constitutive role in thought. This would mean that thinking about
concrete categories and situations exploit (at least partly) the same modal-
speciﬁc cognitive resources as perception and action. A substantial amount of
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neuroscientiﬁc evidence shows that it does.105 Some theorists (e.g. Pylyshyn,
1981) argue that mental images are epiphenomenal and have no causal role in
thinking. The same may hold true for the activation of sensory and motor areas
associated with thinking. However, damage to sensory and motor areas cause
selective deﬁciencies in conceptual processing, implying that these resources
do signiﬁcant work in category processing. For example, damage to visual
areas disrupts the processing of categories that usually characterized by visual
features (e.g. birds), and likewise damage to motor and somatosensory areas
disrupt processing of tools, for example (Barsalou, 1999, 585). An ability to
construct, maintain, and transform conscious spatial representations is highly
correlated with the ability to solve certain mechanical problems, suggesting
that conscious mental imagery may be important. This evidence, however, is
more consonant with the interpretation that non-visual analogical reasoning is
involved, which exploits piecemeal causal knowledge instead of mere holistic
inspection of internal images (Hegarty, 2004).
These results do not warrant that even concrete category representations
are strictly constituted by low-level sensory and motor properties. For exam-
ple, the human visual system contains high-level neurons that code qualitative
information about the presence of edges or lines without a particular length,
position, or orientation. These schematic components may be further inte-
grated to category content which, nevertheless, cannot be represented by any
speciﬁc visual features (Barsalou, 1999). Imagination and perception utilize
partly diﬀerent resources in the way that thinking with images activates per-
ceptual circuits only at the necessary level of speciﬁcity. If one wants to infer
whether German shepherd dogs are larger than elephants, only higher-level
integrated feature detectors may be activated; but if one thinks of whether a
German shepherd has pointy or ﬂoppy ears, parts of the early visual cortex
become active, which are sensitive to ﬁne-grained details lower in the abstrac-
tion hierarchy (Pearson et al., 2015). This may explain the phenomenological
diﬀerence between rich perception and less vivid thought (Brogaard & Gatzia,
2017).
A problem in these considerations is that everyone believes that high-level
representations, activated upstream from perceptual areas, are essential for
conceptual thought. The only question is do these representations turn into
amodal at some point in the processing pathway. I must admit that I am unsure
on this; however, pace Barsalou, I do not believe that all conceptual content
is entirely modal. For example, causal knowledge is not strictly perceptual or
105 For summary, see e.g. Barsalou et al. (2003); Barsalou (2008); Brogaard & Gatzia (2017).
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motor and neither is presumably all the procedural (e.g., inferential) knowledge
associated to abstract concepts. Nevertheless, I would rather abstain from
this discussion. The standard philosophical argument against naive concept
empiricism goes that imagery underdetermines content. To depict fruit, you
need to depict a particular fruit. But no image of, e.g., lemon determines if
it is about a particular fruit (lemon), a particular type of fruit (citrus), or a
symbolic token of fruit(ness) in general—a concept which perhaps cannot be
pictorially represented at all. Likewise, if you have an image of Urho Kekkonen,
nothing in the image as such conveys the fact that it depicts the 8th and longest
acting president of Finland.
As explained above, neo-empiricist theories of mental content are not com-
mitted to such naive resemblance theory. However, insisting that in the ﬁnal
analysis cognitive contents must be always reducible to somatosensory neu-
ral activation begs for needless philosophical problems. The reader should be
aware that the theories discussed in this section are somewhat controversial.
It is not at question if sensory and motor processing are involved in concep-
tual thought, but whether that is the whole story and if the question is even
strictly empirical.106 If we insist that all the higher-order representations are
perceptual because they are (in the right circumstances) activated by percep-
tual input, the claim is weak and likely misleading. Proponents of symbolic
mental representations believe that mental symbols are activated this way, and
especially causal theorists, such as Fodor, take such causal facts as a corner-
stone of their theory. We saw in Chapter 2 that it is theoretically diﬃcult to
identify content by such causal covariation. The problems arise especially with
abstract content. Because of these problems, Johnson-Laird insisted that men-
tal models are as iconic as possible, but some content is necessarily symbolic.
Now, it may be that symbolic content is mentally attached to linguistic to-
kens that have (multi)modal mental representation, but very few would think
that linguistic symbolic content is constituted by the visual or auditory repre-
sentations of words, for example, rather than inferential and other knowledge
associated with them—even if auditory, visual, or (pre)motor processing is
factually necessary to use language.
So what good are simulations for? The idea of simulation is basically
that of mentally recreating a situation and letting the implicit cognitive pro-
cesses to do their work. Simulation works essentially as mental self-stimulation
that prompts the reward and outcome expectations normally cued by actual
perception (Decety & Grèzes, 2006; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Barsalou, 2008;
106 See Machery (2007) for a critical review.
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Benoit et al., 2014). Frontal areas of the brain are involved in preparation
and control of action. There are extensive neuronal connections feeding back
from frontal areas to sensory cortex, and this loop supposedly enables thinking
as long chains of simulated actions and perceptions (Hesslow, 2002). I be-
lieve that imagining contexts and actions, therefore, works as a memory probe
to activate speciﬁcally procedural and causal background knowledge. Hence,
what these stimulations activate need not be conscious, holistic, or detailed
image-like representations even if they employ knowledge extracted in sensori-
motor interactions. Instead, simulations are often piecemeal and sketchy, and
they can lead to correct reasoning even when the agent lacks correct explicit
descriptive knowledge (Hegarty, 2004).
Implicit cognitive capacities that support automated situated reasoning
are extremely eﬀective; however, they can not be accessed directly and this
sort of self-stimulation is a way to access them indirectly. As a downside,
the process depends heavily on speciﬁc experiences and how we remember
past events. It is essentially like a future-oriented retrospection that can be
distorted and, in the words of Daniel Gilbert and Timothy Wilson, ”mental
simulation is the means by which the brain discovers what it already knows”
(Gilbert & Wilson, 2007, 1354). Thus, simulation is embodied and situated
reasoning re-enacted. This idea is not pure neo-empiricism but a combination
of its core ideas with theories of implicit learning and memory and perceptual
recognition theory of cognitive skills. If this is correct, mental images or models
involved in simulations do not convey content by resembling their targets. It
turns out that mental images and related sensorimotor representations are
instead probes to pragmatic inferential content. Hence, the idea is immune to
classical arguments against empiricist resemblance theories, and second we do
not need to assume a strong form of neo-empiricism that takes into account
only sensorimotor content and simulation. Depending on personal experience
and speciﬁc tasks, some commonsense reasoning may very well also involve the
use of explicit rules (Hegarty, 2004).
4.3.2 Procedural knowledge and cognitive control
Perhaps the most long-standing result in the psychology of expertise is that ex-
perts make decisions mostly by rapid pattern matching rather than by explicit
search through the problem space. Search means systematically ﬁguring out,
step by step, how to reach a speciﬁc goal from a given starting point by apply-
ing a given set of means. In contrast, pattern recognition is a rapid, implicit,
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and automatic process that exploits stored knowledge rather than intricate
inference. This ﬁnding of expertise goes back to Adrian de Groot’s (1965) in-
ﬂuential research on chess players. His main result was that grandmasters do
not think of their moves more than the less competent players. This does not
mean that they do not spend time calculating their moves or that thinking is
irrelevant in chess but that their advantage is due to intuitive preselection of
more relevant options to consider. He also found that more competent players
showed better recall of board positions that were displayed to the subjects for
a few seconds. While masters could reconstruct the positions of more than 20
pieces out of 25, novices managed to recall only about ﬁve pieces correctly.
William Chase and Herbert Simon (1973) explained that this capacity re-
sults from expertise dependent ability to chunk individual pieces into larger
perceptual units of about ﬁve pieces. They found that veridical recall re-
quires the arrangements to be meaningful rather than random positions. They
interpreted this result to demonstrate that highly developed skills—at least
in chess—depend on perceptual ability to literally see diﬀerent things on the
board. What changes with experience is not the low-level functioning of the
visual system but the knowledge base that perception activates, which, in turn,
triggers action (Larkin et al., 1980; Campitelli & Gobet, 2010). Since novice
and expert performance in the memory task is almost identical if chess pieces
are arranged randomly (Gobet & Simon, 1996),107 the expert ability is not
dependent on better (visual) memory but on domain knowledge and the fa-
miliarity with the stimuli. The phenomenon is not conﬁned to chess. For
example, expert physicians display the same memory phenomena with random
versus meaningful patterns of symptoms when compared to medical students
(Palmeri, 1997, 346). One can think of these perceptual chunks as similar to
categories, that is patterns of features that carry certain (pragmatic) meanings.
In chess, their contents are just conﬁned to the speciﬁc game that constitutes
an isolated system of such meanings. For novices with little know-how of the
game, pieces tend to appear as unconnected units while for experts, speciﬁc
arrangements signify certain meaningful situations in the context of a whole
game. Desirable moves become associated with such chunks and eventually
the whole board positions rather than calculated for individual pieces, and this
107 N.b. that the main result of Gobet & Simon (1996) is as per the title: ”Recall of rapidly
presented random chess positions is a function of skill.” That is, experts do show better recall
of random board positions than novices. However, the eﬀect size is very small; hence, while
the study technically corrects the original ﬁnding it still practically corroborates it.
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transforms how the board positions and the game are understood (Dreyfus &
Dreyfus, 1986, 33–34).
One of the key observations was that experts often cannot explain very
detailed reasons for their superior performance, and so the knowledge they
acquire is mostly tacit know-how rather than explicit know-that (de Groot,
1965; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). Although the proportional role of controlled
versus automatized processes remains debated (Christensen et al., 2016), these
results formed the backbone of modern expertise research: high-level skills are
incremental products of vast amount of learning (up to tens of thousands of
instances), and they result in a consciously inaccessible capacity to (a) auto-
matically focus on only relevant factors and (b) make competent decisions and
engage in reasonable course of action without reﬂection. This does not mean
that experts do not additionally employ diﬀerent problem-solving strategies
compared to novices, but selection of those strategies is also intuitively pre-
ﬁltered in routine tasks. This makes expert performance diﬀerent and more
eﬀective since experts do not spend much time ﬁguring out how to ﬁgure out
the problem (Larkin et al., 1980; Chi et al., 1981). Such intuitive competen-
cies are far from mysterious. In fact, they are mostly perceptual capacities,
which are rather straightforwardly explained as resulting from a quick access to
memory traces of recurring patterns. Therefore, intuitive decision making is in
many ways similar to the intuitive interpretation of stimuli (i.e., categorizing).
I quote Herbert Simon the second time: ”The situation has provided a cue;
This cue has given the expert access to information stored in memory, and the
information provides the answer. Intuition is nothing more and nothing less
than recognition.” (Simon, 1992, 155)
There are two dominant contemporary paradigms addressing expertise:
naturalistic decision-making (NDM) and heuristics and biases (HB) tradition.
NDM has mostly been developed by Gary Klein and his colleagues (Klein et
al., 1993; Klein, 1998). It builds on the works of de Groot, Chase, and Simon
and emphasizes the reliability and power of human expertise in real-world set-
tings. The basic idea in Klein’s model is familiar from our previous discussion.
Experts do not compare options but simulate a course of action in their minds
and see if it works. If yes, they implement the action. If not, they modify the
simulation. If modiﬁcation seems hard or impossible, they search for another
plausible approach. Mental simulation is eﬃcient since it utilizes tacit knowl-
edge and recognition-primed decisions. Given the processing limits of human
reﬂective cognition, following explicit rules and evaluating several options can-
not achieve such results in real time with complex and vaguely deﬁned tasks
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in the face of multiple constraints, uncertainty, rapidly shifting conditions,
unanticipated disturbances, and so on. Moreover, very subtle cues—that often
cannot be explicated but need to be experienced—may inform an expert that
things are not proceeding normally. In Klein’s famous case study, a ﬁreﬁghter
lieutenant aborted a mission and pulled out his crew from a seemingly routine
kitchen ﬁre because he felt that something else was wrong besides that the ﬁre
did not react normally to extinguishment attempts. In hindsight, some un-
typical features were that the living room was extraordinarily hot and the ﬁre
quiet. It turned out that the ﬂames were actually soaring from the basement,
and the ﬂoor collapsed once the crew exited the building. Klein’s book (1998)
contains several examples of this sort.
The heuristics and biases tradition is foremost associated with the works
of Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Thomas Gilovich. Instead of success,
it rather focuses on failures of intuitive decision-making. This tradition can
be traced to the works of Paul Meehl (1954) and Lewis Goldberg (1979), who
studied clinical psychologists’ diagnostic judgments (see Kahneman & Klein,
2009). They found that diagnoses were often inconsistent, and simple statis-
tical models proved more accurate. One of the ﬁrst studies in HB tradition
investigated experienced psychologists’ and statisticians’ intuitions about what
would be the appropriate sample sizes in certain psychological experiments
Tversky & Kahneman (1971). Participants reached incorrect conclusions and
failed to apply statistical rules with which they were certainly familiar with.
Research in this tradition has revealed that even formally trained and experi-
enced professionals are susceptible to several such reasoning errors, which are
often systematic and predictable between subjects.
Bulk of these reasoning problems appear in statistical and logical inference.
This has fueled the hypothesis, generally held in the dual process theories, that
formal reasoning is conducted in explicit System 2 and it is hard mainly because
of the system’s inherent processing limits. This makes people shortcut complex
calculations by resorting to intuitive heuristics that may work in many situa-
tions but produce predictable biases in others. Both NDM and HB approaches
embrace dual-processing framework, and beyond their apparent conﬂict, they
mostly actually agree on the cognitive psychology of expertise. For example,
both approaches accept the recognition-based model of skills and the related
simulation account of practical reasoning. HB tradition mostly focuses on the
simplifying heuristics that are associated with (formal) explicit reasoning and
which need not rise from speciﬁc experience. Skill learning based on speciﬁc
experience is the domain of NDM research. Hence, the approaches are funda-
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mentally complementary rather than adversarial. Recognition-primed model
implies that the environment needs to provide adequately predictive cues to
inform action, and the agent needs to have opportunity to learn those cues.
An immediate implication of this is that the causal and statistical structure
of the environment needs to provide a suﬃciently stable array of valid cues to
support learning. If that is not the case, intuitive thinking can be defective
regardless of the practice invested in skill learning. (Kahneman & Klein, 2009)
For example, expert political forecasts often go wrong because history, as
a point of fact, does not repeat itself that much, and therefore the task of
learning reliable cues to predict future historical events is simply impossible.
Sometimes the task structure is stable and the cues salient but misleading. A
famous story of this is told in Daniel Kahneman’s autobiography for Nobel
Institute.108 He was lecturing to ﬂight instructors that reinforcing accomplish-
ments is more advantageous for skill learning than punishing poor performance.
The audience ﬁercely protested. They had witnessed that many times yelling
and screaming after failure resulted in better performance the next time but
praising exceptional feats led only to disappointments. That is an entirely
correct observation but because the instructors are witnessing the regression
to the mean and not the results of their feedback. The instructors got the
statistical structure right but causal structure wrong.
Besides the stability and validity of the environment, expertise needs ac-
tual practice to develop—and often lots of it. For example, for chess masters,
the gathering of tens of thousands of useful exemplars in their knowledge base
is estimated to take about 10,000 hours of dedicated practice stretching over
a decade. Similar time frames are estimated for other domains. (Ericsson et
al., 1993) People are notoriously poor intuitive statisticians, but our aptness
for accurate probabilistic reasoning shows up in many casual everyday con-
texts (Nisbett et al., 1983; Griﬃths & Tenenbaum, 2006). While our explicit
statistical reasoning might be defective, we are able to extract a surprisingly
accurate statistical structure of our stimulus environment even in laboratory
(Reber, 1989). The ability to exploit that information—including base rates—
does not seem to depend on declarative knowledge but on implicit procedural
knowledge that requires actual interaction to be learned (Koehler 1996; Ahn
et al. 2000b, 378), which is also a precondition for a sense of understanding
of that information. Arthur Reber (1989) conducted a study on implicit se-
quence learning. He gave his subjects accurate frequency information about
108 Available on the oﬃcial web site of the Nobel price at https://www.nobelprize.org/
nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2002/kahneman-bio.html (29.06.2018).
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the sequence of appearing lights. The subjects reported that they understood
and believed the information they were provided but still felt that this knowl-
edge lacked any meaning they felt they could use. After a real experience with
the task, they developed a skill set that directed their predictions about how
the sequences proceed. They reported achieving a sense of the nature of the
event sequences, which they did not get from the explicit instructions (p. 222).
Allen and Brooks (1991) made a similar observation with learning complex
non-statistical classiﬁcation rules.
By and large, these observations side with the highly inﬂuential model of
expertise developed by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus (1986). They recognize ﬁve
stages in a trail from a novice to an expert. In a nutshell, novices adhere rigidly
to taught rules without a practical and contextual understanding of proper
actions that they consider in isolation. For example, they attend to individual
pieces in a chessboard instead of the global situation of the game. After some
advancement, they begin to grasp that several situational variables need to be
understood in wider contexts, but they fail to rank their relevance for present
situations automatically. Beginners move to a third competent stage when
they begin to understand the relevance of diﬀerent aspects in terms of long-
term goals. In this stage they have learned some routines that enable them to
shift focus from the immediate situation to more strategic aspects of the task.
Proﬁciency is reached when subjects begin to base their task understanding
on the holistic appraisal of situations rather than on isolated attributes, and
then they also start to notice deviations from normal patterns. At this, stage
decision-making is still largely deliberate; however, deliberations are guided
by situational factors. At the ﬁnal stage of true expertise, decision-making is
mostly automatized and intuitive. Experts cease to rely on rules and reﬂection
and rather base their decisions on deep tacit understanding of the problem
domain. Conscious deliberation occurs only when things are proceeding not as
expected.
Note the resemblance of this model to dual-process theories. The top-down
learning envisioned above can be interpreted as resulting from the indirect in-
teraction of the two systems through behavior. Reﬂective System 2 initially
drives behavior, and the intuitive System 1 slowly learns the proper responses
to task stimuli (Wilson 2002, 121; Toates 2006, 84). If the problem domain
is conceptually vague or characterized by complex statistical contingencies, in-
tuitive learning at some point surpasses the accuracy that can be achieved by
following explicit rules, resulting in eﬃcient behavior despite the inability to
verbalize or even acknowledge what one has learned (Seger, 1994; Sun et al.,
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2005). Such implicit learning produces representations that reﬂect the agent-
world interactions, and the statistical and causal structure of the task environ-
ment (Reber, 1989). If all goes well, deliberate control becomes advantageous
only when a resolution for stimulus can not be retrieved from the long-term
memory or existing solutions do not work—i.e., outcomes of actions under
stimulus are not as expected. Then attention mechanisms are triggered, and
controlled behavior is initiated (Toates, 2006) as per the default-interventionist
dual process model of reasoning (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).
But how is procedural knowledge represented in the intuitive mind? Skills
and automaticity are often taken to build on situation-action-outcome (SAO)
instances (e.g. Logan, 1988; Palmeri, 1997; Sakai, 2008; Koechlin, 2014). When
a stimulus is encountered and action taken, these two alongside with the re-
sulting outcome are encoded in long term memory. When the same (or similar)
stimuli are encountered later, associated SAO exemplars are automatically re-
trieved. Encoding and retrieval processes are mandatory and content speciﬁc.
When more similar exemplars accumulate in memory, the access time speeds
up, leading to rapid triggering of action before explicit thinking has time to
commence. According to these instance theories, the automatization of skills
is, at least for the most part, a memory phenomenon associated with speciﬁc
contents which does not change the underlying general cognitive capacities.
These observations are comparable to what has been reported in exemplar
research of categories (Allen & Brooks, 1991).
While the theory has a slight ﬂavor of behaviorism, it is not about simple
stimulus–response associations. Internal goals enter into encoding and process-
ing of SAO exemplars, and the idea is that the resultant memory storage is
indexed by stimuli and internal goals (Larkin et al., 1980). Since (pragmatic)
contexts can be deﬁned by events interpreted in terms of goals, exemplars
encode actions interpreted on the contextual basis. This is because overtly
the same action can mean diﬀerent things in diﬀerent contexts (Vallacher &
Wegner, 1987; Christensen et al., 2016). While encoding is mandatory and
can happen without awareness, the agent is not a passive receiver but ac-
tive attentional processes constrain what gets encoded during learning (Lo-
gan, 1988; Reber, 1989). Since disturbances are assumed to trigger attention,
challenging events receive more attentive processing, and thus we tend to re-
member and learn more from hard than easy tasks (Christensen et al., 2016,
60). A similar observation is made in category processing where unexpected
instances draw attention and have elevated inﬂuence in subsequent judgment
(Heit, 1998). Lastly, automatic processes are controlled even if they are not
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explicitly reﬂected. This is evident by the fact that disruptions interrupt the
ﬂow of action. Christensen et al. (2016) have criticized the Dreyfus model
for overemphasizing automation. Skillful action does not rely on the ballis-
tic execution of preprogrammed routines but we actively seek information to
maintain situation awareness and guide our behavior online. As noted earlier
(see page 184), this is true even when all the relevant information is available:
We often shift our focus to retrieve information in piecemeal fashion during
performance rather than load everything in working memory in one go.
In brief, fundamental cognitive representations in procedural knowledge
are SAO exemplars, which serve as inputs to cognitive control. Both repre-
sentation and processing are composed of endogenous goals and action control
with exogenous stimuli and aﬀordances. The learner extracts a stock of rule-
like representations that associate speciﬁc actions to desired outcomes in a
given context.109 Note that this is an essentially identical theoretical construct
with the one postulated by Medin and Schaﬀer (1978) for exemplar category
processing. As noted earlier (e.g., on page 130), these recurring similarities be-
tween procedural knowledge research and exemplar theories of categorization
are almost certainly not coincidental but a result from the fact that exemplar
research is actually probing skill learning. In other words, category learning
tasks that demonstrate exemplar-based learning are, in fact, investigating the
process of associating proper actions with stimuli, where a successful outcome
is deﬁned by making the correct classiﬁcation response in the context of the
experiment.
Much of implicit learning research goes beyond addressing how an action
is associated with static stimuli, and focuses on sequence learning, for example.
Often such sequences are implemented by a Markov process, which produces
branching strings where the next event is determined by the current one by
a stochastic function. Learning such temporal structures is essential if organ-
isms are to anticipate how complex events unfold. Related research focuses
on sequences that are produced by hierarchical structures generated by recur-
109 Often rules are thought as language-like symbolic constructs and contrasted with asso-
ciations (e.g. (Sloman, 1996)). Gigerenzer and Regier (1996) have pointed out that there
is no empirically or conceptually principled way to tell simple if–then rules apart from one-
way associations. I ﬁnd this seemingly trivial remark as hugely important. It implies that
conceiving SAO associations as rules does not necessarily commit us to symbolic computa-
tionalism. Moreover, it means that if (presumably) associative implicit cognition can learn
what (presumably) rule-governed explicit thinking does, it can still learn the very same things
regardless of the assumed qualitative diﬀerences of implicit and explicit representation and
processing.
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sive rules. These are called artiﬁcial grammar tasks because the stimulus sets
used are often symbolic formal languages (in the well-deﬁned mathematical
sense) and because of the widely held idea in linguistics that natural language
competence is a product of such recursive processes. It has been a furiously
debated issue for decades whether or not this implies that linguistic processing
necessitates a hierarchical execution of formal rules that manipulate symbolic
strings in working memory. I would rather not touch that speciﬁc issue at
all. At this point, it is enough to remember that linguistic structures can be
parsed by neural networks that lack such architecture (Socher et al., 2013), and
complex hierarchical plans can be learned through reinforcement that maps sit-
uations onto policies of actions instead of mapping them onto singular actions
only (Russell & Norvig 2010, 856; see also Uddén et al. 2009). Therefore, as-
suming that representation of actions or policies of actions does not require
symbolic rules, it is not necessary to jump to conclusions what implicit hierar-
chical structure learning might imply about the representation and processing
characteristic of the intuitive mind.
As discussed in Section 2.2.2 neural resources behind such hierarchical
sequence learning are not associated with language only but with a more gen-
eral capacity to understand and maintain hierarchically structured sequences
and action. To recap from our earlier discussion, it seems that it is a funda-
mental capacity of the human cognitive system to chunk not only perceptual
input but also simple actions to more complex action programs and recursively
these programs to more complex units. The result is a hierarchically organized
behavior where the highest level is the gist or long-term oriented understand-
ing of the behavior, which is multiply realizable by integrating simpler and
more speciﬁc actions, which organize the behavior around more immediate
goals and aﬀordances. Now, all this is far easier said than done. The peren-
nial problem in cognitive science is to understand how the action selection and
control is actually achieved in complex open environments. Curiously, research
on elementary learning and decision-making have been advancing quite sepa-
rately even though related neuroscientiﬁc approaches study the functions of
the same brain regions (Padoa-Schioppa & Schoenbaum, 2015). Recently, ef-
forts to change this sorry state of aﬀairs have surfaced (Domenech & Koechlin,
2015; Duverne & Koechlin, 2017), and the analysis happens to be relevant to
my purposes.
The basic theoretical apparatus behind this endeavor is the combination
of task sets and reinforcement learning. The notion of task set (or ”mental
set”) dates back to 19th-century German empirical psychology (Monsell, 2003,
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135). The basic idea is that the same stimulus can evoke any number of
meaningful reactions, depending on the contextual setting where the stimulus
is encountered. The mindset or task set is the psychological readiness to select
a contextually appropriate course of action. It is trivial to arrange two tasks
such that the stimuli are identical in both, but each require diﬀerent stimulus-
response mappings. For example, one can ask subjects to conﬁrm whether a
digit is even versus asking them to judge whether it is larger than ﬁve. It
is equally easy to arrange two tasks such that all stimulus-response pairs are
actually identical in both by ensuring that the even digits in the stimulus sets
are smaller and odd digits larger that ﬁve. Still, even in this identical S-R
condition when subjects need to switch from one task to another, a switch
cost is observed which is a transient decrement of speed and accuracy in the
subsequent task even if it is well-learned. This reﬂects the processing required
to adapt to a new context, even though the observable S-R associations remain
constant. Much research has been dedicated to investigate how such task sets
are established, maintained, and controlled (Meiran et al., 2000; Monsell, 2003;
Sakai, 2008).
Philippe Domenech and Etienne Koechlin (2015) have proposed a model,
based on computational and empirical neuroscience, of how an adaptive task
set construction and control happens in open environments. Simple decisions
are learned initially as selective stimulus-action pairs through model-free re-
inforcement learning (RL). RL is an unsupervised learning technique where
rewarding actions get reinforced, producing habitual mappings of S → A asso-
ciations that maximize reward value associated with actions. In RL, the agent
does not need to have speciﬁc predetermined goals but it can autonomously
discover what it ﬁnds satisfying through reinforcement. The basic idea is to
learn what to do through interaction, which is conceptually quite similar to
classical conditioning via trial and error. The premotor cortex encodes ac-
tions associated to perceptual cues, and basal ganglia—a subcortical structure
present in all vertebrates—maintains ongoing behavioral strategy and adjusts
it according to the expected and realized reward values. Such model-free RL
is roughly the computational equivalent of the inﬂuential reward prediction
error theory of the dopaminergic system, which models behavioral adjustment
through rewards and punishments (Doll et al., 2012).110
110 N.b.: The notion of ”reward” is not equivalent to utility or hedonistic pleasure, even
though if all goes well rewarded actions are advantageous to the agent. ”Reward” in this
context is a theoretical notion associated with motivation and learning and refers to aspects
of stimuli, actions, or outcomes that reinforce behavior and serve as incentives in decision-
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If the environment is stable, cues are encountered suﬃciently often, and
rewards depend strictly on current stimulus and selected actions, RL tends to
converge to behavior strategy that maximizes reward values. However, by de-
sign, pure RL overwrites existing associations if the external contingencies or
internal rewards change (e.g., due to satiety). This is ﬁne if they change gradu-
ally and permanently but maladaptive if the agent needs to cope with abruptly
changing and periodically recurring situations. Moreover, simple model-free
RL is unsuited to organize sequential behavior where the intermediate steps
are not reinforced and distant rewards must be inferred from the current and ex-
pected future states (Doll et al., 2012; Koechlin, 2014). According to Domenech
and Koechlin (2015), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (PFC) encodes action-
outcome associations separately from ﬁxed S → A associations for selecting
actions according to outcome reward values. These A → O pairs are learned
statistically rather than by reinforcement, and they are predictive instead of se-
lective with respect to actions. In combination, S → A and A → O pairs make
it possible to map stimulus to expected outcomes of actions and dissociate
speciﬁc stimuli from speciﬁc action-outcome pairs. Utilizing (stimulus)-action-
outcome exemplars through statistical learning makes it possible to establish
model-based RL where the SAO knowledge base tracks the functional structure
of the task environment. Moreover, dissociating action-outcome associations
from stimulus enables to surpass the inherent limitations of model-free RL
through task set exploitation.
SAO exemplars enable deﬁning the statistical distributions of outcomes
(associated with speciﬁc actions in speciﬁc situations) in a non-parametric way.
In non-parametric models, it is not necessary to prespecify the range of possible
outcomes and track posterior distributions every A → O contingency in a given
situation. Instead, one can cumulate something like tabular or histogram-type
representations that contain an accurate description of observed outcomes and
their relative proportions. For example, if one gathers 80 × (S1 → A1 → O1)
and 20 × (S1 → A1 → O2) exemplars, action A1 seems to lead to outcome
O1 80% of the time in situation S1. Trying other options (i.e., A2, A3, . . .)
will generate similar information about their outcomes O1, O2, O3, . . .. At any
given time, the agent can discover new actions and outcomes and hence learn
completely new contingencies in a piecemeal fashion. Successful (rewarded)
making. For example, in case of addiction, rewards make us do harmful things that are not
necessarily enjoyable or gratifying, although dissociation of reward, pleasure, and perceived
instrumental utility is not pathological as such. The notions are closely related but distinct
both conceptually, psychologically, and neurologically (see Berridge & O’Doherty, 2014).
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outcomes are encoded in the action selection (S → A) model of the task while
SAO clusters form the predictive model. Future rewards can be predicted
based directly on previous experience or by prospective simulation (Gilbert &
Wilson, 2007). Here, I concentrate mostly on the outcome prediction. From
a predictive point of view, outcomes are subsequent situations brought about
by interventions or manipulations of the current situation. Thus, outcome O
becomes situation S2, and similarly, the agent can produce information about
the outcomes of speciﬁc actions taken there. In this way, we acquire action sets
that allow goal-directed outcome prediction and sequential action selection in
an environment where contingencies remain relatively stable (Collins & Frank,
2013; Domenech & Koechlin, 2015).
The hard part is to explain how this knowledge is controlled and main-
tained in open environments. The key is to use task sets that are clusters of
action sets, which are activated in speciﬁc contexts. As explained above, several
action sets are associated with a speciﬁc task and stimuli. They are adjusted
by reinforcement; however, to avoid useful knowledge to be erased, (S)AO
traces are permanently stored and only those task-speciﬁc action sets that are
currently selected to drive behavior are subjected to change through RL. This
raises a fundamental problem in reinforcement learning, however: since exter-
nal conditions can always change, the agent needs to arbitrate when to exploit
and adjust previously learned knowledge and when to learn utterly new task
sets to maximize long term rewards. This exploration/exploitation-dilemma is
a computationally intractable problem because, in complex environments, the
number of learned behavioral strategies can grow very large, and an optimal
solution requires re-evaluating past arbitrations and adjustments and at the
same time monitoring the whole repertoire of learned behavioral options on-
line (Koechlin, 2014). According to Domenech and Koechlin (2015), PFC has
been evolved to solve this problem.
Basically, an actor task set (the active strategy driving behavior) is ac-
tivated as aﬀorded by the stimuli, that is, the surface content of a situation
activates clusters of speciﬁc memories that are associated with the current goal.
Core executive system in the medial portion of PFC computes the absolute re-
liability of the actor by using forward inference from stimulus to expected
outcomes. If action outcomes match expectations, external contingencies are
presumed to remain unchanged, and the actor is maintained. If not, the actor
is discarded, and a new one is created from long-term memory.
A distinct inference track in the lateral PFC is assumed to be responsible
for new task set creation, and the development of these regions in primates al-
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lows for proactive instead of simple reactive inferences, that is, evaluating actor
reliability before action (Koechlin, 2014). Thus, action sets are not stimulus-
reaction associations. They appear in between stimulus and action and serve as
inputs to control. Then the agent needs to monitor contextual cues and other
external evidence to assess actor reliability before feedback. This happens
through forward inference from cues to outcomes perhaps via simulation. It is
important to note that task set selection is not based on its expected utility but
its reliability (Collins & Koechlin, 2012). Every time a task set is created, it is
recoded as a separate trace—at least if found reliable—and the more the simi-
lar sets accumulate in memory, the more they contribute to task interpretation
and action selection. Successful actions get promoted through RL and more
frequently selected actions cluster into long-term memory further promoting
their selection. While the underlying selection is fundamentally stochastic, this
implements a winner-takes-all mechanism that restricts alternative (hopefully
futile) actions from being initiated (Domenech & Koechlin, 2015). This pro-
cess is reminiscent of the Logan’s idea of how accumulating exemplars lead to
more rapid but less versatile decision-making and hence automation; only the
underlying assumptions of the model are more detailed and complex.
The selection of proper actor task set is a challenge in the ﬁrst place.
Outside the laboratory, we are rarely told explicitly what to do and we need
to ﬁgure out the pragmatic context by ourselves. Anne Collins and Michael
Frank (2013; also see Collins et al. 2014) made an interesting discovery that
in novel tasks subjects seem to spontaneously encode parts of the stimuli as
contextual cues, and some stimulus features as direct cues for action selection.
This happened even in simple tasks without any apparent beneﬁt and without
any indication as which input dimension should indicate broader context and
which drive immediate action selection. In one experiment, for example, the
stimuli consisted of objects with two shapes and two colors, and in the learning
task one of four diﬀerent actions were supposed to be associated with each
pair. Thus, one could easily learn simple disjunctive rules: red squares→ A1,
red triangles→ A2, yellow squares→ A3, yellow triangles→ A4. Still, about
half of the subjects displayed task switch cost on color change and a half on
shape change. They seemed to learn rules of the following hierarchical kind:
(a) if the color is red, then square→ A1 and triangle→ A2; (b) if the color
is yellow, then square→ A3 and triangle→ A4—thus treating color as context
for selecting speciﬁc S → A rules (and mutatis mutandis for the group that
treated shape as a context).
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In short, similar observations revealed that we spontaneously encode stim-
uli such that some stimulus dimensions Sc are used to retrieve action sets
(S → A associations, presumably conditioned on goals), and after this, other
stimuli Sa activate speciﬁc A → O associations. In other words, task sets are
ﬁrst triggered by higher-order contextual information from the environment
and selected in response to context, and then speciﬁc actions are selected in
response to speciﬁc contextualized stimulus content. Developmental psycholo-
gist Renée Baillargeon (2002) has also proposed along similar lines that infants
ﬁrst categorize an event and then use knowledge associated to the event to
guide what variables should be attended to. Again, similar proposal was made
in Medin and Schaﬀer’s (1978) seminal paper on exemplar based categories.
But, what would be the point of this? Presumably nothing in the above
discussed Collins and Frank’s austere artiﬁcial task. However, in more com-
plex ecologically valid environment sit makes multidimensional decisions easier
by breaking it down to two phases: ﬁrst, interpret the higher-order pragmatic
context; and then select relevant actions aﬀorded by speciﬁc stimuli (Collins
& Koechlin, 2012). The same mechanism may explain the spontaneous cre-
ation of ad hoc and goal derived categories by constructing object identity and
category structure through the preceding selection of the pragmatic context.
Such arrangement is also necessary for maintaining hierarchically structured
behavior where the long-term goal is multiply realizable, and the speciﬁc ac-
tions need to be associated with speciﬁc aﬀordances, interpreted in terms of
the functional context. Lastly, diﬀerent contexts may utilize similar task sets,
and dissociating speciﬁc actions (at least partly) from contextual cues allow
for analogical transfer. The problem then is to ﬁnd a proper analogy. The
assumption is that contexts are recognized by surface cues (i.e., speciﬁc con-
tent S) and hence retrieving a valid existing task set (i.e., A → O rules to be
associated with the novel stimuli to serve as analogy) is not necessarily easy
and requires experience to pinpoint the relevant structural cues.
To sum up, reinforcement learning makes us to select actions based on
expected rewards under a task set, and task set enables selecting actions based
on cues. Notably, this enables the agent to discover its own means and ends.
The task sets are selected according to current goals as aﬀorded by stimuli,
and maintained or discarded based on their reliability. The realiability and
reward is computed by medial portions of PFC. Inference track in the lateral
PFC computes the reliability of alternative task sets and creates new ones in
the case the active set needs to be switched. Neuronal coupling of these two
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systems integrates expected rewards and learned rules in strategy selection
(Duverne & Koechlin, 2017).
The practical reality of the agent is conceptually organized according to
pragmatic contexts which are deﬁned by goals and concrete aﬀordances. These
concext often overlap and they come in diﬀerent levels of abstraction. Indeed,
virtually every situation consist of nested and intersecting contexts, which are
delineated by immediate and distant goals. This is reﬂected in the hierarchical
structure in the lateral PFC where the most frontal parts arbitrate between
diﬀerent goals and behavioral strategies the situation aﬀords. In essence, these
areas are ﬁguring out what should be done and manage competing goals that
may unfold in diﬀerent time-frames. The neighboring caudal parts process
what could be done and manage behavioral strategies as dictated by goals
and aﬀorded by the stimuli (Mansouri et al., 2017; Pezzulo et al., 2018), and
this inference track extends to premotor areas, which is involved in action
preparation and encodes the acute action rules.
Since the idea here is that task sets are essentially the interpretation of
context, I presume that analogical transfer would often require an understand-
ing of how the procedural part of situation representations connects remote
analogies. Experience is also needed to tell misleadingly similar tasks apart.
Recall from the introduction the Brian Ross’ (1984) study in which the sub-
jects misapplied a solution procedure that was learned in one task to another
task sharing similar surface content. Presumably, the reason was that the sub-
jects interpreted the context correctly: it was about probability calculations.
Hence, they were able to retrieve a speciﬁc task set associated with such cal-
culations. However, they lacked alternative procedural knowledge attached to
those speciﬁc contents (e.g., dice rolls), and, for being novice, they did not have
relevant experience that could aid them to interpret the task diﬀerently (other
than in terms of task set attached to probability calculations about dice rolls)
and exploit the problem’s formal structure in action selection.111 Hence, they
presumably lapsed into exploiting the existing but irrelevant action set in vain
rather than engaging in an eﬀortful (and possibly just as futile) explicit search
for solution.
Revisiting naturalistic decision-making and the kitchen ﬁre example (page
196), we can hypothesize that the ﬁre’s observed lack of response to the extin-
guishment attempts aﬀorded the ﬁrst reactive inference that the current be-
havioral strategy was unreliable. The other cues (e.g., the unusual quietness)
111 The psychology of surface versus structural content in task interpretation is discussed in
detail in the next chapter.
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may have worked as less salient prospective cues, signaling that the situation
at hand was actually something not expected. Since the ﬁre lieutenant had
not experienced such a situation before in any seemingly identical house, no
previously stored task set could be activated to interpret the mixture of such
cues to inform him that it was a basement ﬁre rather than a kitchen ﬁre. Novel
task set creation is supposed to be an eﬀortful oﬀ-line process, and hence in
such risky and time-critical settings, the best and only option was to pull out
and rethink what to do.
Note that the scheme of cognitive control in the above-discussed theory
by Koechlin, Domenech, Collins, Frank, et al. is, again, highly similar to the
default-interventionist dual-process theory. If the task is considered as familiar,
agents execute a routinized course of action. If things fail to go as expected or
no interpretation for the situation is found, explicit search for an alternative
solution ensues. These writers are unfortunately not very explicit on how the
alternative task sets are created, apart from suggesting that they are retrieved
from long term-memory by recombining existing actions and action sets. Ana-
logical reasoning clearly ﬁts this bill, especially in case of ill-understood prob-
lems. Another evident option is to use domain knowledge when it is available.
If the agent has substantial procedural knowledge associated with a context,
it is in good position to search for familiar patterns and solutions. This, of
course, requires expertise. For educated adults, it is sometimes diﬃcult to re-
member that seemingly trivial skills such as elementary arithmetic need to be
learned at some point in life, and subjects without such skill sets ingrained in
long-term memory may be entirely unable to solve or even understand tasks
like simple probability calculations. The point of these remarks is that if the
putative System 2 is engaged in reﬂective thinking in case intuitive solution is
not available, quite likely this process is mainly devoted to searching analogies
and procedural information from the-long term memory rather than execut-
ing decontextualized, formal, and general reasoning processes. If so, System
2 contents depend on the idiosyncratic stock of experiences, possessed by the
person engaged in reﬂective thinking.
A critical part of the exploratory behavior in the above-discussed model
involves compiling and testing the reliability of novel task sets. However, if
absolutely no interpretation for the task can be retrieved, the agent lapses into
a model-free exploratory behavior as the last resort. One might assume that
this sort of activity is best described as ”random” (e.g. Collins & Koechlin,
2012). However, I presume that this is not the case. Given that human cogni-
tion is adapted to extract the causal structure of the environment, one should
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expect that the free exploratory behavior displays patterns of optimal data
selection in testing causal hypotheses. This seems to be the case in general
(Penn & Povinelli, 2007, 104), and it is discussed further in the next chapter.
This exploration behavior is generally missing from dual process-theories that
emphasize intuitive heuristics to cope with complex and unfamiliar problems.
Moreover, one crucial source of behavior strategies seems to be missing in most
of these theories: learning from others, which we discussed in Section 2.2.2.
Lastly, it should be noted that talking about input stimuli may mislead
thinking in terms of impoverished sense data. However, sensory input is almost
always interpreted as a rich causal representation of the surrounding situation.
This mainly pertains to familiar everyday situations but less so to artiﬁcial
stimuli and tasks tested in the laboratory. When dealing with familiar ob-
jects and contexts, situations do not need to be familiar in detail to aﬀord
intuitive appraisal of the pragmatically relevant causal structure. As discussed
in Section 4.2.1, domain knowledge automatically guides our attention toward
causally relevant variables and aﬀords the generation of causal hypotheses or
exploratory task sets. The predictive models constructed from task sets are
fundamentally similar to the causal models discussed earlier. The main diﬀer-
ence is that causal model approach emphasize allocentric representation where
the eﬀects of interventions are derived from the structure of the model, while
predictive models based on task sets primarily contain egocentric information
about interventions (i.e., the outcomes of one’s actions). Presumably, in the
latter structures the knowledge about agent independent event–event causation
can be contained as a special case of abstaining from overt action.
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5 Abstract thinking with concrete intuitions
Finally, we have covered the basics of concrete category, situation, causal, and
procedural knowledge. What we have left on the agenda is the following part
of the working hypothesis:
c) Basic reasoning mechanisms are forward causal inference, simulation of
situated action, and abstraction by exemplar-based analogical transfer:
- Surface features are the primary retrieval cues.
- Valid analogies bind diﬀerent tasks under shared pragmatic schemata.
Complex skills and commonsense reasoning are both mostly achievements
of intuitive cognition, and along the way I have claimed that this also pertains
to reasoning with schematic and theoretical concepts—even though intuitive
reasoning rests on speciﬁc empirical knowledge, and by deﬁnition schematic
reasoning is non-speciﬁc and theoretical concepts are non-empirical. Earlier, I
announced that the hard part of theories that emphasize situated concrete rea-
soning is explaining abstract thinking. However, at this point the hard work
has been mostly done already. In the following sections, I ﬁrst explain how
schematic contents can be engendered by situation representations and pro-
cedural knowledge in a bottom-up manner and then how discursive reasoning
with theoretical and formal concepts can be learned as an inferential capacity
than employs similar implicit learning in cultural contexts. While the former
part is mostly a recapitulation of our previous discussion, the latter is more
hypothetical and focuses on the following planks of the working hypothesis:
A.2. Conceptual understanding builds up as an adaptive cognitive skill. Its
cognitive basis is in the intuitive system that gradually learns to exploit
context- and goal-relevant regularities in the environment, especially the
eﬀects of our own actions in speciﬁc situations.
A.3. Often relevant environments are, at least partly, socially constructed. In
the case of theoretical concepts, in particular, the relevant regularities
are in large part inferential and other discursive commitments. Hence,
abstract concept learning is a special case of functional/causal learning
in (broadly) social or cultural contexts.
A.4. Initial competencies depend on concrete examples and their surface fea-
tures or speciﬁc content. Extensive learning of procedural knowledge
results in a gradual shift of focus from surface cues to structural features
of the conceptual domain.
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A.5. Through experience, the abstract/practical distinction dissipates both
psychologically and phenomenologically.
C.4. Cognitive contents of theoretical and formal concepts are constructed by
the agent through social interaction. While grounded in the same capac-
ities, discursive and concrete concept learning often diﬀer qualitatively:
Discursive conceptual domains track communal conventions; this makes
content intersubjective and normative.
5.1 A case study on conditional reasoning
Thus far we have learned the following: Human intuitive cognition relentlessly
tracks the structure of the environment producing causal maps about how en-
tities and their features interact in speciﬁc situations. At the same time, we
track the eﬀects of our actions, producing predictive models that drive the use
of procedural knowledge. Now, let us postpone the obvious question about
how these knowledge structures are related. (I will get back to that in the
next chapter.) However, both kinds of knowledge are tied to speciﬁc contents
and situations, and they are activated by perceptual (or simulated) input that
contains the stimuli which with they are associated. The causal maps are
organized around distinct entities that allow for recombining novel arrange-
ment of familiar things to derive causal predictions in previously unencoun-
tered events. Unfortunately, causal maps can quickly become very complex
making such information practically useless. Moreover, these causal represen-
tations portray mostly the qualitative structure of events, and the eﬀective
use of that knowledge (e.g., deriving accurate statistical estimations) generally
necessitates practical experience in recurring situations. Fortunately, during
learning, humans can extract very ﬁne grained cues to command their actions,
and repetition eventually results in a capacity to make complex but accurate
judgments in the blink of an eye. Moreover, we spontaneously track contextual
cues in the environment that trigger (in combination with exogenous factors
such as needs and goals) speciﬁc sets of procedural knowledge, which guides
what information needs attention. This arrangement makes complex decisions
easier since the context, cue, and aﬀordance recognition, which support ac-
tion, occurs in two phases. All this encoding and retrieving are automatic and
mandatory. They often happen without awareness, although selective attention
aﬀects both learning and retrieval.
Apart from searching for contextual cues, we are inclined to identify our
behavior in the highest level of identity that can be characterized by a coher-
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ent, pragmatic context or goal. When speciﬁc actions are routinized, control
shifts to higher strategic aspects of the task, allowing cognitive resources to be
allocated for the pursuit of long-term goals. This necessitates that the more
detailed action routines are ﬁrst mastered intuitively, and if problems arise,
focus will again lapse back to lower, more speciﬁc aspects of performance.
Also, the understanding of generic events, whose deﬁning characteristics are
removed from speciﬁc objects and acts, requires understanding of lower-level
instances for translating schematic descriptions into concrete world knowledge.
In any case, the capacity to conceive behavior in the higher level of organiza-
tion allows integration of simple actions into complex, hierarchically struc-
tured tasks. This makes behavior more ﬂexible and promotes new courses of
action, because the intention of such higher-level behaviors tend to be multi-
ply realizable. Moreover, all this enables skilled persons to pay attention to
more structural elements of familiar situations instead of the detailed imple-
mentation of how to cope with them. Unfortunately, the perceptually driven
memory mechanisms that activate relevant pragmatic knowledge seem to be
triggered by speciﬁc contents, even though diﬀerent contexts may harbor the
same functional structure under the seemingly diﬀerent surface. Hence, the
exact routines sometimes need to be learned over and over again in diﬀerent
contexts.
What we have not discussed is the cognitive etiology of rule-based and log-
ical reasoning. Below, we will see how all this plays out in inferential reasoning
with rules, and how domain knowledge and schematic concepts build up from
similar skill learning and hence inherit its characteristics. For expository and
narrative purposes, I tell this story by way of exploring how our previous dis-
cussion applies to conceptualize behavior in the Wason selection task—likely
the most employed paradigm in the study of human reasoning. The original
version (Wason, 1966), often referred to as the abstract task, used a deck of
cards with letters printed on one side and numbers on the other side of each
card. The subjects were told that if a card has a vowel on one side, then it has
an even number on the other side. Then, for example, the cards A, D, 4, and
7 are displayed and the subjects are told to pick those (an only those) cards
which have to be turned over to check whether the claim is true or false.
The logic is straightforward: formally the claim is a universally quantiﬁed
conditional for all x: if x has P , then x has Q; or simply every P is (or has) Q.
This is arguably the basic logical form of generalizations in natural language.
The task can also be framed by a reference to a speciﬁc letter and a number,
for example: if there is A on the one side of the card, there is 7 on the other
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side. This leaves the logic essentially intact, and does not aﬀect the responses
given by the subjects. In what follows, I will use the notation P , ¬P , Q, ¬Q
to refer to the cards in the selection task, given the rule of the form if P then
Q (e.g., in the original task P = A, ¬P = D, Q = 4, ¬Q = 7).
The task is thought (by the experimenters, but perhaps not by the sub-
jects) to be about a test of the validity of a material implication if P then
Q—the most elementary conditional statement. Practically, everyone is per-
fectly able to reason with such a logical form: if it is the case that A, and also
that if A then B, then it follows that B. Logic does not go much simpler than
this, and many conditional rules that we are all familiar with follow this logic.
However, surprisingly, most people have problems when trying to comply with
the logic in a less direct manner and when confronted with rules they are not
familiar with. This is why the task has attracted considerable attention. De-
spite its simple logical structure, only about 10% of the participants choose
the correct cards. Consistently across replications, about half of the subjects
choose P & Q, and about one third choose card P only. For testing the rule,
card P obviously needs to be turned over. Card ¬P is irrelevant, because the
rule only pertains to cards having P , so it is immaterial what there is on the
other side of ¬P . The problem is with the selection of Q and ¬Q. Suppose
you turn over the card that has Q and you ﬁnd P on the other side. The if P
then Q rule is certainly followed then. However, suppose there is ¬P on the
other side. Now, we just agreed that cards with ¬P are irrelevant. Therefore,
Q card is irrelevant because for the validity of the rule it does not matter what
there is on the other side. However, if you turn ¬Q over and ﬁnd P on the
other side, the rule is obviously violated. Hence ¬Q is relevant, and the correct
solution is to select cards P and ¬Q.
The ﬁnding is sometimes taken to demonstrate the inherent fallibility of
human reasoning because whatever the subjects are doing it does not look like
logical inference. At ﬁrst sight, the problem might be attributed to the trivial
misinterpretation of the rule. We often use conditional if . . . then structure to
indicate biconditional P if and only if Q. However, then all the cards should be
turned over, and this rarely happens in the experiments. When asked to justify
their choices or (incorrect) choices made by others, subjects mostly produce
irrelevant and inconsistent explanations, further indicating that they are not
at least consciously reasoning according to biconditional or any other Boolean
reading of the rule (Wason & Evans, 1975; Evans & Wason, 1976). In principle,
they may be unconsciously reasoning according to if P then NOT Q, but that
would be a very odd interpretation, indeed. When the subjects are instructed
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to turn all the cards and tell which of them would invalidate the rule, usually
all give the correct answer (Wason & Shapiro, 1971). Thus, it seems that
the subjects understand the relevant logic but are unable to employ it in the
selection task.
The reason I discuss this experiment is because for about a half century
it has been a sort of a fruit ﬂy of the psychology of reasoning. Virtually every
conceivably relevant variable in the experimental setting has been tested by
using thematic versus abstract content and familiar versus unfamiliar rules,
employing context or a story to frame the task and assessing how cognitive
performance measures (e.g., SAT scores) and formal education aﬀects the per-
formance. This has produced a wealth of data about the relations of factors
in human reasoning relevant to my argument, the most crucial being exper-
tise, experience with speciﬁc content, schematic reasoning in familiar domains,
and the role of context. This allows me to point out how these factors hang
together in elementary reasoning with a logical rule. Whether classical logic
provides the right normative model to evaluate the performance in Wason’s
task is a contentious issue; however, subsequent research has revealed that
speciﬁc manipulations of the content and context of the rule allows the major-
ity to conform to the logical model. Whether this means that subjects in these
instances are exploiting logic or merely conforming to logic is an interesting
issue.
Another reason to discuss this particular experimental paradigm is its im-
portant role in theoretical debates of human rationality and reasoning. As such,
it seems to support the pessimistic image of human cognitive competence, ad-
vertised by the heuristics and biases tradition. It has also been crucial for the
development of dual-process theories of reasoning. To my best knowledge the
modern version of the theory was ﬁrst proposed by Wason and Evans (1975)
as an explanation of the behavior in the selection task. The interesting theo-
retical challenge is that even though subjects are not reasoning in accordance
with logic, they are not behaving randomly, either. The selection patterns are
unevenly distributed and highly predictable between replications. Since sub-
jects are often to unable to provide any sound reasons for their selections, this
pattern is thought to emerge from the operations of the intuitive mind.
Some authors have complained that the selection task has received too
much attention, and the test itself does not tell us much about human reason-
ing. For example Dan Sperber et al. (1995; 2002) have argued that pragmatic
comprehension mechanisms pre-empt the use of any reasoning that might be
needed in the task. The patterns of selection simply follow from the subject’s
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(in)ability to comprehend what is asked of them, and the task actually taps
contextual relevance assessment rather than inferential processes in problem-
solving. Evans has made the same point that it is indeed a selection task and
not a reasoning task. In one of his experiments (Evans, 1996) he used a com-
puter screen to display the cards and instructed the subjects to hover a mouse
pointer over each of the cards as they were considering whether it was neces-
sary to turn the card over or not. When a selection was made, the subjects
clicked on a card, and the total time spent on that card was recorded. The
recorded time for each card strongly correlated with the probability of its se-
lection. Thus, reﬂection seems not to have much eﬀect on selection decisions,
but instead, the subjects spent most of their time thinking about the cards
they were going to pick anyway. I think this is what basically makes the task
very interesting because relevance is the most important ill-understood issue
in human cognition, and such intuitive pre-selection of information is generally
thought to be the essence of relevance assessment.
I use the selection task as an example of how the causal and pragmatic
reasoning framework explains information selection that guides discursive rea-
soning. Note that since task set selection is an interpretation of context and
production of the predictive causal model is the interpretation of the task con-
tent, the diﬀerence between inference and interpretation becomes somewhat
moot. At least trivial inferences about the relevant variables are already con-
tained in the interpretation, as per the above point made by Sperber and his
colleagues. More speciﬁcally, I exploit the selection task as a concrete example
case to expose how the main theoretical threads of my empirical hypothesis
hang together, in particular, content speciﬁc causal reasoning, exemplar based
inference and memory access, and the reliance of cognitive expertise on speciﬁc
content and content. The discussion also introduces the idea of how schematic
abstractions are engendered bottom-up by analogical transfer—a theme which
will be further elaborated in the next section.
5.1.1 Behavior in abstract and unfamiliar selection tasks
In the abstract task, the subjects do not have prior experience with the test
rule, and hence they cannot retrieve any meaningful information from long-
term memory. Then the task turns into interpreting the if . . . then construction
and what to do with it in the task context. Unfortunately, conditionals have no
standard decontextualized interpretation, or at least it is not the one used in
formal logic. Anyone familiar with teaching an introductory level course in logic
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knows that the deﬁnition of material implication is unnatural, as evidenced by
the so-called paradoxes of logical implication. For example, any truth is implied
by any proposition, and this is because in logic if A then B simply means that
¬A or B (or both) where A and B do not need to bear any relation. Such truth-
functional interpretation of the implication is very remote from its standard
semantics in natural language, which is to express some factual (and often
causal) dependency between A and B.
Consider the following claim: In every pub, there is a customer such that if
the customer does not drink, then no one drinks in the pub. Do you think this
is true? My guess is that most people ﬁnd it obviously false. Regardless, it hap-
pens to be a logically valid statement. To see this, let’s translate it into predi-
cate calculus: In every model M (i.e., pub) there is an entity x (a customer) that
satisﬁes the following sentence: ¬P (x) → ∀x¬P (x) (where P (x)=”x drinks”).
Hence, the claim says that in every model M  ∃x[¬P (x) → ∀x¬P (x)].
The formula is equivalent to ∃x[P (x) ∨ ∀x¬P (x)], which is equivalent to
∃xP (x) ∨ ∃x∀x¬P (x). Since in the right-hand side, x is already univer-
sally quantiﬁed, the existential quantiﬁer is redundant, and therefore we get:
∃xP (x) ∨ ∀x¬P (x), which is certainly valid because it is equivalent to a triv-
ial tautology: ∃xP (x) ∨ ¬∃xP (x). In plain English: ”Either at least someone
drinks in the pub or no one drinks in the pub.”
So why our intuition resists such an ”obvious” logical fact? It is hardly
the complexity of the calculations involved. People do understand much more
complex claims, and if the complexity was an issue, one probably should expect
people to be mostly undecided and sometimes approve the sentence rather than
reject it outright. The likely explanation is that the ”if . . . then” clause is
interpreted as causal, that is, as a claim that in every pub there is someone
who would force everyone to abstain from drinking if he has decided to have
a sober evening. That is an entirely natural interpretation of the conditional,
albeit not logical in the formal sense. As per that interpretation, the claim is
deﬁnitely false.
Since conditionals are generally used to express such material contingen-
cies, subjects do not have a ready interpretation for the conditional statement
if they cannot see what dependency it tries to capture; even while they are
perfectly able to process formally identical rules. Using thematic material and
context that highlight the relevant aspects of the task remove such problems
(Sperber et al., 1995; Sperber & Girotto, 2002). The abstract selection task fails
to elicit a meaningful learned response, because there is no natural sense in the
rule. According to the generic dual-process hypothesis, when this happens, the
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control is passed to the explicit system. Unfortunately, the logical solution still
resists. Even previous acquaintance with formal logic does not necessarily help
much, and neither does scientiﬁc education in general; this further underscores
that this is a semantic issue. People need to ﬁnd the proper interpretation of
the task (i.e., as a test of the logical implication) to understand what to do
with it even if they have the required competence (Cheng et al., 1986; Jackson
& Griggs, 1988); and this is not a trivial feat. With proper instructions, it is
possible to achieve good performance with subjects not acquainted with formal
logic; however, when this facilitation is eﬀective, the experimental instructions
basically consists of explaining how to solve the task and therefore the ex-
periment reduces to observing if people are able to follow simple instructions
(Platt & Griggs, 1993). In case no instructions or pragmatic understanding is
available, subjects presumably resort to fall-back heuristics; for example, they
might merely focus on the cards that are mentioned in the rule Evans (1984).
Based on our previous discussion, we should expect that if all else fails,
some model-free exploratory behavior ensues. Basically, this means doing at
least something and seeing what happens. Generic heuristics may guide this
behavior, making it less random, and more speciﬁcally we should expect in-
tuitive responses to reﬂect Bayesian search for regularities between variables
occurring in the task. Such an account as a rational analysis of the selection
task behavior has been proposed by Mike Oaksford and Nick Chater (1994).
Since exploratory search is an inductive and often iterative process, the sub-
jects should not be expected to attempt a one-shot falsiﬁcation attempt but
behave as if it was an interactive process where the cards displayed represent
only a sample from a larger domain to be explored. This might be an odd
interpretation of the task; however, but this is how many subjects approach
the task when tested in a session consisting interaction with the experimenter
(Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2004).
Oaskford and Chater’s (1994; 1995; 2007) theory is more elaborate in but,
to cut the story short, they counted the selection frequency of each individual
card in 34 experiments (with a total of 845 subjects) using standard abstract
or arbitrary selection rule. The observed ranking was as expected: P > Q >
¬Q > ¬P . What one perhaps would not expect is that, given some reasonable
assumptions, this ordering represents the most informative ranking of data
samples if one wants to test the hypothesis P → Q against the null hypothesis
that P and Q are independent. These arguably reasonable rarity assumptions
are that P and Q are suﬃciently rare with respect to their contrastive classes
¬P and ¬Q.
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Assume, for example, that you are set out to ﬁnd out if all crows (P ) are
black (Q). Assume further that there are far more birds other than crows, and
more birds of other colors than black. Informally, the Oaksford and Chater’s
analysis is that in this case, you will most likely end up with a bunch of white
seagulls, green parrots, etc. if you sample the set ¬Q regardless of whether
the hypothesis is true or not. Of course, you only need to investigate the
set P ; however, if your sample size is limited, it is possible that you just
accidentally ﬁnd the few crows which happen to be black. If you take an
equally small sample from the set Q, you would expect not to ﬁnd many crows
if the foil hypothesis holds, since the statistical distribution of crows should
amount to the whole sample space in that set, and there the rarity assumption
does its work. Therefore, ﬁnding crows from the set of black birds would make
the hypothesis more likely by corroborating the otherwise unlikely correlation.
This is the Bayesian solution to the famous Hempel’s raven paradox (Good,
1960) applied to the selection task. It explains the pattern of selections as
reﬂecting a rational inductive inference in trying to conﬁrm the conditional
rather than a confused attempt of deductive inference in trying to falsify it. In
that case, it is a matter of your assumptions about the environment whether it
is a good idea to focus on Q or ¬Q, and this also depends on what you assume
about the generalization P → Q.
More speciﬁcally, assume your hypothesis H1 states that there is a strong
but non-deterministic causal mechanism making, say, around 98% of every P to
have Q. In the domain you are investigating, you happen to estimate that 5%
of the entities have property P and 15% have Q. You consider H1 equally likely
to the foil hypothesis H0, which states that there is no statistical correlation
between P and Q, making property Q distributed evenly in sets P and ¬P .
Then if you take samples from ¬Q, you expect them to be P 2% of the time if
H1 is true and 5% of the time H0 is true. This may be signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
the long run but negligible with small sample sizes. If you take a samples from
Q, you ﬁnd P about 33% of the time if H1 is true but only 7% of the time
if H0 is true. It is straightforward to show that with these and a wide range
of other parameters where the rarity assumption holds, the Bayesian posterior
odds for H1 and H0 diverge more sharply if samples are consistently taken
from Q, rather than ¬Q, making it more informative for the induction task.
Therefore, the overall behavior of subjects in the abstract selection task
is rational if they are doing this kind of inductive exploratory search with
the generic assumptions that the dependency of Q on P is strong but non-
deterministic (if it exists) and that the rarity assumption holds. This, however,
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is not what subjects are supposed to do in the task (under its logical interpre-
tation), and it is dubious if the rarity assumption is reasonable in the original
selection task. Nevertheless, the behavior reﬂects what I previously claimed
to be a natural function of the intuitive mind when there is no prior domain
knowledge to guide the search for information. Whether the rarity assumption
holds or not in most uninformed inductive tasks (making it a rational default
assumption) is another matter, which cannot be decided a priori. In any case,
similar behavior is a robust ﬁnding in causal learning research in that subjects
are sensitive to the rarity assumption and tend to focus on c+ and e+ events
and their possible correlation (McKenzie & Mikkelsen, 2007). Note that under
this interpretation, there is no single correct answer to the selection task. It is
a matter of ecological and resource considerations as to how optimize search,
that is what variables to choose and how many require attention.
The optimal data selection model does not readily explain why the log-
ically correct solution P & ¬Q is prevalent in some versions of the selection
tasks—especially the ones using thematic rules familiar to the subjects or an
explanation which establishes sensible relation between P and Q and renders
falsifying instances semantically natural. Abolishing the rarity assumption
makes the logically normative selection normative also in the induction task,
and Oaksford and Chater (1995) oﬀer this as an explanation for the ﬁndings
of Sperber et al. (1995). I ﬁnd the explanation with these particular ﬁndings
as rather ad hoc. The readers are encouraged to consult the cited papers and
make their judgment on this, but, in any case, that would be quite odd as a
general explanation of such selection task behavior. For how does the rarity
assumption rarely hold with familiar contingencies (as we shall see below) if it
is supposed to be a sound generic strategy with unfamiliar rules in arbitrary
domains?
I think Oaksford and Chater have found what we are disposed to do when
confronted with tasks that we cannot resolve by retrieving knowledge from
the long-term memory, which is model-free exploration. The diﬀerent kind of
behavior observed with familiar rules and natural contexts can be explained
by the exploitation of previously obtained background knowledge. Below, I
discuss why the varieties of the selection task cannot be explained by resorting
to a core reasoning mechanism but the explanation needs to account for the
interplay of several distinct albeit related cognitive processes.112
112 To be sure, Oaksford and Chater (1994) distinguish between rule testing and rule use,
and explain reasoning with deontic rules (explained below) by resorting to the latter. On
that issue I am not sure if their theory is incompatible with mine. They discuss how expected
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Before moving on, I want to clarify a possible misunderstanding. I have
claimed that with the rule ”if a card has a vowel, then it has an even number”
subjects implicitly treat the conditional as causal. I am not, of course, claiming
that the participants are tracking whether vowels cause even numbers. That
would not make any sense. The cards are artifacts, and with artifacts the
attribute correlations are taken to be caused by creator intentions and man-
ufacturing process (unless they result from the intrinsic mechanical structure
of the object). Therefore, not all contingency and covariation learning need to
be about direct causal mechanisms. The claim is rather that such probabilistic
learning is closely connected to causal induction (Nisbett et al., 1983), and that
in the abstract selection task the subjects are exploiting the generic mechanism
for uncovering causal structure of the environment.
Lastly, the human mind is an engine that tries to make sense of the present
and predict future events based on previous experiences, which makes us highly
adaptive species not only to ecological but also to cultural environments. The
core reasoning capacities are adapted to adapt to local material environments.
Now, in addition to the possible relation of variables mentioned in the cards,
another set of contingencies that the participants are learning in the selection
task are normative event–event or situation–action–outcome dependencies. In
the debrieﬁng, the participants learn through experimenter feedback what they
should have done. It depends on the experimental setting, of course, whether
feedback is available, but generally in these kinds of situations subjects are con-
currently learning a procedural contingency structure of social practices, that is
how they should behave. In the abstract selection task, the practice is artiﬁcial
and isolated, and hence the subjects approach it without any preﬁgured sense
in mind and whatever they learn does not readily transfer to other contexts.
This is based on our earlier discussion that subjects are learning the contin-
gency structure of the speciﬁc variables in that speciﬁc task context and also
what counts as successful behavior.113 In less contrived tasks this procedural
know-how should also convey the sense of the task context by connecting it to
other meaningful goals and possibly by contextualizing the relevant variables
utility modulates the selections when deontic rules are applied in a context. Below I try to
explain how our subjective understanding of these kind of rules is constituted in the ﬁrst
place, which is a prerequisite for their consistent application.
113 Note that this is quite diﬀerent from non-social learning where the agent can ﬁnd its own
goals and standards of success based on what it happens to ﬁnd rewarding. This does not
necessarily mean that in social learning there is something essentially diﬀerent going on, but
only that we ﬁnd positive feedback from our peers and authorities rewarding, as suggested in
section 2.2.2.
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with more distant goals. Since the stimulus material, contingency structure,
and the task demands are social products, tasks of this kind can be seen as
an example of elementary contingency learning in cultural contexts (although
there is nothing special in the selection task in this respect). This is a highly
hypothetical claim; however, the idea is exploited below that cultural learn-
ing can be seen as employing the same mechanisms as empirical learning of
material contingencies.
5.1.2 The eﬀect of content and domain familiarity
Given that humans are excellent practical reasoners, it is clearly of interest to
ﬁnd out if we reason diﬀerently when the selection task is framed with familiar
thematic content. A follow-up to Wason’s original experiment was conducted
with envelopes instead of cards, and the task was to evaluate the rule ”if an
envelope is sealed, then it has a 50 lire stamp on it.” Around 80% of the subjects
chose the sealed envelope and the one with less than a 50 lire stamp on it; that
is, they made the logically correct selection P & ¬Q (Johnson-Laird et al.,
1972). Similar result was obtained with cards containing cities and means of
transportation (Wason & Shapiro, 1971).
However, it soon became clear that realistic or concrete material as such
was not the facilitating factor. The mentioned results failed to replicate in
subsequent studies. It turned out that the postal rule was tested with British
subjects that had experience with similar regulation about stamp values and
sealed letters; in contrast, North-American subjects without such experience
produced the same pattern of responses as in the abstract selection task. These
replications were made by Richard Griggs and James Cox (1982). One of
their test rule of particular interest was the drinking age rule framed with the
following scenario:
On this task imagine that you are a police oﬃcer on duty. It is your
job to ensure that people conform to certain rules. The cards in
front of you have information about four people sitting at a table.
On one side of a card is a person’s age and on the other side of the
card is what the person is drinking. Here is the rule: if a person
is drinking a beer, then the person must be over 19 years
of age. (p. 415)
More than 80% of the participants made the logically correct selection
P & ¬Q. Virtually no subject chose ¬P or Q cards. The drinking age rule
221
is generally familiar to the adult population in most countries, and the task
has proved to yield a high level of normative performance reliably. Thus, the
speciﬁc experience with the tested or a similar rule seems to be a decisive factor
in competent reasoning.
On the left, there is a sketch
of the general sort of knowledge we
obtain by such experience. It is
an ad hoc illustration of a causal
model that incorporates the func-
tional knowledge about the postal
regulation connecting stamp values
and letters being sealed or not. As
with the abstract task, we, naturally,
do not learn any direct causal infor-
mation about seals and stamps. In-
stead, the graph depicts an event–event structure connecting these variables to
expectations about services being provided (i.e., letters get sent) and possible
penalties imposed (perhaps mere scolding) on attempts to violate the regu-
lation by getting the extra service without paying the extra cost. Solid lines
represent generative and dashed preventive relations. Thus, the ﬁgure depicts
that if you try to post a sealed letter, problems may arise in case you do not
pay the required stamp. If you pay the 50c stamp it covers the regular stamp
which, is enough to receive the standard service. Hence, by forming this sort
of mental model, one can readily grasp that one violates the regulation only
by sealing the letter and paying for the lesser stamp.
This kind of situation representation captures one micro-domain of causal
knowledge about consequences of actions. More than enabling conditional rea-
soning indirectly about sealing and stamp values, it also speciﬁes what violation
of the rule means in practice: possible penalties and the denial of service. It
also contains other pragmatic information; for example that not sealing the
letter as such implies no obligations or rights to services. Such representations
enable ﬂexible situated understanding of contingencies. For example, if the rule
is ”for access, you must ﬁrst pay the price” and subjects are told to observe
if the authorities enforcing this rule are violating it, they tend to make the
selection ¬P & Q, rarely seen otherwise in the selection task. This is because
the authorities are violating the rule if the access is not granted while the price
is paid, so the interpretation of the meaning of ”violation” depends on indi-
viduals’ point of view. How speciﬁc permissions, obligations, preconditions,
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etc. play out depend on the details of the rule and the situations they apply.
(Holyoak & Cheng, 1985) Since such knowledge is encoded and processed as
situated knowledge rather than decontextualized logical rules, the capacity to
give logically correct answers in one task does not readily transfer to other
tasks with ostensibly the same logical structure but diﬀerent content.
However, a curious thing is deontic rules (i.e., rules concerning obligations,
permissions, and so on), tend to a yield high level of logically correct responses
when unfamiliar or even strange rules are tested, like ”if a man eats cassava
root, he must have a tattoo in his face”—especially if the social character of
the rule is made clear (Cosmides, 1989). Thus, we seem to reason diﬀerently
in deontic matters in comparison to other domains because familiarity is not
essential with rules containing permissions and obligations. Perhaps we are
hardwired to reason better with social rules? This seems at least prima facie
plausible for we are inherently social creatures. Famously, Leda Cosmides and
John Tooby (1992) have argued for this hypothesis. They claim that we are
armed with a cognitive module that tracks cheaters in situations involving
social contracts, and hence we readily grasp what violates the rule if it has the
form if you take the beneﬁt, then you pay the cost, for example. Their theory is
more far-reaching and contain a more general hypothesis that the mind relies
on a massive amount of self contained modules that enable domain-speciﬁc
cognitive capacities. This speciﬁc explanation, however, is dubious because
we ﬁnd a good level of logically normative reasoning with deontic rules where
costs and beneﬁts are not involved. While drinking beer in a pub may plausibly
require cheating on the part of a minor, drinking beer is hardly a beneﬁt paid
with aging. Subsequent studies manipulated an arbitrary deontic selection task
by providing or eliminating a cost/beneﬁt references in an otherwise similar
task and found no eﬀect to the normative answer rate (Cheng & Holyoak,
1989). Furthermore, deontic rules lacking any social contract character, such
as ”if you clean up spilled blood, you must wear rubber gloves”, facilitate
normative performance (Evans & Over, 1996, 79).
The presence of a narrative that provides a scenario or a rationale for the
task also impacts behavior. In one study, the police oﬃcer narrative in the
drinking age problem was omitted, and the proportion of P & ¬Q selections
was only 32% (Stanovich & West, 1998) in comparison to 86% in the original
study with the narrative. The highly untypical deontic rules that Cosmides
and Tooby used were all introduced with a rationale explaining the rule. For
example, the cassava-eating rule mentioned above was explained to be about
marital status and sexual ethics. Having a tattoo in one’s face signiﬁes being
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married, and cassava root was told to be a potent aphrodisiac. Given such
context, the rule ”if a man eats cassava root, he must have a tattoo in his
face” corresponds to the familiar norm (even if not nowadays very strongly
enforced) condemning extramarital sex. Cheng and Holyoak (1985) found that
explaining the rationale of a deontic rule increased the normative selections
from about 60% to more than 90%. One of the rules they used was the postal
regulation rule ”if an envelope is sealed then it must have 50 lire stamp on it”
(emphasis added). Note that in (Griggs & Cox, 1982), the postal rule was in the
indicative form (i.e., without the word ”must”), and they found no diﬀerence in
performance to the abstract task; indeed, only one out of 24 subjects gave the
correct answer. However, in Cheng and Holyoak’s study, the rule was rendered
deontic by adding a mere word and the normative selection rate was found
to be 60%. Explaining a rationale had no eﬀect on the subjects who were
already familiar with the rule because they already understood the point and
performed at the ceiling level. Thus, using speciﬁc content with an explanation
or rationale seems to make the task psychologically concrete, leading to a
performance that is indistinguishable from subjects who have acquaintance
with similar rules.
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) used a short narrative with the above-
mentioned tasks; however, they also found that deontic rules needed no ex-
planation or speciﬁc content to facilitate performance. The schematic rule ”if
one is to take action A, then one must ﬁrst satisfy precondition P” yielded
the same rate of logically normative responses. Therefore, while deontic rules
combined with an explanation leads to response behavior that is indistinguish-
able from familiar rules, it is enough to indicate that the test rule is about
permissions or obligations to achieve a substantially good level of logically
normative selections. So qualitatively, this pattern looks much the same as
with abstract and familiar non-deontic material: (1) the concreteness of the
rule is not a factor but strict familiarity or (2) an explanation that makes the
task semantically transparent. Logically correct answers are facilitated with
whatever content whenever the problem formulation indicates clearly that the
task is to focus on P & ¬Q (Sperber & Girotto, 2002). The diﬀerence is on the
base rate of logically correct answers, which is above 50% with unfamiliar or
abstract deontic rules and around 10% with unfamiliar or abstract non-deontic
rules. Moreover, it takes less eﬀort to instruct the participants to reach the
ceiling performance with unfamiliar deontic rules than with the abstract task.
Cheng and Holyoak concluded that the exemplar-based explanation of deontic
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reasoning cannot hold but the knowledge exploited is encoded as more abstract
reasoning schemata.
It has been pointed out (e.g., Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2001, 2004) that
the deontic task is logically diﬀerent from the standard task. In the deontic
versions, subjects are not checking whether the rule holds or not. Instead,
they are instructed to ﬁnd possible violations. This removes several possible
sources of misunderstanding because, under the deontic interpretation and such
instructions, subjects usually understand the relevance of P & ¬Q. However,
Cheng and Holyoak actually instructed their subjects to monitor if the rule
is followed rather than violated. Sieghard Beller (2012) found that when the
deontic character of the schematic rule was made clear to the subjects and
violation instructions were used, the performance improved from what Cheng
and Holyoak found. Hence, deontic reasoning seems to be easy if only one
understands to engage in such reasoning, and it is not just the instructions that
do the trick but also the subject’s previous understanding of deontic concepts
they bring to the experimental situation. Beller interpreted these results in
the dual-system framework as showing that deontic reasoning is executed by
System 2 process because it looks like a rule-like, abstract, and normatively
correct capacity.
I have maintained that even if the reasoning is executed as System 2 or
any other explicit process, the competence must be rooted in intuitive know-
how. If that is the case, a mere reference to System 2 is not an explanation
of the competence without explaining the etiology of that know-how. Note
also that Evans (1996) provides evidence against Beller’s conclusion. Strongly
facilitating rules tends to prompt quick and pragmatic rather than slow and
analytic processing. (Unfortunately, speciﬁcally abstract deontic rules were
not tested.) Similarly one can reply to Stenning and van Lambalgen that
the facilitation in deontic tasks is not merely the eﬀect of the instructions
used. With abstract tasks, the subjects need substantially more coercion to
understand and follow the intended logic. Hence, we need to account for where
this enhanced ability to understand deontic logic comes from. Below, I explain
that the conclusion reached by Cheng and Holyoak is not necessary, and it is
probably misleading if it means that deontic reasoning exploits qualitatively
diﬀerent type of knowledge than practical reasoning with familiar content.
Speciﬁcally, I try to show that (a) there is nothing psychologically extraordinary
in deontic reasoning but ecologically (or more speciﬁcally socially) there is
compared to many other conceptual domains and (b) the capacity to conform
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to and interpret schematic rules does not necessarily indicate explicit rule-based
System 2 processing.
5.2 Constructing schematic knowledge bottom-up
The concrete, exemplar-based memory encoding means that whatever we learn
through action or observation, the resultant knowledge is associated with spe-
ciﬁc contents and contexts and does not contain general abstract information.
As content manipulations in selection tasks indicate, the capacity to handle one
task does not usually transfer to another even if both share the same logical
structure. For example, the logical form of the drinking age rule is arguably
the same as the postal regulation rule; however, the subjects who were fa-
miliar with the former gave diﬀerent answers in the latter task if they were
unfamiliar with the postal regulation. This is what one should expect under
the pragmatic situated reasoning theory I that am proposing. If you do not
have previous acquaintance with how stamp values relate to sealed letters, then
whatever knowledge you may have about stamps does not help you in grasping
this speciﬁc relation. While the material implication may capture the general
form of material reasoning, which is also applicable to this particular task, and
we can learn to comply with it in any given domain, human material reasoning
is still not guided by form but by content. Thus, the capacity to understand
one task does not readily generalize to others. Moreover, while we are able to
employ formal rules by the laborious exercise of reﬂective thought, our ﬂuent
intuitions are sensitive to speciﬁc contextualized contents.
But what is the point of associating procedural knowledge to speciﬁc sur-
face attributes rather than to the actually relevant functional form? Logically,
nothing for the whole point of logic is to abstract away from content and focus
solely on the form. Ecologically, however, it makes sense, given our cognitive
limits. Similar surface features may quite reliably indicate speciﬁc functional
contexts and structures. Indeed, our categorization processes are sensitive to
features that indicate functional diﬀerences, and they partition the world into
pragmatically relevant classes. In speciﬁc recurring event types, the members
of these classes presumably tend to correlate predictably and provide recurring
aﬀordances and cause predictable eﬀects. For agents with a vast behavioral
repertoire, knowledge selection is the central problem in complex open envi-
ronments. Perceptually cued (i.e., surface feature sensitive) pattern recognition
allows a memory system with a very eﬃcient content addressable search, as
evidenced by our rapid categorization capacity and the long-standing research
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in machine learning. Exemplar search is precisely sensitive to feature corre-
lations, and that is what you need to search for when identifying situations.
Focusing on correlations reduces the search space by restricting it to attribute
conjunctions (or it may weight the search results if exemplars are retrieved
en masse). Indexing situation exemplars with goals and context cues further
narrows search and enables more ﬂexible concrete knowledge representation by
allowing diﬀerent task sets to be associated with stimulus equivalent situations.
All this makes the deployment of procedural knowledge highly eﬀective
because it makes knowledge exploitation basically a matter of recognition. This
comes with a cost, however, because in novel contexts without familiar contents
such recognition is of little use. Learning new things by trial and error can be
laborious—especially if it involves learning complex hierarchical plans—and in
the worst case even dangerous. Fortunately, clusters of action–outcome pairs
encoded in long-term memory can be dissociated from their speciﬁc contents
and transferred to novel situations. If that works, even approximately, learning
does not need to start from scratch and the transferred actions sets can be later
optimized for the new contexts through further learning. Hence, while surface
content may indicate relevant functional structure, similar functional structures
may also unite situations with diﬀerent surface contents by such transfer. That
is the basic idea of analogical transfer and reasoning.
5.2.1 Analogical reasoning
I assume the basics of analogical reasoning are familiar to most but, in a
nutshell, it goes like this: You face an ill-understood problem A while you
already master another task B; that is, you have a pretty good idea what
happens if you manipulate a variable b associated with situation B. Then the
thought crosses your mind that how about if you substitute variables in A with
variables in B, solve B, and see if that gets you what you want when you map
the solution back to A. Here is a picture:
familiar source B : b1 b2
a1 a2novel target A :
action A
map A onto B map B back onto A and verify
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The following classical example in analogical reasoning literature origi-
nates from Gick & Holyoak (1983): In radiation therapy, ionizing radiation
is used to destroy tumors. The problem is that the ray also destroys healthy
tissue along its path. So what to do? The following story may help ﬁgure that
out: A general is about to capture a fortress. Several roads radiate outward
from the fortress; however, they all have been mined so that a small group
of soldiers can pass them safely but any large group (necessary for successful
attack) triggers the mines and foils a full-scale assault. The general divides his
forces into small groups to travel diﬀerent roads and converge at the fortress
at the same time.
Now, substitute a group of soldiers with a single ray and the number of
soldiers with the intensity of the ray; here is your answer to the radiation
problem. Note that these problems are not entirely analogous: You destroy
the tumor with one full intensity ray but you do not conquer the fortress with
a full-scale attack from one direction. It is a common feature in analogical
reasoning that some relevant aspects of the source and the target problems are
similar while they do not share a completely identical structure.
Traditionally, it is held that problems (or situations) can be characterized
by (a) surface (or thematic) content, which consists of non-relational prop-
erties of task elements and (b) a system of relations called a deep structure,
which determines how the elements are related and what the outcomes are
when they are manipulated. Analogical reasoning has taken to consist of the
above-depicted sub-processes that are more or less independent: (1) ﬁnding a
potentially useful source analog from memory, (2) ﬁnding a mapping of corre-
sponding elements between the source and the target, (3) deriving inferences
based on the mapping, and (4) adapting the solution to satisfy the constraints
of the target in case the analogy is imperfect (Holyoak et al., 1994). Accepting
a candidate analogy has been considered to depend on the similarity between
deep structures of the source and the target, and similarity is traditionally
measured as a degree of formal isomorphism between the relational structures
(e.g., Gentner, 1983).
In addition to discovering how the deep structure of the source is retrieved
and adapted to the target task, the research has been concerned with how
knowledge of the structural schemata, which is abstracted away from the sur-
face content of the source, is induced in the process. But thinking of deep versus
surface features simply in terms of relational and non-relational properties can
be misleading. A better deﬁnition is that deep structure consists of properties
that are relevant to goal attainment—relational or not—and by implication,
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they are not ﬁxed intrinsic features of the source analog but also determined
by the current reasoning task (Holyoak & Koh, 1987). Often, though, such
properties are relational properties of a causal kind. In what follows, I will use
the term functional rather than deep structure. This is the causal structure
that is tracked by our mental situation models and action–outcome predictive
models.
Here I adopt a notion of schemata from Holyoak et al. (2010, 703) that
schemata relate to analogical situations the way categories relate to instances:
Analogies embody a schematic structure that can be projected across speciﬁc
situations, and schemata can be abstracted from situations that can be mean-
ingfully grouped by the schema. In the above example, the idea of distributing
a powerful force to travel several paths to avoid unwanted destruction and in-
tegrating it in a speciﬁc point, is the schema projectible across the two tasks.
As an example of commonsense schema it is probably not very representative
because such a pattern does not frequent in our daily aﬀairs. While the idea is
easy to understand, we do not have a name for it and it does not stand out as
a lexicalized concept. This is probably why the radiation problem is diﬃcult,
even though the solution is quite obvious once pointed out.114 More familiar
schematic concepts are, for example, obligation and getting dressed and folk
physical principles such as centrifugal force, which guides our lay understand-
ing of everyday mechanics.
The idea, that analogical transfer is a matter of structural comparison is
approximately correct; however, a purely syntactic approach is not. Suppose
that a candidate source consists of three causes for eﬀect feature E. Two of
them, G1 and G2, are generative, and one of them is preventive P . Call this
model G1G2P . Lee and Holyoak (2008) found that their subjects regarded
G1G2 to be more similar to the source model than G1P , demonstrating that
similarity judgments are aﬀected by the causal properties of the structure. No
such eﬀect was found when comparing G1G2 and G1G3 against the G1G2G3
model. Subjects were explained how features G1, G2, and P relate to eﬀect E,
and they found this information to more strongly predict the occurrence of E in
the G1G2 model than in the G1P model. For example, in one task the subjects
were told that ”[f]or Animal A, dry ﬂaky skin tends to PRODUCE blocked
oil glands; muscular forearms tend to PRODUCE blocked oil glands; a weak
immune system tends to PREVENT blocked oil glands” (Lee & Holyoak, 2008,
114 In Gick & Holyoak’s (1983) original study, only 10% of participants solved the problem
spontaneously. 75% of the subjects managed to solve it once they were given the story about
the fortress and hinted that it may help.
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1114). Then the participants expected more strongly animal B with dry ﬂaky
skin and muscular forearms (G1G2) to have blocked oil glands than animal
C with dry ﬂaky skin and a weak immune system (G1P ). That is not very
surprising given that the source and the targets exhibit the same speciﬁc cause
properties. However, this eﬀect was also observed in cross-domain inference
where the source analogy was a story about a discovery in chemistry (synthesis
of a substance) and the target was a hypothesis in astronomy (the forming of a
super-star), and thus both the surface properties and the presumed underlying
causal mechanisms diﬀered.
Based on these and related ﬁndings Lee & Holyoak (2008) and Holyoak et
al. (2010) have concluded that causal understanding and analogical reasoning
are closely related. Since the 1980s, Holyoak has pursued the idea that com-
ponent processes in analogical reasoning are constrained by pragmatic factors,
namely that analogies are retrieved and evaluated in accordance with agents’
current goals (e.g. Holyoak, 1985). The alternative is to emphasize formal
structural similarities because not all intelligible analogies are causal or need
to appear in problem solving contexts. Gentner (1989) has argued that this
is evident in metaphors such as ”All rising to a great place is by a winding
stair,” and purely structural analogies such as ”if abc → pqr then abd → pqs.”
However, intelligibility is one thing and use and retrieval another, and purely
structural constraints are rather weak if one wants to exploit existing knowl-
edge for novel problems. Through our earlier discussion of the selection task,
we know that structural formal knowledge does not transfer well across tasks
if its relevance is not noticed, and this often requires content and context cues.
Earlier, we also saw that we are able to employ decent probabilistic heuris-
tics in everyday life, but that ability seems to suddenly disappear in unfamiliar
events. People seem to be good at understanding structural analogies; however,
they are also weak in spontaneously exploiting structural knowledge. More-
over, meanings of metaphors and idioms are not transparent by their structural
correspondences to their intended interpretation, but their meanings are ex-
tracted from their use in discursive practices (Keysar & Bly, 1999). In any
case, analogical reasoning operates under multiple constraints which are fa-
miliar from categorization: at least feature similarity, structure, and purpose
(Holyoak & Thagard, 1997).
Despite diﬀerent emphases and some disagreements, the general signiﬁ-
cance of pragmatics and causal knowledge has always been widely accepted in
the analogical reasoning literature. For a brief discussion see (Holyoak et al.,
2010) where the authors also introduce a computational model of analogical
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transfer based on Bayesian theory of causal induction. This model utilizes
Bayes nets to represent source analogs, build corresponding (partial) models
to interpret targets and run the generated target model to see what comes
out. Based on our earlier discussion, I accept this as my preferred account of
analogical inference. The model makes, inter alia, the above-mentioned unique
prediction that causal polarity (preventive vs. generative) has an impact on
analogical reasoning. Without going into details, the model has a quantita-
tively imperfect but qualitatively good ﬁt to human data. Note that in this
theory, causal knowledge has a dual role: it works as a structural constraint
for selecting a source and provides a model for inferences about the operations
of the target. Hence, the outcomes of analogical inferences are not directly
imported by mapping from the source but simulated at the target. The idea
is depicted on the right and the old model of analogical transfer on the left.
source B : b1 b2
a1 a2target A :
b1 b2
a1 a2
5.2.2 Learning schematic concepts through analogical transfer
Mixing causal and analogical reasoning may explain how causal hypotheses are
generated in the ﬁrst place by directing focus on the areas of the search space
that contain familiar or credible models (Lee & Holyoak, 2008). The surface
content is another highly constraining factor, which explains why the cross-
domain transfer is diﬃcult. In a familiar domain, models of the target can
be partly retrieved by resorting to known regularities between familiar target
variables and partly inferred by analogical transfer. Experts know more about
a domain than novices and are hence in a better position to retrieve relevant
functional information. Moreover, they have a better understanding of the
structural principles in their domain of expertise and are more able to project
such knowledge across tasks. This suggests that analogical transfer is not only
a matter of mapping speciﬁc graphs between tasks, but there is also genuine
higher level schematic competence that guides domain understanding and is
dissociable from speciﬁc contents. This is apparently also the case with folk
theories and other commonsense conceptual domains like deontic reasoning. By
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resorting to the situated representation and processing assumptions discussed
earlier, I suggest that this happens in the following way.
Think of an agent who learns to cope with situations a, b, c which are
psychologically distinct. That is, the agent grasps the functional structure
of these tasks and they are learned separately in diﬀerent contexts and have
suﬃciently diﬀerent surface contents, so no commonalities between them are
recognized in the largely stimulus driven processing. This is the situation as
depicted in entry (A) below. Unknown to the agent, a substantial overlap
happens to be in the functional structure of these situations such that under
speciﬁc tasks, they are actually analogous. In other words, a general action
policy A in situations a, b, and c would lead to predictable outcomes a∗, b∗,
and c∗, which would be relevantly similar in terms of goal attainment in each
of these situations. Models of these events may be complex, but for the sake
of clarity the idea is depicted below as simple situation–outcome pairs x → x∗
associated with a speciﬁc course of action.
(B) In time, the agent learns that something connects these situations so
that there is some pragmatically relevant mapping between them, which al-
lows one task—as well as some novel problems (d)—to be resolved in terms
of others. At this point, the agent does not need to know what is it exactly
that connects these situations. The observation can derive solely from tacit
know-how associated with implicit task set selection. Despite decades of re-
search, the process of ﬂexible and creative selection of (especially cross-domain)
analogies is not perfectly understood, but we know that (a) explicit attention
to the structural commonalities makes analogy learning easier and analogy use
more ﬂuent; however, (b) we can learn and often use analogies without explicit
awareness of this. In other words, resolution from one problem to another
can be transferred implicitly without recollection of the source (Holyoak et al.,
1994; Reeves & Weisberg, 1994; Gentner et al., 2003; Kostic et al., 2010).
A: c c∗
b b∗
a a∗
B:
d d∗
c c∗
b b∗
a a∗
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C:
d d∗
c c∗
b b∗
a a∗
D:
domain
schema
e e∗
At point (B), the agent is in the process of learning a domain implicitly
by a bottom-up process. The more the structurally identical but superﬁcially
divergent exemplars accumulate in the long-term memory, the easier it be-
comes to ﬁnd an analogical task set for novel problems. This stems from the
availability of more context and stimulus cues and because similar task sets
are increasingly replicated in the long-term memory, promoting their selection
when exploratory sets are called for. This is a gradual process where problem-
solving becomes behaviorally more ﬂexible, but the agent does not need to
acknowledge what it has learned or even that it is improving in the mapping
aspects of speciﬁc situations or ”micro-domains” across tasks. The more the
clusters grow, the more eﬀective they become in facilitating transfer and the
more they function like a domain-speciﬁc reasoning schema that can be applied
to novel situations.
(C) At some point, some of these structural relations become acknowledged
through a recurring practice of exploiting them. A schematic understanding
of what uniﬁes these micro-domains is produced—i.e., explicit understanding
of their functional structure. This includes event–event causal patterns and
action→outcome components of task sets, which can then be more ﬂexibly
dissociated from speciﬁc stimuli and projected across tasks. This stage can
be reached without having a speciﬁc name for such schemata, but linguistic
cues associated with the processing episodes of their constitutive exemplars
may serve as contextual markers that enable the selection of relevant task
sets in—and hence as a procedural interpretation of—unfamiliar situations.
Moreover, as we discussed in connection with psychological essentialism (see
also Gentner & Boroditsky, 1999, 245), lexicalization also promotes the search
for commonalities (at least with concrete categories), thus possibly facilitating
schema induction by directing attention to aid category formation.
This process may give way to stage (D) where schematic knowledge pro-
vides know-how that can be exploited without necessary recourse to speciﬁc
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contents and situations. That is, if novel problem e is identiﬁed as belonging to
the domain of learned procedural schema, it can be directly exploited to make
inferences about e. If these inferences about e are then veriﬁed through actual
action to be valid, the resultant know-how about e becomes incorporated into
the stock of speciﬁc SAO knowledge base that constitutes the schema. Such
identiﬁable patterns in our daily practices get labeled, allowing their com-
munal identiﬁcation without describing their actual structures and associated
procedures. (This is similar to how category labels communicate information
without describing category contents, which is often implicit and unknown to
language users anyway.) This engenders discursive and other symbolic uses of
such concepts—or more precisely, uses of words that refer to these situations
and procedures—which aﬀords communicating and reasoning about them out-
side the empirical context where they were learned.
That is my explanation of abstract schema induction based on concrete
knowledge. Analogical reasoning explains how it is possible to reason in novel
situations even while situated reasoning exploits exemplar knowledge associ-
ated with familiar events, and analogical transfer explains how the develop-
ment of domain-speciﬁc cognitive expertise emerges from that practice. The
shift from novice to expert results from accumulating knowledge and not pri-
marily from changes in reasoning procedures or cognitive resources. This in-
cidentally explains the ostensibly unique behavior in deontic selection tasks.
Our proﬁciency in deontic reasoning is not due to specialized processes for
social cognition but results from domain general learning mechanisms that
use instance-speciﬁc encoding and tracks pragmatic causal regularities in our
everyday environment. There is thus nothing cognitively special in deontic
reasoning.115 The observed performance stems from the fact that most of the
rules we learn throughout our life are by and large deontic. We cope with
such requirements on a daily basis—especially in childhood when considerable
learning takes place—and we have thus learned especially well what it means
to follow or violate rules of this generic type. Thus, obligations, permissions,
etc. are heavily present in social learning, rendering learned deontic rules and
contexts abundant. This is why any adult who has gone through normal so-
115 This is not to say that there is nothing special in social cognition in general. I do believe
that some capacities are speciﬁcally evolved for social cognition, but I also believe that they
are mostly irrelevant for explaining how we understand speciﬁc conceptual domains, deontic
included. In the next section I discuss how social cognitive adaptations may be necessary for
explaining general discursive reasoning capacities.
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cialization is an expert deontic reasoner, and this is why sparse linguistic cues,
at best a mere word, may suﬃce to prompt a deontic interpretation of a rule.
A narrative or related description of the functional context may further
help in ﬁnding a relevant analogy. For example, the odd rule ”if a man eats
cassava root, he must have a tattoo in his face” in (Cosmides, 1989) was accom-
panied by a story which implied that the rule was about sexual ethics. Cassava
was told to be a potent aphrodisiac, and the tattoo signiﬁed a marriage sta-
tus.116 One may object that maybe the context description or a narrative
simply makes it easier to imagine the situation and that is what actually helps
in resolving the task. But then again, I am here precisely trying to explain
what such imagination means and, more to the point, how it helps. Note that
if analogical reasoning works by importing functional structure from a source
to the target rather than simulating the source—like Holyoak et al. (2010
claim—one will not need to consciously solve the problem by thinking of the
source. This is also how task set transfer is supposed to work, that is dissociat-
ing the functional knowledge from the source and (provisionally) associating it
with the target. Explicit thinking is generally considered to facilitate analogi-
cal transfer, and hence it may be that when eﬀortful reasoning helps in these
types of tasks, it is mostly due to searching and verifying candidate analogies
and task sets rather than due to logical inference (see also Evans, 1984).
This explanation has implications beyond mere deontic reasoning. All fa-
miliar domains involved in practical reasoning should be accompanied by a
comparable competence of intuitive understanding; for example, folk physics
and folk psychology. Amit Almor and Steven Sloman (1996) tested non-deontic
rules, which were somewhat transparent analogs of familiar everyday princi-
ples. Logically normative answer rate was found to be from around 30% to
60%. Most errors were ¬P card omissions, not Q card inclusions. The best
performance was observed in tasks that were designed to map onto folk physical
source analogies.
Another implication is that the mere knowledge of formal logic does not
help in the abstract task, but subjects that routinely use formal logic should
be in a better position to interpret the task as considering the validity of the
logical implication. Jackson and Griggs (1988) conﬁrmed this by showing that
while the level of education did not predict an advantage, mathematical educa-
tion did and more so among doctoral than bachelor level students.What these
mathematicians were presumably doing was task set retrieval from previous
116 Griggs and Ransdell (1986), for example, have oﬀered similar explanation that selection
task performance is best explained by memory cueing plus analogical reasoning.
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logic problem contexts. Assuming that the abstract selection task is not obvi-
ously a logic problem by its very nature (in a psychological sense), the task set
retrieval is psychologically speaking analogical transfer; that is, application of
existing knowledge to a novel context. Indeed, I assume the procedural knowl-
edge retrieval in general to exploit exemplar representations of past situations
and, as Medin and Schaﬀer (1978) noted, exemplar classiﬁers are inherently
analogical reasoning systems.
Lastly, the problem of importing knowledge from familiar tasks to unfa-
miliar ones, especially to abstract selection task, is not only due to diﬀerent
surface contents and learning contexts but also structural features contained
in situation representations. The ad hoc depiction of the mental representa-
tion of the postal regulation is again depicted below. Note that it contains
relations to speciﬁc services and penalties, but presumably no corresponding
events are expected in the abstract selection task. Hence, they should be
absent in the task’s mental representation. Therefore, whatever logical sim-
ilarities these rules share (i.e., the abstract rule and postal regulation rule),
there is hardly any structural correspondence between their functional mental
representation.117
While the functional representation of the postal regulation rule does not
bear structural correspondence with logical inference rules it corresponds to
many real world situations, even if the similarities are not always noticed. I
assume that most of us are familiar with the rule that you need to pay for the
ﬁrst-class ticket if you take the ﬁrst-class seat on a train. Entry (1) depicts
the causal model representation of this fact. Many of us are unfamiliar with
the postal regulation considering sealed letters; however, it is easy to transfer
practically identical functional structure to that rule by pointing out that (2)
sealing the letter is an extra service, like the ﬁrst-class seat, for which you need
to pay an extra price. Both rules apply to situations that have mostly the same
causal structure.
117 However, inference rules and conditional permissions share certain practical commonal-
ities, in that both are learned in social contexts where the application is socially sanctioned
rather than determined by the intrinsic causal properties of the reasoned variables. Of course
we do, e.g., modus tollens type inferences in material contexts where incorrect reasoning imply
incorrect factual predictions, and the feedback comes from non-social environment. However,
the point is that these inferences are learned in speciﬁc material contexts and consider spe-
ciﬁc concrete contents. When we learn logical inference rules as logical inference rules (i.e.,
as rule conceptually considering formal logic), the learning contexts are social. This is not a
conceptual fact but an empirical fact about the psychological etiology of formal concepts.
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(1) (2)
Moreover, the explanation connecting (1) and (2) contains the functional
commonality between these two regulations, which is a general idea of how
additional services work (3). From there, one can take a step further and
incorporate other related higher-order pragmatic schemata to the mixture by
pointing out that this is just a special case of more general principle about
conditional permission where meeting the precondition does not oblige you to
anything but releases the ban on taking a speciﬁc action (4). This is just
another way to present the same point about schematic abstraction as with
the ﬁgures (A) to (D) earlier.
(3) (4)
A few remarks are worth noting here. First, this is not supposed to be
any sort of stage theory about abstract concept learning. It resembles closely
the representational redescription theory proposed by the developmental psy-
chologist Annette Karmiloﬀ-Smith (1992). According to her, the development
of domain knowledge goes through speciﬁc stages where the initially concrete
and procedural knowledge is redescribed to diﬀerent representational formats
in three stages, producing pretty much like the above-described abstraction
process. However, the learning process I envision does not produce quali-
tatively diﬀerent representations in each step. It is more about developing
functional capacities. The shift from (A) to (B) happens gradually as knowl-
edge about diﬀerent recurring situations accumulates, which leads to the more
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or less spontaneous observation of functional correspondences between them.
The representations of situations a, b, c, etc. are supposed to be potentially
complex models that are also learned in a piecemeal fashion. Hence, it is
not just accumulating knowledge of diﬀerent examples that help here but also
the increasing knowledge about singular event types that makes it easier to
ﬁnd relevant structural similarities between them. The shift from (B) to (C)
happens when the learner spots what these similarities are. This is based on
a long-standing result in analogical reasoning research that schema induction
involves accumulation and comparison of several examples, and the process
can be facilitated by varying the learning contexts and contents, which allow
the learner to spot relevant variables and commonalities between instances
(Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Holyoak, 1985; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Novick, 1988;
Gentner, 1989; Ross & Kennedy, 1990; Reeves & Weisberg, 1994; Gentner et
al., 2003), and supported by similar observations in developmental psychology
(Baillargeon, 1998) and exemplar category research (Homa & Vorsburgh, 1976;
Medin & Schaﬀer, 1978).
Moreover, these are mandatory, incremental, and non-terminating learning
processes that endure the whole life; although if some procedures adapt to
external and internal contingencies optimally, they presumably reach a stable
plateau as long as these conditions remain unchanged. Second, the learning
trajectory has nothing inherently to do with childhood development but with
the development of novel conceptual capacities in general.
But does the shift from (B) to (C) not produce a separate representation
of the induced schema? Recall that while task sets are learned in associa-
tion with speciﬁc contents, they contain action→outcome elements that can
be transferred to other contexts and stimuli. This does not require that pro-
cedural knowledge be communicable or consciously accessible. Such transfer
can happen completely tacitly, and in order to transfer knowledge at will, the
agent needs only to grasp that it has a relevant capacity to cope with speciﬁc
contingencies that recur in another context and to be able to recognize when
such transfer is helpful. Such understanding may be explicit but this does not
imply that the subject has access to the procedural knowledge enabling that
understanding. The implicit retrieval of such knowledge is the basis of under-
standing situations, and the understanding of one’s competencies stem from
actually exercising them rather than from introspective enlightenment. Phe-
nomenologically and psychologically, we attend to aspects of situations rather
than our cognitive faculties. Likewise, we know that we know what chairs,
birds, or tools are; however, we are unable to access the detailed knowledge
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that constitutes our understanding of these things. (That is what similarity-
based theories taught us.)
Hence, what is needed for getting from (B) to (C) is a shift of focus from
surface cues to speciﬁc patterns and practices that recur; it is also necessary
to understand what aﬀordances and other functional commonalities they share
beyond trivial appearances. The capacity to group distinct situations based
on such pragmatically relevant patterns is the key here and not new type
of representations. However, I do not have an argument why some kind of
representational redescription could not happen in this process. I only try
to explain why it is not theoretically necessary, or more speciﬁcally, if some
redescription is taking place, it only requires bracketing the S part of SAO in
task sets or to turning causal graphs nodes from ﬁxed entities to open variables.
Producing entirely new types of abstract representations is not needed.
Vinod Goel et al. (2004) conducted a neuropsychological study on Wason
selection task. They investigated how the reasoning of patients with frontal
lobe damage diﬀered from healthy controls. Previous research had discovered
that, consistent with our discussion in this and section 4.3, familiar content
activates areas in the lateral PFC and temporal areas dealing with linguistic
meaning while abstract and unfamiliar content is processed in distinct areas
in the parietal system (Goel, 2007, see also). Accordingly, the performance of
healthy controls and patients with frontal lobe lesions were indistinguishable in
the abstract selection task. However, when tested with the concrete drinking-
age rule and the abstract permission schemata, they failed to beneﬁt from
the rule content in both conditions without signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
tasks. This is consistent with my claim that pragmatic schemata and concrete
knowledge are processed at least in the same cognitive systems even if they do
not utilize exactly the same knowledge.
It should be kept in mind that, as with event identities, procedural knowl-
edge contains levels with higher-order identities. Hierarchically structured ac-
tions tend to be multiply realizable at higher levels. When executing these
higher-order scripts, one needs only to monitor if the lower-level routines are
executed successfully rather than mind their detailed implementation. Even if
planning and problem-solving is a sort of simulation of concrete events, agents
need likewise to attend only to such gist levels of tasks if they know that they
can handle the component tasks. Hence, I seem to assume something that can
be interpreted as abstract representation of problems or procedures. However,
earlier I explained that such a superordinate level understanding depends on
grasping lower-level speciﬁc events and acts instead of on formal understand-
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ing of task structures. Hence, there is no (necessary) switch at any point to
explicit symbolic or formal representation. Once the common functional struc-
ture that uniﬁes these lower-level situated actions is understood, it becomes
easier to incorporate novel behaviors and situations under the existing action
schema, thus aﬀording more ﬂexible behavior and necessitating less attention
to speciﬁc details. So the overall competence aﬀords more abstract descrip-
tion; however, this does not necessitate that the processes and representations
responsible for that competence are qualitatively diﬀerent from those underly-
ing concrete situated reasoning. The basic idea is comparable to recursion in
computer programming: You give some recurring routines their identity (i.e.,
deﬁne a subroutine or a function), and then you can deﬁne procedures at a
more abstract level by compounding these routines. The diﬀerence is that
the psychological subroutines are not rigid sets of well-deﬁned instructions
to manipulate symbolic expressions but incrementally learned and open-ended
patterns whose identities and contents are constructed by repeated interactions
with the environment.
It should be clear that a similar process is happening in schema learn-
ing through analogical transfer. This is how skill learning promotes abstract
schema learning, given that schemata are functional structures extracted in
goal attainment and that higher-level action schemata consists of schematic
functional knowledge that incorporates lower-level situational know-how. In-
deed, the whole schema induction goes that increasing expertise in a domain
produces an intuitive understanding of speciﬁc events, which promotes learning
their higher-order functional structures. Hence, the more skilled can pay at-
tention to increasingly abstract regularities, and they can more ﬂexibly project
highly learned task sets to novel situations. This is a species of domain knowl-
edge where the agent knows lots of contingencies between variables, recognizes
numerous recurring patterns, and is able to understand situations on the basis
of higher-level regularities. Likewise, in analogical reasoning, the received view
is that experts gain schematic domain knowledge, which is based on projecting
schematic patterns over sets of varying surface contents. They become more
able to comprehend problems and analogies by their structural features, while
novices approach problems by concrete exemplars and spot analogies mainly
by speciﬁc surface contents (Ross & Kennedy, 1990; Reeves & Weisberg, 1994).
Moreover experts become better at ﬁnding cross-contextual mappings and eval-
uating their validity (Novick, 1988; Gentner et al., 2003). This is most likely
because they can readily retrieve frequently used task sets and because they
have more reﬁned and simply more numerous functional schemata available.
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So there are marked similarities in how expertise and abstraction are construed
in both skill learning and analogical reasoning research, and here is an expla-
nation why.
When it comes to incremental learning of domain knowledge, Karmiloﬀ-
Smith’s theory can be criticized on the grounds that leaning of conceptual
domains does not happen in distinct stages. Instead, it initially develops by
learning distinct event types and contingencies. Infants learn to categorize
events and predict how speciﬁc variables operate in each event type. By impli-
cation, they sometimes need to relearn how a variable operates in contexts that
they do not identify. Now, there might be an issue with terminology here. One
can think of a larger domain such as commonsense mechanics, as constituted
by microdomains that are learned separately and integrated later. However,
these microdomains, as identiﬁed by Baillargeon (2002), for example, are very
speciﬁc, like occlusion and containment events, balance and works of gravity,
etc. So it is perhaps better to speak of generalizations over speciﬁc event types
or contingencies rather than domains. Observed commonalities generalize to
general principles while unexpected outcomes trigger a search for new variables
that could explain the discrepancy between expectations and outcomes. These
notes on conceptual development, emphasized by Baillargeon match with my
account. Proper conceptual domains seem to develop as an incremental mix-
ture of better learned contextual schemata and more speciﬁc event exemplars.
The learning process tracks functional similarities and diﬀerences, producing
increasingly reﬁned ontology of the environment. If analogical reasoning is the
source of schematic domain knowledge, one should expect that generalizations
achieved in one task bolster structure learning in others associated with the
same conceptual domain. This is because the intra-domain transfer is facili-
tated by shared structure and surface cues between better and worse mastered
contexts. This may provide a scaﬀolding that leads to rapid domain-wide learn-
ing, yielding cognitively continuous but behaviorally fast stage-like transition
in competence once some schematic knowledge of the domain is attained.
Theorists who concentrate on top-down learning (e.g., Hubert and Stuart
Dreyfus) emphasize how by following rules of thumb people learn procedural
knowledge which they are unable to articulate. In bottom-up learning, the
main subject in this section, the picture looks somewhat diﬀerent. People in-
stead learn gradually to articulate the regularities that they discover once they
explicitely notice them (see Reber 1989, 229; Sun et al. 2005, 161). However,
these accounts are not in conﬂict and they both claim that the inaccessible part
is intricate tacit knowledge, while the verbal reports are sparse and elliptical
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description of broad salient aspects of observed recurring patterns. Note that
conceptual deﬁnitions usually have this character even while analytic deﬁni-
tions are often considered as the prime examples of explicit knowledge. True,
in some domains deﬁnitions work as accurate constitutive rules. This is the
case in mathematics. However, with ordinary concepts, analytical deﬁnitions
are more akin to heuristic remarks that try to capture important aspects of
how we use the concept under analysis. A bachelor is a male that has never
been married; however the pope is, probably, still not a bachelor, and other
exceptions are easy to invent. The classical deﬁnition of knowledge captures
the essentials of the notion but arguably it is inaccurate because it misses the
Gettier examples. We ﬁrst tacitly learn to apply these concepts in broader
real-life contexts, then ﬁgure out the deﬁnitions that seem to capture their
use, and then use our underlying intuitions to evaluate the proposed deﬁni-
tions. Unfortunately, rarely does the established use reduces to a few neat
logical rules which in combination are both suﬃciently narrow and broad. In
general, even if our ability to describe what we have learned grows out from
spotting regularities in our practices, we still often learn more than we can
describe.
I suspect that verbalization can come about as early as phase (B) as an
articulation of experienced vague commonalities without being able to describe
them besides pointing out the similarities between things or events.118 In gen-
eral, when the patterns become salient and diﬀerentiable through experience,
they likely receive their own labels like concrete categories do, especially if they
are associated with shared practices and regularities in one’s language commu-
nity (be that the whole culture or an exclusive professional community). Since
schematic contents are not borne out of grasping universal analytical content
but recurring concrete patterns, they can be quite idiosyncratic. Particularly at
phase (B), two subjects may have quite a diﬀerent grasp of what their linguis-
tic expressions actually pick out. Later when the commonalities become more
salient (at C), it may become easier to negotiate what they are. However, since
the underlying competencies are mostly tacit, diﬀerent subjects may have dif-
ferent understandings about the contents of their schemata. Conceivably this
may result in diﬀerent discursive practices and contents associated with the
expressions used to communicate and reason about such schemata—especially
within diﬀerent social groups sharing diﬀerent experiences. Moreover, since
the implicit contents are retrieved on a contextual basis and the same linguis-
118 Indeed, Pine & Messer (2003) found that verbalization does not mark the mature end
state of domain learning but happens in very early stages.
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tic expressions occur in widely diﬀerent contexts, there should be contextual
variability in the content associated with the expressions.
5.3 Theoretical concepts and discursive reasoning
But what is the status of purely schematic reasoning depicted in entry (D)?
Based on our previous discussion, it is somewhat unclear whether there are any
such capacities. But surely there seems to be. Formal concepts, by their very
nature, are removed from speciﬁc contents, and there certainly are practic-
ing logicians. Apart from mathematics, many concepts are theoretical, in the
sense that we acquire an understanding of them through education and public
reasoning rather than by direct interaction with their putative referents. Scien-
tiﬁc concepts are one thing, but discursive schematic reasoning is a prevalent
characteristic of common sense also. If you understand what ”permission”
and ”obligation” mean, then you understand that (1) if you get permission
for something, it incurs obligations to some other people. If that is not all
transparent, it means that (2) if you ﬁrst need to satisfy a precondition C to
get a permission to do P , then any authority enforcing such a rule is obliged
not to interfere with you doing P if you have satisﬁed C. For example (3), if
it is the case that you need to clean your room to go out and play, then your
parents need to let you go out and play, given that you have cleaned your room.
(4) Of course it is possible that you do not have a common understanding of
what cleaning your room means, but then your parents can instruct you. (5) If
the instructions are not understood, they can show you. If that does not help,
then probably nothing does, save some actual practice.
So there are descending levels of abstraction from (1) to (5) that terminates
in a Wittgensteinian observation whereby eventually descriptions need to be
rooted in actual practice in to be understood. Generally, adults understand
schematic descriptions at levels (1) and (2), but the expressions can be also
explained by giving (mutually understood) examples, such as (3). Now, we
have covered all this; however, the point is that these are examples of concepts
that aﬀord discursive inferences at the schematic levels (1) or (2) without
necessarily reducing the discourse to lower levels, such as (3). For example,
if you are obliged to do A, you must be permitted to do so, because no
authority can require you to do something and simultaneously not allow
you to do that; or perhaps they can, but everyone understands that this would
create a contradictory condition that violates the logic of bans and obligations.
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In principle, such logic can be learned through discursive practices that
allow one to understand how to use such concepts even without having lower-
level empirical content associated with them. For example, deontic logic has
been developed as a branch of general modal logic that contains systems with
only a formal interpretation. Informal logic of deontic terms, of course, is
mostly learned in everyday life; however, the capacity to do such schematic
reasoning is probably a result of both (a) empirical knowledge extracted from
the speciﬁc situations that the expressions refer to and (b) discursive practices
of using those expressions in public reasoning and communication. In formal
logics, the discursive element is presumably decisive. Similarly, mental con-
tents and skills to use superordinate concepts such as ”mammal” contain both
empirical and discursive elements, and this is, I presume, the norm with hu-
man lexicalized concepts. What sort of knowledge a word use employs is both
a matter of idiosyncratic experiences and how the use is related to discursive
and material practices in the linguistic community at large.
I maintain that these two types of knowledge are actually products of the
same type of pragmatic empirical learning. Discursive knowledge is just ex-
tracted in cultural praxis. It is hard to say what sets ”natural” or ”empirical”
apart from ”cultural” or ”discursive”. There is no metaphysical demarcation
of these realms, and here I propose that neither are there are any substan-
tial qualitative gap that strictly demarcates empirical and discursive cogni-
tive contents.119 Nevertheless, discursive and empirical or de dicto and de re
knowledge associated with certain things, situations, or practices can still be
exploited in diﬀerent proportions and ways in various contexts, hence produc-
ing competences where (lay) theoretical and empirical content may seem to be
dissociated.
Probably there are things such as colors that cannot be fully explained
but they need to be experienced to have the same cognitive contents associated
with such concepts, which most people have. However, this does not preclude
(color) blind people from having a theoretical or discursive understanding of
colors. Then there are things such as transﬁnite cardinals and the cosmological
constant that cannot be directly experienced and we acquire knowledge about
them only by theoretical means. However, this does not mean that the related
understanding is purely intellectual comprehension of essences. Instead, theo-
retical contents are culturally produced, even if their referents are not always
119 See our previous discussion about the impossibility to diﬀerentiate inferential and causally
determined contents in Section 2.1.3, and similar points about entanglement of culture and
nature in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
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cultural products, and grasping the contents is adaptive procedural know-how
in discursive domains. This is an interactional (mostly tacit) skill engendered
through immersion in the way of life of a linguistic community, be it the society
at large or a group of speciﬁc experts.
5.3.1 Learning formal domains top-down
The hypothesis I oﬀer is that learning theoretical contents can be explained by
resorting to the framework of schema learning, discussed in the last section.
Although mathematical and related formal concepts are probably the most
abstract ones that one can think of, the idea most straightforward to explain
in the context of formal conceptual domains precisely because they are so
abstract that the above considerations about intermixing of diﬀerent sources
of knowledge do not complicate the explanation.
The basic idea is this: When we begin to learn the most simple basics of
arithmetic, we count apples and oranges perhaps with ﬁngers and learn how
simple addition and terms referring to numerosity work. We are taught how
to express quantities and simple arithmetic operations and their outcomes by
symbols. We gradually learn to associate speciﬁc numbers and operations with
certain outcomes (e.g., 2+3 = 5). By using pen and a notebook, we learn how
to do more complex calculations on paper. While the operations are formal
and their correct applications are determined by mathematical facts, what we
are primarily learning is procedural know-how to concretely work with exter-
nal symbols. Presumably, a similar learning trajectory happens when we go to
university and learn subjects like theoretical physics or formal logic. Students
are given a set of syntactic inference rules (say, the Gentzen’s deduction sys-
tem) and instructions how to apply those rules to manipulate symbolic tokens.
At ﬁrst, students may consider the rules as rather arbitrary manipulations of
senseless scribbles. They need not (and perhaps better not) think of the math-
ematical rationale of these rules, and that is the crucial point: For learning
to proceed, students only need to treat the syntactic rules as socially permit-
ted concrete operations in that context and be committed to participate in
the associated social practice. As for the mathematical aspect of the symbol
manipulations, the feedback whether we are doing it right comes from our
teachers, tutors, peers, exercise sections of text-books, and in short from social
and cultural sources that teach, deﬁne, and sanction those practices. In time
the students learn the structural properties of the domain and become able to
see the reason behind the rules and what is their mathematical point.
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I assume that the major diﬀerence between elementary school and uni-
versity level mathematics is that as educated adults we are initially equipped
with more sophisticated conceptual machinery and skill sets. However, we are
similarly introduced to new concepts, labeled by symbols and explained by
examples and deﬁnitions. More importantly, we are given some principles and
techniques as how to use those expressions in reasoning and solving exercises.
Such expressions work as concrete variables that aﬀord manipulations. The
students can manipulate these tokens in any way they please; yet, not all the
possible ways are sanctioned in the institutional setting where the learning
takes place. They are embedded in situations where they need to conform to
certain practices instituted by rules and enforced by epistemic authorities. The
mathematics they already master when they enroll on mathematical curricula
puts constraints (i.e., provides background skills) on subsequent learning but
most of them are still learning completely novel skills, which are somewhat
removed from their existing conceptual structures and knowledge. To learn
the rules that constitute those domains, they need substantial practice with
concrete problem instances.
Analogies can be used to make sense of some of these new concepts and
principles; however, presumably many of them are very abstract and the proce-
dures (like proof methods) strictly foreign. Hence, the procedures and concepts
are initially quite rather of sense both psychologically and phenomenologically,
and the students are quite unable to understand and apply them properly. The
best way to teach them is to concretize them by providing speciﬁc examples
of general methods and make the students reason through them. When they
learn the same principles in various contexts and with various contents, they
gradually learn to apply them correctly and more spontaneously to unfamiliar
problems. In other words, they begin to see the relevant non-obvious patterns
in the problems they are facing which they were unable to spot before and
which begin to guide their problem-solving skills.
This is top-down skill learning where we are ﬁrst introduced some gen-
eral schematic principles, and through their concrete applications to speciﬁc
problems, the stock of intuitive know-how about these principles builds up.
As a result we learn in a bottom-up fashion abstract inference skills that track
the intended use of those principles and thus begin to understand the intended
meaning of abstract concepts, such as structural induction. So what is happen-
ing is a controlled build-up of an implicit exemplar-based knowledge structure
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(C) under the guidance of explicit instructions concerning general abstract
principle depicted in (D):120
D:
schema
instuctions
c c∗ C:
d d∗
c c∗
b b∗
a a∗
If this is correct, then an understanding of such abstract principles depends
on the implicit know-how of their use, and their understanding is fundamentally
a gradually developing procedural know-how. Moreover, then the discussion
in the previous section should apply to the learning of such abstract concepts
and principles. The formal expressions get their meanings from how they are
embedded in inferential practices constrained by schematic rules. This is ba-
sically an inferentialist or use theory of formal concepts closely in the spirit
of conceptual role semantics but expressly conﬁned to formal domains where
such semantics is not very controversial. Moreover, my version of inferential-
ism does not share the tenet of CRS that the cognitive processes involved are
logical computations over symbolic representations—even if the resulting be-
havioral competencies are. In time, at least simple operations are internalized
and they can be processed without explicit rule-following and external symbol
manipulations. These simple processes then can be simulated mentally. The
philosophically relevant point is that simulation of formal calculus is, in fact,
executing formal calculus. In this sense, people eventually manage to do log-
ical symbol processing mentally. That capacity, however, is not fundamental
characteristic of human cognition but derives from behavioral competences as
a mental simulation of those skills.
Once simple operations are mastered and understood, they enable the
learning of more complex procedures, which can be used to reason about other
abstract principles, and this way domain understanding gradually develops.
Not surprisingly, this learning process mirrors the typical organization of math-
120 The dotted line signiﬁes instructions as to how to apply the generic principle to a par-
ticular occasion. Solid lines depict actual application.
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ematical textbooks and curricula. First, simple procedures are taught, then
more complex theorems are derived, and these new conceptual tools are then
used to derive even more general and complex results. This is how complex hi-
erarchically organized skills are learned in general, and how concepts are both
means and ends in abstract concept learning. However, mathematical practices
often resemble more planning than direct execution of such skills, because not
all the lower-level procedures need to be carried out when deriving results in
higher levels of abstraction. When deriving complex theorems, the students
and practicing mathematicians need only to mind goal-relevant, more or less
complex mathematical results, given that they know that these results can
be inferred by using more detailed and conceptually lower-level inferences if
needed. When students gain more ﬂexible and creative skills with the concep-
tual machinery, what was once an abstract and semantically opaque set of con-
cepts and methods gradually comes to make sense in their own terms through
conceptual development rooted in procedural know-how. The phenomenolog-
ical and psychological character of abstractness should dissipate during this
process similar to any conceptual domains that participate in our daily prac-
tices. With well-deﬁned formal and other scientiﬁc concepts, we likely gather
more explicit knowledge compared to everyday concepts because of the more
pronounced role of explicit top-down learning. Thus, the explicit character
of the resultant conceptual understanding is not because these concepts are
intrinsically processed in System 2 but mostly because of the learning history.
If you happen to entertain yourself by reading popular science books on
quantum physics, you inevitably encounter claims that no one really under-
stands it. But surely the practicing physicists who make these claims do un-
derstand their trade better than, for example, I do. I gather that this oft-
repeated statement means that the reality of fundamental physics is so remote
from our commonsense understanding of physical mechanics that there is no
natural mapping from that strange reality to our lay conceptions concerning
physical objects and principles. Hence there is no ”click of comprehension”
that is produced by translating the odd nature of fundamental particles to
existing intuitive world knowledge. This, however, does not preclude all sorts
of (theoretical) understanding. The following quotation by Freeman Dyson
(1958, 77–78 captures the course of conceptual development ”things become to
make sense in their own terms”:
I have observed in teaching quantum mechanics, and also in learn-
ing it, that students go through an experience similar to the one
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that Pupin describes. The student begins by learning the tricks
of the trade. He learns how to make calculations in quantum me-
chanics and get the right answers, how to calculate the scattering
of neutrons by protons and so forth. To learn the mathematics
of the subject and to learn how to use it takes about six months.
This is the ﬁrst stage in learning quantum mechanics, and it is
comparatively painless. The second stage comes when the student
begins to worry because he does not understand what he has been
doing. He worries because he has no clear physical picture in his
head. He gets confused in trying to arrive at a physical explanation
for each of the mathematical tricks he has been taught. He works
very hard and gets discouraged because he does not seem to be
able to think clearly. This second stage often lasts six months or
longer. It is strenuous and unpleasant. Then, unexpectedly, the
third stage begins. The student suddenly says to himself, ”I under-
stand quantum mechanics,” or rather he says, ”I understand now
that there isn’t anything to be understood.” The diﬃculties which
seemed so formidable have mysteriously vanished. What has hap-
pened is that he has learned to think directly and unconsciously in
quantum-mechanical language. He is no longer trying to explain
everything in terms of prequantum conceptions.
Note that I am not advocating a strong form of social constructivism con-
cerning natural science—or even folk concepts and theories—as I, hopefully,
made suﬃciently clear in the latter half of Chapter 2. While our scientiﬁc con-
cepts, theories, and beliefs are cultural products, the practices producing these
beliefs and concepts are designed to be constrained by human independent em-
pirical reality. While I stress discursive knowledge in using and understanding
scientiﬁc concepts, my notion of ”discursive” is not conﬁned to language but
to the whole praxis of giving and asking for reasons within a particular domain
and social groups. This means that, for example, evaluating what qualiﬁes
as evidence for a particular claim is a discursive act, and so are considera-
tions of how to produce that evidence and the actual practice of gathering
it. While gathering evidence is often non-linguistic interaction with material
reality (especially in natural sciences), the practice itself (how and why you
do it) is socially constrained to serve private and public reasoning. This is a
general point of discursive praxis: Certain facts (evidence) are reasons to say
something in accordance with social settings that constitute reasons to make
249
certain statements in general (like doing science). The general reasons to say
something (e.g., stating hypotheses) are, again, reasons to do something (gath-
ering evidence), and speciﬁc social norms (e.g., methodological considerations)
constrain how this activity should be done in accordance with the mutually
understood point of the praxis.
Similarly, I am not selling psychologism about mathematics. My inclina-
tions are somewhat more in line with the formalist program in that mathe-
matical logic is like a game that starts by giving a set of rules about how to
manipulate a determined set of tokens, and then we proceed to apply these
rules to reach more or less clearly predetermined goals. However, I mean this
only as a contrived characterization of mathematical praxis. Our ability to
grasp mathematics is necessarily dependent on our cognitive make up, but the
understanding eventually comes from our capacity to track certain social dis-
cursive practices, which, in turn, are de facto constrained by cultural praxis
developed during the history of science, thought, and technology. However, I
assume that mathematical practices track objectively true facts about quan-
tities, set structures, logical entailment, etc. Such facts are useful in many
human aﬀairs, and therefore the practices of exploiting these facts and even-
tually the science of exploring these facts have been evolved. That is, as far
as I can tell, mathematical facts are objective, and when we do mathematics
(like arithmetic) we are following intersubjective norms constrained by those
facts. Hence, mathematics does not reduce to psychology nor social science.
Roughly, its autonomy is guaranteed because no consistent practice exploiting
mathematical methods can violate these facts without losing its mathemati-
cal character. But this, again, is not necessarily a metaphysical fact about
mathematics but a conceptual one, and by ”conceptual,” I mean that it is a
constitutive character of the practice we call ”mathematics.”
So, again, my claim is that the ability to use and understand formal and
other theoretical concepts results from tracking pragmatic regularities in our
environment, which are instituted and constantly reproduced by material so-
cial practices. Broadly similar ideas, stating that abstract concept learning is
cultural learning, have been proposed by Jerome Bruner (1990) and Lev Vy-
gotsky (1986), for example. In the same vein, Murphy and Medin (1985, 309)
suggest that when children learn a language they do not learn abstractions
but cultural conventions, and this learning is guided and constrained by their
world knowledge. Fundamentally, this is a learning of event–event causation
in the context of discursive acts. The most natural settings for such learning
is mutual reasoning and communication, and formal inference is a special case
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of cultural learning in which the manipulation of inert symbolic tokens is em-
phasized rather than direct social interaction. Still, one can think of exercising
such formal capacities as a quite typical case of situated reasoning. The agent
faces a speciﬁc task that contains a set of variables instantiated by concrete
tokens with their contextual aﬀordances. The agent proceeds to manipulate
those tokens by applying concrete procedures to transform the situation (or
problem state) to another in order to eventually attain its goals.
Many social practices are constituted precisely this way in schools and
workplaces. We are not bound by the causal properties of things we manipu-
late but by the normative constraints of what we are allowed and expected to
do; and following or violating those constraints has predictable concrete conse-
quences. The causal graphs in the previous section depicting event and variable
contingencies in following regulations are simple examples, although the tasks
are often much more complex. As neopragmatists claim, the cognitive contents
associated with tokens participating in these practices emerge from the socially
constituted procedural understanding of how these communal practices work.
No current research directly addresses if theoretical concept learning pro-
ceeds in the way proposed here. To my best knowledge, the studies by Larkin
et al. (1980) and especially Chi et al. (1981) on novice and expert physics
reasoning come closest to establishing that it is. One possible complication
is that the tasks in these studies were introduced by diagrams, and it might
be that experts used visually guided preprocessing in selecting the principles
and equations to work with. Rich quasi-perceptual processing of problems has
been implicated in expert physicists (Clement, 2004), and while these results
support my general argument about the applicability of my account of practi-
cal situated cognition to scientiﬁc reasoning, they do not constitute a strong
argument that it applies directly to explicit symbolic thought.
However, there are suggestive commonalities. In schema learning, there
is an interaction between explicit and implicit processes. While analogy re-
trieval and schema induction can happen spontaneously, both can be highly
facilitated by an explicit search for commonalities and especially by pointing
them out and explaining how speciﬁc solutions can work as analogies for other
problems. One might suspect that this leads to grasping and storing the com-
mon principle explicitly as a rule. But explaining a rule does not functionally
lead to instant rule-based behavior: people consistently rely on exemplars even
if they have simple and accurate rules available. Early in the learning pro-
cess we are often quite unable to apply rules instead of speciﬁc exemplars in
reasoning, and these exemplars also aﬀect how the rule is later used (Ross &
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Kennedy, 1990). The content and induction of superordinate categories de-
pend on the amount and variation of the source exemplars (Gick & Holyoak,
1983). The shift of reliance from the surface to structural features is due to
an increase in domain-speciﬁc knowledge, and this shift parallels the novice
to expert development in a given domain (Reeves & Weisberg, 1994). These
exemplar eﬀects in later rule application are most evident when the task af-
fords perceptually guided holistic processing (Allen & Brooks, 1991; Brooks
et al., 1991); however, at least with novices, mathematical know-how is more
strongly cued by task content than structure (Ross, 1984). Already Thorndike
(1922) showed that slight changes in the syntax from familiar to unfamiliar
in mathematical problems aﬀect reasoning, thus demonstrating that ”any dis-
turbance whatsoever in the concrete particulars reasoned about will interfere
with reasoning.” Barsalou (1999, 606) has proposed the same idea that formal
thinking is (quasi-)perceptual simulation of concrete manipulation of external
symbolic tokens, and notes that logicians and scientists often construct visual
simulations to discover and understand formalisms.
Considering the extended, interactive, and distributed nature of scientiﬁc
cognition, a relevant strand of research comes from Nancy Nersessian (2008).
Her work focuses on creative scientiﬁc reasoning and conceptual change and
investigates how analogies, (perceptual) simulation, and thought experimens
are employed in these processes. Nersessian stresses how scientiﬁc reasoning
is situated and distributed among scientists and scientiﬁc instruments, meth-
ods, practices, and representations. Focal representational tools are diagrams
and models, which do not convey only symbolic information but analogical and
heuristic knowledge about the dynamics and structural properties of the target
phenomenon. Diagrams depict the relevant feature of the target, and they can
utilize visual devices such as proximity, arrows, brackets, and the like to signify
the structural and causal relations of the system. Sketching and tinkering these
external representations is an important part of the thinking process as well as
gesturing over them. The production of external models is constrained by the
subjects’ theoretical understanding on the target domain, and the resultant
visual features render important information salient for reasoning and aﬀord
insights that are hard to process and communicate with propositional state-
ments. Indeed, according to Nersessian, diagrams scaﬀold simulations. They
provide constraints and aﬀordances for inferences and aﬀect what is simulated
and how simulations can be transformed.
Hence, external models do not only support cognitive processing but ex-
ternal and internal representations are genuinely coupled through interaction,
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where external representations and other devices inform, constrain, and af-
ford reasoning and communication. All this makes scientiﬁc thinking domain-
speciﬁc and situated activity, which is supported by external material de-
vices.121 Nersessian also emphasizes that analogical reasoning is not a one-shot
event that reveals a complete hypothesis of the target phenomena but one of
the basic tools for scientists to reason about and improve their models. Lastly,
we share the same insight that ”propositional articulation at most codiﬁes a
reasoning process that already has been carried out by other means. That
is, the mental model needs to have been constructed and simulated in order
for the propositions that make up the argument to be identiﬁed” (Nersessian,
2008, 176).
That statement brings us back to formal symbolic reasoning and my claim
that the associated learning is based on the same resources than other top-down
discursive reasoning. I must clarify that this does not imply that the develop-
ment of formal competencies track the development of commonsense concepts.
Indeed, my main claim is that formal propositional calculus is not the right
instrument to model human thinking, and formal logic is perhaps quite remote
from—and maybe even antithetical to—most folk’s daily activities. I have also
argued in many places that diﬀerent tasks use diﬀerent kinds of information and
cognitive faculties. If human conceptual understanding develops as a gradual
adaptation to our situated pragmatic constraints, we should expect the domain
constraints to dictate mature expert performance more than the general psy-
chological learning dispositions—within the limits of cognitive constraints, of
course. The basic point of my ecological approach to cognition dictates that
expert mathematical competence comes eventually to track the structure and
constitution of mathematical conceptual domain, and if everyday domains are
constituted diﬀerently, the end result should look diﬀerent accordingly.
Conversely, the impact of the general psychological constraints (e.g, the
eﬀect speciﬁc experiences to learning) should be most obvious in the early
stages of learning. Expert cognitive skills such as science, and especially formal
disciplines, are interesting for my purposes precisely because the concepts they
harbor are often remote from commonsense concepts. Therefore, expert versus
novice competence in science should be a good place to study how conceptual
understanding develops in adult cognition with a relatively clean slate, even
121 See especially Chapter 5 in Nersessian (2008). The reader is also advised to consult
MacLeod (2016), which contains an excellent brief summary on these issues and especially
how domain-speciﬁcity of scientiﬁc competence aﬀects interdisciplinary research, considering
that science is also a social project.
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though the subsequent competence probably does not reﬂect that much the
nature of everyday reasoning in other domains.
As for my stand on the cognitive status of elementary logical concepts,
such as disjunction, conjunction, and implication, I should add that causal
reasoning and representation with Bayesian framework presumes a capacity to
process disjunctions, conjunctions, negation and forward inference. Moreover,
language and social pragmatic learning presumes a capacity to follow rules
and execute recursive procedures. Hence, the key capacities to understand and
process simple and combinatorially complex (formal) concepts is presumed in
my manner to specify the idea that we are natural born causal and social
pragmatists.
In any event, I am not denying the relevance of (propositional) mental
representations and formal-logical structures to human thought and especially
to scientiﬁc reasoning. They are indispensable for scientiﬁc praxis. I only
maintain that such representations, conceptual structures, and their cognitive
contents are not innate but acquired through incremental learning. Symbolic
and diagrammatic representations factor into our scientiﬁc practices, and their
exploitation and internalization happens through interaction, which includes
external (and derivately internal) manipulations of these representational de-
vices, sometimes in the guidance of formal rules. Hence, I do not strive for
an eliminativist stance to explain logical competencies and representational
mental contents away but for a conservative explanation how they are psycho-
logically constituted and how we can have such things in the ﬁrst place, given
that they are not innate.
I take that the understanding of mathematical and logical concepts
through formal education develops similar to any other domain-speciﬁc cogni-
tive skills and not as a distinct stage in human psychological development. My
understanding is that when we employ these skills, we are often doing analog-
ical inference as it is traditionally conceived: We map entities or propositions
to symbolic expressions and use our skill to apply formal rules to such expres-
sions to resolve the task we need. Moreover, these competencies can stem from
multiple sources and component processes. For example, simple counting may
be partly based on an innate ability to perceive and discern small ordinals, a
linguistic trait to label them, and a trait to continue sequences (Carey, 2009).
Counting with ﬁngers may be cognitively a diﬀerent ability than doing multipli-
cations on paper, even if both are arithmetic practices. Indeed, arithmetics and
other formal competencies are not monolithic skills but they can be learned
in diﬀerent ways in diﬀerent contexts for speciﬁc purposes. These context-
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and problem-speciﬁc mathematical competencies may not easily transfer to
other domains but remain as integral part of the activity they were originally
learned, bearing idiosyncratic characteristics of the speciﬁc practices and being
dependent on the actual material settings where they are exercised.122
5.3.2 Informal theoretical and discursive concepts
Despite an obvious overlap, my notion of ”theoretical concepts” in this section
diﬀers from the concepts-organized-as-theories idea in the theory–theory of cat-
egories, which holds that conceptual content is constituted by how categories
take part in explaining events. As discussed earlier, this is a questionable way
to formulate the knowledge account because such ”explanations” or ”theories”
do not need to be explicit nor linguistic. A more accurate way to describe
human conceptual content is that it is largely determined by how concepts
enable us to understand and anticipate events and how they participate in ac-
tion. Except for the section above, I have mostly avoided discussing language
and controlled explicit reasoning; however, by ”theoretical concepts” I basically
mean linguistic concepts. More accurately, since there are no strictly linguis-
tic and non-linguistic concepts, my treatment of theoretical concepts means
theoretical contents where ”theoretical” refers to discursive know-how, that is
procedural knowledge of how we use linguistic expressions in public reasoning
and communication. As discussed earlier, expressions such as ”mammal” or
even ”dog” are psychologically associated with discursive knowledge regard-
less of how concrete their referents may be. This is supposed to be a trivial
rather than a profound observation because, at the limit, one discursive use of
words is to use them to communicate about, or even just name, speciﬁc things
in the environment. In Section 2.2, I promoted the commonly held idea that
in the development of language this is one of the most primordial discursive
acts. I take no stand whether this implies that alarm calls of some animals,
for example, should be considered as genuine discursive acts.
The previous section examined a mode of formal learning where symbolic
expressions occupy the role of objects to be manipulated by explicit rules. The
classical computationalist theory of the mind sees this as the standard model of
language processing and thinking: Thinking is logical computation of symbolic
122 See Lave (1988) for a cognitive anthropological study showing that people acquire arith-
metic skills to manage their daily needs in supermarkets, which are distinct from the math
skills learned in school and employ their own methods and heuristics; that is, the skills do not
correlate strongly with formal mathematical ability and tend to disappear with isomorphic
formal tasks. However, they can be (partly) retained in simulated grocery shopping activities.
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representations, and language use is overt expression of these computations or
their outputs. The principal function of the mental machinery was taken to
be problem-solving and deductive inference of new information based on what
is already known. In the heyday of the logical model the adaptive capacity
of the human mind was attributed to its purported universal and formal na-
ture. The idea was perhaps best captured in the famous physical symbol system
hypothesis (Newell, 1980). The story was that since the mind is a universal
problem-solver, you can throw a cognitive agent in any environment, and it
will ﬁgure its ways out there. This capacity was supposed to make the diﬀer-
ence between genuinely mental agents and simple automata executing trivial
reﬂexes. The model of human cognition that I am proposing also takes the
mind to be essentially an adaptive engine; however, the adaptation is a slow
learning process, driven by our activity in the environment and constrained
by our needs and capabilities as situated embodied agents. I do not aim for
a wholesale rejection of the classical rationalist model but rather to put it in
its proper place. Yes, we have reﬂective competencies, and we employ them
to ﬁgure out what to do when we do not know. We also need explicit con-
trolled cognition to learn various novel skills, such as playing games and doing
mathematical logic. However, this is not how our minds guide our behavior
most of the time. If we intend to understand what the human mind is and
how it works—or how we generally work—it is more fruitful to study cognitive
processes that are responsible for the etiology of our everyday activity instead
of the interesting but rather weak and marginal reﬂective capacity.
So where does this leave linguistic reasoning and communication? With
top-down learned theoretical competencies, such as formal logic, our linguistic
expressions may track our actual psychological reasoning processes because we
learn these skills by exercising our explicit linguistic and symbolic faculties.
However, most of our skills are implicit and learned largely in a bottom-up
fashion through interaction. We use our linguistic expressions to communicate
the patterns in our environment (i.e., recurring entities, situations, and prac-
tices) rather than our (inaccessible) thought processes. Experts are ostensibly
better at explaining their decisions; however, we know from expertise research
that they are often unable to articulate them in a way that communicates the
actual (tacit) reasons and processes underlying their judgment. They rather
seem to be better at articulating the relevant aspects of task features in their
area of expertise. That is, they gradually learn pragmatically important re-
curring patterns, and these overt patterns get lexicalized. They also learn how
these patterns and the variables in the underlying concrete situations consti-
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tuting those patterns hang together. Still, they are often unable to articulate
their exact inaccessible thought processes about these matters.
Thus, the communicative function of linguistic expressions mostly describe
aspects of recurring situations to peers who ideally share roughly the same
experiences and the resultant tacit understanding of what is discussed. Recipi-
ents’ own comprehension processes ﬁll in the blanks. This tacit understanding
that underlies successful communication does not need to be symmetric, how-
ever. In educational contexts the tutor tries to explain to the pupils what they
should concentrate on and how they should employ the conceptual appara-
tus they are learning. But these remarks do not only pertain to educational
contexts nor expert skills and communities. If common sense is sociocultural
expertise, then in the same vein, communication and public reasoning with
commonsense concepts rest on the shared understanding of how our everyday
environment and social practices work.
In summary, in formal and other (scientiﬁc) domains, which are largely
learned top-down, our explicit argumentative reasoning protocols track more
or less accurately our thinking practices because these thinking practices are
products of such protocols, but in complex and vague implicitly learned con-
ceptual domains they often do not. What does this tell us about the nature
of commonsense discursive reasoning, then? Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber
(2011; 2017) have proposed that argumentative reasoning has not been evolved
to serve the function of improving knowledge or making better decisions. In-
stead, it has been developed for communicative purposes. The ability to devise
arguments has evolved for the purpose to persuade others, and the ability to
evaluate arguments has evolved to assess the quality of the information pro-
vided by others and to judge their status as reliable information sources. We
are always vulnerable to misinformation, and if someone tells us something that
we do not already believe, we better ask some justiﬁcation for the claims—given
that we choose not to trust that person blindly; which may be appropriate if
the information source is an epistemic authority of some sort. By evaluating
the reasons given to believe those facts, we are eﬀectively evaluating the qual-
ity of the information. If the given justiﬁcation is unsound, we have grounds
to disregard the information and any considerations based on it. Even if the
arguments are sensible, we may disregard the conclusion if we or other peo-
ple participating in the discursive transaction have more compelling reasons to
believe that the claim is not true.
Mercier and Sperber (2011) argue their theory largely by noting that if
explains wide swaths of peculiarities observed in human reasoning. One general
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phenomenon in this regard is that we reason a lot with our peers and seem to be
quite good at it; however, when placed in a laboratory to reason by ourselves,
poor judgment is often observed. This probably has to do with the fact that
often in everyday contexts we reason about everyday matters we are experts
of, but in the laboratory we are often tasked to solve unfamiliar problems.
However, this is far from the whole story. For example, if the participants in
the abstract selection solved the problem in groups of ﬁve to six members, an
70–80% level of correct answers were reached (Moshman & Geil, 1998; Mercier
& Sperber, 2011, 63). An obvious explanation is that in large enough groups
you happen to ﬁnd someone who can solve the problem and the correct solution
then spreads in the group. This is part of the explanation (Maciejovsky &
Budescu, 2007); however, it cannot be the whole story because that is neither
suﬃcient nor necessary for groups to reach the corrects solution.
In collaborative problem solving, groups tend to perform better (but may
sometimes perform worse) than their best individuals, and this is be because
the collaborative reasoning process is diﬀerent from individual reasoning pro-
cesses. When people are requested to explain and defend their judgments in
the abstract selection tasks, the odd, confused, and irrelevant character of their
justiﬁcations are easy to spot and challenge. Subjects are perfectly able to in-
vent explanations for their behavior; however, they do not know the etiology
of their intuitive judgment and when they invent reasons post hoc, their expla-
nations do not always make much sense. While the logical interpretation of
the selection task is not very salient, it is still available to virtually everyone
as testiﬁed by the debrieﬁng sessions (Wason & Shapiro, 1971). Through peer
feedback and collaboration subjects spot problems in their reasoning and par-
tial solutions, which facilitate insight into formal aspects of the task and enables
them to converge to the logical solution (Moshman & Geil, 1998). According
to Mercier and Sperber (2011), this is a general phenomenon. If one thinks
of argumentation and reasoning from information processing perspective, the
nature of that process is diﬀerent between individuals in comparison to what
happens inside the participants’ heads. Our individual cognition tends to focus
on one hypothesis with conﬁrmatory tendencies, while the exchange between
individuals employs primarily falsifying strategy toward multiple hypotheses.
Note that the logical interpretation does not necessitate knowledge about
formal logic because the logical use is one of the ways that we use conditional
statements in everyday language, even if it is not the most usual way. Arguably,
the logical reading is the most reasonable interpretation of the selection task,
once you think trough what the experimenter might have in mind. But people
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do not think it through because when put to reason individually, we just follow
our intuitive judgment that feels compelling and then confabulate unchallenged
reasons for the judgment. Critical exchange of arguments puts the quality of
those confabulations under review, and the joint reasoning tends to converge
to the non-obvious but reasonable logical interpretation.123
Outside laboratory, the argumentative theory of Mercier and Sperber ex-
plains, for example, the notorious conﬁrmation bias, that is our robust tendency
to pay attention to information that supports our beliefs and hypotheses while
disregarding the information that could disconﬁrm them. Curiously, while peo-
ple are poor in spotting evidence that goes against their beliefs, they are still
good at seeking conﬂicting evidence for conceptions that they do not personally
hold. According to Mercier and Sperber, conﬁrmation bias does not stem from
cognitive limitations but from ecological functions for which the argumentative
practice has evolved: Our aptitude to device arguments is evolved to persuade
others to believe what we believe, and our ability to refute claims is evolved to
check the credibility of the information we are fed. Their theory also explains
the close cousin of conﬁrmation bias, the belief bias, which is our tendency to
evaluate the quality of arguments based not on their form but the credibility
of conclusions. If you do not believe the conclusion, you are disposed to ﬁnd
weak links in the argument; if you already believe it, you often do not care
how it is justiﬁed on speciﬁc occasions.
Once this practice of giving and asking for reasons is in place, it applies
to explaining and arguing for actions and not only claims. I take that this
is actually the default way in which argumentative reasoning is used, as we
probably care about the quality of information mainly because we use that
information for our pragmatic aims. However, this also has a consequence
that discursive reasons can become practical reasons for actions. Communal
discourse is used to persuade others not just to believe what we believe but
also to do what we believe ought to be done. Once these discursive practices
are internalized as our own reasons for our own actions, they begin to guide
our behavior. People tend to make decisions based on what they ﬁnd easiest to
justify, even if they sacriﬁce economic utility (Mercier & Sperber, 2017, 255).
123 Many subjects explain that they are trying to verify the rule (Wason & Evans, 1975).
They are actually correct, if the Bayesian explanation of abstract selection task performance
is true. The problem, however, is that the participant are unable to give a coherent expla-
nation what their selections has to do with veriﬁcation. Also, if they are doing Bayesian
induction, there is no single correct answer (which is required by the task) and hence the
logical interpretation arguably is the rational one.
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As we have discussed earlier, discursive reasons are fundamentally rooted
in patterns of social behavior. The tacit generalization of these patterns (pre-
sumably via analogical transfer) to quite diﬀerent contexts may further explain
some peculiarities conﬂicting the individualistic economically rational model of
the human. For example, the sunk cost fallacy may be explained by the ap-
plication of the norm ”do not waste” in inappropriate places. Sometimes the
norms themselves may not be (economically) very rational. For example, you
might prefer dish A to B in a restaurant but pick B because your friend ﬁrst or-
ders A and you feel compelled to follow the maxim ”don’t pick the same things
as others.” People use all kinds of lay theories and principles to guide their
decisions and sometimes against their apparent interest (Mercier & Sperber,
2011, 70-71).
Also relevant here is the Henrich et al.’s (2005) extensive cross-cultural
investigation into how local norms and practices aﬀect individual economical
decisions. The study found that subjects’ behavior in economical games (ulti-
matum, public goods, and dictator games) varied in a culture-speciﬁc manner
and the variation was best explained as reﬂecting the patterns of interaction
encountered in everyday life. ”Selﬁshness axiom” was absent as a norm and
the authors remarked that ”humans are endowed with cultural learning capac-
ities that allow us to acquire the beliefs and preferences appropriate for the
local social environment; that is, human preferences are programmable and are
often internalized [...] The preferences become part of the preference function
that is maximized in preferences, beliefs, and constraint models. Norms such
as ”treat strangers equitably” thus become valued goals in themselves, and not
simply because they lead to the attainment of other valued goals.” (p. 813)
Why certain maxims end up as having normative force in speciﬁc societies
need not concern us. The important point is that they have normative force
which makes them pragmatically binding, or at least suggestive, to all parties
committed to shared communal practices pertaining to rational action. Mercier
and Sperber are unfortunately not very explicit about the cognitive processes
involved in devising and evaluating arguments. They attribute these capacities
to intuitive cognition, even if the argumentative practices are linguistic and ex-
plicit. This is similar to what I have promoted throughout this work; that is,
understanding how things, situations, and facts relate to each other in relevant
ways depends on a tacit pragmatic understanding of such matters. Producing
arguments and explaining reasons is pointing out an approximate path of ra-
tionales that the audience needs to be able to follow themselves. This is the
norm with all communication. Sentences and gestures generally have no de-
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terminate meaning unless the recipient understands the context and can ﬁll in
the blanks to retrieve speaker’s meaning (see Mercier & Sperber, 2017, 60–63).
If these explanations are too vague and complex, they can be broken down and
dissected in detail, but eventually mutual understanding needs to be grounded
in a tacit know-how shared to a suﬃcient degree. This means that discursive
content partly emerges from non-discursive pragmatic knowledge. Moreover,
since discursive reasons are practical reasons to engage in speciﬁc policies of
actions, discursive norms and acts also make us perform certain non-discursive
acts. Hence in social reality—that is, the human reality—there is a two-way
interaction, or more like an entanglement, of discursive and non-discursive
praxis.
And what does the rehearsal of these points add to our understanding
of non-formal theoretical and discursive contents? Remember the remarks
a few pages back that expressions referring to abstractions like ”permission”
and ”obligation” derive their contents partly from our pragmatic knowledge
of speciﬁc situations and partly from their discursive uses. The point is that
there often is a two-way interaction between the abstraction levels where our
discursive practices with abstract superordinate concepts make us conceive the
concrete, more speciﬁc situations and actions in new conceptual light.
For example, as children we learn from our parents that we should be
fair to other people. What ”being fair” really amounts to cannot be captured
in simple rules. Through parental feedback in speciﬁc events, we learn when
we have acted fair and when we have not. Explicit rules may be useful in
highlighting which aspects of social interaction we need to pay attention to,
but we mostly need to extract the vague sense of the label ”fair,” which is
embedded in intricate pattern of behaviors. Once some understanding of this
concept is established, we begin to enforce the norm to our peers. When we
socialize with other children, they may have diﬀerent understanding of what
is fair and what is not. Conﬂicts ensue, but at least we have a shared word to
negotiate what the culprit is, which helps to mutually adjust our behavior to
meet and shape the shared standards. Later in life, we discover that fairness
is not something that happens in just a playground but a complex social and
political issue, which has a lot to do how we organize our society. Sometimes
it is branded as ”justice,” ”equity,” ”responsibility,” and so on. We learn that
many people have rather diﬀerent ideas what it means, and we read books by
philosophers and social scientist who have developed intricate theories of what
it amounts to. By these conceptual devices we may end up ﬁnding new contexts
where the concept is relevant and reconsidering that some of our behavior we
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have considered as fair may not actually be that, and change our attitudes and
behavior accordingly. This conceptual restructuring does not happen solely
due to intellectual enlightenment, but also the acceptance and impact of these
theories depend on our (internalized) norms, identity, and social practices that
delineate who we are and what we take as just and reasonable. So there is a
two-way interaction (or perhaps a complex system) between these theoretical
revelations and our situated acquaintance with social norms and concepts like
fairness, and this interaction of levels is made possible by lexicalizing these
concepts and thus introducing them to symbolic discursive practices.124
So while the understanding of linguistic expressions grows from pragmatic
know-how tied to concrete events, the practices of naming things and classi-
fying concrete situations in our practical reality are not the only things we
do with words. The discursive practices themselves are practical things we do
with words with actual real-life consequences and impact to our intuitive un-
derstanding. This connects to our earlier discussion about the neopragmatist
theory of linguistic contents in Section 2.2.2 and in particular to the idea that
words participate in social interaction much like tools participate in the work
done with them.
One can think of theoretical concepts, especially in the early phases of
learning, as complex technology we operate attentively. First the focus is on
the use of the technologies, and we employ our previous conceptual compe-
tencies in reasoning with them and making sense of their nature. In time,
the technology fades into the background as we get the feel and sense of how
they work and participate in our practices, and the focus shifts to the point of
the praxis itself; which is the phenomenological status with our commonsense
concepts. Many commonsense concepts reside in both theoretical and concrete
realm; fairness in one, but notions like society, democracy, meaning have this
124 Note that while saying is doing, our sayings and corresponding doings do not always
happen in the same context. That is, the contexts where we discuss our norms are often
diﬀerent where we actually enact our norms. Since the underlying procedural knowledge and
associated incentives in each case are activated on contextual basis, our explicitly endorsed
norms do not automatically become enforced in practice, even if they have been internal-
ized. What gets internalized is not norms in the abstract sense but acceptable, sanctioned
behaviors; that is, what is a proper thing to say in one context and do in another. Although
the sayings and doings can have identiﬁable common content (because the sayings are often
interpreted against the background knowledge about doings) the tendency to say something
(and mean it) in one context does not necessarily turn into a tendency to behave accordingly
in another relevant context. Therefore, not every case of inconsistency between saying and
doing is a case of the weakness of the will. The agent may be completely unaware of this
inconsistency.
262
character also. According to Avner Baz (2016) Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations can be read as an attempt to show that with words like know,
mean, and understand, the referential image of language is inept. These words
have conditions of use but the conditions are products of our non-referential
discursive practices. While the established use of these concepts may have
some general characteristics, they are ill-deﬁned, and explicit rules do not eas-
ily capture the adept use. Moreover, proper use tends to diﬀer from context
to context. Despite being commonsensical, these concepts are theoretical in
the sense of being mostly discursive in content, and I believe that many ex-
pert conceptual domains are psychologically constituted similarly. Academic
disciplines such as philosophy and theoretical corners of social sciences and hu-
manities are largely constituted by discursive practices revolving around such
ill-deﬁned discursive concepts, and indeed much of the professional life in the-
oretical science is focused on reﬁnement and rethinking our conceptual tools.
If the concepts are ill-deﬁned, they cannot be wholly explicated by rules
to guide top-down learning. So how are they learned, then? If my account of
conceptual understanding is correct, the explanation is simply that by partic-
ipating in discursive practices and tracking the use of such concepts in actual
situations. Once students enroll in university, they start to catch new terms
and reasoning heuristics (like ”naturalistic fallacy”), which may be quite ab-
stract and semantically opaque at ﬁrst. Analogies can concretize the concepts;
however, since the analogies tend to be imperfect, the mastery of such concepts
needs eventually to be learned by acquaintance through their proper use. We
all have some ideas what things like ”society” or ”knowledge” mean before we
participate in philosophy or social science classes but the point of the curricula
is to reﬁne and transform these ideas. Textbooks have descriptions and deﬁ-
nitions of these concepts; however, they are often inadequately simplistic, and
we are in any case quite unable to use these deﬁnitions for competent reasoning
before practical understanding has suﬃciently developed.
Concerning complex theoretical ideas for which deﬁnitions and concrete
analogies are of little use, I suspect that much learning follows the pattern of
ritualistic or model learning, discussed in Section 2.2.2. Under this hypothe-
sis, students ﬁrst learn to replicate the discursive praxis that they catch from
their professors, textbooks, peers, etc. This process is aided by pedagogical
tools like analogies, instructions, and heuristics; however, these tools are not
mere learning aids but part of the model to be learned, which are then passed
to the next generation of students. Students’ use of theoretical concepts are
ﬁrst heavily dependent on the actual examples that they have encountered.
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They replicate this praxis in essays and discussions and get feedback if they
are doing it right. In time, they learn to spot where certain expressions and
discursive moves are in or oﬀ place. They track these practices as normative;
in other words, they are committed to presume that there are proper ways
to use the theoretical language, which has normative force over them if they
wish to participate in the praxis as competent members. They try to adapt
their practices to these norms, which they understand only vaguely at ﬁrst.
Gradually, their understanding gets more nuanced, and they begin to grasp
the sense of the intricate patterns of regularities and contextual factors that
govern proper use. Eventually, their discursive competence grows more ﬂex-
ible and withdraws from mere imitation. The discursive interaction becomes
more contributory and less conformist. Students learn to characterize what
they have learned more clearly, formulate arguments for novel ideas, evaluate
arguments more reliably, and enforce the norms they have discovered on their
peers.
This is the standard story of top-down skill development combined with
the hypothesis that learning theoretical discursive skills is social model learn-
ing where the constraints of success are intersubjectively determined norms.
This is due to the ecological, cognitive, and pragmatic constraints on how this
learning takes place. The implication is that certain expressions ﬁrst ﬁnd their
proper use in speciﬁc instances and when they are encountered and applied
(correctly or incorrectly) in various contexts, the accuracy and generality of
applications gradually improves, and the actual use becomes less dependent on
speciﬁc models and becomes to track more generally sanctioned, intersubjec-
tively instituted correct use. Still, the contents are products of and determined
by the learning history just like any bottom-up learning. Therefore, learners
at no point grasp the intellectual essence of these concepts (which the con-
cepts generally do not have), and unfortunately their understanding of them
can be contaminated by whatever biases, prejudices, inconsistencies, and other
idiosyncrasies present in the learning environment—just like with pathological
environments in skill learning in general.
It should be noted that students are not merely replicating the use of
speciﬁc words. Instead, they are likely imitating the whole praxis itself. This
socialization in a cultural niche also incorporates the adoption of values and
learning what is important, relevant, (in)appropriate, and so on. As with other
skill development, learning new values and ways to think should not necessarily
change the previous conceptions; instead, we may learn new attitudes and
means of using certain expressions in new contexts, and part of the ﬂexibility
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of expert reasoning is the ability to switch from one interpretation (i.e., use) to
another at will and understand which interpretation is relevant and proper on
which occasions. Hence, reﬁned conceptual competences (e.g., about societal
issues, learned in university curricula) do not necessarily replace previous lay
theories. It is up to the expert to understand this diﬀerence and learn how to
exploit and mix their conceptual competencies in diﬀerent discursive contexts.
This explanation of inferential use of language is not tied to academic and
other expert domains but applies also to commonsense discursive reasoning.
Very practical commonsense discourses referring to speciﬁc concrete matters
are one end of the continuum and explicit rule-governed formal practices per-
haps the other. I ﬁnd it diﬃcult to articulate concisely and clearly the nature
of the vague, complex, intermixed conceptual competencies in between, which
philosophers are mostly interested in and cognitive psychologists practically
less so. Avner Baz (2016) has extracted a similar notion of language from the
works of Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty and empirical psychologists such as
Tomasello. I am compelled to quote him at length (69–71):
Merleau-Ponty, who also comes to compare words to tools, speaks
in this connection of ”a new meaning of the word ’meaning’,” for
the reason that here meaning is both perceptually and theoretically
inseparable from what ”has” it (1996, pp 146, 174). Accordingly,
Merleau-Ponty proposes that we learn the meaning of a word in
much the same way that we learn the use of a tool—that is, ”by
seeing it employed in the context of a certain situation” (1996, p.
425).
An important diﬀerence between words and the sorts of work-things
one may ﬁnd in a toolbox is that what makes a work-thing—a
hammer, say—ﬁt for certain uses but not others is, for the most
part, its physical properties, whereas what makes a word suitable
for certain uses but not others—call it its ”meaning”—is, for the
most part, its history, or as Merleau-Ponty puts it, ”previous acts
of expression” (1996, p. 192). ”It is for having been employed in
diﬀerent contexts that the word gradually takes on a meaning that
is impossible to ﬁx absolutely,” he writes (1996, p. 408; see also p.
194).
Thus, the basic unit of linguistic sense or intelligibility, for Merleau-
Ponty as for Wittgenstein, is not the isolated word or the isolated
combination of words, but the speech-act as performed by an indi-
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vidual speaker in some particular context—”the total speech act in
the total speech situation,” as Austin puts it (1999, p. 148).
The open-ended plasticity of language—the fact that words may
always, and in a sense must, be used or meant in new ways—means
that understanding the speech of another is not a matter of simply
putting together the already-ﬁxed meanings of her words. Rather,
it is a matter of seeing and aptly responding to the signiﬁcance, or
point, of her utterance—of being able to follow, and follow upon,
her act of articulating and taking up a position in an inter-personal
world, orienting herself by means of words. This last idea should not
be understood psychologistically: seeing the point of an utterance
is no more a matter of attributing some inner mental state to the
utterer than seeing the point of a move in chess is a matter of such
psychologizing (see Turnbull & Carpendale, 1999, p. 343).
Tomasello (2009) pushes these ideas as far as claiming that linguistic syn-
tax is abstracted from the situated communicative patterns encountered in
daily life; and Brandom (2000, 128):
The correct use of these components is then to be understood as
determining the correct use also of further combinations of them
into novel sentences. The linguistic community determines the cor-
rect use of some sentences, and thereby of the words they involve,
and so determines the correct use of the rest of the sentences that
can be expressed by using those words.
As the reader might guess, I assume that individual reasoning abilities
come about as these practices are internalized and simulated; that is, theoret-
ical thinking is simulation of argumentative practices. Just like with formal
concepts, the simulation of discursive reasoning is discursive reasoning, and
importantly, individual reasoning inherits is the normative character from the
social practices that it is simulating.125 In general, explicit processing is ex-
125 An empirical remark: This implies that abstract thinking recruits linguistic areas of
the brain while processing concrete concepts employs sensory areas, as conﬁrmed in a meta
analysis (Wang et al., 2010). Note that mathematical reasoning activates areas independent of
natural language processing and associated with space and numerosity. There seems to be also
a speciﬁc sensory area dedicated to visual representation of numbers and equations, which
is active during mathematical reasoning but only among expert mathematicians (Amalric
& Dehaene, 2016). While mathematical ability can be independent of visual processing,
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ploitation of patterns encountered in life, and early in the learning people are
not thinking but doing; and this applies also to explicit rule use.
As Mercier and Sperber (2011) remark, to use this capacity in individual
reasoning in order to improve knowledge and make better decisions, one needs
to acknowledge their limitations and biases and to be able to distance them-
selves from their opinions to evaluate them critically. In eﬀect, a sound theoret-
ical inference should psychologically proceed like a debate: as a simulated ex-
change of arguments and counterarguments where the reasoner mentally shifts
imagined positions with respect to the argument under development.
My main point is that theoretical reasoning is not abstract formal cal-
culation but we should not be take strictly psychologizing attitude to under-
standing what people do when they are theorizing. This is because thinking is
content-based and theoretical contents are products of cultural practices not
of individual mental processes. To understand why individuals reason the way
they do, we should take an ecological perspective and look at social norms and
practices and their history. Similarly, serious (self-)critical thinking should in-
volve the examination of the cultural and personal etiology of one’s concepts,
rationales, and norms. While in practice this is often too much to ask, it is
crucial to understand that mere rigorous contemplation does not guarantee
deep understanding of complex issues if one is not prepared to track rationales
of competing viewpoints in good faith. This is because no one’s reason is pure
and free from the impact of the environment; and because the impact is largely
tacit, the more self-evident a personal standpoint feels like, the harder it is to
introspectively evaluate whether the reason for this felt givenness is the self-
evident nature of the subject matter or one’s limited and biased understanding.
When people say that they do not need to examine the sources of their
intuitions because they are already thinking logically and objectively, free from
the biasing impact of any doctrines, it is almost guaranteed that most of the
time they are doing entirely something else. The fact that one cannot ﬁnd one’s
biases and socially produced intuitions through serious reﬂection, no matter
how hard one tries, is no guarantee that they are not there. The reluctance
to accept that they might be there prevents ﬁnding them. During the social
rich visuospatial processing is implicated among visually unimpaired (Amalric et al., 2018).
Unfortunately, these latter studies do not reveal the developmental trajectory of mathematical
skills, but they do point out that the brain recruits a diverse set of resources for diﬀerent
sorts of tasks, and mathematical reasoning might be cognitively quite diﬀerent from other
forms of discursive reasoning. This is not that surprising for, after all, formal symbolic
computation is quite diﬀerent from informal discourse in natural language even while they
do share commonalities.
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exchange of ideas, biases more easily become manifest and corrected. However,
that necessitates some divergence of beliefs between participants to prompt a
critical look to spot the fault lines. Too like-minded groups may just end
up consolidating shared biases. The process also necessitates taking diﬀerent
rationales, standpoints, and people seriously.
Lastly, one might wonder why in the ﬁrst place we even have practices
of discussing things like ”knowledge,” ”meaning,” the nature of ”good” and
”bad,” ”justice,” and ”democracy” if their contents are forged in communal
discourse without obvious concrete referents outside mere conversation. This
is not a question for psychologists to answer but cultural historians. As with
our idiosyncratic implicit concepts, meanings of these shared discursive con-
cepts are also in constant ﬂux while they are transmitted, reinvented, and
reinterpreted. The idea that the discussion of these matters in theoretical or
philosophical tone is mere only and the discussion of the meanings of things
like ”justice” and ”democracy” is mere semantics is seriously misleading. These
discourses determine how we reason about such matters and hence shape the
norms that aﬀect how we think, talk, and make mutual decisions; critically,
they also produce reasons for doing things in certain ways and doing some
things at all. Fundamentally, these discourses are founded on a capacity to
track and enforce cultural praxis, and together with material conditions of our
practical reality, they shape our social order, institutions, and the whole way
of life.
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6 Conclusions and further reﬂections
In this work, I have examined a vast range of research in cognitive psychology,
including the three traditional category theories, psychological essentialism,
causal learning and inference, implicit learning and reasoning, skill learning
and procedural knowledge, mental models and simulation, expertise research,
conditional inference, analogical inference, and schema induction. I also dis-
cussed selected research in the ﬁelds of developmental and social psychology,
cognitive linguistics, and cognitive neuroscience. It might have appeared that
I attempted to forge a grand synthesis of existing research; however, that was
not my aim. Rather, as I see it, these various research programs naturally in-
tersect, and my attempt has been to survey what we ﬁnd from the intersection.
”Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution” was the name
of the famous essay by Theodosius Dobzhansky (1973). I am not a biologist
but I presume that actually a lot of things in biology make at least some sense
without evolutionary considerations. Dobzhansky’s point, of course, was that
”[w]ithout that light [biology] becomes a pile of sundry facts—some of them
interesting or curious but making no meaningful picture as a whole” (p. 129).
Similarly, I ﬁnd it diﬃcult to form a meaningful big picture of cognitive psy-
chology without taking a pragmatic and ecological perspective toward it. After
that illumination, it still takes a good deal of work to see how exactly all the
pieces ﬁt together.
Certainly I do not assume that I got the picture, or even most fragments
of it, completely right. Almost all the empirical results and their theoretical
interpretations I have been promoting can be and have been reasonably con-
tested within their respective research programs. Some ﬁelds and theories are
currently under development (e.g., Bayesian causal induction), some are contro-
versial (e.g., neoempiricist simulation theories), and some are pretty established
with their canonical presentation in standard textbooks (e.g., similarity-based
category theories). Nonetheless, even the research ﬁled under the established
theories are open to new interpretations. This can be especially fruitful when
the reinterpretations are not novel competitive theories within the same re-
search tradition but ideas informed by neighboring ﬁelds of study because that
opens the door for theoretical integration. While integration is generally con-
sidered a virtue in its own right, it may also help in explaining inconsistencies
in the data. For example, developments in the causal induction theories have
enabled the integration of prototype and knowledge theories in the way that ex-
plains why we sometimes see phenomena like causal status eﬀect and sometimes
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we don’t, and why sometimes raw similarity and sometimes category coherence
dominates classiﬁcation. Again, conceiving situation representations as causal
models helps integrating analogical and causal reasoning, and so on. What I
attempted to show is how component processes might hang together in human
cognition once seen in the pragmatist light.
As a methodological principle, I have avoided introducing any novel con-
cepts or hypotheses concerning human cognitive processes and representations.
The reader should be wary that because of the breadth of the necessary research
to compile this picture, I have not been able assess all competing standpoints
and fair criticism on the speciﬁc empirical theories addressed in this work.
While I have made attempts to avoid any cherry picking of evidence, this dis-
sertation is not recommended to be read as a fair and balanced introduction
to any of the research programs discussed. I have tried to put together fairly
standard cognitive psychology in a way that conserves the spirit of embodied,
enactive, and embedded paradigms—even if I have been largely using represen-
tationalistic and computationalistic terminology. One (admittedly fairly weak)
justiﬁcation for my speciﬁc selection of research is how they conﬂate naturally
as a coherent whole under the pragmatist look on the human mind.
As for the choice of my terminology, although I ﬁnd moderate scientiﬁc re-
alism to exhibit good philosophical taste, I am also somewhat instrumentalist in
what comes to scientiﬁc concepts. This attitude comes oﬀ quite naturally from
my conception of concepts in general as being not (intrinsically) referential.
For words to be useful, it is not necessary that they pick stable, well-deﬁned
classes but, inter alia, work as tools for public and private reasoning—and
this is especially true of theoretical notions such as ”mental representation”
and ”cognitive processing.” If my widespread use of representationalistic ter-
minology excludes me from the club of genuine enactivist, I am completely
ﬁne with that. I use that language to discuss standard cognitive psychology,
which even radical theorists need to address somehow at some point. Even if
the elimination of the remnants of representationalism is the long-term goal, it
is probably a good idea to try to bridge these research programs in the mean-
time and see how it plays out. Enactivist approaches have been criticized for
excessive radicalism and getting stuck in accounting for only lower cognition,
such as perceptually guided action. I consider my work partly as an attempt
to improve this sorry state of aﬀairs by taking an approach sympathetic to
enactivist and embodied theories, which I use to interpret the current research
on higher cognition and investigate how far you can push the notion of (sim-
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ulated) perceptually guided action to understand the higher faculties of the
mind.
The critical undertones of this work target principally the classical log-
ical computationalism and associated tenets in the analytical philosophy of
mind and language—not computational approaches to the mind as such. The
question as to whether the mind or the brain can be modeled as some sort
of information or signal processing system (and what counts as such a system
anyway) is mostly orthogonal to my argument. I have nothing against infor-
mation processing models of cognition as such but (1) how mathematical logic
was generalized as model of language, concepts, and reasoning in analytical
philosophy and in particular (2) how these ideas were smuggled into cognitive
psychology via the computer metaphor of the mind. Hopefully it is clear that
under the view of the human cognition I am been promoting, the right way to
understand cognitive processing—higher cognition included—is to look at the
pragmatically oriented concrete interactions with the environment and their
ecological constraints. Whether or not the dynamical systems approach gives
the best tools to model these interactions is a practical matter for which I
have no strong opinion. I am in league with the philosophers who maintain
that intentional agency necessitates some form of rationality; however, I stress
practical rather than formal rationality in this regard.
In practice, my standpoint has been fairly internalist. This is because
I have attempting to make a philosophical point about the nature of human
mind and intentional content, and hence I have been avoiding much of the
discussion on how the speciﬁcs of the body and environment contribute to par-
ticular factual competencies. In that attempt, however, I have found the idea
of cognitive processing as involving the interaction of the brain, body, and the
world to be profoundly important. To understand the nature of conceptual
cognition we should focus on skill learning but also culture and social interac-
tion to account for normative and discursive reason. Hence, this work does not
promote merely ecological but social ecological cognitive science.
6.1 Overview and some implications of the empirical argument
The main message of this work is that human conceptual system primarily
tracks aﬀordances and other properties that have pragmatic relevance to us
as embodied and active organisms and that cognitive processes and represen-
tations are highly contextualized, pragmatic, action oriented, and shaped by
our human practices, goals, and needs. The notions of situation and action
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rather than symbol and referent are the keys to understanding human cog-
nition. Concepts are principally devices for action, and derivatively building
blocks of thoughts. In the recapitulation of the argument, I will use square
brackets to refer to sections and subsections of this work.
In section 3.2. I began the empirical discussion with a review of the three
standard category theories in cognitive psychology. The section is inﬂuenced
by Edouard Machery’s (2009) argument that these theories are not competitive
but complementary. I showed that prototype [3.2.1] and knowledge represen-
tation [3.2.2] are not, generally speaking, independent but prototypes are actu-
ally structured by causal knowledge involving both relations between intrinsic
properties of objects [4.1.2.] and how they participate in event causation [3.2.3;
4.1.1 4.2.3; 4.3.1]. At the limit, when no causal information is available, cate-
gorization presumably relies on linear combination of features (or on exemplars
if the category has no coherent structure); in general, however, it is based on
inference based on the causal model of the category [4.1.2]. In Section 4.1.1, I
explained how aﬀordances are important to categorization, and category con-
tent can even consist of speciﬁc movements. ”Aﬀordance” is the key notion
here because aﬀordances are object properties but they also determined by
the situation and the agent and its goals. Hence, in a way, aﬀordances bridge
objects with internal and external factors of situations.
In Section 4.1.1, I also explained how category systems and category con-
tents are dependent on the idiosyncratic experiences of the subjects. Category
cuts are made on the basis of the property correlations and the causal structure
of the environment. However, nothing in the environment as such forces us to
carve its joints in any particular way. This is especially true of ﬁneness of the
grain of one’s basic level categories in a given domain. Experts tend to parti-
tion things in their area of expertise in more detail that the rest of us. While
ultimately any conceptual system is subjective and a product of idiosyncratic
experience, concepts tend to be determined intersubjectively; they also depend
on the culture in which one is immersed, be it an expert subculture such as
bird watchers, aircraft engineers, or scientists or culture in the broader social
and historical sense. This is because culture determines many of our practices
and therefore (shared) experiences. For the same reason, people in diﬀerent
cultures and areas of expertise tend to settle to diﬀerent category systems and
with diﬀerent kinds of information associated with speciﬁc categories. Pre-
sumably, experts associate more speciﬁc aﬀordances and causal information
with things that serve as superﬁcial subordinate categories for non-experts.
For example, while a regular urban resident sees a bunch of diﬀerent looking
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trees, landscapers and forest industry engineers see elms, oaks, pines, etc. with
diﬀerent practical purposes. For experts, goal-derived ideals may override the
similarity or typicality-based categorization of novices (Lynch et al., 2000).
What even counts as a feature is something that needs to be learned, and
hence there is no strict separation of perceptual and conceptual [3.2.3; 4.3;
4.1.2]. Here, I wish to highlight that category representations are not products
of ﬁxed perceptual modules but in category learning there is also concurrent
learning in perceptual level, and features also need to be constructed often in
parallel to category construction (see Murphy, 2002, 479).
Two points are worth remembering. First, many people reside in changing
intersections of many diﬀerent cultures and social groups, and hence ”culture”
is only a heuristic notion here, characterized by a relatively stable set of norms
and practices. Moreover, ”subculture” does not relate hierarchically to ”cul-
ture.” For example, one can be a Western European and member of a subcul-
ture of professional social scientists; however, not being a Western European
obviously does not exclude anyone from the latter social group. Second, our
conceptual system is aﬀected by the community in which we are embedded,
and we tend to absorb the category system of peers with which we interact.
Even if we personally ﬁnd no use for discerning, say, diﬀerent genera of trees
for our personal goal attainment, we still probably would learn to do that if
the people around us ﬁnd that taxonomy important. We tend to adapt to the
basic level category system of our peers, if not for any other reason than to
understand what the others around us are talking about and socialize with
people we are aﬃliated with.
Sections 4.1 and 4.3 discussed event representations and how they re-
late to goals and objects and other speciﬁc variables. The latter section ex-
plained event comprehension as exploiting quasi-perceptual (causal) models
either to execute or to simulate situated reasoning and action [4.3.1]. In be-
tween, Section 4.2 reviewed recent advances in Bayesian modeling of human
causal knowledge and inference. Some important observations emerged from
this discussion. First, causal induction is domain-general but not associative
(in the traditional sense). It is guided by generic assumptions about causal-
ity (or by implicit learning dispositions that eﬀectively work like assumption).
The most important of these is that, in the ﬁrst place, the world has relatively
stable, albeit non-deterministic, causal structure which is responsible for most
observed events, even when not all causes are directly observable. Moreover,
by default, we seem to extract only coarse causal maps of our environment.
Initial learning, in particular, is focused on strong causes that are relatively
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sparse. For example, if an eﬀect E results from strong and weak generative
causes C1 and C2, we may disregard C2 as one of the unspeciﬁed background
causes that are responsible for the base rate of E. This obviously leads to less
accurate causal maps; however, it may actually improve our ability to predict
important events by constraining the complexity of world knowledge search
and processing. Optimal accuracy/complexity trade-oﬀ is an interactive mat-
ter determined by the environment and the capabilities and needs of the agent.
Minute outcome optimization by managing weakly causative variables is often
irrelevant—unless gains accumulate through frequent repetition, for example;
and therefore individual diﬀerences are likely. Domain experts presumably
extract more detailed causal maps and feature sets to guide their judgment.
We also learned that active production and control over the data are highly
useful and sometimes necessary for causal induction. After some knowledge is
attained, it comes to guide how causal learning subsequently proceeds, allow-
ing for rapid learning and narrowing down hypothesis spaces. In all, these
observations show that humans are both behaviorally and cognitively active
producers of causal knowledge and the nature of causal induction cannot be
understood strictly by a priori analysis but pragmatic and ecological factors
need to be accounted for. These sections make the case for the following item
of the hypothesis about intuitive conceptual competencies:
a) Inductive (Bayesian) search for causally predictive and pragmatically rel-
evant regularities in concrete situations:
- Category representations are (prototype) feature clusters structures by
causal relations between constituent features.
- Basic ontology is formed around aﬀordances and features relevant to
event–event causation.
- Basic situation representations are quasi-perceptual model type struc-
tures.
Section 3.2.2 discussed also a rather diﬀerent view on human category
representation. We saw that in certain studies categorization previously en-
countered exemplars instead of causal or summary information about cate-
gories. Caution was advised against interpreting these results as telling much
about category structure. These exemplar eﬀects are pronounced mostly in
ill-structured categories, which are very hard to learn in comparison to most
natural categories. They are incoherent and lack any natural sense. They have
no point or use outside the very categorization tasks manufactured in the lab-
oratory, and they do not connect to existing knowledge structures. All of these
properties are antithetical to human categories in general.
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Artiﬁcial stimuli are deliberately used to insulate categorization from ex-
isting background knowledge. The idea is that the possible distorting or con-
founding eﬀects of knowledge can be ﬁltered out this way, and therefore in
experimental settings, we see pure categorization phenomena instead of ef-
fects of content-based inference, for example. However, since categorization
actually utilizes category-knowledge and category-based inference, this exper-
imental paradigm mostly dismisses the nature of conceptual representation,
which it is set to investigate. Note that comparable issue arises in the abstract
Wason selection task. The original abstract task was designed to reveal pure
inference without confounding eﬀects of category knowledge; however, because
ecologically valid reasoning is content based, the experiment mostly misses the
psychology of human deductive inference [5.1].
Nonetheless, there are ecologically valid studies that indicate the exis-
tence of compulsory and lasting exemplar processing in categorization. Visu-
ally guided dermatological diagnostics was discussed as an example. Without
a doubt, medical diagnostics is a challenging skill. After Murphy (2002), Smith
& Minda (2000), and Johansen & Palmeri (2002), I suggested that exemplar ef-
fects do not reﬂect to category structure but skill learning. The correct way to
interpret exemplar categorization research is to think categorization responses
in these studies as procedural knowledge and in terms of situated, perceptu-
ally guided action. The theme was further elaborated in Section 4.3.2. Indeed,
much of the task set selection and switch research are virtually identical to
exemplar categorization studies: Generally, in both research paradigms the
task of the participants is to make a simple, speciﬁc response (e.g., pushing
a correct button) to speciﬁc stimulus items in which the identifying features
correlate arbitrarily. Allen and Brooks (1991) found that exemplar eﬀects were
clear with pictorial, easily integrated stimuli but tend to disappear when verbal
feature lists are used. This further indicates that exemplar eﬀects may results
from perceptually cued access to implicit memory about instances—generally
associated to skill learning, as discussed by Murphy (2002, 85–88).
This theme was further elaborated in Section 4.3.2. where the main mes-
sage was that cognitive skill learning is mostly a memory phenomena with
much of the processing happening in perception. In eﬀect, intuitive decision-
making and action selection are basically recognition. When a person engages
in goal-directed action, the action leaves a memory trace associated with the
outcome and the stimulus—or more precisely with the variables of the total
stimulus that are perceived to constitute the situation. When the stimulus
is reencountered, these SAO exemplars are automatically retrieved, and they
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immediately produce subjective expectations of how things in that situation
work.
In exemplar categorization research, it has been suggested that every en-
counter with a stimulus leaves a trace (Murphy, 2002, 58–60). In procedural
knowledge research, ”encounter” is interpreted in terms of actions taken (with
restraining from action as perhaps a special case), so every time a stimulus
is enacted, an SAO-exemplar gets recoded. These exemplars cluster into ac-
tion sets that encode non-parametric statistical distributions of action-outcome
probabilities. Action sets cluster to task sets that serve as units of procedural
knowledge attached to speciﬁc tasks. In any given situation, the stimulus envi-
ronment is ﬁrst contextualized by selecting an appropriate task set that serves
as a pragmatic interpretation of present variables in terms of goals, and then
appropriate procedural knowledge (i.e., action set) is triggered by the contex-
tualized stimuli. It is essential to understand how all the components of this
process are situation dependent and not only stimulus dependent. This makes
the contextualized task sets essential representational tools. The same speciﬁc
outcome can be a failure in one situation and success in another. The same
action can mean diﬀerent things in diﬀerent situations, and the same stimulus
environment can mean diﬀerent things and provide diﬀerent aﬀordances under
diﬀerent goals.
These task sets can initiate action directly and in highly learned tasks
they often do. Hence, we can operate most of the time nearly on autopilot,
although fundamentally task sets work as inputs to cognitive control. If they
lead to unexpected outcomes or are deemed unreliable before action, control
shifts to searching and constructing novel task sets from long-term memory.
This is often associated with explicit reasoning, and if that fails, behavior lapses
to inductive exploration. This dynamics was discussed further in Chapter 5
and particularly in Section 4.3.2, completing the next item of the working
hypothesis:
b) Instance-speciﬁc encoding of event/action/outcome exemplars:
- Context- and goal-dependent causal expectations are generated by as-
sociative (pattern matching) memory retrieval or analogical mapping
from exemplar-based situation representations.
- Without valid expectations, control shifts to exploration or explicit rea-
soning.
Now, let us pause for a moment here. It looks like we have found two
kinds of fundamental knowledge structures; one seems to be quickly, established
object-oriented knowledge with prototype and causal model structure and the
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other appears action-oriented knowledge that exploits exemplars associated
with actions and outcomes. Their properties are tabulated below:
Type A Type B
Object oriented Action oriented
Category prototypes Event exemplars
Causal models Procedural knowledge
(Causal structure?) (Causal strength?)
Sparse structural detail Rich surface detail
Quickly established Slowly extracted
Predictive model Task sets
This looks like a distinction between declarative and procedural knowl-
edge, although that interpretation might be slightly misleading. At least Type
A knowledge is not necessarily linguistic nor explicit (because neither proto-
type nor causal knowledge is), even though this type of knowledge might be,
at least partly, more easily communicable than Type B knowledge. This is be-
cause compared to procedural knowledge causal structural knowledge is easier
to transmit by declarative sentences. (Note that at least this tentative distinc-
tion does not seem to reﬂect the common characterizations of Systems 1 and
2, either.) It is uncertain to me whether causal structure and strength can be
dissociated and, in turn, associated according to this sketchy sorting of Type A
and B knowledge. But the reason to think so is that while categorization and
category-based inference supported by structural causal knowledge is sensitive
to qualitative causal strength [4.1.2], we are unable to use frequency informa-
tion eﬀectively and accurately without extracting it by actual acquaintance.
People also form causal models from instructions and then try to map learn-
ing data onto this structure (Lagnado et al., 2007, 165). As stated on page
197, subjects often do not feel that the frequency information is meaningful
and useful until they experimentally extract it and get a natural sense of the
phenomena they are dealing with. Now, although I brought up the distinction,
I am more interested in how these two purported knowledge structures are
integrated rather than separated.
Active intervention is the most eﬀective way to extract causal knowledge
from the source, surpassing the eﬀects of sheer observation or instructions. In
fact, intervention may be the only way to ﬁnd hidden variables and structures
[4.2]. So even if A and B knowledge are separate, they are often learned
concurrently in the same interactive settings. Since structural information is
often not very easy to use without practice (i.e., Type A knowledge tends to be
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useless without Type B knowledge), and because initial learning of even very
simple general principles or event types (like how gravity and occlusion events
work) are learned in a piecemeal fashion during speciﬁc concrete events [5.2.2],
it seems a reasonable bet that experience-dependent and event exemplar-based
Type B knowledge is more fundamental.
As a technical point, not all (or necessarily any) of the causal relations
need to be represented in the long term-memory. They can be computed from
contingency data when needed. Recall the end of Section 4.2.2 where I brought
up the problem of learning weak causes in the long run without tracking all
the possible relations between variables and at the same time keeping track of
the order of encountered causal events. Here is an idea how this might happen:
Assume that events leave memory traces that contain relatively rich but shal-
low information about events—basically a record of present entities or other
variables, their properties or values, actions taken, and associated outcomes.
These traces could be indexed and ﬁltered by these properties. Such ﬁltering
would be similar to conditioning the data on the values of selected variables. If
you have enough of this data, weak signals (i.e., value correlations) should even-
tually stand out from the noise, and causal networks then can be inferred from
masses of such data. Some authors (e.g., Gopnik et al., 2004) concede that
these kinds of algorithms may explain human causal induction; however, as
Lu et al. (2008b) observe, such data-intensive computations are hardly called
for to explain causal learning, which tends to be rapid. Nevertheless, data
rich methods appear to be necessary to explain skill learning, which involves
statistical clustering of action→outcome pairs, conditioned on stimulus or sit-
uations [4.3.2]. Now, the technical point I am after is that posterior density
distributions of the possible causal relations between any given variables can
be approximated from such data by using non-parametric methods—namely
computing the density at each point by using nearest neighbor or kernel meth-
ods. Both are used in exemplar theories to compute the degree (or probability)
of set inclusion of stimuli (Russell & Norvig, 2010, Sections 18.8 & 20.2).
The upside of non-parametric methods is that the learner does not need
to pre-specify what input dimensions it is tracking, and weak cues can be
extracted from the data at any point of learning. Something like this seems
to happen spontaneously in skill learning because learners tend to become
incrementally sensitive to subtle cues and conﬁgurations without awareness of
this happening. However, because of a lack of space and my competence, I
dwell no further on computational modeling details. Moreover, I have little
knowledge about whether similar formal methods that Collins & Frank (2013),
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for example, have used to model procedural knowledge can be used to explain
causal learning data. But from the point of view of the process and knowledge
integration in elementary learning, it is a suggesting point that similar methods
that have been used to model procedural and exemplar (Type B) knowledge
can be used to extract—or even directly implement—Type A causal knowledge.
This is worthwhile to note especially because much of Type A causal learning
depends on interactive settings where Type B knowledge is extracted.
Nonetheless, the above speculation hardly explains how we can readily
grasp causal structures from instructions. Moreover, procedural knowledge
is supposed to be very situation-speciﬁc, and sometimes we need to exploit
causal knowledge in novel situations where Type B knowledge is not available.
Hence, Type A and B knowledge may be separate. Then again, I have claimed
that schematic knowledge and analogical transfer can do the trick here by
exploiting existing Type B knowledge in these events. Nonetheless, my claim
is not that all the core processes of conceptual cognition turn out to be actually
identical, and therefore I am not compelled to show that A can be reduced to
B knowledge. Quite the contrary: I aim to show that conceptual cognition
is a set of functionally integrated capacities. To ”have” a concept is not to
have information ingrained in one’s brain but to understand that information,
or more appropriately to understand the environment one is inhabiting, which
is fundamentally to act in relevant ways in one’s practical reality and this
capacity is supported by information we tend to associate with concepts.126
Type A knowledge supports procedural knowledge precisely in this way.
Recall that procedural knowledge is constituted by situation→action→outcome
exemplars. If an agent enters an unfamiliar situation for which it has no pro-
cedural scheme available, it needs to build and test a novel tasks set from the
long-term memory. Type A knowledge supports task set construction by pro-
126 Having a linguistic concept is slightly more complicated, as discussed in Section 5.3.
Understanding linguistic expression is an ability to use it and interpret its use in linguistic
practices (to convey information, signal values, opinion or status, device arguments, persuade
others etc.). This includes understanding how words are used to refer to certain things, and
generally, this necessitates previous non-linguistic understanding of the world and human
practices. Concerning mastery of a foreign language, it is perhaps easier to grasp that all
this requires practice and skill to learn proper word–world knowledge mappings, which can
be aided by learning foreign word—native word knowledge mappings. The knowledge about
(native) language and the world presumably develop concurrently. So sometimes we possess
knowledge of a symbolic entity, which involves understanding how to translate the expression
into world knowledge as well as to know how use it in communication. However, this is a
limiting case, and understanding natural language necessitates a (non-linguistic) conceptual
system that enables us to understand the world around us.
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viding aﬀordances and qualitative expectations of how things in a given novel
situation interact. This species of knowledge enables us to grasp how things
unfold in the absence of our interventions. Hence, one way to conceive object-
oriented event–event causal knowledge is to take it as a limiting case of SAO
knowledge when actions are not taken (hence, properly SO knowledge) and
then procedural knowledge adds a layer of information about action outcomes.
However, this is misleading. In Section 4.1, we saw that object identity is partly
dependent on aﬀordances as well as associated movements or motor programs.
This means that Type A knowledge involves action information and shows
again how Type B knowledge may directly contribute to category knowledge
and category identity. This tight coupling of action and object knowledge is
evident if the basic ontology and category cuts are incrementally produced by
the agent in interaction with the environment as proposed in section 4.1.1.
Corollary 1: Considering the above discussion, it is safe to assert that
prototype, exemplar, and (causal) knowledge representation are
tightly integrated in conceptual processing. Although this contrasts
with Edouard Machery’s (2009) well-known claim that these three phenom-
ena form distinct concept representation formats, we both agree that the
notion of ”concept” cannot be identiﬁed with any of these three information
structures. Actually, in my account ”concept” cannot be strictly identiﬁed
with any purported representation in the brain for I take that the notion
of having a concept should be understood as having a set of functional ca-
pacities that support intentional action, including derivately thinking. In
any case causal knowledge and prototypes are not separate. Machery (2009,
71–74) and Machery and Seppälä (2009/2010) refer to linguistic evidence
to show that similarity and knowledge representations are separate, but I
think what they have (correctly) found is that theoretical linguistic knowl-
edge may be separable from other kinds of category knowledge. I shall
return to this later.
Note that since event identiﬁcation and the resultant action selection are
supported only by a restricted set of variables, events may be novel in many
ways but still remain subjectively familiar if familiar goal-relevant variables are
present. More importantly, similarity-based categorization allows category-
based inferences with novel entities that share features with familiar things.
An essential part of the task set selection process is ﬁrst to classify an event
with regard to a functional context and then focus on action relevant variables,
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such as objects or object features [4.3.2]. An agent with suﬃciently extensive
pragmatic knowledge base should be able to construct causal models of novel
situations quite ﬂexibly to support task set construction—even though the
automatized access to relevant knowledge is heavily constrained by surface
similarity and the ability to spot relevant analogies [5.1,5.2]. Minor variations
in routine events should not be even noticed.
If category representations are constituents of situation representations,
and contextualized causal information is constitutive of category representa-
tions, the distinction becomes somewhat moot. An example of this is our
ability to form reasonable goal-dependent and ad hoc categories on the ﬂy
[3.2.3]. Also, goal-neutral categories often have a graded structure, which is
not always stable but varies from occasion to occasion (Barsalou, 1987), mean-
ing that contexts modulate category representation. Even a casual observation
veriﬁes that aﬀordances are represented diﬀerently in diﬀerent situations. For
example, chairs might appear as something to stand on to change a light bulb
in one context and something to hold a door open in another. A hammer
may appear as a tool or a weapon depending on a situation or even a handy
bottle opener—if you know how to do it without breaking the bottle. Now,
if aﬀordances and other functional information are not encoded separately of
categories but as constitutive of conceptual content, this cast serious doubts
on whether there are invariant category representations in human cognitive
system at all, even if chairs, for example, will be chairs in every occasion and
retain their deﬁnite character of something to sit on in every context.
Recall that event types are generally conceived by a general gist in mind
that delineates what is happening and why. The entities that are listed in tak-
ing part of events are often superordinate types, and superordinate categories
are mainly characterized by generic functional features [4.1.1]. Every event to-
ken necessarily has some speciﬁc things ﬁlling these functional roles. How the
object tokens are conceived depends on the speciﬁc situations because aﬀor-
dances, context selection, and object identity go hand in hand. Although this
point is hypothetical, it makes sense that the event–event causal knowledge
that is activated to support task set construction is similarly ﬁltered according
to functional context.
Corollary 2: Object knowledge is (partly) dependent on event
knowledge, and object representations are active situated con-
structs. The point does in no way mean that there is no stable knowledge
encoded in the long-term memory. Quite the contrary: The problem with
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ﬂuent on-line reasoning is that there is too much knowledge in long-term
memory. The point instead is that the same exact content does not repre-
sent a category in every situation, and the question is then how these ad hoc
structures are constructed and category information selected on the spot.
Rosch (1999) and especially Barsalou (1987; 2003) share the same convic-
tion with me that, psychologically speaking, categories are active constructs
rather than static information structures. We have several ways to represent
each category, and this ﬂexibility results from selective information retrieval
from long-term memory. I maintain that this mechanism is relevant to both
abstraction and relevance assessment.
Also, especially Rosch (1999, 72) emphasizes that contexts or situations
are the unit that categorization research needs to concentrate. Indeed, as
mentioned above, category contents are intertwined with event knowledge,
and in my mind, this connection is what actually makes category repre-
sentations conceptual: Understanding how things interact and participate
in diﬀerent events is what conceptual content is about. Isolated category-
speciﬁc knowledge does not convey natural intentional content. This is, of
course, pretty much what knowledge account of concepts is about [3.2.3].
According to this view, prototypes and other summary category representa-
tions are simply clusters of statistical, causal, and other information. When
put to use in an actual situation, that information serves functions such as
categorization, induction, inference, and word meanings through selective
activation of information contained in the cluster. That contextual activa-
tion turns the information into actual intentional content via its pragmatic
relevance in that speciﬁc situation, and gives it meaning.
In section 4.3.1, I suggested that situations are represented as causal mod-
els and that thinking is simulation of internalized situated reasoning that draws
on tacit conceptual processes to produce situation-relevant and action-related
causal expectations [4.3.1]. This is supposed to be precisely the same mecha-
nism that is responsible for cognitive skills as per the recognition-primed theory
of decision-making and expertise [4.3.2]. Note that while these theories gen-
erally do not make much of an issue about the selection of functional context
prior to action selection, it is a vital part of procedural knowledge, render-
ing it ﬂexible even if it is anchored to speciﬁc concrete situations and stimuli.
Context and action selection are guided by internal goals and external cues in
encountered stimuli; however, this surface content dependency is relaxed when
the agent learns higher-order regularities that allow situation and causal under-
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standing to be based on event types and superordinate categories. Note that
the corollary above pertains especially to superordinate classiﬁcation, that is
selecting the functionally determined category identity based on how the role
ﬁllers factor in the external situations and present goals. This ability makes
behavior more ﬂexible because it allows situated understanding to be based on
schematic knowledge instead of strictly speciﬁc variables, and it allows seem-
ingly diﬀerent things to be incorporated into a shared pragmatic schemata.
As discussed in Section 4.3, situations are represented and simulated in vari-
able degrees of surface detail, and schematic abstraction enables hierarchical
planning, understanding, and execution of tasks where subgoals are multiply
realizable in lower, more detailed levels and therefore need not and cannot be
always speciﬁcally addressed.
The close connection betwee abstraction and analogical reasoning is dis-
cussed in Section 5.2.2. Given the pragmatic view on human cognition, the
proposed intimate relation of analogical reasoning and abstraction should not
be surprising at all. If one wonders what the functions of schematic abstrac-
tion and analogical inference are, the answer is the same for both. Similar
to schemata, analogical reasoning makes it possible to use existing functional
knowledge to interpret novel problems and incorporate new entities into ex-
isting knowledge structures. Both work on a contextual basis. Superordinate
classiﬁcation of entities means treating them as alike in some sense, speciﬁed
by their functional role in the current situation (as per Corollary 2), and some
problems are similarly analogical in some sense, as determined by their func-
tional structure under current goals [5.2.1]. Whether or not there is even a
diﬀerence may be somewhat a matter of perspective. Think, for example, that
you know substances x and y promote tumor growth, and both are antioxi-
dants. You also know that z is an antioxidant and therefore hypothesize that
it may also trigger tumor growth. Is this a superordinate category-based in-
ference or an analogical inference? The diﬀerence presumably is whether you
use superordinate category antioxidant to make this deduction or directly the
causal knowledge associated with x or y. However, as the discussion in Sections
5.2.2 and 4.1.1 show, there is no fundamental diﬀerence because the contents of
superordinate categories and schemata are extracted from and mostly reduce
to the constitutive exemplars.
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This example also shows how causal hypotheses can be generated by ana-
logical reasoning.127 In any case, discussion of these matters in Section 5.2
completes the following part of the empirical hypothesis:
c) Basic reasoning mechanisms are forward causal inference, simulation of
situated action, and abstraction by exemplar-based analogical transfer:
- Surface features are the primary retrieval cues.
- Valid analogies bind diﬀerent tasks under shared pragmatic schemata.
Corollary 3: Regarding information encoding and selection mechanisms, it
should be emphasized that category structure and use in addition to
memory search and relevance assessment cannot be understood
without a pragmatic and ecological perspective. The constructive,
pragmatic, and idiosyncratic nature of even concrete object concepts was
discussed in Chapters 3 through 5, and just above, we saw how the same
principles determine superordinate and schematic concepts. In Section 5.1
the same theme was discussed in connection with conditional inference. It is
worth recalling that prototype theory presumes that useful feature correla-
tions are found in the environment, which is manifest in how the mechanism
breaks down with ill-structured artiﬁcial stimuli [3.2.2]. Similarly, surface
feature-based exemplar search is presumably useful because surface content
reliably guides toward familiar causal structures and aﬀordances [4.3, 5.1,
5.2]. The ecological and cognitive rationale of sparse structural causal in-
duction was discussed above and in Section [4.2.3]. None of the key features
of these processes can be understood by contemplating their function in
strictly formal register; however, they all make sense, given the cognitive
limits of the human mind and the fact that these processes are evolved to
make human goal attainment possible in a complex but relatively stable
and structured environment where cues for relevant intentional action can
be extracted from ambient information. These mechanisms exploit shallow,
knowledge-intensive memory search that is poorly suited for formal inference
127 Penn & Povinelli (2007, 111) brieﬂy mention a similar hypothesis concerning the relations
of abstraction and analogical and causal reasoning. They also make an interesting remark
that there is no evidence of analogical reasoning in non-human animals apart from one famous
unreplicated study with a trained chimpanzee (Gillan et al., 1981). Often the human ability
to abstract thinking is attributed to language and controlled explicit reasoning. I agree
with this in the case of theoretical concepts [5.3]; however, it is an intriguing observation
that presumably uniquely human ability to schematic abstraction may actually stem from a
largely unrelated, non-linguistic cognitive capacity to analogical transfer.
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and requires considerable experience to be very eﬀective in the wild. Its lim-
itations can be somewhat mitigated by analogical inference and controlled
top-down learning [5.3.1], as feeble as these capacities may be. Nonethe-
less, the real compensation for this trade-oﬀ comes from the very eﬃcient
real-time guidance of behavior in open environments and abruptly changing
contexts after learning.
6.2 The epistemological import of pragmatist cognitive science
Now let us turn to the more philosophically loaded working hypothesis:
A.1. Expert and commonsense reasoning are both grounded in the same cognitive
processes.
A.2. Conceptual understanding builds up as an adaptive cognitive skill. Its cognitive
basis is in the intuitive system that gradually learns to exploit context- and
goal-relevant regularities in the environment, especially the eﬀects of our own
actions in speciﬁc situations.
A.3. Often relevant environments are, at least partly, socially constructed.
In the case of theoretical concepts, in particular, the relevant regular-
ities are in large part inferential and other discursive commitments.
Hence, abstract concept learning is a special case of functional/causal
learning in (broadly) social or cultural contexts.
A.4. Initial competencies depend on concrete examples and their surface features or
speciﬁc content. Extensive learning of procedural knowledge results in a gradual
shift of focus from surface cues to structural features of the conceptual domain.
A.5. Through experience, the abstract/practical distinction dissipates both psycho-
logically and phenomenologically.
A.6. Still, even later competence is aﬀected by the speciﬁc learning history and con-
tent. Hence, the result is not an acquisition of general formal reasoning capacity
but a gradual transformation in domain understanding.
A.7. Therefore, the process produces domain-speciﬁc conceptual competencies by a
general adaptive and praxis-oriented learning mechanism. The resultant do-
mains are products of our needs, goals, capabilities, learning environments, cul-
ture(s), etc.
At this point, we have covered everything except for A.3. As discussed
above, A.1. follows basically from A.2. Cognitively, expertise is mainly an
intuitive memory phenomenon supporting procedural know-how but socially,
the notion of ”expert” refers to members of exclusive social groups acquainted
with certain practices that are uncommon within the larger population. Note
that then ”expert” and ”expert skills” are culturally determined social notions.
Expertise is something that not everyone has. Some competencies may be
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common in rural communities but strike as special skills among the modern
urban folk, and vice versa. Often expertise is associated with higher education
in specialized ﬁelds but, as I explained in the introduction (see footnote on
page 22), being an expert does not even necessitate that one has a practically
usable skill; only that other people think so and grant that status. Items A.4,
A.6, and A.7. were discussed particularly in section 5.2.
Plank A.5. above is a somewhat hypothetical point; however, it is sup-
ported by the considerations about superordinate and schematic abstractions
and their relation to concrete exemplars and procedural knowledge as well as
how people acquire the intuitive sense of instructions, descriptions, and ab-
stract notions through concretization and tacit practical learning [4.1.1, 4.3.2,
5.1, 5.2.2]. The plausibility of Items A.5. and A.1. is perhaps less evident
in connection with theoretical concepts and scientiﬁc and related expertise.
I think this partly stems from our cultural stories that depict deep scientiﬁc
understanding as requiring extraordinary minds and mental feats. Partly the
intuitions that resist Items A.5. and A.1. may come from dual-process and
related scientiﬁc theories of reasoning, which place linguistic theoretical think-
ing in its own cognitive realm. I think both of these planks are, by and large,
false but it hinges on the plausibility of Item A.3. whereby theoretical concept
learning is a special case of functional learning in social or cultural contexts.
I began to unravel this claim in Section 5.1. where I argued that the
ability to cope with logical reasoning is a function of expertise with formal
logic. While that by itself is banal and obvious, it is important that it also
applies to very elementary reasoning tasks. When confronted with a formal
problem, we do not necessarily switch to a formal mode of thinking but recruit
whatever knowledge we have to contextualize and interpret the task. If this
fails, we may resort to exploration rather than simplifying heuristics. People
do think in the selection task; however, thinking is mostly associated with
rationalizing their decisions rather than engaging in logical inference.128 The
problem the subjects have is not with the ability to understand and reason with
logical conditionals (therefore the idea that people use simplifying heuristics in
this task is likely wrong) but exploiting that knowledge.
These observations suggest that explicit reasoning is not inherently formal
or logical. Although controlled explicit thought makes ﬂexible rule-following
128 Remember that this sort of rationalization is an integral part of discursive reasoning
because rationalization fulﬁlls the social coordinative function of argumentation [5.3.2]. Un-
fortunately, it does not help much when the participants are reasoning alone and have no
idea what they should be doing.
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possible [5.3.1], I doubt that the notion of ”rule” characterizes explicit thought
meaningfully. Not all explicit reasoning is rule-following, and we can learn to
follow rules implicitly. Rather, rule following characterizes some tasks and be-
havior that can be supported by both implicit and explicit thinking. Generally,
tasks are executed by context- and content-sensitive search for implicit proce-
dural knowledge, and already in the introduction, I pointed out that at least
novices do not switch to formal or mathematical mode of reasoning when they
encounter mathematical problems nor do they extract the formal structure of
the tasks but haphazardly resort to whatever procedural knowledge that they
have previously learned with related problem contents. This reﬂects normal
skill learning [4.3.2], and it is also consistent with linguistic pragmatism in
that linguistically mediated concepts are interpreted by resorting to knowledge
associated with actual practices [2.2.2].
I do not rehearse the argument here, but Section 5.3.1 contains the sugges-
tion of how theoretical and particularly formal reasoning is learned as manipu-
lation of external symbols. This manipulation is guided by explicit instructions
and learned in a top-down manner. Concurrently, there is bottom-up schema
learning going on whereby the agents internalizes the explicit instructions that
they follows in speciﬁc situations. Through this process, agents also extract
more abstract procedural knowledge that gradually tracks the intended mean-
ing of the abstract principles involved (such as proof procedures), and gradu-
ally they also learn to make strategic decisions and select relevant tokens and
methods for the task at hand, reﬂecting general implicit skill learning. The
constraints of success and correctness of procedures are culturally determined;
however, the cultural determination may be further constrained by human
independent facts. This hypothesis is a mixture of ideas drawn from the top-
down theory of skill learning, dual-process theories, extended cognition, and
linguistic pragmatism fused with the theory of schematic abstraction proposed
in Section 5.2.
The main diﬀerence between common sense and specialized expertise basi-
cally reduces to a psychologically irrelevant fact that the former is shared with
every member of society while concepts that comprise the latter are mostly
shared among a minority who have gone through similar specialized training;
although formal training often results in more explicit and regimented concep-
tual knowledge than with more casual commonsense notions. Throughout, I
have been stressing the importance of actual practice and hands-on experience
in the development of expertise and understanding. One central point has
been that we are quite unable to use domain-general abstract principles spon-
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taneously in intuitive processing and that we mostly understand the things
with which we interact through intuition. When we grasp new conceptual do-
mains that are remote from our everyday practice, the concepts lack intuitive
content and may appear initially as arbitrary, abstract, and formal. This is,
I guess, why many scientiﬁc concepts are often thought to be abstract; they
rarely inhabit a place in the nexus of common everyday activities. However,
when thinking, writing, discussing, and otherwise using abstract concepts be-
come a routine activity, we slowly internalize their meaning, which is their
appropriate use in public reasoning and communication. During that process,
the concepts gradually cease to be alien and abstract in the psychological and
phenomenological sense. To put it bluntly, for the practicing scientist, monads
and transﬁnite inductions are embedded in their daily practices essentially in
the same way as any routine aﬀairs at large within the common folk.
The proposal is, of course, hypothetical, and my argument mostly aims to
show how formal or theoretical concept learning is possible at all in the prag-
matic situated reasoning framework. It also demonstrates suggestive parallels
between formal concept, schematic concept, and skill learning, which justiﬁes
the claim A.5. that the contrived feel of abstract theoretical concepts comes
from the lack of intuitive procedural interpretation of the concepts. However,
once the competence is achieved, the subjects get the intuitive sense of the
associated concepts like in implicit learning tasks where the subjects report
to gain the intuitive feel of artiﬁcial sequence stimuli after exposure to task
structure through interaction.
Relations to dual-process theories: Recall from the introduction the B.1.
list of attributes that I was ready to accept as the characteristics of intuitive
and reﬂective cognition.
Intuitive system Reﬂective system
independent of working memory dependent on executive function
high capacity/low eﬀort, fast low capacity/high eﬀort, slow
associative systematic
rigid ﬂexible
parallel serial
implicit explicit
automatic controlled
situated detached
default process inhibitory
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At no point have I really justiﬁed the demarcation of implicit and explicit
systems or that they can be characterized precisely in this way. I will not
do that here, either. In some sections (e.g., 4.3.2), I expressed my support
for the default-interventionist dual-process theory of reasoning (see Evans &
Stanovich, 2013). The only place I deﬁnitely needed the distinction of explicit
and implicit processing is with the discussion of controlled top-down learning.
What is important is what is missing from the list above, which is any refer-
ences to the idea that the intuitive cognition is an engine of quick and dirty
pragmatic heuristics while the explicit system is a cultured, normative, and
linguistic symbolic processor. In fact, it is the explicit system that often ex-
ploits simplifying heuristics, for example, when we are learning complex new
traits by following instructions and rules of thumb.
The italicized entries above are what Evans and Stanovich (2013) take
to be the deﬁning features of Systems 1 and 2, and the rest are merely cor-
related properties. I concur with their analysis that basically explicit system
reduces to the executive function consisting of voluntary control and working
memory, which enable cognitive decoupling from the current stimulus environ-
ment, mental simulation, and hypothetical and counterfactual thinking. I take
these three items to be essentially the same thing. In contrast to the tradi-
tional formulations of the dual-process theories, I believe that the contents and
competencies of explicit thought are mostly intuitive capacities. However, as
feeble as the explicit system is, it allows us to learn arbitrary situation-action
mappings, which can be internalized as implicit skills, and the resultant capac-
ities can be clustered to support complex, hierarchically organized behavior,
planning, and decision-making. Hence, the variability of behavioral and cog-
nitive capacities that the explicit system enables is hugely signiﬁcant even if it
takes time to learn to utilize those feats eﬀectively through automatization. I
will leave it to the reader to decide whether I am advocating a version or an
antithesis of dual-process theories.
The ﬁnal section (5.3.2) is perhaps the most chaotically organized part
of the text. It is an attempt to discuss commonsense and scientiﬁc concepts
that are schematic and partly theoretical but defy clear deﬁnitions. They are
often constituted both taxonomically and theoretically and operate approxi-
mately on the level of superordinate categories. Why this sort of concepts defy
clear presentation is because many overlapping kinds of knowledge constituting
them can be learned by many routes (i.e., by cultural learning, observation,
or manual experience), and the relative proportion and the relevance of these
factors depend on idiosyncratic and cultural matters. Direct interaction with
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category instances provide diﬀerent, often at least more accurate and rich, con-
ceptual representation in contrast to learning declarative facts. Obviously, this
also pertains to event knowledge. For example, you can hear from a friend
that pouring water into an oil ﬁre is a bad idea. Once you see that happen,
you probably get a better idea of the expected results, and unwisely trying
this yourself will most likely provide even more profound knowledge of what
happens and how to handle that sort of situations. Generally, the more our
interactive pragmatic knowledge of concrete things and events, the deeper our
insight of them. Something of this sort is also familiar with formal and the-
oretical concepts. If you read through a calculus text-book, you either need
a spectacular talent or good mathematical background to immediately apply
the declarative knowledge contained in the book without gaining procedural
knowledge by doing the exercises.
This does not concern only the quantity of information that diﬀerent
sources provide but also a qualitative diﬀerence. Many of the concepts that we
possess have both discursive content and content derived directly with inter-
acting with category instances. I know that water is H2O, and this is strictly
due to cultural learning. However, almost all I know about the macroscopic
properties of water is derived from manual experience. I have direct acquain-
tance with mammals; however, my notion of ”mammal” is, I think, constituted
by discursive knowledge, and so on. I have relied on the following tentative
typology of concepts and conceptual knowledge: 1◦ Object and other concrete
concept representations that allow taxonomic abstractions; 2◦ schematic
abstractions that are based on concrete situation representations and allow
pragmatic knowledge to generalize over speciﬁc events; and 3◦ theoretical
concepts that are produced by learning discursive practices in public and pri-
vate reasoning. This above list is not meant to represent a fundamental or
exhaustive typology of concepts nor a complete list of what all things ”ab-
stract” might mean but merely as a heuristic description of key components in
human conceptual learning and how they relate to diﬀerent kinds of intentional
content.
Corollary 2 states that 1◦ and 2◦ are not strictly separated. Clearly, Types
2◦ and 3◦ are also mixed since the crux of Type 3◦ learning is to learn discursive
skills, and the theory proposed here claims that all skill learning is based on
pragmatic knowledge which, in turn, is engendered by accumulating experience
of concrete situations where the concepts are applied. Type 3◦ concept learn-
ing is basically supposed to add a layer of social and linguistic learning, and
sometimes it requires controlled and explicit top-down processes such as rule
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following. Generally, utterances are acts that we use to make things happen in
social settings. This requires considerable knowledge about inferential struc-
ture of the context, (shared) word use, what is permissible and relevant both
in a social and logical sense, host of epistemological, psychological and per-
haps sociological assumptions, and so on. Most of this knowledge is tacit, and
these complex discursive interactions are paradigm cases of Type 2◦ pragmatic
knowledge deployment. This was the main subject matter of Section 5.3.2,
which consists of a hypothetical application of linguistic pragmatism [2.2.2] on
top of the pragmatic reasoning framework articulated earlier. Note that the
discussion was not intended as a detailed model of the psychology of linguistic
cognition but rather as an empirically informed hypothesis about how human
discursive reasoning could be understood in the pragmatic situated reason-
ing framework as a product of tracking social praxis and in the way that is
also consistent with a credible philosophical analysis of human reasoning and
intentional content [2.2, 2.3].
In Corollary 1, I mentioned that Machery and Seppälä (2009/2010) have
argued that the human conceptual system harbors diﬀerent category repre-
sentations for similarity-based an theoretical knowledge. They insist that the
necessary condition for these knowledge structures to be aspects of the same
concept (and not diﬀerent concepts), is not only that they are linked but they
should also be coordinated in the sense that they do not produce conﬂict-
ing category judgments. In their experiments the participants agreed, for ex-
ample, that ”in a sense, tomatoes are vegetables” but also that ”in a sense,
tomatoes are not vegetables.” As one might suspect, their subjects explained
that botanically tomatoes are fruits (knowledge based classiﬁcation), but in
culinary contexts they are considered as vegetables (similarity based classiﬁca-
tion). However, I have claimed that conceptual representations, and especially
superordinate classes such as ”vegetable,” are not static information structures
but constructed from memory on a contextual basis. Hence, I am inclined to
interpret the above result as showing that under diﬀerent interpretations of
the claims about tomatoes, people exploit diﬀerent information that they have
associated with tomatoes in diﬀerent learning context. ”Interpretation” means
selecting a pragmatic context that, in turn, activates relevant information to
support decision-making concerning speciﬁc things in that context.129
129 Note that the subjects initially change the interpretation of vegetable and not that of
tomato on the contextual basis; however, this leads them to conceive tomatoes diﬀerently in
each contexts; that is, either by activating theoretical botanical or practical culinary infor-
mation.
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As Machery and Seppälä acknowledge, the diﬀerence between their het-
erogeneity hypothesis and integrative accounts like mine, may eventually be
terminological. I agree, and we all agree on the empirical fact that they have
demonstrated the existence of conceptually relevant and dissociable informa-
tion structures associated with lexicalized items. However, I think we have a
relevant disagreement on what having a concept means, which is not merely a
trivial matter of words. For them, having a concept is having an information
structure; for me, it principally means having a capacity for intentional action.
These two ways of conceiving concepts are surely compatible, and having
a capacity to intentional action presumably often implies having an informa-
tion structure (at least in some sense). Still, I stress my position because the
notion of ”concept” plays various epistemic roles in science and philosophy. It
is an indispensable explanans in social theory and subﬁelds of psychology other
than cognitive as well as an important framework concept to coordinate diﬀer-
ent research programs (see Pöyhönen, 2013). Because ”concept” does not refer
to a univocal cognitive kind, it may be helpful to identify it with something
else to serve these other epistemic purposes; and I think it is both possible
and productive to identify it with a complex interlocking set of capacities that
support intentional action. The characterization is suﬃciently informative and
conservative to serve both as a explanans in various research ﬁelds and as an
explanandum in cognitive psychology. For many of these epistemic roles I ﬁnd
it important to understand how concepts in psychological sense are unstable
active constructs, and how and why they are modulated by contexts. Con-
ceiving diﬀerent information structures as separate concept representations,
instead of component parts of concepts, may lead one to think that we always
activate one of these alternative representations on the contextual basis. This
may mask the intricate dynamics of situated content construction and in par-
ticular the fact that in many contexts the active construction process draws
simultaneously and selectively on several of these information pools.
In any case, now that we hopefully agree on A.3., the epistemological
version of the working hypothesis below needs no further speciﬁcation:
C.1. The human conceptual system tracks aﬀordances and other causal properties
that have pragmatic relevance to us as embodied and active organisms.
C.2. Intentional content is fundamentally procedural competence to exploit the re-
sulting know-how of what things do and what can be done with them.
C.3. Expertise in abstract expert domains (e.g. science) can be thought of as ex-
tended common sense, and common sense can be thought of as a specialized
learned skill.
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C.4. Cognitive contents of theoretical and formal concepts are constructed by the
agent through social interaction. While grounded in the same capacities, dis-
cursive and concrete concept learning often diﬀer qualitatively: Discursive con-
ceptual domains track explicit and implicit communal conventions; this makes
content intersubjective and normative.
C.5. Two people share the same intuitive understanding as far as they share the
same practices, goals, needs, capacities, discursive commitments, environmental
demands, aﬀordances, and culture, or, in brief, the same practical reality.
Conceptual understanding as a skill: I presume that the notion of conceptual
understanding as a skill is not very controversial in the case of mathematics
and related complex domains, which are constituted by well deﬁned inference
rules. How we subjectively understand these domains is determined by our
ability to exploit their conceptual apparatus and inference methods in goal
attainment. Our understanding may be wrong or partial, depending on how
accurately our competence tracks the intended use of these concepts. The
normative standards are social products, while they may be constrained by
non-social factors. Nevertheless, our subjective understanding goes as far as
our skills to cope with such conceptual systems. The same story applies to
ill-deﬁned and ambiguous discursive notions such as ”society” and ”belief.” A
crucial part of ﬂuent know-how is the ability to interpret the context to guide
the interpretation of situational factors—be they verbal expressions, reason-
ing heuristics, or concrete things such as tools—and assess the relevance of
aﬀordances they provide for the task at hand. So like with actual tools, in
discursive contexts we need to be able to evaluate what conceptual tools are
relevant and how they are used in that context to reach a meaningful outcome,
such as expressing a contextually reasonable point.
What comes to schematic and superordinate concepts, they are similarly
incremental products of our knowledge about how concrete situations and
things embedded in them work. As Barsalou (2003, 1177) notes, ”abstraction is
the skill to construct temporary online interpretations of a category’s members.
Although an inﬁnite number of abstractions are possible, attractors develop for
habitual approaches to interpretation.” Again, this is a key part of procedu-
ral knowledge associated with context interpretation as explained in Section
4.3.2. It is also closely related to analogical reasoning, which consist largely of
skill transfer to novel situations. Indeed, the critical cognitive components in
analogical transfer are the same as in recognition-primed decision-making.
I suppose that intuitions may resist the notion of understanding as a skill
when it comes to concrete basic level objects, like cats and hammers. Now,
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inferences concerning concrete things is an exercise of a skill (and constitutive
of category content), medical diagnostics of speciﬁc diseases is a skill, chicken
sexing is a skill, recognizing tree genera and edible mushrooms are skills (even
expert skills among moder urban folk), superordinate classiﬁcation (such as
selecting on a contextual basis whether a tomato is or is not a vegetable) is
a skill; so it would perhaps be an odd discontinuity if classifying things like
cats or hammers and understanding what kind of things they are would be
something entirely diﬀerent. The fact that such feats are automatic and easy
and virtually everyone can do them does not mean that they are not skills.
Common sense is certainly a skill as well as expert reasoning. Note that mere
categorization rarely equates understanding. Phenomenologically speaking,
we understand what an object is by being able to take diﬀerent perspectives
and stances towards it; and cognitively this is supported by the automatic
activation of situated knowledge concerning what the thing does, how it is
used and examined, what it aﬀords, and how it factors in human practices.
This capacity to intuitive perspective taking constitutes something simi-
lar to the horizon of the noematic Sinn in Husserl’s theory of meaning, and
deﬁnitely, it is the key to practical reasoning and know-how. Getting an in-
tuitive sense of inference supporting knowledge of factors like base rates and
rules requires practical acquaintance and the same holds for the construction
of the subjective ontology of the world. Grasping the structure of a dynamic
phenomena requires implicit procedural know-how and not only declarative
knowledge, and so does the grasping of reality in general. In a sense, one can
think of categories as variables and the world as a very complex and open dy-
namical system. Similar to discursive skills, understanding our environment is
not a binary matter but determined by our ability to grasp what is happening
and how the present variables interact with each other and with ourself.
What I speciﬁcally want from the notion of understanding as a skill is to
explain what understanding is, how it relates to language and non-linguistic
cognition, where meaning, sense, or intentional content comes from and high-
light that in order to understand cognitive psychology of concepts, we should
conceptualize the notion as both a constitutive part of and something consti-
tuted by the core cognitive processes responsible for expertise, cognitive skills,
and procedural knowledge. Workings of higher cognition are still somewhat a
mystery, and here I try to formulate conceptual tools to reconsider what sort
of a thing the mind fundamentally is to guide the framing of hypotheses and
questions about the constitution of the higher cognition in a productive way.
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If it is still unclear what this could mean in explaining the constitution
of complex concepts consider ”climate change.” Its analytical deﬁnition is pre-
sumably ”a global long-term change in average weather and weather patterns.”
If one needs to further unpack this, we all know what weather is based on our
casual experience. Through our lived experience we also know that sometimes
seasons are untypical and the implication is that the untypical ones will become
the norm. In practice this may mean quite diﬀerent things to city dwellers and
farmers and it may carry diﬀerent connotations to diﬀerent individual in dif-
ferent places of the world. The context where we need to unpack the meanings
of ”weather” and ”average patterns” may also dictate how they are construed
in that situation. If the context (or our personal understanding of the climate
change) is foremost academic, we may think of weather not as through our
personal embodied experience but as a set of quantiﬁed parameters, such as
temperature, humidity, etc., and construe ”average” in terms of how we have
learned to calculate averages in elementary school math class. Some of us with
more mathematical tutoring may further notice that it is not just the averages
but variances that will be aﬀected.
My point here is not to explain how ”climate change” parses analytically
but to describe the process when we actually unpack the notion and this un-
packing is a situated process where we use its conceptual components to attain
a discursive goal in a (imagined) situation. When we do that, we switch our
focus not only from the higher level concepts to more detailed ones but psycho-
logically we also switch contexts. First we may exploit our discursive analytical
knowledge on how ”climate change” is generally deﬁned and then switch to con-
sider weather. This contextual control shift may activate detailed knowledge,
which may not be hierarchically related to the top-level notion, for example
how pleasant or unpleasant exceptional heat waves may be. Moreover, the dis-
cussions about climate change carry a subtext that it is an ongoing process of
global warming, which is (depending on who you ask) caused by greenhouse gas
emissions. We may have theoretical knowledge about the mechanism, which
can be concretized by an analogy how actual greenhouses work or what hap-
pens in cars that are parked in direct sunlight. If the top-level context (i.e., the
task of discussing what ”climate change” means) is primarily politically laden,
we may not unravel the notion in terms of the physical process and weather
patterns but our discursive knowledge on how the problem is going to change
societies and how it connects to our means of production, global economic in-
equality, etc. Then the knowledge we draw on comes from our acquaintance
with public political debates, our personal moral conversations, social science
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classes, and so on. Our intuitive situated interpretation how to engage in the
task depend on how we and our reference groups thing and talk about the
matter and what opinions we have and feel that we should have. Therefore,
the question how complex notions like ”climate change” are psychologically
constituted should be answered by focusing on intricate interactive processes,
which contain multiple context, control, and task switches that lead to dy-
namically drawing on diﬀerent kinds of knowledge pools in diﬀerent level of
detail to attain speciﬁc subgoals under the top-level pragmatic context. This
process cannot be understood without accounting for what we are actually
doing and why and how the speciﬁc contextual factors dictate how the discur-
sive situation unfolds. This process is psychologically not determined only by
our explicit know-that but critically by procedural know-how guiding how all
that knowledge gets used, which is, again, dependent on active construction of
situationally relevant ad hoc goals and knowledge structures.
Relations to embodied and enactive theories: Here is a rerun of some
of the key quotations characterizing embodied and enactive paradigms from
Section 2.3.1: ”Cognition is the exercise of skillful know-how in situated and
embodied action,” (Thompson, 2007, 11), and therefore ”cognition is not the
representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enact-
ment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions
that a being in the world performs” (Varela et al., 1991, 9). Because of the
nature of cognitive skills and their relation to conceptually structured thought
and action, ”’higher’ cognitive structures also emerge from recurrent patterns of
perceptually guided action” (Varela, 1999, 17). Moreover, as Varela continues,
I have also maintained that ”the world we know is not pregiven; it is, rather,
enacted through our history of structural coupling, and the temporal hinges
that articulate enaction are rooted in the number of alternative microworlds
that are activated in every situation. These alternatives are the source of both
common sense and creativity in cognition.” These ”microworlds” basically are
recurring situations, or interpretations of situations, for which we have relevant
readiness for action. In philosophical terms, one key observation here is that
human cognition does not track the universal conceptual realm but cognition is
an interactive constitutive process with the body and the environment involved
in creating one.
I could go on with these quotes, but perhaps it would not be very con-
structive. Although the content of embodied and enactive theories cannot be
captured with such catch lines, I take that these programmatic points are what
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I just discussed above and have been underlining throughout this dissertation.
I have not much discussed the speciﬁc embodied nature of cognition nor the
details of the structural coupling of the body, brain, and the environment.
Mostly, I have focused on the impact of situated action for higher cognition.
However, I have all the time worked under the assumption that some account
of embodiment is necessarily entailed by my constant talk about the needs and
capacities of the agent, even though my research plan was not to articulate
the speciﬁc import of embodiment to concept constitution. At least, to what
speciﬁc features in the environment we are sensitive and how they interact in
the active construction of situated representations are things that need to be
further speciﬁed; but I believe that the researchers who are investigating the
lower-level processes and detailed coupling with the environment are doing just
that. Therefore, I consider my work as a complementary eﬀort to that line of
research. What I have provided is an account of cognitive psychology for the
more orthodox embodied/enactive researchers with which they can interface
their theories, if they choose to interface their research with standard cognitive
psychology at all.
Moreover, radical enactivist seem sometimes to get caught surprised how
to deal with questions considering how to conceptualize, for example, cogni-
tive competencies of severely paralyzed people who can not feel and move their
bodies or how to understand the situated and embodied nature of thought pro-
cesses in solitary and overtly inactive contemplation. The answers I have heard
a few times are that, paralyzed or not, human bodies are still active; our bodies
digesting food, pumping blood, there are hormones doing their work, and so
on. Further, we are always situated in a physical environment and at least
the gravity has a hold on us, so we are never free from the eﬀect of physical
forces, and so on. Every plank entirely true, but I still fail to understand how
these factors might be constitutive of explanations of our thought processes.
In the passages where I have been discussing thinking as internalized situated
reasoning, my general point has been that not every mental episode need to
be explained in this way. The impact of situated, embodied, and enactive the-
ories needs only be to emphasize how mental contents and processes cannot
be understood without taking into account the individual stock of experiences
engendered in the (bodily) interaction with the environment. It should also
stress the general ecological, practical, social, biological, and other material
constraints for which the individual mental faculties are adapted in both evo-
lutionary and individual developmental sense. So situated (bodily) interaction
is the key to understanding the general characteristics of human cognition (as
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per Corollary 3 above) but the body and environment do not need to be fac-
tored as a necessary constitutive part into every possible description of mental
episodes.
6.3 Closing remarks concerning the nature of human reason
In closing, I want to bring forward some possible implications of the social
pragmatic nature of discursive reasoning. Section 5.3.2 combined the argumen-
tative theory of Mercier and Sperber (2011; 2017) with linguistic pragmatism
and ritualistic model learning discussed in Section 2.2.2. This amalgamation
has some interesting consequences to how to understand the dynamics of public
reasoning and decision-making, the social construction of discursive contents,
and how these factors shape individual thinking.
Recall the basic idea of Mercier and Sperber that cognitive faculties for
argumentative reasoning have not evolved for improving knowledge but for
producing reasons for the claims we make in order to persuade others that our
input is reasonable and reliable. The capacity to evaluate arguments serves
the function to spot faults in the reasons given by others in order to evaluate
the credibility of the information they provide. This may look like a very pes-
simistic image that portray human rationality and reasoning as a competitive
undertaking of attacks and defenses and holding your ground as tightly as you
can. However, as the authors note, this is not the correct interpretation if one
looks at the social dynamics of what is going on in such interactions. Such a
competitive setting can still be a cooperative venture to seek the truth sincerely,
and if all goes well, it may actually converge to the truth or at least to the ac-
ceptance of the best argument. Indeed, as Mercier and Sperber (2011) remark,
from the division of epistemic labor perspective, it may be optimal that not
all the participants engaged in a complex epistemic project—be it a research
program or a formulation of a political program, for example–invest that much
in examining the subject matter critically from all the possible angles. Instead,
they should perhaps spend their time on devising the best possible justiﬁcation
for their own standpoint and then bring it under public review, which tends
to correct individual biases. Thus, especially with complex issues, the best
possible outcome may be reached by a congregation of disagreeing people who
have a shared interest in the truth.
An important consequence of how I conceive this process is how social and
social psychological factors aﬀect the dynamics of public reasoning. I recall
some philosopher has proclaimed that a good argument has a nonviolent but
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imperative force; that is, when confronted with a persuasive argument, we are
compelled to to accept it and to act according to the truth of the conclusion.
Something like this is in the heart of the classical rationalist idea of the human.
Reason dictates what is rational to accept, and rational, morally competent
and utility maximizing subject does what is the best thing to do according to
the current beliefs. Of course, weakness of the will and the passions of the soul
complicate things but, roughly, this is the classical image of the dynamics of
reasoning, decision-making, and action. I think the cited wisdom has truth in
it; however, it has less to do with individual rationality or utility maximization
than social conformism, which is not a strict constraint of human-decision
making but still a compelling force driving social coordination of collective
and individual behavior.
Recall that norm enforcement and compliance is modulated by several
factors, such as perceived authority and in- or outgroup membership, the need
to identify with the model, and peer pressure. Competence to understand and
engage in argumentation necessitates a practical understanding of the topic.
In practical reasoning, this often means understanding the practices and their
material and social constraints; however, in more theoretical settings, this of-
ten means understanding how the local language game plays out; that is, what
the acceptable and relevant discursive moves are, and how the topic and con-
ceptual domain under discussion is inferentially constituted. Two participants’
disagreement may lead to diﬀerent outcomes in multiple arational ways which
are not necessarily dysfunctional (given the social coordinative function of ar-
gumentation) but independent of the quality of the arguments.
If mutual understanding is suﬃcient, and participants have a reasonable
trust in each other, and also in the possibility of reaching at least a tentative
consensus, things may develop smoothly as dictated by the shared norms of
discursive rationality. However, if the participants come from social diﬀerent
groups with diﬀerent discursive backgrounds, they may have genuine problems
in understanding each other because the meaning engendering inferential norms
on which the participants tacitly rely may be too divergent. Because the norms
are tacit and often complex, the other side may seem inconsistent, incompetent,
and incoherent for reasons that may be nearly impossible to discern, making
little or no sense at all. Depending on the social factors, failing to make
sense may appear as a norm violation leading to penalizing, which may mean
hostility, simple indiﬀerence, or an attempt to exclude the other from the
shared decision-making process and one’s own social group. Hence, trust is
an issue and so is commitment to the mutual enterprise in good faith. Of
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course, trust may break and commitments may be subjected to review, but
presumably respect and close social aﬃliation help in seeking common grounds
for understanding each other and accommodate others’ values and ways of
reasoning to shared discursive protocols. In antagonistic, settings participants
may be reluctant to accept even good arguments if the other is perceived merely
as an adversary to be refuted.
In in-group settings, the dynamics may be somewhat diﬀerent. In case
the recipient does not understand the reasoning of the other, arguments and
conclusions may still be accepted and perceived as rational and authoritative.
This is presumably the case if the other is perceived as an (epistemic) authority
(e.g., a teacher or an expert) or a model with whom the recipient wishes to
identify. Then disagreement may be taken as a learning opportunity that pro-
vides a model for one’s own reasoning protocols. If two participants disagree,
any third person may be similarly compelled to evaluate the quality of the ar-
guments based on perceived authority. This is, by and large, rational but only
if the authority is merited. Several reasons (again, related to social aﬃliation,
status, etc.) may modulate the argument acceptance in these events.
In general, social factors may contaminate our judgment to a larger ex-
tent than we acknowledge, rendering our internalized reasoning protocols (i.e.,
ways of thinking) as rational or biased as the social norms and protocols that
support our reasoning are, as well as the whole settings where learn to rea-
son. In certain environments we may develop non-conscious biases to evaluate
arguments selectively solely based on what reference group we identify with
and what reference group the dissenting arguments come from. The best ar-
gument is by no means guaranteed to win if the partisans do not trust, and
do not want to trust, each other and are not committed to coordinate their
behavior together. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that people may even
be susceptible to a reasoning bias which is in a way converse to the belief bias:
seeking disconﬁrmation to arguments whose conclusion they already believe,
if it comes from an adversary social group. The implications for political and
moral discourse should be obvious. In these contexts, the arational impact
may be particularly pronounced for several reasons.
The ﬁrst and the most obvious reasons is the sociological and social psy-
chological factors that shape political identities of individuals and groups so
that the default attitude between groups may become antagonistic. This is es-
pecially problematic if it reaches the point where the discursive practices that
shape and reproduce the in-group norms are isolated between groups, breaking
the critical feedback between dissenting participants. When political discourse
300
goes theoretical and value based, there may be little external constraints to
check the adequacy of the ideas, save the social feedback. This is diﬀerent
from technical and practical problems that are generally constrained by hard
external facts. In Section 5.3.2, I proposed that abstract theoretical discourses
resemble ritualistic settings which tends to promote the ways of doing things
together (which is the ways of reasoning things together) tacitly as a normative
end in itself, hence suppressing any need and motivation for a critical inter-
group feedback. Under extreme political polarization, argumentative practices
simply lose their meaning when the social coordinative function breaks down.
Second, it is important to remember that public reasoning shapes con-
ceptual contents, and after internalization they come to predelineate how we
conceive the subject matter. Groups with homogeneous values and discur-
sive practices may end up producing highly biased judgments if there is no
social pressure to question their rationales and background commitments and
make them explicit. This may result in a production of radical and borderline
nonsensical ideas within groups where certain initially innocent inclinations are
ampliﬁed and gradually transformed into locally shared common sense. This is
perhaps a problem mostly associated with think tanks and similar institutions;
however, the problem may aﬀect any relatively insulated knowledge-producing
community.130 As we have seen, ﬂuent expertise takes years to develop, and
during this process, intellectual intuitions may become too deeply entrenched.
One of the key features of the intuitive faculty is that when we have developed
an appropriate level of understanding of a domain, we cease to think about its
fundamental constituents spontaneously. This is why commonsense concep-
tions are often seen as self-evident truths. Indeed, there is rarely a practical
reason to examine them since intuition automatically directs our attention
to what is relevant and provides appropriate interpretations for our practi-
cal needs. Thus, our intuitions determine our default stance on the matters
what our reasoning episodes are about. If research communities that study
related problems become insulated from one another, they may develop a fun-
damentally diﬀerent and deeply internalized understandings of their research
subject and there is the risk that they may cease to understand what others
are doing and end up regarding the related research as not complementary
but, at worst, incoherent and nonsensical. This would clearly be detrimental
to interdisciplinary collaboration. In the worst case, a tradition may dissociate
from other research and degenerate into an irrelevant self-contained discourse
130 This is obviously a problem also for solitary theorizing because the public checks of
individual biases are missing, see (Mercier & Sperber, 2017).
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where initially arbitrary but compelling ideas end up as axiomatic facts, or at
least appear to participants as highly relevant just because they are frequently
referenced for the sake of the idiosyncrasies of the tradition.131
While the point is more general, the implications to the methodology of
philosophy should be, again, quite evident. This theme was discussed already
in Section 3.1; however, now we are in a better position to appreciate its impli-
cations. Note how the abstraction process proposed in Section 5.2.2 resembles
conceptual analysis. Take the concept of ”concept,” for example. Early ana-
lytical philosophers found that mathematical concepts could be broken down
into well-deﬁned logical constructs that reduce to self-evident primitives. Some
took this as a model of a general analysis of concepts presumably because it
was essentially a regimented version of the classical analysis. Later, Wittgen-
stein remarked that, actually, concepts like ”game” are better characterized by
a family resemblance structure instead of a set of necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions that try to capture essential meanings. Then Kripke and Putnam used
natural kind concepts such as ”water” to make a case for concept essentialism
of sorts. Despite diﬀerent analyses, all the time most philosophers agreed to
a suﬃcient degree on what they were talking about. Now, my point is that
this case-based methodology resembles my claim that we have some shared un-
derstanding of the superordinate schematic concepts like ”concept,” but that
understanding is tacit and to explicate it, we need to concretize the schematic
concept with speciﬁc examples that prompt our intuitions about its applica-
tion. After that, we generalize what we have learned based on those examples
as an explication of the meaning of the superordinate/schematic concept.
In this way, the conceptual analysis does not necessarily add much to our
conceptual knowledge but makes aspects of it explicit. This resembles sim-
ulation where through self-stimulation ”the brain discovers what it already
knows” (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007, 1354). I believe the similarity is due to the
fact that the thought experiments that the case-based methodology employs
are mental simulations of imagined and real concept use situations. Neverthe-
less, the resulting explication may change how the superordinate concepts are
subsequently understood by aﬀecting how they are discussed in the following
debates, text-books, and so on. (Recall our discussion on how explicating the
131 See also MacLeod (2016) on how entrenched discipline-speciﬁc practices and epistemic
values may hinder interdisciplinary collaboration because scientists do not always understand
the methods and requirements of their collaborators. This can lead them to consider the
input of their associates as arbitrary and incompetent, eroding the necessary trust between
the participants.
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concept of fairness may change how it is subsequently applied, see page 262.)
If a one-sided analysis attains an intellectual hegemony, this may be prob-
lematic. However, the practice itself is completely innocent and potentially
useful. In fact, it is presumably the only available method for investigating
our analytic intuitions. The important point is that these intuitions are often
simultaneously produced in the process of investigating them.132
One should also exercise caution with thought experiments. The under-
lying message that runs through the literature on human reasoning is that
our intuitions are not trustworthy in situations in which we do not have any
practical experience. Therefore, discourses based on intuitions about Chinese
rooms, zombie worlds, and perhaps political utopias, should be of suspect. This
does not mean that these debates are entirely pointless but that care must be
taken that the methodology that aims to free our thinking from the conﬁnes
of common sense does not end up producing common nonsense. The same
goes for several maxims entrenched in philosophical training and academic
discourse, in general. However, not all thought experiments are problematic.
Many arguments in analytical philosophy probe our intuitions about the use of
commonsense concepts such as knowledge and deploy thought experiments with
realistic and well-understood contexts. We should expect to have reliable intu-
itions in these instances. The famous Gettier problems (Gettier, 1963) may be
a an example.133 However, highly counterfactual thought experiments invent
extremely low-validity environments for our intuition to work with, and the
resultant judgments may be close to arbitrary. The speciﬁc problem with this
is that we may initially accept certain intuitions for the sake of argument, but
when the discussion proceeds, we may overlearn the logic of the discourse and
eventually end up accepting the resulting semantic intuitions as facts of reason
like any common truism. This would resemble the impact of so-called ”wicked”
environments where our intuitive faculties proﬁciently follow misleading cues
(Kahneman & Klein, 2009, 523).
These issues are not limited to groupthink but aﬀect the thought of in-
dividuals, as far as individual reason remains a social product. If we are to
form a rational analysis of individual reasoning with domains that are even
partially socially constructed—which is almost any domain—we have to take
132 See Baz (2016) for more in-depth discussion about similar points and a more forceful
argument aiming to show that the case-based methodology of philosophy seems to stand
(and therefore actually fall) with the representational view of language.
133 Which does not mean that everyone shares the same intuitions about the Gettier cases
but that we have a good reason to presume that the intuitions are inherently questionable.
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into account the functioning of the complex social networks: how they pro-
duce and maintain knowledge and constrain the judgment of their members.
Individuals may operate entirely rationally in their respective intellectual en-
vironments but still against epistemological norms accepted elsewhere. So it is
not just that good discursive and epistemic practices make better knowledge
production communities but they help us make better intuitive judgments at
the individual level. Recall the words of Alfred North Whitehead (1911, 61):
It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books
and by eminent people when they are making speeches, that we
should cultivate the habit of thinking of what we are doing. The
precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by extending
the number of important operations which we can perform without
thinking about them.
While I just provided grounds for being skeptical whether the automatization
of thought is always a sign of progress, these lines capture well the insight that
the cognitive power of language does not fundamentally originate from its role
in individual psychology but from its coordinative function to shape communal
practices that can be partly internalized; and these internalized routines sup-
port cultural scaﬀolding of increasingly complex practices and traits. In this
section, I have been mapping the possible fault lines of this cultural scaﬀolding
which, when all goes well, extends our capacity for important operations with
less need for time-consuming critical thought. I focus on the problems be-
cause they may reveal something important about the constitution of cultured
thought and not because we should necessarily emphasize the problems over
the possibilities of the cultural evolution that it makes possible.
As far as I can tell, not much of what I have said in this section is really
news to anyone familiar with the sociology of knowledge. However, I aimed not
to deliver novel insights to the reader interested sociology but rather show how
common (albeit not universally held) ideas in that ﬁeld of study conﬂate rather
naturally with the social ecological account of cognitive psychology and how
these research programs could, therefore, be mutually informative. I hasted to
add that the problems pertaining to group dynamics and social aspects of indi-
vidual reasoning are not merely due to social incentives. It is well known from
the classics of cognitive anthropology that our culture makes us reluctant to
publicly reason in speciﬁc ways (e.g. Luria, 1976). It is also common wisdom,
that we endorse arguments, conclusions, values, and language games based on
social aﬃliation. However, my point is that when we engage in these language
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games, they change how we think and understand the world around us, and
this impact is mostly tacit. Although social incentives and values often are in
play, the point is eventually not about incentives to think or talk in particular
ways but about tendencies to intuitively understand the world in particular
ways, which are deeply entrenched, automatic, hard to notice, and which un-
fortunately often suppress understanding of another kinds of perspectives.
I’m afraid that in this concluding chapter I ﬁnally sound like a full-blown
post-modernist. And yes, I think many of the post-modernists got some aspects
of human condition in many ways more right that their adversaries in the
universalist enlightenment camp. As for my defense, all I can say is that
I think it would still be a sort of naturalistic fallacy to make prescriptive
conclusions based on this. I do not know if there are objective values or truth.
Note that this is not to suspect the existence of objective reality in which I
ﬁrmly believe. Without presuming metaphysical material realism, no ecological
framework makes any sense. ”Truth,” remember, is not a property of reality
but a property of representational vehicles we use to describe reality. What I
have tried to argue is not that facts do not exist or matter but that at least
theoretical facts matter only through cultural process. Regardless whether
or not there are objective truths, I think it is often a very good idea to at
least pretend that there are, because such an idea keeps us committed to joint
projects and standards even if we can not ﬁnd reasonable grounds to commit
us to each other. Moreover, compared to some radical relativist thinkers, I may
be more optimistic about the prospects of ﬁnding common grounds between
subjects with a divergent stock of experiences—even if all the tacit knowledge
we acquire throughout our life cannot be communicated entirely. Much of
what uniﬁes us remains invisible, being too commonplace and obvious to take
notice. Diﬀerences are easier to spot when our tacit expectations about mutual
understanding fails, the fault lines break and conﬂicts become visible. It is
just often not a very good idea to enforce the truths and values we ﬁnd upon
others because we can never be really sure if our unshakable deep convictions
reﬂect the objective truths of reason and general human condition or only a
conﬁned corner of the complex manifold of potential human experience and
understanding.
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